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Memorandum

2007

THE
HISTORY OF ROME

BY
THEODOR MOMMSEN.



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
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
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BOOK THIRD.

FROM THE UNION OF ITALY
TO THE
SUBJUGATION OF CARTHAGE AND THE GREEK
STATES.

· *Arduum res gestas scribere.*—SALUST.

CHAPTER I.

CARTHAGE. .

THE Semitic stock occupied a place amidst, and yet aloof from, the nations of the ancient classical world. The true centre of the former lay in the East, that of the latter in the region of the Mediterranean ; and, however wars and migrations may have altered the line of demarcation and thrown the races across each other's path, a deep sense of diversity has always severed, and still severs, the Indo-Germanic peoples from the Syrian, Israelite, and Arabic nations. This diversity was no less marked in the case of that Semitic people, which spread more than any other in the direction of the west—the Phœnicians or Punians. Their native seat was the narrow border of coast bounded by Asia Minor, the highlands of Syria, and Egypt, and was called Canaan, that is, the “plain.” This was the only name which the nation itself made use of ; even in Christian times the African farmer called himself a Canaanite. But Canaan received from the Hellenes the name of Phœnike, the “land of purple,” or “land of the red men,” and the Italians also were accustomed, as we are accustomed still, to call the Canaanites Phœnicians. The Phœnicians.

The land was well adapted for agriculture ; but its excellent harbours and the abundant supply of timber and of metals eminently favoured the growth of commerce, and it was there perhaps, where the opulent eastern continent abuts on the wide-spreading Mediterranean so rich in harbours and islands, that commerce first dawned in all its greatness upon man. The Phœnicians directed all the resources of courage, acuteness, and enthusiasm to the full development of commerce and its attendant arts of navigation, manufacturing, and colonization, and thus connected Their commerce.

the East and the West. At an incredibly early period we find them in Cyprus and Egypt, in Greece and Sicily, in Africa and Spain, and even on the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea. The field of their commerce reached from Sierra Leone and Cornwall in the west, eastward to the coast of Malabar. Through their hands passed the gold and pearls of the East, the purple of Tyre, slaves, ivory, lions' and panthers' skins from the interior of Africa, frankincense from Arabia, the linen of Egypt, the pottery and fine wines of Greece, the copper of Cyprus, the silver of Spain, tin from England, and iron from Elba. The Phœnician mariners supplied every nation with whatever it needed or was likely to purchase, and they roamed everywhere, but always cherished the hope of returning to the narrow home to which their affections clung.

Their intellectual endowments.

The Phœnicians are entitled to be commemorated in history by the side of the Hellenic and Latin nations; but their case affords a fresh proof, and perhaps the strongest proof of all, that the development of national energies in antiquity was of a one-sided character. Those noble and enduring creations in the field of intellect, which owe their origin to the Aramæan race, did not emanate from the Phœnicians. While faith and knowledge in a certain sense were the especial property of the Aramæan nations and reached the Indo-Germans only from the East, neither the Phœnician religion nor Phœnician science and art ever, so far as we can see, held an independent rank among those of the Aramæan family. The religious conceptions of the Phœnicians were rude and uncouth, and it seemed as if their worship was meant to foster lust and cruelty rather than to subdue them. No trace is discernible, at least in times of clear historical light, of any special influence exercised by their religion over other nations. As little do we find any Phœnician architecture or plastic art at all comparable even to those of Italy, to say nothing of the lands where art was native. The most ancient seat of scientific observation and of its application to practical purposes was Babylon, or at any rate the region of the Euphrates. It was there probably that men first followed the course of the stars; it was there that they first distinguished and expressed in writing the sounds of language; it was there that they began to reflect on time and space and on the powers at work in nature: the earliest traces of

astronomy and chronology, of the alphabet, and of weights and measures, point to that region. The Phœnicians no doubt availed themselves of the artistic and highly developed manufactures of Babylon for their industry, of the observation of the stars for their navigation, of the writing of sounds and the adjustment of measures for their commerce, and distributed many an important germ of civilization along with their wares; but it cannot be demonstrated that the alphabet or any other ingenious product of the human mind belonged peculiarly to them, and such religious and scientific ideas as they were the means of conveying to the Hellenes, were scattered by them more after the fashion of a bird dropping grains than of the husbandman sowing his seed. The power which the Hellenes and even the Italians possessed, of civilizing and assimilating to themselves the nations susceptible of culture with whom they came into contact, was wholly wanting in the Phœnicians. In the field of Roman conquest the Iberian and the Celtic languages have disappeared before the Romanic tongue; the Berbers of Africa speak at the present day the same language as they spoke in the times of the Hannos and the Barcides.

Above all, the Phœnicians, like the rest of the Aramæan nations as compared with the Indo-Germans, lacked the instinct of political life,—the noble idea of self-governed freedom. During the most flourishing times of Sidon and Tyre the land of the Phœnicians was a perpetual apple of contention between the powers that ruled on the Euphrates and on the Nile, and was subject sometimes to the Assyrians, sometimes to the Egyptians. With half the power Hellenic cities had achieved their independence; but the prudent Sidonians calculated that the closing of the caravan-routes to the East or of the ports of Egypt would affect them more than the heaviest tribute, and so they punctually paid their taxes, as it might happen, to Nineveh or to Memphis, and even gave their ships, when they could not avoid it, to help to fight the battles of the kings. And, as at home the Phœnicians patiently submitted to the oppression of their masters, so also abroad they were by no means inclined to exchange the peaceful career of commerce for a policy of conquest. Their colonies were factories. It was of more moment in their view to traffic in buying and selling with the natives than to acquire extensive territories in distant lands, and to carry out there the slow and difficult work of coloni-

Their political qualities.

537. zation. They avoided war even with their rivals ; they
 474. allowed themselves to be supplanted in Egypt, Greece, Italy,
 and the east of Sicily almost without resistance ; and in the
 great naval battles, which were fought in early times for the
 supremacy of the western Mediterranean, at Alalia (217)
 and at Cumæ (280), it was the Etruscans, and not the
 Phœnicians, that bore the brunt of the struggle with the
 Greeks. If rivalry could not be avoided, they compromised
 the matter as best they could ; no attempt was ever made
 by the Phœnicians to conquer Cære or Massilia. Still less,
 of course, were the Phœnicians disposed to enter on aggres-
 sive war. On the only occasion in earlier times when they
 took the field on the offensive, namely in the great Sicilian
 expedition of the African Phœnicians which terminated in
 480. their defeat at Himera by Gelo of Syracuse (274), it was
 simply as dutiful subjects of the Great King and in order
 to avoid taking part in the campaign against the Hellenes
 of the east, that they entered the lists against the Hellenes
 of the west ; just as their Syrian kinsmen were in fact obliged
 in that same year to share the defeat of the Persians at
 Salamis (i. 330).

This was not the result of cowardice ; navigation in un-
 known waters and with armed vessels requires brave hearts,
 and that such were to be found among the Phœnicians, they
 often showed. Still less was it the result of any lack of
 tenacity and idiosyncrasy of national feeling ; on the con-
 trary the Aramæans defended their nationality with spiri-
 tual weapons as well as with their blood against all the
 allurements of Grecian civilization and all the coercive
 measures of Eastern and Western despots, and that with an
 obstinacy which no Indo-Germanic people has ever equalled,
 and which to us who belong to the West seems to be some-
 times more sometimes less than human. It was the result
 of that want of political instinct, which amidst all their lively
 sense of the ties of race, and amidst all their faithful attach-
 ment to the city of their fathers, formed so marked a feature
 in the character of the Phœnicians. Liberty had no charms
 for them, and they aspired not after dominion ; “ quietly they
 lived,” says the Book of Judges, “ after the manner of the
 Sidonians, careless and secure, and in possession of riches.”

Carthage.

Of all the Phœnician settlements none attained a more
 rapid and secure prosperity than those which were established
 by the Tyrians and Sidonians on the south coast of Spain

and the north coast of Africa,—regions that lay beyond the reach of the arm of the Great King and of the dangerous rivalry of the mariners of Greece, and in which the natives held the same relation to the strangers as the Indians in America held to the Europeans. Among the numerous and flourishing Phœnician cities along these shores, the most prominent by far was the “New Town,” *Karthada* or, as the Occidentals called it, *Karchedon* or *Carthago*. Although not the earliest settlement of the Phœnicians in this region, and originally perhaps a mere dependency of the adjoining *Utica* the oldest of the Phœnician towns in Libya, it soon outstripped its neighbours and even the mother-land through the incomparable advantages of its situation and the energetic activity of its inhabitants. It was situated not far from the (former) mouth of the *Bagradas* (*Mejerda*), which flows through the richest corn district of northern Africa, and was placed on a fertile rising ground, still occupied with country houses and covered with groves of olive and orange trees, falling off in a gentle slope towards the plain, and terminating towards the sea in a sea-girt promontory. Lying in the heart of the great North-African roadstead, the Gulf of Tunis, at the very spot where that beautiful basin affords the best anchorage for vessels of larger size, and where drinkable spring water is got close by the shore, the place proved singularly favourable for agriculture and commerce and for the exchange of their respective commodities—so favourable, that not only was the Tyrian settlement in that quarter the first of Phœnician mercantile cities, but even in the Roman period Carthage was no sooner restored than it became the third city in the Empire, and still, under circumstances far from favourable and on a site far less judiciously chosen, there exists in that quarter a flourishing city of a hundred thousand inhabitants. The prosperity, agricultural, mercantile, and industrial, of a city so situated and so peopled, needs no explanation; but the question requires an answer—In what way did this settlement come to attain such a development of political power, as no other Phœnician city possessed?

That the Phœnician stock did not even in Carthage renounce its passive policy, there is no want of evidence to prove. Carthage paid, even down to the times of its prosperity, a ground-rent for the space occupied by the city to the native Berbers, the tribe of *Maxitani* or *Maxyes*; and

Carthage heads the western Phœnicians in opposition to the Hellenes.

although the sea and the desert sufficiently protected the city from any assault of the eastern powers, Carthage appears to have recognized (although but nominally) the supremacy of the Great King, and to have paid tribute to him occasionally, in order to secure its commercial communications with Tyre and the East.

But, with all their disposition to be submissive and cringing, circumstances occurred which compelled these Phœnicians to adopt a more energetic policy. The stream of Hellenic migration was pouring ceaselessly towards the west: it had already dislodged the Phœnicians from Greece proper and Italy, and it was preparing to supplant them also in Sicily, in Spain, and even in Libya itself. The Phœnicians had to make a stand against it somewhere, if they were not willing to be totally crushed. In this case, where they had to deal with Grecian traders and not with the Great King, submission did not suffice to secure the continuance of their commerce and industry on its former footing, liable merely to tax and tribute. Massilia and Cyrene were already founded; the whole east of Sicily was already in the hands of the Greeks; it was full time for the Phœnicians to think of serious resistance. The Carthaginians undertook the task; after long and obstinate wars they set a limit to the advance of the Cyrenæans, and Hellenism was unable to establish itself to the west of the desert of Tripolis. With Carthaginian aid, moreover, the Phœnician settlers on the western point of Sicily defended themselves against the Greeks, and readily and gladly submitted to the protection of the powerful cognate city (i. 153). These important successes, which occurred in the second century U.C., and which saved for the Phœnicians the south-western portion of the Mediterranean, served of themselves to give to the city which had achieved them the hegemony of the nation, and to alter at the same time its political position. Carthage was no longer a mere mercantile city: its aim was to rule over Libya and over part of the Mediterranean, because there was a necessity for its doing so. It is probable that the custom of employing mercenaries contributed materially to these successes. That custom came into vogue in Greece somewhere about the middle of the fourth century U.C., but among the Orientals and the Carians more especially it was far older, and it was perhaps the Phœnicians themselves that began it. By the system of foreign recruiting war was con-

verted into a grand pecuniary speculation, which was quite in keeping with the character and habits of the Phœnicians.

It was probably the reflex influence of these successes abroad, that first led the Carthaginians to change the character of their occupation in Africa from a tenure of hire and sufferance to one of proprietorship and conquest. It appears to have been about 300 u. c. that the Carthaginian merchants got rid of the rent for the soil, which they had hitherto been obliged to pay to the natives. This change enabled them to prosecute husbandry on a great scale. The Phœnicians were at all times anxious to employ their capital as landlords as well as traders, and to practise agriculture on a large scale by means of slaves or hired labourers; a large portion of the Jews in this way served the merchant-princes of Tyre for daily wages. The Carthaginians could now without restriction extract the produce of the rich Libyan soil by a system akin to that of the modern planters; slaves in chains cultivated the land—we find that single citizens possessed as many as twenty thousand. Nor was this all. The agricultural villages of the surrounding region (agriculture appears to have been introduced among the Libyans at a very early period—probably anterior to the Phœnician settlement, and in all likelihood from Egypt) were subdued by force of arms, and the free Libyan farmers were transformed into fellahs, who paid to their lords a fourth part of the produce of the soil as tribute, and were subjected to a regular system of recruiting for the formation of a home Carthaginian army. Hostilities were constantly occurring with the roving pastoral tribes (*νόμαδες*) on the borders; but a chain of fortified posts secured the territory enclosed by them, and the Nomades were slowly driven back into the deserts or the mountains, or compelled to recognize Carthaginian supremacy, to pay tribute, and to furnish contingents. About the period of the first Punic war their great town Theveste (Tebessa, at the sources of the Mejerda) was conquered by the Carthaginians. These form the “towns and tribes (*ἔθνη*) of subjects” which appear in the Carthaginian state-treaties; the former being the non-free Libyan villages, the latter the subject Nomades.

The Cartha-
ginian do-
minion in
Africa.

450.

To this fell to be added the sovereignty of Carthage over the other Phœnicians in Africa, or the so-called Liby-phœnicians. These included, on the one hand, the smaller settlements sent forth from Carthage along the whole north and part of the

Liby-phœ-
nicians.

north-west coast of Africa—which must have been not unimportant, for on the Atlantic alone there were settled at one time 30,000 such colonists—and, on the other hand, the old Phœnician settlements especially numerous along the coast of the present province of Constantine and Beylik of Tunis, such as Hippo afterwards called Regius (Bona), Hadrumetum (Susa), Little Leptis (to the south of Susa)—the second city of the Phœnicians in Africa—Thapsus (in the same quarter), and Great Leptis (near Tripoli). In what way all these cities came to be subject to Carthage—whether voluntarily for their protection perhaps from the attacks of Cyrenæans and Numidians, or by constraint—cannot be now ascertained; but it is certain that they are designated as subjects of the Carthaginians even in official documents, that they had to pull down their walls, and that they had to pay tribute and furnish contingents to Carthage. They were not liable however to the recruiting system or to land-tax, but contributed a definite amount of men and money, Little Leptis for instance paying the enormous sum annually of 365 talents (£89,843); moreover there was equality of law between them and the Carthaginians, and they could contract marriage on equal terms.* Utica alone escaped a similar fate and had its walls and independence preserved to it, less perhaps from its own power than from the pious feeling of the Carthaginians towards their ancient protectors; in fact the Phœnicians cherished a remarkable

* The clearest description of this important class occurs in the Carthaginian treaty (Polyb. vii. 9), where in contrast to the Uticenses on the one hand, and to the Libyan subjects on the other, they are called *οἱ Καρχηδονίων ὑπαρχοὶ ὅσοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται*. Elsewhere they are spoken of as cities allied (*συμμαχίδες πόλεις*, Diod. xx. 10) or tributary (Liv. xxxiv. 62; Justin, xxii. 7, 3). Their *connubium* with the Carthaginians is mentioned by Diodorus, xx. 55; the *commercium* is implied in "equal laws." That the old Phœnician colonies were included among the Liby-phœnicians is shown by the designation of Hippo as a Liby-phœnician city (Liv. xxv. 40); on the other hand as to the settlements detached from Carthage, it is said in the Periplus of Hanno: "the Carthaginians resolved that Hanno should sail beyond the pillars of Hercules and found cities of Liby-phœnicians." In substance, the word "Liby-phœnicians" was used by the Carthaginians not as a national designation, but as a term denoting a class in constitutional law. This view is quite consistent with the fact that grammatically the name denotes Phœnicians mingled with Libyans (Liv. xxi. 22, an addition to the text of Polybius); in reality, at least in the institution of very exposed colonies, Libyans were frequently associated with Phœnicians (Diod. xiii. 79; Cic. *pro Scauro*, 42). The analogy in name and constitutional relations between the Latins of Rome and the Liby-phœnicians of Carthage is unmistakable.

feeling of reverence for such relations, forming a thorough contrast to the indifference of the Greeks. Even in intercourse with foreigners "Carthage and Utica" always stipulate and promise in conjunction; which, of course, did not preclude the far more important "New Town" from practically asserting its hegemony over Utica. Thus the Tyrian factory was converted into the capital of a mighty North-African empire, which extended from the desert of Tripoli to the Atlantic Ocean, contenting itself in its western portion (Morocco and Algiers) with the occupation, and that to some extent superficial, of a belt along the coast, but in the richer portion to the east (the present districts of Constantine and Tunis) stretching its sway over the interior also and constantly pushing its frontier further to the south. The Carthaginians were, as an ancient author significantly expresses it, converted from Tyrians into Libyans. Phœnician civilization prevailed in Libya just as Greek civilization prevailed in Asia Minor and Syria after the campaigns of Alexander; although not with the same intensity. Phœnician was spoken and written at the courts of the Nomad sheiks, and the more civilized native tribes adopted for their language the Phœnician alphabet;* to Phœnicize them completely suited neither the genius of the nation nor the policy of Carthage.

The epoch, at which this transformation of Carthage into the capital of Libya took place, admits the less of being determined that the change doubtless took place gradually. The author just mentioned names Hanno as the reformer of the nation. If the Hanno is meant who lived at the time of the first war with Rome, he can only be regarded as having completed the new system, the carrying out of which probably occupied the fourth and fifth centuries of Rome.

The flourishing of Carthage was accompanied by a parallel

* The Libyan or Numidian alphabet, by which we mean that which was and is employed by the Berbers in writing their non-Semitic language—one of the innumerable alphabets derived from the primitive Aramæan one—certainly appears to be more closely related in several of its forms to the latter than the Phœnician alphabet; but it by no means follows from this, that the Libyans derived their writing not from Phœnicians but from earlier immigrants, any more than the partially older forms of the Italian alphabets prohibit us from deriving these from the Greek. We must rather assume that the Libyan alphabet has been derived from the Phœnician at a period of the latter earlier than the time at which the records of the Phœnician language that have reached us were written.

decline in the great cities of the Phœnician mother-country, in Sidon and especially in Tyre, the prosperity of which was destroyed partly by internal commotions, partly by the pressure of external calamities, particularly of its sieges by Salmanassar in the first, Nebuchodrossor in the second, and Alexander in the fifth century, *v. c.* The noble families and old firms of Tyre emigrated for the most part to the secure and flourishing daughter-city, and carried thither their intelligence, their capital, and their traditions. At the time when the Carthaginians came into contact with Rome, Carthage was as decidedly the first of Canaanite cities as Rome was the first of the communities of Latium.

Naval
power of
Carthage.

But the empire of Libya was only half of the power of Carthage; its maritime and colonial dominion had acquired, during the same period, a no less powerful development.

Spain.

In Spain the chief station of the Phœnicians was the primitive Tyrian settlement at Gades (Cadiz). In addition, they possessed to the west and east of it a chain of factories, and in the interior the region of the silver mines, so that they had in their possession nearly the modern Andalusia and Granada, or at least the coasts of these provinces. They made no effort to acquire the interior from the warlike native nations; they were content with the possession of the mines and of stations for traffic and for shell and other fisheries; and they had difficulty in maintaining their ground even in these against the adjoining tribes. It is probable that these possessions were not strictly Carthaginian but Tyrian, and Gades was not reckoned among the cities tributary to Carthage; but practically, like all the western Phœnicians, it was under Carthaginian hegemony, as is shown by the aid sent by Carthage to the Gaditani against the natives, and by the institution of Carthaginian trading settlements to the westward of Gades. Ebusus and the Baleares, again, were occupied by the Carthaginians even at an early period, partly for the fisheries, partly as advanced posts against the Massiliots, with whom furious conflicts were waged from these stations.

Sardinia.

In like manner the Carthaginians already at the end of the second century, *v. c.*, established themselves in Sardinia, which was turned to account by them precisely in the same way as Libya. While the natives withdrew into the mountainous interior of the island to escape from the bondage of agricultural serfs, just as the Numidians in Africa

withdrew to the borders of the desert, Phœnician colonies were conducted to Caralis (Cagliari) and other important points, and the fertile districts along the coast were rendered productive by the introduction of Libyan cultivators.

In Sicily the straits of Messina and the larger eastern Sicily. half of the island had fallen at an early period into the hands of the Greeks; but the Phœnicians, with the help of the Carthaginians, retained on the one hand the smaller adjacent islands, the Ægates, Melita, Gaulos, Cossyra (the settlement in Malta in particular was rich and flourishing); on the other hand the west and north-west coast of Sicily, whence they maintained communication with Africa by means of Motya and afterwards of Lilybæum and with Sardinia by means of Panormus and Soluntum. The interior of the island remained in the possession of the native Elymi, Sicani, and Siceli. After the further advance of the Greeks was checked, a state of comparative peace had prevailed in the island, which even the campaign undertaken by the Carthaginians at the instigation of the Persians against their Greek neighbours in the island (274) did not permanently interrupt, and which continued on the whole to subsist till the Attic expedition to Sicily (339-341). The two competing nations made up their minds to tolerate each other, and confined themselves in the main each to its own field.

480.

415-413

All these settlements and possessions were important enough in themselves; but they were of greater moment as the pillars of the Carthaginian maritime supremacy. By their possession of the south of Spain, of the Baleares, of Sardinia, of western Sicily and Melita, and by their prevention of Hellenic colonies on the east coast of Spain, in Corsica, and in the region of the Syrtes, the masters of the north coast of Africa rendered their sea a closed one, and monopolized the western straits. In the Tyrrhene and Gallic seas alone the Phœnicians were obliged to admit the rivalry of other nations. This state of things might be endured so long as the Etruscans and the Greeks served to counterbalance each other in these waters; with the former as the less dangerous rivals Carthage even entered into an alliance against the Greeks. But when, on the fall of the Etruscan power (a fall which, as is usually the case in such forced alliances, Carthage had hardly exerted all her power to avert), and after the miscarriage of the great projects of Alcibiades, Syracuse stood forth as indisputably the first Greek naval

Maritime
supremacyRivalry
with Syra-
cuse.

- power, not only did the rulers of Syracuse naturally begin to aspire to dominion over Sicily and lower Italy and at the same time over the Tyrrhene and Adriatic seas, but the Carthaginians also were compelled to adopt a more energetic policy. The immediate result of the long and obstinate conflicts between them and their equally powerful and infamous antagonist, Dionysius of Syracuse (348-389), was the annihilation or weakening of the intervening Sicilian states—a result which both parties had an interest in accomplishing—and the division of the island between the Syracusans and Carthaginians. The most flourishing cities in the island, Selinus, Himera, Agrigentum, Gela, and Messana, were destroyed from the very foundation by the Carthaginians in the course of these unhappy conflicts: and Dionysius was not displeased to see Hellenism destroyed or suppressed there, that, leaning for support on foreign mercenaries enlisted from Italy, Gaul, and Spain, he might rule in greater security over provinces which lay desolate or which were occupied by military colonies. The peace, which was concluded after the victory of the Carthaginian general Mago at Kronion (371), and which subjected to the Carthaginians the Greek cities of Thermæ (the ancient Himera), Segesta, Heracleia Minoa, Selinus, and a part of the territory of Agrigentum as far as the Halycus, was regarded by the two powers contending for the possession of the island as only a temporary accommodation; on both sides the rivals were ever renewing their attempts to dispossess each other.
394. Four several times—in 360 in the time of Dionysius the elder; in 410 in that of Timoleon; in 445 in that of Agathocles; in 476 in that of Pyrrhus—the Carthaginians were masters of all Sicily as far as Syracuse, and were baffled by its solid walls; almost as often the Syracusans, under able leaders, such as were the elder Dionysius, Agathocles, and Pyrrhus, seemed equally on the eve of dislodging the Africans from the island. But more and more the balance inclined to the side of the Carthaginians, who were, as a rule, the aggressors, and who, although they did not follow out their aim with Roman steadfastness, yet conducted their attack with far greater method and energy than the Greek city, vexed and torn by factions, conducted its defence. The Phœnicians might with reason expect that a pestilence or a foreign *condottiere* would not always snatch the prey from their hands; and for the time being,

at least at sea, the struggle was already decided (i. 425): Pyrrhus' attempt to restore the Syracusan fleet was the last. After the failure of that attempt, the Carthaginian fleet commanded without a rival the whole western Mediterranean; and its endeavours to occupy Syracuse, Rhegium, and Tarentum, showed the extent of its power and the objects at which it aimed. Hand in hand with these attempts went an endeavour to monopolize still more thoroughly the maritime commerce of this region, at the expense alike of foreigners and of their own subjects; and it was not the wont of the Carthaginians to recoil from any violence that might help forward their purpose. A contemporary of the Punic wars, Eratosthenes, the father of geography (479-560), affirms that every foreign mariner sailing towards Sardinia or towards the Straits of Gades, who fell into the hands of the Carthaginians, was thrown by them into the sea; and with this statement the fact completely accords, that Carthage by the treaty of 406 declared the Spanish, Sardinian, and Libyan ports open to Roman trading vessels, whereas by that of 448 (i. 426), it totally closed them, with the exception of the port of Carthage itself, against the same.

275-194.

348.

306.

Aristotle, who died about fifty years before the commencement of the first Punic war, describes the constitution of Carthage as having changed from a monarchy into an aristocracy, or into a democracy inclining towards oligarchy, for he designates it by both names. The conduct of affairs was immediately vested in the hands of the Council of Ancients, which, like the Spartan Gerusia, consisted of the two kings nominated annually by the citizens, and of twenty-eight Gerusiasts, who were also, as it appears, chosen annually by the citizens. It was this council which mainly transacted the business of the state, making, for instance, the preliminary arrangements for war, organizing levies and enlistments, nominating the general, and assigning to him a certain number of Gerusiasts from whom in ordinary cases the sub-commanders were taken; and to it despatches were addressed. It is doubtful whether along with this small council there existed a larger one; in any case it was not of much importance. As little does any special influence seem to have belonged to the kings; they acted chiefly as supreme judges, and they were frequently so named (*Shofetes*, *prætores*). The powers of the general were greater. Isocrates, Constitution of Carthage. Council. Magistrates.

the elder contemporary of Aristotle, says that the Carthaginians had an oligarchical government at home, but a monarchical government in the field; and thus the office of the Carthaginian general is probably correctly described by Roman writers as a dictatorship, although the Gerusiasts attached to him must have, practically at least, restricted his power, and there likewise awaited him, after he had laid down his office, a regular official reckoning unknown among the Romans. There existed no fixed term of office for the general, and for this very reason he was doubtless different from the annual king, from whom Aristotle also expressly distinguishes him. The combination however of several offices in one person was not unusual among the Carthaginians, and it is not therefore surprising that often the same person appears as at once general and Shofete.

Judges.

But the Gerusia and the magistrates were subordinate to the corporation of the Hundred and Four (in round numbers the Hundred), or the Judges, the main bulwark of the Carthaginian oligarchy. It had no place in the original constitution of Carthage, but, like the Spartan Ephorate, it originated in an aristocratic opposition to the monarchical elements of that constitution. From the venality of the magistracies and the small number of members forming the supreme board, a single Carthaginian family, eminent above all others in wealth and military renown, the clan of Mago (i. 331), threatened to unite in its own hands the management of the state in peace and war, and the administration of justice. This led, nearly about the time of the decemvirs, to an alteration of the constitution and to the appointment of this new board. We know that the holding of the quæstorship gave a title to admission into the body of judges, but that the candidate had nevertheless to be elected by certain self-electing Boards of Five (Pentarchies); and that the judges, although probably by law chosen from year to year, practically remained in office for a longer period or indeed for life, for which reason they are usually called "senators" by the Greeks and Romans. Obscure as are the details, we recognize clearly the nature of the court as an oligarchical board constituted by aristocratic co-optation; an isolated but characteristic indication of which is found in the fact that there were in Carthage special baths for the judges over and above the common baths for the citizens. They were primarily intended to act as political jurymen,

who summoned the generals in particular, but beyond doubt the Shofetes and Gerusiasts also when circumstances required, on resigning their office to give account of their stewardship, and inflicted even capital punishment at pleasure, often with the most reckless cruelty. Of course in this as in every instance, where administrative functionaries are subjected to the control of another body, the reality of power was transferred from the controlled to the controlling authority; and it is easy to understand on the one hand how the latter came to interfere in all matters of administration (the Gerusia for instance submitted important despatches first to the judges, and then to the people), and on the other how fear of the control at home, which regularly meted out its award according to success, hampered the Carthaginian statesman and general in council and action.

The body of citizens in Carthage, though not expressly Citizens. restricted, as in Sparta, to the attitude of passive bystanders in the business of the state, appears to have had but a very slight amount of practical influence on it. In the elections to the Gerusia a system of open corruption was the rule; in the nomination of a general the people were consulted, but only after the nomination had really been made on the proposal of the Gerusia; and other questions only went to the people when the Gerusia thought fit, or could not otherwise agree. Comitia of the people, exercising judicial functions, were unknown in Carthage. The powerlessness of the citizens was probably in the main occasioned by their political organization; the mess-associations, which are mentioned among the Carthaginian institutions, and compared with the Spartan Pheiditia, were probably guilds under oligarchical management. Mention is made even of a distinction between "burgesses of the city" and "manual labourers," which leads us to infer that the latter held a very inferior position, perhaps approaching to servitude.

On a comprehensive view of its several elements, the Character of the government. Carthaginian constitution appears to have been a government of capitalists, such as would naturally arise in a civic community which had no opulent middle class but consisted on the one hand of a city rabble without property and living from hand to mouth, and on the other of great merchants, planters, and noble governors. The system of enriching decayed nobles at the expense of its subjects, by despatching them as tax-assessors and governors to the de-

pendent communities—that infallible token of a rotten civic oligarchy—was not wanting in Carthage; Aristotle describes it as the main cause of the tried durability of the Carthaginian constitution. Up to his time no revolution worth mentioning had taken place in Carthage either from above or from below. The multitude remained without leaders in consequence of the material advantages which the governing oligarchy was able to offer to all ambitious or necessitous nobles, and was satisfied with the crumbs, which in the form of electoral corruption or otherwise, fell to it from the table of the rich. A democratic opposition indeed could not fail with such a government to emerge; but at the time of the first Punic war it was still quite powerless. At a later period, partly under the influence of the defeats which were sustained, its political influence appears on the increase, and that far more rapidly than the influence of the similar party at the same period in Rome; the popular assemblies began to give the final decision in political questions, and broke down the omnipotence of the Carthaginian oligarchy. After the termination of the second Punic war it was enacted, on the proposal of Hannibal, that no member of the council of a Hundred could hold office for two consecutive years; and thereby a complete democracy was introduced, which certainly was under existing circumstances the only means of saving Carthage, if there still was time to do so. The opposition was swayed by a strong patriotic and reforming enthusiasm; but the fact cannot withal be overlooked, that it rested on a corrupt and rotten basis. The body of citizens in Carthage, which is compared by well-informed Greeks to the people of Alexandria, was so ungovernable that on that account it well deserved to be powerless; and it might well be asked, what good could arise from revolutions, where, as in Carthage, the boys helped to make them.

Capital and
its power in
Carthage.

In a financial point of view, Carthage held in every respect the first place among the states of antiquity. At the time of the Peloponnesian war this Phœnician city was, according to the testimony of the first of Greek historians, financially superior to all the Greek states, and its revenues were compared to those of the Great King; Polybius calls it the wealthiest city in the world. The intelligent character of the Carthaginian husbandry (which, as was the case subsequently in Rome, generals and statesmen did not disdain scientifically to practise and to teach) is attested by the

agricultural treatise of the Carthaginian Mago, which was universally regarded by the later farmers of Greece and Rome as the fundamental code of rational husbandry, and was not only translated into Greek, but was edited also in Latin by command of the Roman senate and officially recommended to the Italian landholders. A characteristic feature was the close connection between this Phœnician agriculture and the management of capital: it was quoted as a leading maxim of Phœnician husbandry that one should never acquire more land than he could thoroughly manage. The rich resources of the country in horses, oxen, sheep, and goats, in which Libya by reason of its Nomad husbandry perhaps excelled at that time, as Polybius testifies, all other lands of the earth, were of great advantage to the Carthaginians. As these were the instructors of the Romans in the art of profitably working the soil, they were so likewise in the art of turning to good account their subjects. By that art Carthage reaped indirectly the rents of the "best part of Europe," and of the rich (and in some portions, such as in Byzacitis and on the lesser Syrtis, exceedingly productive) province of northern Africa. Commerce, which was always regarded in Carthage as an honourable occupation, and the shipping and manufactures which commerce rendered flourishing, brought even in the natural course of things golden harvests annually to the settlers there; and we have already indicated how skilfully, by an extensive and ever-growing system of monopoly, not only all the foreign but also all the inland commerce of the western Mediterranean, and the whole carrying trade between the west and east, were more and more concentrated within that single harbour.

Science and art in Carthage as afterwards in Rome seem to have been mainly dependent on Hellenic influences, but they do not appear to have been neglected. There was a respectable Phœnician literature; and on the conquest of the city there were found rich treasures of art (not created, it is true, in Carthage, but carried off from Sicilian temples) and considerable libraries. But there intellect also was in the service of capital; the prominent features of its literature were chiefly agricultural and geographical treatises, such as the work of Mago already mentioned, and the account by Admiral Hanno of his voyage along the west coast of Africa, which was originally deposited publicly in one of the Carthaginian temples, and which is still extant in a translation.

Even the general diffusion of certain kinds of attainments, and particularly of the knowledge of foreign languages,* as to which the Carthage of this epoch probably stood almost on a level with Rome under the Empire, forms an evidence of the thoroughly practical turn given to Hellenic culture in Carthage. It is absolutely impossible to form an idea of the mass of capital accumulated in this London of antiquity, but some notion at least may be gained of the public revenues from the fact, that, in spite of the costly system on which Carthage organized its wars and in spite of the careless and faithless administration of the state property, the contributions of its subjects and the customs-revenues completely covered the expenditure, so that no direct taxes were levied from the citizens; and further, that even after the second Punic war, when the power of the state was already broken, the current expenses and the payment to Rome of a yearly instalment of £48,900 could be met without levying any tax merely by a somewhat stricter management of the finances, and fourteen years after the peace the state proffered immediate payment of the thirty-six remaining instalments. But it was not merely the sum total of its revenues that evinced the superiority of the financial administration at Carthage. The economical principles of a later and more advanced epoch are found by us in Carthage alone of all the more considerable states of antiquity. Mention is made of loans from foreign states, and in the monetary system we find along with gold and silver bars (and also gold and silver coins primarily intended for the Sicilian commerce) a token-money having no intrinsic value—a sort of currency not used elsewhere in antiquity. In fact, if government had resolved itself into a mere matter of business, never would any state have solved the problem more brilliantly than Carthage.

Comparison
between
Carthage
and Rome,
in their
economy.

Let us now compare the respective resources of Carthage and Rome. Both were agricultural and mercantile cities, and nothing more; art and science had substantially the same altogether subordinate and altogether practical cha-

* The steward on a country estate, although a slave, ought, according to the precept of the Carthaginian agricultural writer Mago (*ap. Varro, R.R. i. 17*), to be able to read, and ought to possess some culture. In the prologue of the "Pænulus" of Plautus, it is said of the hero of the title:—

*Et is omnes linguas scit ; sed dissimulat sciens
Se scire ; Pænus plane est ; quid verbis opus't ?*

racter in both, except that in these points Carthage had made greater progress than Rome. But in Carthage the moneyed interest preponderated over the landed, in Rome at this time the landed still preponderated over the moneyed; and, while the agriculturists of Carthage were universally large landlords and slave-holders, in the Rome of this period the great mass of the burgesses still tilled their fields in person. The majority of the population in Rome held property, and was therefore conservative; the majority in Carthage held no property, and was therefore accessible to the gold of the rich as well as to the reform cry of the democrats. In Carthage there already prevailed all that opulence which marks powerful commercial cities, while the manners and police of Rome still maintained at least externally the severity and frugality of the olden times. When the ambassadors of Carthage returned from Rome, they told their colleagues that the relations of intimacy among the Roman senators surpassed all conception; that a single set of silver plate sufficed for the whole senate, and had reappeared in every house to which the envoys had been invited. The scoff is a significant token of the difference in their economic condition.

In both the constitution was aristocratic; the Judges In their constitution. governed in Carthage, as did the senate in Rome, and both on the same system of police-control. The strict state of dependence in which the governing board at Carthage held the individual magistrate, and the injunction to the citizens absolutely to refrain from learning the Greek language and to communicate with a Greek only through the medium of a public interpreter, originated in the same spirit as the system of government at Rome; but in comparison with the cruel harshness and the categorical precision, bordering on silliness, of this Carthaginian state-tutelage, the Roman system of fines and censures appears mild and reasonable. The Roman senate, which was open to eminent ability and represented in the best sense the nation, was able to trust that nation, and had no need to fear its officials. The Carthaginian senate, on the other hand, was formed on the basis of a jealous control exercised over the administration by government, and represented exclusively the leading families; its system was mistrust of all above and below it, and therefore it could neither be confident that the people would follow whither it led, nor free from the dread of usurpations on the

part of the magistrates. Hence the steady course of Roman policy, which never receded a step in times of misfortune, and never threw away the favours of fortune by negligence or indifference; whereas the Carthaginians desisted from the struggle when a last effort might perhaps have saved all, and weary or forgetful of their great duty as a nation allowed the half-completed building to fall to pieces, only to begin it in a few years anew. Hence the able magistrate in Rome was ordinarily on a good understanding with his government; in Carthage he was frequently at decided feud with his masters at home, and was forced to resist them by unconstitutional means and to make common cause with the reform party which constituted the opposition.

In the
treatment of
their sub-
jects.

Both Carthage and Rome ruled over communities of lineage kindred with their own, and over numerous others of alien race. But Rome had thrown open her citizenship to one district after another, and had rendered it even legally accessible to the Latin communities; Carthage from the first maintained her exclusiveness, and did not permit the dependent districts even to cherish a hope of being some day placed upon an equal footing. Rome granted to the communities of kindred lineage a share in the fruits of victory, especially in the acquired domains, and in the other subject states sought, by conferring material advantages on the rich and noble, to gain over at least a party to her own interests. Carthage not only retained for herself the produce of her victories, but even deprived the most privileged cities of their freedom of trade. Rome did not wholly take away the independence of even the lowest grade of her subject communities, and imposed a fixed tribute on none; Carthage despatched her overseers everywhere, and loaded even the old Phœnician cities with a heavy tribute, while her subject tribes were practically treated as state-slaves. In this way there was not in the Carthagino-African state-league a single community, with the exception of Utica, that would not have been politically and materially benefited by the fall of Carthage; in the Romano-Italic there were none which had not much more to lose than to gain in rebelling against a government, which was careful to avoid injuring material interests, and which never at least by extreme measures challenged political opposition to conflict. If Carthaginian statesmen believed that they had attached to the interests of Carthage her Phœnician subjects by the greater terrors of

a Libyan revolt and all the landholders by means of token-money, they transferred mercantile calculation to a sphere to which it did not apply. Experience proved that the Roman symmachy, notwithstanding its seemingly looser bond of connection, held out against Pyrrhus like a wall of rock, whereas the Carthaginian fell to pieces like a gossamer web as soon as a hostile army set foot on African soil. It was so on the landing of Agathocles and of Regulus, and likewise in the mercenary war; the spirit that prevailed in Africa is illustrated by the fact, that the Libyan women voluntarily contributed their ornaments to the mercenaries for their war against Carthage. In Sicily alone the Carthaginians appear to have exercised a milder rule, and to have attained on that account better results. They granted to their subjects there comparative freedom in foreign trade, and allowed them to conduct their internal dealings with a metallic currency after the Greek fashion, instead of the nominal currency of the Carthaginians; far greater freedom of movement generally was allowed to them than was permitted to the Sardinians and Libyans. Had Syracuse fallen into Carthaginian hands, their policy would soon have changed. That event, however, did not happen; and so, owing to the well-calculated mildness of the Carthaginian government and the unhappy distractions of the Sicilian Greeks, there actually existed in Sicily a party really friendly to the Phœnicians; for example, even after the island had passed to the Romans, Philinus of Agrigentum wrote the history of the great war in a thoroughly Phœnician spirit. Nevertheless on the whole the Sicilians must, both as subjects and as Hellenes, have been at least as averse to their Phœnician masters as the Samnites and Tarentines were to the Romans.

In a financial point of view the state revenues of Carthage In finance. doubtless far surpassed those of Rome; but this advantage was partly neutralized by the facts, that the sources of the Carthaginian revenue—tribute and customs—dried up far sooner (and that, just when they were most needed) than those of Rome, and that the Carthaginian mode of conducting war was far more costly than the Roman.

The military resources of the Romans and Carthaginians In their military system. were very different, yet in many respects not unequally balanced. The citizens of Carthage still at the conquest of the city amounted to 700,000, including women and

children,* and were probably at least as numerous at the close of the fifth century; in that century they were able in case of need to set on foot a burgess-army of 40,000 hoplites. At the very beginning of the fifth century, Rome had in similar circumstances sent to the field a burgess-army equally strong (i. 437); after the great extension of the *ager Romanus* in the course of that century the number of full burgesses capable of bearing arms must at least have doubled. But far more than in the number of men capable of bearing arms, Rome excelled in the effective condition of the burgess-soldier. Anxious as the Carthaginian government was to induce its citizens to take part in military service, it could neither furnish the artisan and the manufacturer with the bodily vigour of the husbandman, nor overcome the native aversion of the Phœnicians to warfare. In the fifth century there still fought in the Sicilian armies a "sacred band" of 2500 Carthaginians as a guard for the general; in the sixth not a single Carthaginian, officers excepted, was to be met with in the Carthaginian armies, such as that of Spain. The Roman farmers, again, took their places not only in the muster-roll, but also in the field of battle. It was the same with the cognate dependencies of both communities; while the Latins rendered to the Romans no less service than their own burgess-troops, the Liby-phœnicians were as little adapted for war as the Carthaginians, and, as may easily be supposed, still less desirous of it, and so they too disappeared from the armies; the towns bound to furnish contingents probably redeemed their obligation by a payment of money. In the Spanish army just mentioned, composed of some 15,000 men, only a single troop of cavalry of 450 men consisted, and that but partly, of Liby-phœnicians. The flower of the Cartha-

* Doubts have been expressed as to the accuracy of this number, and the highest possible number of inhabitants, taking into account the available space, has been reckoned at 250,000. Apart from the uncertainty of such calculations, especially as to a commercial city with houses of six stories, we must remember that the number is to be understood in a political, not in an urban, sense, just like the numbers in the Roman census, and that thus all Carthaginians would be included in it, whether dwelling in the city or its neighbourhood, or resident in its subject territory or in other lands. There would, of course, be a large number of such absentees in the case of Carthage; indeed it is expressly stated, that in Gades for the same reason the burgess-roll always showed a far higher number than that of the citizens who had their fixed residence there.

ginian armies was formed by the Libyans, whose recruits were capable of being trained under able officers into good infantry, and whose light cavalry was unsurpassed in its kind. To these were added the forces of the more or less dependent tribes of Libya and Spain and the famous slingers of the Baleares, who seem to have held an intermediate position between federal contingents and mercenary troops; and finally, in case of need, the hired soldiery raised abroad. So far as numbers were concerned, such an army might without difficulty be raised almost to any desired strength; and in the ability of its officers also, in acquaintance with arms, and in courage it might be capable of coping with that of Rome. Not only, however, did a dangerously long interval elapse, in the event of mercenaries being required, ere they could be got ready, while the Roman militia was able at any moment to take the field, but—which was the main matter—there was nothing to keep together the armies of Carthage but military honour and selfish interest, while the Romans were united by all the ties that bound them to their common fatherland. The average Carthaginian officer estimated his mercenaries, and even the Libyan farmers, very much as men in modern warfare estimate cannon-balls; hence such disgraceful proceedings as the betrayal of the Libyan troops by their general Himilco in 358, which was followed by a dangerous insurrection of the Libyans, and hence that proverbial cry of “Punic faith” which did the Carthaginians no small injury. Carthage experienced in full measure all the evils which armies of fellahs and mercenaries could bring upon a state, and more than once she found her paid serfs more dangerous than her foes.

396.

The Carthaginian government could not fail to perceive the defects of their military system, and they undoubtedly sought to remedy them by every available means. They insisted on maintaining full chests and full magazines, that they might at any time be able to equip mercenaries. They bestowed great care on those elements which among the ancients represented the modern artillery—the construction of machines, in which we find the Carthaginians regularly superior to the Siceliots, and the use of elephants, after these had superseded in warfare the earlier war-chariots: in the case-mates of Carthage there were stalls for 300 elephants. They could not venture to fortify the dependent cities, and

were obliged to submit to the occupation of the towns and villages as well as the open country by any hostile army that landed in Africa—a thorough contrast to the state of Italy, where most of the subject towns had retained their walls, and a chain of Roman fortresses commanded the whole peninsula. But on the fortification of the capital they expended all the resources of money and of art, and on several occasions nothing but the strength of its walls saved the state; whereas Rome held a political and military position so secure that it never underwent a formal siege. Lastly, the main bulwark of the state was their war-marine, on which they lavished the utmost care. In the building as well as in the management of vessels the Carthaginians excelled the Greeks; it was at Carthage that ships were first built of more than three banks of oars, and the Carthaginian war-vessels, at this period mostly quinqueremes, were ordinarily better sailers than the Greek; the rowers, all of them public slaves, who never stirred from the galleys, were excellently trained, and the captains were expert and fearless. In this respect Carthage was decidedly superior to the Romans, who, with the few ships of their Greek allies and still fewer of their own, were unable even to show themselves in the open sea against the fleet which at that time without a rival ruled the western Mediterranean.

If, in conclusion, we sum up the results of this comparison of the resources of the two great powers, the judgment expressed by a sagacious and impartial Greek is perhaps borne out, that Carthage and Rome were, when the struggle between them began, on the whole equally matched. But we cannot omit to add that, while Carthage had put forth all the efforts of which intellect and wealth were capable to provide herself with artificial means of attack and defence, she was unable in any satisfactory way to supply the fundamental wants of a land army of her own, and of a symmachy resting on a self-supporting basis. That Rome could only be seriously attacked in Italy, and Carthage only in Libya, no one could fail to see; as little could any one fail to perceive that Carthage could not in the long run escape from such an attack. Fleets were not yet in those times of the infancy of navigation a permanent heirloom of nations, but could be fitted out wherever there were trees, iron, and water. It was clear, and had been several

times tested in Africa itself, that even powerful maritime states were not able to prevent a weaker enemy from landing. When Agathocles had shown the way thither, a Roman general could follow the same course; and while in Italy the entrance of an invading army simply began the war, the same event in Libya put an end to it by changing it into a siege, in which, unless some special accident should intervene, even the most obstinate and heroic courage must finally succumb.

CHAPTER II.

THE WAR BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE CONCERNING
SICILY.

State of
Sicily.

FOR upwards of a century the feud between the Carthaginians and the rulers of Syracuse had devastated the beautiful island of Sicily. On both sides the contest was carried on with the weapons of political proselytism, for, while Carthage kept up communications with the aristocratico-republican opposition in Syracuse, the Syracusan dynasts maintained relations with the national party in the Greek cities that had become tributary to Carthage. On both sides armies of mercenaries were employed to fight their battles —by Timoleon and Agathocles, as well as by the Phœnician generals. And as like means were employed on both sides, so the conflict had been waged on both with a disregard of honour and a perfidy unexampled in the history of the west. The Syracusans were the weaker party. In the peace of 314. 440, Carthage had still limited her claims to the third of the island to the west of Heraclea Minoa and Himera, and had expressly recognized the hegemony of the Syracusans over all the cities to the eastward. The expulsion of Pyrrhus from Sicily and Italy (275. 479) left by far the larger half of the island, and especially the important city of Agrigentum, in the hands of Carthage; the Syracusans retained nothing but Tauromenium and the south-east of the island. In the second great city on the east coast, Messana, Campanian mercenaries. a band of foreign soldiers had established themselves and held the city, independent alike of Syracusans and Carthaginians. These new rulers of Messana were Campanian mer-

cenaries. The dissolute habits that had become prevalent among the Sabellians settled in and around Capua (i. 364), had made Campania in the fourth and fifth centuries—what Ætolia, Crete, and Laconia were afterwards—the universal recruiting-field for princes and cities in search of mercenaries. The partial civilization that had been called into existence there by the Campanian Greeks, the barbaric luxury of life in Capua and the other Campanian cities, the political impotence to which the hegemony of Rome condemned them while yet its rule was not so stern as wholly to withdraw from them the right of self-disposal—all these things drove the youth of Campania in troops to the standards of the recruiting officers. As a matter of course, so frivolous and unscrupulous a selling of themselves was in this as in all cases attended by estrangement from their native land, habits of military violence and lawlessness, and indifference to the breach of their allegiance. These Campanians could see no reason why a band of mercenaries should not seize on their own behalf any city intrusted to their guardianship, provided only they were in a position to hold it—the Samnites had established their dominion in Capua itself, and the Lucanians in a succession of Greek cities, in a mode not much more honourable. Nowhere was the state of political relations more inviting for such enterprises than in Sicily. Already the Campanian captains who came to Sicily during the Peloponnesian war had insinuated themselves in this way into Entella and Ætna. Somewhere Mamertines. about the year 470 a Campanian band, which had previously 284. served under Agathocles and after his death (465) took up 289. the trade of freebooters on their own account, established themselves in Messana, the second city of Grecian Sicily, and the chief seat of the anti-Syracusan party in the portion of the island that was still in the power of the Greeks. The citizens were slain or expelled, their wives and children and houses were distributed among the soldiers, and the new masters of the city, the Mamertines, or “men of Mars,” as they called themselves, soon became the third power in the island, the north-eastern portion of which they reduced to subjection in the times of confusion that succeeded the death of Agathocles. The Carthaginians were no unwilling spectators of these events, which established in the immediate vicinity of the Syracusans a new and powerful adversary instead of a cognate and ordinarily allied or dependent

city. With Carthaginian aid the Mamertines maintained themselves against Pyrrhus, and the untimely retreat of the king restored to them all their power.

It is not proper in the historian either to excuse the perfidious crime by which the Mamertines seized their power, or to forget that the God of history does not necessarily punish the sins of the fathers to the fourth generation. He who feels it his vocation to judge the sins of others may condemn the human agents; for Sicily it might have been a blessing that a warlike power, and one belonging to the island, thus began to be formed in it—a power which was already able to bring eight thousand men into the field, and which was gradually putting itself in a position to take up at the proper time and on its own resources that struggle against the foreigners, to the maintenance of which the Hellenes, becoming more and more unaccustomed to arms notwithstanding their perpetual wars, were no longer equal.

Hiero of
Syracuse.

275-274.

War be-
tween the
Syracusans
and Ma-
mertines.

In the first instance, however, things took another turn. A young Syracusan officer, who by his descent from the family of Gelo and his intimate relations of kindred with king Pyrrhus as well as by the distinction with which he had fought in Pyrrhus' campaigns, had attracted the notice of his fellow-citizens as well as of the Syracusan soldiery—Hiero, son of Hierocles—was called by military election to command the army, which was at variance with the citizens (479-480). By his prudent administration, the nobleness of his character, and the moderation of his views, he rapidly gained the hearts of the citizens of Syracuse (who had been accustomed to the most scandalous lawlessness in their despots) and of the Sicilian Greeks in general. He rid himself (in a perfidious manner, it is true) of the insubordinate army of mercenaries, revived the citizen-militia, and endeavoured, at first with the title of general, afterwards with that of king, to re-establish the deeply sunken Hellenic power by means of his civic troops and of fresh and more manageable recruits. With the Carthaginians, who in concert with the Greeks had driven king Pyrrhus from the island, there was at that time peace; the immediate foes of the Syracusans were the Mamertines. They were the kinsmen of those hated mercenaries whom the Syracusans had recently extirpated; they had murdered their own Greek hosts; they had curtailed the Syracusan territory; they had

oppressed and plundered a number of smaller Grecian towns. In league with the Romans who just about this time were sending their legions against the Campanians in Rhegium, the allies, kinsmen, and confederates in crime of the Mamertines (i. 424), Hiero turned his arms against Messana. By a great victory, after which Hiero was proclaimed king of the Siceliots (484), he succeeded in shutting up the Mamertines within their city, and after the siege had lasted some years, they found themselves reduced to extremity and unable to hold the city longer against Hiero on their own resources. It was evident that a surrender on favourable terms was impossible, and that the axe of the executioner, which had fallen upon the Campanians of Rhegium at Rome, as certainly awaited those of Messana at Syracuse. Their only means of safety lay in delivering up the city either to the Carthaginians or to the Romans, both of whom could not but be so strongly set upon acquiring that important place as to overlook all other scruples. Whether it would be more advantageous to surrender it into the hands of the Phœnicians or those of the masters of Italy, was doubtful; after long hesitation the majority of the Campanians at length resolved to offer the possession of their sea-commanding fortress to the Romans.

270.

It was a moment of the deepest significance in the history of the world, when the envoys of the Mamertines appeared in the Roman senate. No one indeed could then anticipate all that was to depend on the crossing of that narrow arm of the sea; but that the decision, however it should go, would involve consequences far other and more important than had attached to any decree hitherto passed by the senate, must have been manifest to every one of the fathers of the city assembled in council. Strictly upright men might indeed ask how it was possible to hesitate at all, and how any one could even think of suggesting that the Romans should not only break their alliance with Hiero, but should, just after the Campanians of Rhegium had been punished by them with righteous severity, admit their no less guilty Sicilian accomplices to the alliance and friendship of the state, and thereby rescue them from the punishment which they deserved. Such an outrage on propriety would not only afford their adversaries matter for declamation, but must seriously offend all men of moral feeling. But even the statesman, with whom political morality was no mere phrase, might ask

The Mamertines received into the Italian confederacy.

in reply, how Roman burgesses, who had broken their military oath and treacherously murdered the allies of Rome, could be placed on a level with foreigners who had committed an outrage on foreigners, where no one had constituted the Romans judges of the one or avengers of the other? Had the question been only whether the Syracusans or Mamertines should rule in Messana, Rome might certainly have acquiesced in the rule of either. Rome was striving for the possession of Italy, Carthage for that of Sicily; the designs of the two powers scarcely then went further. But that very circumstance formed a reason why each desired to have and retain on its frontier an intermediate power (the Carthaginians for instance supporting Tarentum, the Romans Syracuse and Messana); and why, if that course was impossible, each preferred to have the places on the borders given over to itself rather than to its great rival. As Carthage had made an attempt in Italy, when Rhegium and Tarentum were about to be occupied by the Romans, to acquire these cities for itself, and had only been prevented from doing so by accident, so in Sicily an opportunity now offered itself for Rome to bring the city of Messana into its symmachy; should the Romans reject it, it was not to be supposed that the city would remain independent or would become Syracusan; they would themselves throw it into the arms of the Phœnicians. Were they justified in allowing an opportunity to escape, such as certainly would never recur, of making themselves masters of the natural *tête du pont* between Italy and Sicily, and of securing it by means of a brave garrison on which they could, for good reasons, depend? Were they justified in abandoning Messana, and thereby surrendering the command of the last free passage between the eastern and western seas, and sacrificing the commercial liberty of Italy? It is true that other objections might be urged to the occupation of Messana than mere scruples of feeling and of honourable policy. That it could not but lead to a war with Carthage, was the least of these; serious as was such a war, Rome might not fear it. But there was the more important objection that by crossing the sea the Romans would depart from the purely Italian and purely continental policy they had hitherto pursued; they would abandon the system by which their ancestors had founded the greatness of Rome, to enter upon another system, the results of which no one could foretell. It was one of those

moments when calculation fails, and when faith in men's own and in their country's destiny alone gives them courage to grasp the hand which beckons to them out of the darkness of the future, and to follow it they know not whither. Long and seriously the senate deliberated on the proposal of the consuls to lead the legions to the help of the Mamertines; it came to no decisive resolution. But the burgesses, to whom the matter was referred, were animated by a growing sense of the greatness of that power which their own energy had reared. The conquest of Italy encouraged the Romans, as that of Greece encouraged the Macedonians and that of Silesia the Prussians, to enter upon a new political career. A formal pretext for supporting the Mamertines was found in the protectorate which Rome claimed the right to exercise over all Italians. The transmarine Italians were received into the Italian confederacy;* and on the proposal of the consuls the citizens resolved to send them aid (489).

265.

Much depended on the way in which the two Sicilian powers, immediately affected by this intervention of the Romans in the affairs of the island, and both hitherto nominally in alliance with Rome, would regard her interference. Hiero had sufficient reason to treat the summons, by which the Romans required him to desist from hostilities against their new confederates in Messana, precisely in the same way as the Samnites and Lucanians in similar circumstances had treated the occupation of Capua and Thurii, and to answer the Romans by a declaration of war. If, however, he remained unsupported, such a war would be folly; and it might be expected from his prudent and moderate policy that he would acquiesce in what was inevitable, if Carthage should be disposed for peace. This seemed not impossible. A Roman embassy was now (489) sent to Carthage, seven years after the attempt of the Phœnician fleet to gain possession of Tarentum, to demand explanations as to that transaction (i. 423). Grievances not unfounded, but half forgotten, once more emerged; it seemed not superfluous amidst other warlike preparations to replenish the diplomatic armoury with reasons for war, and to be able to claim in the coming manifesto, as was the custom of the Romans, the character

Variance
between
Rome and
Carthage.

265.

* The Mamertines were admitted into precisely the same position towards Rome as the Italian communities, bound themselves to furnish ships (Cic. *Verr.* v. 19, 50), and, as the coins show did not possess the privilege of coining silver.

of the party aggrieved. This much at least might with entire justice be affirmed, that the respective enterprises at Tarentum and Messana stood upon exactly the same footing in point of design and of pretext, and that it was simply the accident of success that made the difference. Carthage avoided an open rupture. The ambassadors carried back to Rome a disavowal on the part of the Carthaginian admiral who had made the attempt on Tarentum, along with the requisite false oaths : the counter-complaints, which of course were not wanting on the part of Carthage, were studiously moderate, and abstained from characterizing the meditated invasion of Sicily as a ground for war. Such, however, it was ; for Carthage regarded the affairs of Sicily, as Rome regarded those of Italy, as internal matters in which an independent power could suffer none to interfere, and was determined to act accordingly. Only, Phœnician policy followed a gentler course than that of threatening open war. When the preparations of Rome for sending help to the Mamertines were at length so far advanced that the fleet formed of the war-vessels of Naples, Tarentum, Velia, and Locri, and the vanguard of the Roman land army under the military tribune Gaius Claudius, had appeared at Rhegium (in the spring of 490), unexpected news arrived from Messana that the Carthaginians, having come to an understanding with the anti-Roman party there, had as a neutral power arranged a peace between Hiero and the Mamertines ; that the siege had in consequence been raised ; and that a Carthaginian fleet lay in the harbour of Messana, and a Carthaginian garrison in the citadel, both under the command of admiral Hanno. The Mamertine citizens, now under Carthaginian influence, informed the Roman commanders, with due thanks for the federal help so speedily accorded to them, that they were glad that they no longer needed it. The adroit and daring officer who commanded the Roman vanguard nevertheless set sail with his troops. But the Carthaginians warned the Roman vessels to retire, and even made some of them prizes ; these, however, the Carthaginian admiral, remembering his strict orders to give no pretext for the outbreak of hostilities, sent back to his good friends on the other side of the straits. It almost seemed as if the Romans had compromised themselves as uselessly before Messana, as the Carthaginians before Tarentum. But Claudius did not allow himself to be deterred, and on a second attempt he

264.
Carthagi-
nians in
Messana.

succeeded in crossing. Scarcely had he landed when he called a meeting of the citizens ; and, at his wish, the admiral also appeared at the meeting, still imagining that he should be able to avoid an open breach. But the Romans seized his person in the assembly itself ; and Hanno and the Phœnician garrison in the citadel, weak and destitute of a leader, were pusillanimous enough, the former to give to his troops the command to retreat, the latter to comply with the orders of their captive general and to evacuate the city along with him. Thus the *tête de pont* of the island fell into the hands of the Romans. The Carthaginian authorities, justly indignant at the folly and weakness of their general, caused him to be executed, and declared war against the Romans. It was of especial importance to recover the lost place. A strong Carthaginian fleet, led by Hanno, son of Hannibal, appeared off Messana ; while the fleet blockaded the straits, the Carthaginian army landing from it began the siege on the north side. Hiero, who had only waited for the Carthaginian attack to begin the war with Rome, again brought up his army, which he had hardly withdrawn, against Messana, and undertook the attack on the south side of the city.

Messana
seized by
the Romans.

War be-
tween the
Romans and
the Cartha-
ginians and
Syracusans.

But meanwhile the Roman consul, Appius Claudius Caudex, had appeared at Rhegium with the main body of his army, and succeeded in crossing on a dark night in spite of the Carthaginian fleet. Audacity and fortune were on the side of the Romans ; the allies, not prepared for an attack by the whole Roman army and consequently not united, were beaten in detail by the Roman legions issuing from the city ; and thus the siege was raised. The Roman army kept the field during the summer, and even made an attempt on Syracuse ; but, when that had failed and the siege of Echetla (on the confines of the territories of Syracuse and Carthage) had to be abandoned with loss, the Roman army returned to Messana, and thence, leaving a strong garrison behind them, to Italy. The results obtained in this first campaign of the Romans out of Italy probably did not quite correspond to the expectations formed at home, for the consul had no triumph ; nevertheless, the energy which the Romans displayed in Sicily could not fail to make a great impression on the Sicilian Greeks. In the following year both consuls and an army twice as large entered the island unopposed ; and one of them, Marcus

Peace with
Hiero.

263.

Valerius Maximus, afterwards called from this campaign the "hero of Messana" (*Messalla*), achieved a brilliant victory over the allied Carthaginians and Syracusans. After this battle the Phœnician army no longer ventured to keep the field against the Romans; Alæsa, Centuripa, and the smaller Greek towns generally joined the victors, and Hiero himself abandoned the Carthaginian side and made peace and alliance with Rome (491). He pursued a judicious policy in joining the Romans as soon as it appeared that their interference in Sicily was in earnest, and while there was still time to purchase peace without cessions and sacrifices. The intermediate states in Sicily, Syracuse and Messana, which were unable to follow out a policy of their own and had only the choice between Roman and Carthaginian hegemony, necessarily preferred the former; because the Romans had not probably as yet formed the design of conquering the island for themselves but sought merely to prevent its being acquired by Carthage, and at all events Rome might be expected to substitute a juster treatment and due protection of commercial freedom for the tyrannizing and monopolizing system that Carthage pursued. Henceforth Hiero continued to be the most important, the steadiest, and the most esteemed ally of the Romans in the island.

Capture of
Agrigentum.

262.

The Romans had thus gained their immediate object. By their double alliance with Messana and Syracuse, and the firm hold which they had on the whole east coast, they secured the means of landing on the island and of maintaining—which hitherto had been a very difficult matter—their armies there; and the war, which had previously been doubtful and hazardous, lost in a great measure its character of risk. Accordingly, no greater exertions were made for it than for the wars in Samnium and Etruria; the two legions which were despatched to the island for the next year (492) sufficed, in concert with the Sicilian Greeks, to drive the Carthaginians everywhere into their fortresses. The commander-in-chief of the Carthaginians, Hannibal son of Gisco, threw himself with the flower of his troops into Agrigentum, to defend to the last that most important of the Carthaginian inland cities. Unable to storm a city so strong, the Romans blockaded it with entrenched lines and a double camp; the besieged, who numbered 50,000, soon suffered from want of provisions. To raise the siege the Carthaginian admiral Hanno landed at Heraclea, and cut off

in turn the supplies from the Roman besieging force. On both sides the distress was great. At length a battle was resolved on, to put an end to the state of embarrassment and uncertainty. In this battle the Numidian cavalry showed itself as superior to the Roman horse as the Roman infantry was superior to the Phœnician foot; the Roman infantry decided the victory, but the losses even of the Romans were very considerable. The result of the successful struggle was somewhat marred by the circumstance that, after the battle, during the confusion and fatigue of the conquerors, the beleaguered army succeeded in escaping from the city and in reaching the fleet. The victory was nevertheless of importance; Agrigentum fell into the hands of the Romans, and thus the whole island was in their power, with the exception of the maritime fortresses, in which the Carthaginian general Hamilcar, Hanno's successor in command, entrenched himself to the teeth, and was not to be driven out either by force or by famine. War ceased on the island; it was continued only by means of sallies from the Sicilian fortresses and descents on the Italian coasts, in a manner extremely injurious and annoying to the Romans.

In fact, the Romans now for the first time felt the real difficulties of the war. If, as we are told, the Carthaginian diplomatists before the outbreak of hostilities warned the Romans not to push the matter to a breach, because against their will no Roman could even wash his hands in the sea, the threat was well founded. The Carthaginian fleet ruled the sea without a rival, and not only kept the coast towns of Sicily in due obedience and provided them with all necessaries, but also threatened a descent upon Italy, for which reason it was necessary in 492 to retain a consular army there. No invasion on a large scale occurred; but smaller Carthaginian detachments landed on the Italian coasts and levied contributions on the allies of Rome, and, what was worst of all, completely paralyzed the commerce of Rome and her allies. The continuance of such a system for even a short time would suffice entirely to ruin Cære, Ostia, Neapolis, Tarentum, and Syracuse, while the Carthaginians easily consoled themselves for the loss of the tribute of Sicily with the contributions which they levied and the rich prizes of their privateering. The Romans now learned, what Dionysius, Agathocles, and Pyrrhus had learned before, that it was as difficult to conquer the Carthaginians

Beginning
of the ma-
ritime war.

The Romans
build a
fleet.

as it was easy to beat them in the field. They saw that everything depended on procuring a fleet, and resolved to form one of twenty triremes and a hundred quinqueremes. The execution, however, of this energetic resolution was not easy. The representation originating in the schools of the rhetoricians, which would have us believe that the Romans then for the first time dipped their oars in water, is no doubt a childish tale; the commercial marine of Italy must at this time have been very extensive, and there was no want even of Italian vessels of war. But these were war-barks and triremes, such as had been in use in earlier times; quinqueremes, which under the more modern system of naval warfare that had originated chiefly in Carthage were almost exclusively employed in the line, had not yet been built in Italy. The measure adopted by the Romans was therefore much as if a maritime state of the present day were to pass at once from the building of frigates and cutters to the building of ships of the line; and, just as in such a case now a foreign ship of the line would, if possible, be adopted as a pattern, the Romans referred their master shipbuilders to a stranded Carthaginian *penteres* as a model. No doubt the Romans, had they wished, might have sooner attained their object with the aid of the Syracusans and Massiliots; but their statesmen had too much sagacity to desire to defend Italy by means of a fleet not Italian. The Italian allies, however, were largely drawn upon both for the naval officers, who must have been for the most part taken from the Italian commercial marine, and for the sailors, whose name (*socii navales*) shows that for some time they were exclusively furnished by the allies; along with these, slaves provided by the state and the wealthier families were afterwards employed, and ere long also the poorer class of citizens. Under such circumstances, and when we take into account, as is but fair, on the one hand the then comparatively low state of shipbuilding and on the other hand the energy of the Romans, there is nothing incredible in the statement that the Romans solved within a year the problem—which baffled Napoleon—of converting a continental into a maritime power, and actually launched their fleet of 120 sail in the spring of 494. It is true, that it was by no means a match for the Carthaginian fleet in numbers and efficiency at sea; and these were points of the greater importance, as the naval tactics of the period consisted mainly in manœu-

ving. In the maritime warfare of that period hoplites and archers no doubt fought from the deck, and projectile machines were also plied from it; but the ordinary and really decisive method of action consisted in running foul of the enemy's vessels, for which purpose the prows were furnished with heavy iron beaks: the vessels engaged in battle were in the habit of sailing round each other till one or the other succeeded in giving the thrust, which usually proved decisive. Accordingly the crew of an ordinary Greek trireme, consisting of about 200 men, contained only about 10 soldiers, but, on the other hand, 170 rowers, from 50 to 60 on each deck; that of a quinquereme numbered about 300 rowers, and soldiers in proportion.

The happy idea occurred to the Romans that they might make up for what their vessels, with their unpractised officers and crews, necessarily lacked in ability of manœuvring, by again assigning a more considerable part in naval warfare to the soldiers. They stationed at the prow of each vessel a flying bridge, which could be lowered in front or on either side; it was furnished on both sides with parapets, and had space for two men in front. When the enemy's vessel was sailing up to strike the Roman one, or was lying alongside of it after the thrust had been evaded, the bridge on deck was suddenly lowered and fastened to its opponent by means of a grappling-iron: this not only prevented the running down, but enabled the Roman marines to pass along the bridge to the enemy's deck and to carry it by assault as in a conflict on land. No distinct body of marines was formed, but land troops were employed, when required, for this maritime service. In one instance as many as 120 legionaries fought in each ship on occasion of a great naval battle; in that case however the Roman fleet had at the same time a landing-army on board.

In this way the Romans created a fleet which was a match for the Carthaginians. Those err, who represent this building of a Roman fleet as a fairy tale, and besides they miss their aim; the feat must be understood in order to be admired. The construction of a fleet by the Romans was in very truth a noble national work—a work through which, by their clear perception of what was needful and of what was possible, by ingenuity in invention, and by energy in resolution and in execution, they rescued their country from a position of peril which was worse than at first it seemed.

Naval victory at Mylæ.

260.

The outset, however, was not favourable to the Romans. The Roman admiral, the consul Gnæus Cornelius Scipio, who had sailed for Messana with the first seventeen vessels ready for sea (494), fancied, when on the voyage, that he should be able to capture Lipara by a *coup de main*. But a division of the Carthaginian fleet stationed at Panormus blockaded the harbour of the island where the Roman vessels rode at anchor, and captured the whole squadron along with the consul without a struggle. This, however, did not deter the main fleet from likewise sailing, as soon as its preparations were completed, for Messana. On its voyage along the Italian coast it fell in with a Carthaginian reconnoitring squadron of less strength, on which it had the good fortune to inflict a loss more than counterbalancing the first loss of the Romans; and thus successful and victorious it entered the port of Messana, where the second consul Gaius Duilius took the command in room of his captured colleague. At the promontory of Mylæ, to the north-west of Messana, the Carthaginian fleet, that advanced from Panormus under the command of Hannibal, encountered the Roman, which here underwent its first trial on a great scale. The Carthaginians, seeing in the ill-sailing and awkward vessels of the Romans an easy prey, fell upon them in irregular order; but the newly invented boarding-bridges proved their thorough efficiency. The Roman vessels hooked and stormed those of the enemy as they came up one by one; they could not be approached either in front or on the sides without the dangerous bridge descending on the enemy's deck. When the battle was over, about fifty Carthaginian vessels, almost the half of the fleet, were sunk or captured by the Romans; among the latter was the ship of the admiral Hannibal, formerly belonging to king Pyrrhus. The gain was great; still greater the moral effect of the victory. Rome had suddenly become a naval power, and held in her hand the means of energetically terminating a war which threatened to be endlessly prolonged and to involve the commerce of Italy in ruin.

The war on the coasts of Sicily and Sardinia.

Two plans were open to the Romans. They might attack Carthage on the Italian islands and deprive her of the coast fortresses of Sicily and Sardinia one after another—a scheme which was perhaps practicable through well-combined operation by land and sea; and, in the event of its being accomplished, peace might either be concluded with Carthage on the

basis of the cession of these islands, or, should such terms not be accepted or prove unsatisfactory, the second stage of the war might be transferred to Africa. Or they might neglect the islands and throw themselves at once with all their strength on Africa, not, in the adventurous style of Agathocles, burning their vessels behind them and staking all on the victory of a desperate band, but covering with a strong fleet the communications between the African invading army and Italy; and in that case a peace on moderate terms might be expected from the consternation of the enemy after the first successes, or, if the Romans chose, they might, by pushing matters to an extremity, compel the enemy to entire surrender.

They chose, in the first instance, the former plan of operations. In the year after the battle of Mylæ (495) the consul Lucius Scipio captured the port of Aleria in Corsica—we still possess the tombstone of the general, which makes mention of this deed—and made Corsica a naval station against Sardinia. An attempt to establish a footing in Olbia on the northern coast of that island failed, because the fleet wanted troops for landing. In the succeeding year (496) it was repeated with better success, and the open villages along the coast were plundered; but no permanent establishment of the Romans took place. Nor was greater progress made in Sicily. Hamilcar conducted the war with energy and adroitness, not only by force of arms on sea and land, but also by political proselytism. Of the numerous small country towns some every year fell away from the Romans, and had to be laboriously reclaimed from the Phœnician grasp; while in the coast fortresses the Carthaginians maintained themselves without challenge, particularly in their head-quarters of Panormus and in their new stronghold of Drepana, to which, on account of its easier defence by sea, Hamilcar had transferred the inhabitants of Eryx. A second great naval engagement off the promontory of Tyndaris (497), in which both parties claimed the victory, made no change in the position of affairs. In this way no progress was made, whether in consequence of the divided command and the rapid changes in the commanders of the Roman troops, which rendered the concentrated management of a series of operations on a small scale exceedingly difficult, or from the general strategical relations of the case, which certainly, as the science of war then stood, were

259

258.

257.

Attack on
Africa.

256.

Naval vic-
tory of
Ecnomus.

unfavourable to the attacking party in general (i. 423), and particularly so to the Romans, who were still on the mere threshold of scientific warfare. Meanwhile, although the pillaging of the Italian coasts had ceased, the commerce of Italy suffered not much less than it had done before the fleet was built. Weary of a course of operations without results, and impatient to put an end to the war, the senate resolved to change its system, and to assail Carthage in Africa. In the spring of 498 a fleet of 330 ships of the line set sail for the coast of Libya: at the mouth of the river Himera on the south coast of Sicily it embarked the army for landing, consisting of four legions, under the charge of the two consuls Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius Volso, both experienced generals. The Carthaginian admiral suffered the embarkation of the enemy's troops to take place; but on continuing their voyage towards Africa the Romans found the Punic fleet drawn up in order of battle off Ecnomus to protect its native land from invasion. Seldom have greater numbers fought at sea than were engaged in the battle that now ensued. The Roman fleet of 330 sail contained at least 100,000 men in its crews, besides the landing army of about 40,000; the Carthaginian of 350 vessels was manned by at least an equal number; so that wellnigh three hundred thousand men were brought into action on this day to decide the contest between the two mighty peoples. The Phœnicians were placed in a single widely-extended line, with their left wing resting on the Sicilian coast. The Romans arranged themselves in a triangle, with the ships of the two consuls as admirals at the apex, the first and second squadrons drawn out in oblique line to the right and left, and a third squadron, having the vessels built for the transport of the cavalry in tow, forming the line which closed the triangle. They thus bore down in close order on the enemy. A fourth squadron placed in reserve followed more slowly. The wedge-shaped attack broke without difficulty the Carthaginian line, for its centre, which was first assailed, intentionally gave way, and the battle resolved itself into three separate engagements. While the admirals with the two squadrons drawn up on the wings pursued the Carthaginian centre and were closely engaged with it, the left wing of the Carthaginians drawn up along the coast wheeled round upon the third Roman squadron, which was prevented by the vessels which it had in tow

from following the two others, and by a vehement onset in superior force drove it against the shore; at the same time the Roman reserve was turned on the open sea, and assailed from behind, by the right wing of the Carthaginians. The first of these three engagements was soon at an end; the ships of the Carthaginian centre, manifestly much weaker than the two Roman squadrons with which they were engaged, took to flight. Meanwhile the two other divisions of the Romans had a severe encounter with the superior enemy; but in close fighting the dreaded boarding-bridges stood them in good stead, and by this means they succeeded in maintaining their ground till the two admirals with their vessels could come up. By their arrival the Roman reserve was relieved, and the Carthaginian vessels of the right wing retired before the superior force. And now, when this conflict had been decided in favour of the Romans, all the Roman vessels that still could keep the sea fell on the rear of the Carthaginian left wing, which was obstinately following up its advantage, so that it was surrounded and almost all the vessels composing it were taken. The losses otherwise were nearly equal. Of the Roman fleet 24 sail were sunk; of the Carthaginian 24 were sunk, and 64 were taken. Notwithstanding its considerable loss the Carthaginian fleet did not give up the protection of Africa, and with that view returned to the gulf of Carthage, where it expected the descent to take place and purposed to give battle a second time. But the Romans landed, not on the western side of the peninsula which helps to form the gulf, but on the eastern side, where the bay of Clupea presented a spacious harbour affording protection from almost all winds, and the town, situated close by the sea on a shield-shaped eminence rising out of the plain, supplied an excellent defence for the harbour. They disembarked the troops without hindrance from the enemy, and established themselves on the hill; in a short time an entrenched naval camp was constructed, and the land army was at liberty to commence operations. The Roman troops ranged over the land and levied contributions: they were able to send as many as 20,000 slaves to Rome. Through the rarest good fortune the bold scheme had succeeded at the first stroke, and with but slight sacrifices: the end seemed attained. The feeling of confidence that in this respect animated the Romans is evinced by the resolution of the senate to recall to Italy the

Landing of
Regulus in
Africa.

greater portion of the fleet and half of the army; Marcus Regulus alone remained in Africa with 40 ships, 15,000 infantry, and 500 cavalry. Their confidence, however, was seemingly not overstrained. The Carthaginian army, which was disheartened, did not venture forth into the plain, but waited to sustain discomfiture in the wooded defiles, in which it could make no use of its two best arms, the cavalry and the elephants. The towns surrendered *en masse*; the Numidians rose in insurrection, and overran the open country far and wide. Regulus might hope to begin the next campaign with the siege of the capital, and with that view he pitched his camp for the winter in its immediate vicinity at Tunes.

Vain negotiations for peace.

The spirit of the Carthaginians was broken: they sued for peace. But the conditions which the consul proposed—not merely the cession of Sicily and Sardinia, but the conclusion of an alliance on unequal terms with Rome, which would have bound the Carthaginians to renounce their own war-marine and to furnish vessels for the Roman wars—conditions which would have placed Carthage on a level with Neapolis and Tarentum, could not be accepted, so long as a Carthaginian army kept the field and a Carthaginian fleet kept the sea, and the capital stood unshaken. The mighty enthusiasm, which kindles into a noble flame among Oriental nations, even the most abased, on the approach of extreme peril—the energy of dire necessity—impelled the Carthaginians to exertions, such as were by no means expected from a nation of shopkeepers. Hamilcar, who had carried on the guerilla war against the Romans in Sicily with so much success, appeared in Libya with the *élite* of the Sicilian troops, who furnished an admirable nucleus for the newly levied force. The connections and gold of the Carthaginians, moreover, brought to them troop after troop of excellent Numidian horse, and also numerous Greek mercenaries; amongst whom was the celebrated captain Xanthippus of Sparta, whose talent for organization and strategical skill were of great service to his new masters.* While the Carthaginians were thus making their preparations in the

Preparations of Carthage.

* The statement, that the military talent of Xanthippus was the primary means of the salvation of Carthage, is probably coloured; the officers of Carthage can hardly have waited for foreigners to teach them that the light African cavalry could be more appropriately employed on the plain than among hills and forests.

course of the winter, the Roman general remained inactive at Tunes. Whether it was that he did not anticipate the storm which was gathering over his head, or that a sense of military honour prohibited him from doing what his position demanded—instead of renouncing a siege which he was not in a condition even to attempt, and shutting himself up in the stronghold of Clupea, he remained with a handful of men before the walls of the hostile capital, neglecting even to secure his line of retreat to the naval camp, and neglecting to provide himself with—what above all he wanted and what might have been so easily obtained through negotiation with the revolted Numidian tribes—a good light cavalry. He thus wantonly brought himself and his army into a situation similar to that which formerly befel Agathocles in his desperate adventure. When spring came (499), the state of affairs had so changed, that now the Carthaginians were the first to take the field and to offer battle to the Romans. It was very natural that they should do so, for everything depended on their getting quit of the army of Regulus, before reinforcements could arrive from Italy. The same reason should have led the Romans to desire delay; but, relying on their invincibleness in the open field, they at once accepted battle notwithstanding their inferiority of strength (for, although the numbers of the infantry on both sides were nearly the same, their 4000 cavalry and 100 elephants gave to the Carthaginians a decided superiority), and notwithstanding the unfavourable nature of the ground, where the Carthaginians were drawn up—a broad plain probably not far from Tunes. Xanthippus, who on this day commanded the Carthaginians, first threw his cavalry on that of the enemy, which was stationed, as usual, on the two wings of the line of battle; the few squadrons of the Romans were scattered like dust in a moment before the masses of the enemy's horse, and the Roman infantry found itself outflanked by them and surrounded. The legions, unshaken by their apparent danger, advanced to attack the enemy's line; and, although the row of elephants placed as a protection in front of it checked the right wing

255.

Defeat of
Regulus.

From such stories, the echo of the talk of Greek guard-rooms, even Polybius is not free.

The statement that Xanthippus was put to death by the Carthaginians after the victory, is a fiction; he departed voluntarily, perhaps to enter the Egyptian service.

and centre of the Romans, the left wing at any rate, marching past the elephants, engaged the mercenary infantry on the right of the enemy, and overthrew them completely. But this very success broke up the Roman ranks. The main body indeed, assailed by the elephants in front and by the cavalry on the flanks and in the rear, formed square, and defended itself with heroic courage, but the close masses were at length broken and swept away. The victorious left wing encountered the still fresh Carthaginian centre, where the Libyan infantry prepared a similar fate for it. From the nature of the ground and the superior numbers of the enemy's cavalry, all the combatants in these masses were cut down or taken prisoners; only two thousand men, chiefly, in all probability, the light troops and horsemen who were dispersed at the commencement, gained—while the Roman legions stood to be slaughtered—a start sufficient to enable them with difficulty to reach Clupea. Among the few prisoners was the consul himself, who afterwards died in Carthage; his family, under the idea that he had not been treated by the Carthaginians according to the usages of war, wreaked a most revolting vengeance on two noble Carthaginian captives, till even the slaves were moved to pity, and on their information the tribunes put a stop to the shameful outrage.*

Evacuation
of Africa.

When the terrible news reached Rome, the first care of the Romans was naturally directed to the saving of the force shut up in Clupea. A Roman fleet of 350 sail immediately started, and after a noble victory at the Hermæan promontory, in which the Carthaginians lost 114 ships, it reached Clupea just in time to deliver from their hard-pressed position the remains of the defeated army which were there entrenched. Had it been despatched ere the catastrophe occurred, it might have converted the defeat into a victory that would probably have put an end to the Punic wars. But so completely had the Romans now lost their judgment, that after a successful conflict before Clupea they embarked all their troops and

* Nothing further is known with certainty as to the end of Regulus; even his mission to Rome—which is sometimes placed in 503, sometimes in 513—is very imperfectly attested. The later Romans, who sought in the fortunes and misfortunes of their forefathers mere materials for school themes, made Regulus the type of heroic misfortune as they made Fabricius the type of heroic poverty, and circulated a number of anecdotes, invented by way of due accompaniment, in his name—incongruous embellishments, forming a sorry contrast to serious and sober history.

sailed home, voluntarily evacuating that important and easily defended position which secured to them facilities for landing in Africa, and abandoning their numerous African allies without protection to the vengeance of the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians did not neglect the opportunity of filling their empty treasury, and of making their subjects clearly understand the consequences of rebellion. An extraordinary contribution of 1000 talents of silver (£244,000) and 20,000 oxen was levied, and the sheiks in all the communities that had revolted were crucified—it is said that there were three thousand of them, and that this revolting atrocity on the part of the Carthaginian authorities really laid the foundation of the revolution which broke forth in Africa some years later. Lastly, as if to fill up the measure of misfortune to the Romans even as their measure of success had been filled before, on the homeward voyage of the fleet three-fourths of the Roman vessels perished with their crews in a violent storm; only eighty reached their port (July 499). The captains had foretold the impending mischief, but the extemporized Roman admirals had nevertheless given orders to sail.

255.

After successes so immense the Carthaginians were able to resume their offensive operations, which had long been in abeyance. Hasdrubal son of Hanno landed at Lilybæum with a strong force, which was enabled, particularly by its enormous number of elephants (they amounted to 140), to keep the field against the Romans: the last battle had shown that it was possible to make up for the want of good infantry to some extent by elephants and cavalry. The Romans also resumed the war in Sicily; the annihilation of their invading army had, as the voluntary evacuation of Clupea shows, at once restored ascendancy in the senate to the party which was opposed to the war in Africa and was content with the gradual subjugation of the islands. But for this purpose too there was need of a fleet; and, since that which had conquered at Mylæ, at Ecnomus, and at the Hermæan promontory was destroyed, they built a new one. Keels were at once laid down for 220 new vessels of war—they had never hitherto undertaken the building of so many simultaneously—and in the incredibly short space of three months they were all ready for sea. In the spring of 500 the Roman fleet, numbering 300 vessels mostly new, appeared on the north coast of Sicily; Panormus, the most im-

Recommencement
of the war
in Sicily.

254.

portant town in Carthaginian Sicily, was acquired through a successful attack from the seaboard, and the smaller places there, Soluntum, Cephalœdium, and Tyndaris, likewise fell into the hands of the Romans, so that along the whole north coast of the island Thermæ alone was retained by the Carthaginians. Panormus became thenceforth one of the chief stations of the Romans in Sicily. The war by land, nevertheless, made no progress: the two armies stood face to face before Lilybæum, but the Roman commanders, who knew not how to encounter the mass of elephants, made no attempt to compel a pitched battle.

253. In the ensuing year (501) the consuls, instead of pursuing sure advantages in Sicily, preferred to make an expedition to Africa, for the purpose not of landing but of plundering the coast towns. They accomplished their object without opposition; but, after having first run aground in the troublesome, and to their pilots unknown, waters of the Lesser Syrtis, whence they with difficulty got clear again, the fleet encountered a storm between Sicily and Italy, which cost more than 150 ships. On this occasion also the pilots, notwithstanding their representations and entreaties to be allowed to take the course along the coast, were obliged by command of the consuls to steer straight from Panormus across the open sea to Ostia.

Suspension
of the mari-
time war.

- Despondency now seized the fathers of the city; they resolved to reduce their war-fleet to sixty sail, and to confine the war by sea to the defence of the coasts and to the convoy of transports. Fortunately, just at this time, the languishing war in Sicily took a more favourable turn.

252. In the year 502, Thermæ, the last point which the Carthaginians held on the north coast, and the important island of Lipara, had fallen into the hands of the Romans, and in the following year (summer of 503) the consul Gaius Cæcilius

251.
Roman vic-
tory at Pa-
normus.

Metellus achieved a brilliant victory over the army of elephants under the walls of Panormus. These animals, which had been imprudently brought forward, were wounded by the light troops of the Romans stationed in the moat of the town; some of them fell into the moat, and others fell back on their own troops, who crowded in wild disorder along with the elephants towards the beach that they might be picked up by the Phœnician ships. One hundred and twenty elephants were captured, and the Carthaginian army, whose strength depended on these animals, was obliged

once more to shut itself up in its fortresses. Eryx soon fell into the hands of the Romans (505), and the Carthaginians retained nothing in the island but Drepana and Lilybæum. Carthage a second time offered peace; but the victory of Metellus and the exhaustion of the enemy gave to the more energetic party ascendancy in the senate.

249.

Peace was declined, and it was resolved to prosecute in earnest the siege of the two Sicilian cities and for this purpose to send to sea once more a fleet of 200 sail. The siege of Lilybæum, the first great and regular siege undertaken by Rome, and one of the most obstinate known in history, was opened by the Romans with an important success: they succeeded in introducing their fleet into the harbour of the city, and in blockading it on the side facing the sea. The besiegers, however, were not able to close the sea completely. In spite of their sunken vessels and their palisades, and in spite of the most careful vigilance, dexterous mariners, accurately acquainted with the shallows and channels, maintained with swift-sailing vessels a regular communication between the besieged in the city and the Carthaginian fleet in the harbour of Drepana. In fact, after a time, a Carthaginian squadron of 50 sail succeeded in running into the harbour, in throwing a large quantity of provisions and a reinforcement of 10,000 men into the city, and in returning unmolested. The besieging land army was not much more fortunate. They began with a regular attack; machines were erected, and in a short time the batteries had demolished six of the towers flanking the walls, so that the breach soon appeared to be practicable. But the able Carthaginian commander Himilco parried the assault by giving orders for the erection of a second wall behind the breach. An attempt of the Romans to enter into an understanding with the garrison was likewise frustrated in proper time. Lastly, after the besiegers had repulsed a first sally, the Carthaginians succeeded during a stormy night in burning the Roman set of machines. Upon this the Romans abandoned their preparations for an assault, and contented themselves with blockading the city by land and water. The prospect of success in this way was indeed very remote, so long as they were unable wholly to preclude the entrance of the enemy's vessels; and the army of the besiegers was in a condition not much better than that of the besieged in the city, because their supplies were frequently

Siege of
Lilybæum.

cut off by the numerous and bold light cavalry of the Carthaginians, and their ranks began to be thinned by the diseases indigenous to that unwholesome region. The capture of Lilybæum, however, was of sufficient importance to induce a patient perseverance in the laborious task, which promised to be crowned in time with the desired success.

Defeat of
the Roman
fleet before
Drepana.

But the new consul Publius Claudius considered the task of maintaining the investment of Lilybæum too trifling: he preferred to change once more the plan of operations, and with his numerous newly manned vessels suddenly to surprise the Carthaginian fleet which was waiting in the neighbouring harbour of Drepana. With the whole blockading squadron, which had taken on board volunteers from the legions, he started about midnight, and sailing in good order, with his right wing by the shore, and his left in the open sea, he safely reached the harbour of Drepana at sunrise. The Phœnician admiral Atarbas commanded there. Although surprised, he did not lose his presence of mind or allow himself to be shut up in the harbour, but as the Roman ships entered the harbour, which opens to the south in the form of a sickle, on the one side, he withdrew his vessels from it by the opposite entrance which was still free, and stationed them in line on the outside. No other course remained to the Roman admiral but to recall as speedily as possible the foremost vessels from the harbour, and to make his arrangements for battle in like manner in front of it; but in consequence of this retrograde movement he lost the free choice of position, and was obliged to accept battle in a line, which on the one hand was outflanked by that of the enemy to the extent of five ships (for there was not time fully to deploy the vessels as they issued from the harbour), and on the other hand was crowded so close on the shore that his vessels could neither retreat, nor sail behind the line so as to come to each other's aid. Not only was the battle lost ere it began, but the Roman fleet was so completely ensnared that it fell almost wholly into the hands of the enemy. The consul indeed escaped, as he was the first who fled; but 93 Roman vessels, more than three fourths of the blockading fleet, with the flower of the Roman legions on board, fell into the hands of the Phœnicians. It was the first and only great naval victory which the Carthaginians gained over the Romans. Lilybæum was practically relieved on the side towards the sea, for though the remains

of the Roman fleet returned to their former position, they were much too weak seriously to blockade a harbour which had never been wholly closed, and they could only protect themselves from the attack of the Carthaginian ships with the assistance of the land army. That single imprudent act of an inexperienced and criminally thoughtless officer had thrown away all that had been, with so much difficulty, attained by the long and galling warfare around the fortress; and such war-vessels of the Romans, as his presumption had not forfeited, were shortly afterwards destroyed by the folly of his colleague. The second consul, Lucius Junius Pullus, who had received the charge of lading at Syracuse the supplies destined for the army at Lilybæum, and of convoying the transports along the south coast of the island with a second Roman fleet of 120 war-vessels, instead of keeping his ships together, committed the error of allowing the first set of transports to depart unattended and of only following with the second. When the Carthaginian vice-admiral, Carthalo, who with a hundred select ships blockaded the Roman fleet in the port of Lilybæum, received the intelligence, he proceeded to the south coast of the island, cut off the two Roman squadrons from each other by interposing between them, and compelled them to take shelter in two harbours of refuge on the inhospitable shores of Gela and Camarina. The attacks of the Carthaginians were indeed bravely repulsed by the Romans with the help of the shore batteries, which had for some time been erected there as everywhere along the coast; but, as the Romans could not hope to effect a junction and continue their voyage, Carthalo could leave the elements to finish his work. The next great storm, accordingly, completely annihilated the two Roman fleets in their wretched roadsteads, while the Phœnician admiral easily weathered it on the open sea with his light and well-managed ships. The Romans, however, succeeded in saving the greater part of the crews and cargoes (505).

Annihila-
tion of the
Roman
transport
fleet.

249.

The Roman senate was in perplexity. The war had now reached its sixteenth year; and they seemed to be farther from their object in the sixteenth than in the first. In that war four large fleets had perished, three of them with Roman armies on board; a fourth select land army had been destroyed by the enemy in Libya; to say nothing of the numerous losses which had been occasioned by the minor

Perplexity
of the Ro-
mans.

252-247. naval engagements, and by the battles, and still more by the guerilla warfare and the diseases, in Sicily. What a multitude of human lives the war swept away may be seen from the fact, that the burgess-roll from 502 to 507 alone decreased by about 40,000, a sixth part of the whole; and this does not include the losses of the allies, who bore the whole brunt of the war by sea and, in addition, at least an equal proportion with the Romans of the war by land. Of the financial loss it is not possible to form any conception; but both the direct damage sustained in ships and *matériel*, and the indirect injury through the paralyzing of trade, must have been immense. An evil still greater than this was the exhaustion of all the methods by which they had sought to terminate the war. They had tried a landing in Africa with their forces fresh and in the full career of victory, and had totally failed. They had undertaken to carry Sicily town by town; the lesser places had fallen, but the two mighty naval strongholds of Lilybæum and Drepana stood more invincible than ever. What were they to do? In fact, there was to some extent reason for despondency. The fathers of the city became faint-hearted; they left matters simply to take their course, knowing well that a war protracted without object or end was more pernicious for Italy than the exhaustion of the last man and the last penny, but without that courage and confidence in the nation and in fortune, which could stimulate new sacrifices in addition to those that had already been lavished in vain. They did away with their fleet; at the most, they encouraged privateering, and with that view placed the war-vessels of the state at the disposal of captains who were ready to undertake a piratic warfare on their own account. The war by land was continued nominally, because they could not do otherwise; but they were content with observing the Sicilian fortresses, and maintaining, when necessary, what they possessed,—measures which, in the absence of a fleet, required a very numerous army and extremely costly preparations.

Now, if ever, the time had come when Carthage was in a position to humble her mighty antagonist. She, too, of course must have felt some exhaustion of resources; but, in the circumstances, the Punic finances could not possibly be so disorganized as to prevent the Carthaginians from continuing the war, which cost them little save money, offen-

sively and with energy. The Carthaginian government, however, was not energetic, but on the contrary weak and indolent, unless impelled to action by some easy and sure gain or by some extreme necessity. Glad to be rid of the Roman fleet, they foolishly allowed their own also to fall into decay, and began after the example of the enemy to confine their operations by land and sea to the petty warfare in and around Sicily.

Thus there ensued six years of uneventful warfare (506– 248–243. 511), the most inglorious in the history of this century for Rome, and inglorious also for the Carthaginian people. One Petty war in Sicily. man, however, among the latter thought and acted differently from his nation. Hamilcar, named Barak or Barca Hamilcar Barca. (i. e. lightning), a young officer of great promise, was intrusted with the supreme command in Sicily in the year 507. His army, like every Carthaginian one, was defective 247. in a trustworthy and experienced infantry; and the government, although it was perhaps in a position to create such an infantry and at any rate was bound to make the attempt, contented itself with passively looking on at its defeats, or at most with nailing the defeated generals to the cross. Hamilcar resolved to take the matter into his own hands. He knew well that his mercenaries were as indifferent to Carthage as to Rome, and that he had to expect from his government not Phœnician or Libyan conscripts, but at the utmost permission to save his country with his troops in his own way, provided it cost nothing. But he knew himself also, and he knew men. His mercenaries cared nothing for Carthage; but a true general is able to substitute his own person for his country in the affections of his soldiers; and such an one was this young commander. After he had habituated his men to face the legionaries in the warfare of outposts before Drepana and Lilybæum, he established himself with his force on Mount Ercte (Monte Pellegrino near Palermo), which commands like a fortress the neighbouring country; and making them settle there with their wives and children, levied contributions from the plains, while Phœnician privateers plundered the Italian coast as far as Cumæ. He thus provided his people with copious supplies without asking money from the Carthaginians, and, keeping up the communication with Drepana by sea, he threatened to surprise the important town of Panormus in his immediate vicinity. Not only were

the Romans unable to expel him from his stronghold, but after the struggle had lasted awhile at Ercte, Hamilcar formed for himself another similar position at Eryx. This mountain, which bore half way up a city of the same name and on its summit a temple of Aphrodite, had been hitherto in the hands of the Romans, who made it a basis for annoying Drepana. Hamilcar deprived them of the town and besieged the temple, while the Romans in turn blockaded him from the plain. The Celtic deserters from the Carthaginian army who were stationed by the Romans at the forlorn post of the temple—a reckless robber band, who in the course of this siege plundered the temple and perpetrated every sort of outrage—defended the summit of the rock with desperate courage; but Hamilcar did not allow himself to be again dislodged from the town, and kept his communications constantly open by sea with the fleet and the garrison of Drepana. The war in Sicily seemed to be assuming a turn still more unfavourable to the Romans. The Roman state was losing in that warfare its money and its men, and the Roman generals their honour; it was already clear that no Roman general was a match for Hamilcar, and the time might be calculated when even the Carthaginian mercenary would be able boldly to measure himself against the legionary. The privateers of Hamilcar appeared with ever-increasing audacity on the Italian coast: already a prætor had been obliged to take the field against a band of Carthaginian rovers which had landed there. A few years more, and Hamilcar might with his fleet have accomplished from Sicily what his son subsequently undertook by the land route from Spain.

A fleet built
by the
Romans.

The Roman senate, however, persevered in its inaction; the desponding party for once had the majority there. At length a number of sagacious and high-spirited men determined to save the state even without the interposition of the government, and to put an end to the ruinous Sicilian war. Successful corsair expeditions, if they had not raised the courage of the nation, had aroused energy and hope in a portion of the people; these had already joined together to form a squadron, burnt down Hippo on the African coast, and sustained a successful naval conflict with the Carthaginians off Panormus. By a private subscription (which had been resorted to in Athens also, but not on so magnificent a scale) the wealthy and patriotic Romans equipped a war fleet, the nucleus of which was supplied by the ships

built for privateering and the practised crews which they contained, and which altogether was far more carefully fitted out than had hitherto been the case in the shipbuilding of the state. This fact—that a number of citizens in the twenty-third year of a severe war voluntarily presented to the state two hundred ships of the line, manned by 60,000 sailors—probably stands unparalleled in the annals of history. The consul Gaius Lutatius Catulus, to whom fell the honour of conducting this fleet to the Sicilian seas, met with almost no opposition: the two or three Carthaginian vessels, with which Hamilcar had made his corsair expeditions, disappeared before the superior force, and almost without resistance the Romans occupied the harbours of Lilybæum and Drepana, the siege of which was now undertaken with energy by water and by land. Carthage was completely taken by surprise; even the two fortresses, weakly provisioned, were in great danger. A fleet was equipped at home; but with all the haste which they displayed, the year came to an end without any appearance of Carthaginian sails in the Sicilian waters; and when at length, in the spring of 513, the hurriedly prepared vessels appeared in the offing of Drepana, they deserved the name of a fleet of transports rather than that of a war fleet ready for action.

241.

The Phœnicians had hoped to land undisturbed, to disembark their stores, and to be able to take on board the troops requisite for a naval battle; but the Roman vessels intercepted them, and forced them, when about to sail from the island of Hiera (now Maritima) for Drepana, to accept battle near the little island of Ægusa (Favignano) (10 March, 513).

Victory of
Catulus at
the island
Ægusa.

241.

The issue was not for a moment doubtful; the Roman fleet, well built and manned, and admirably handled by the able prætor Publius Valerius Falto (for a wound received before Drepana still confined the consul Catulus to his bed), defeated at the first blow the heavily laden and poorly and inadequately manned vessels of the enemy; fifty were sunk, and with seventy prizes the victors sailed into the port of Lilybæum. The last great effort of the Roman patriots had borne fruit; it brought to them victory, and with victory peace.

The Carthaginians first crucified the unfortunate admiral—a step which did not mend the matter—and then despatched to the Sicilian general unlimited authority to conclude a peace. Hamilcar, who saw his heroic labours of seven years

Conclusion
of peace.

undone by the fault of others, had yet too much spirit to sacrifice either his military honour, or his nation, or his own designs. Sicily indeed could not be retained, seeing that the Romans had now command of the sea; and it was not to be expected that the Carthaginian government, which had vainly endeavoured to fill its empty treasury by a state-loan in Egypt, would make any further attempt to vanquish the Roman fleet. He therefore surrendered Sicily. The independence and integrity of the Carthaginian state and territory, on the other hand, were expressly recognized in the usual form. Rome bound herself not to enter into a separate alliance with the Carthaginian, and Carthage engaged not to enter into separate alliance with the Roman, *symmachy*—that is, with their respective subject or dependent communities; neither was to make war, or exercise sovereign rights, or undertake recruiting within the other's dominions.* The secondary stipulations included, of course, the gratuitous return of the Roman prisoners of war and the payment of a war-contribution; but the demand of Catulus that Hamilcar should deliver up his arms and the Roman deserters, was resolutely refused by Hamilcar, and with success. Catulus desisted from his second request, and allowed the Phœnicians a free departure from Sicily for the moderate ransom of 18 *denarii* (11s. 6d.) per man.

If the continuance of the war appeared to the Carthaginians undesirable, they had reason to be satisfied with these terms. It may be that the natural wish to bring to Rome peace as well as triumph, the recollection of Regulus and of the many vicissitudes of the war, the consideration that such a patriotic effort as had at last decided the victory could neither be enjoined nor repeated, perhaps even the personal character of Hamilcar, concurred in influencing the Roman generals to yield so far as they did. It is certain that there was dissatisfaction with the proposals of peace at Rome, and the assembly of the people, doubtless under the influence of the patriots who had effected the equipment of the last fleet, at first refused to ratify it. We do not know with what view this was done, and therefore we are unable to decide whether the opponents of

* The statement (Zon. viii. 17) that the Carthaginians had to promise that they would not send vessels of war into the territories of the Roman *symmachy*—and therefore not to Syracuse, perhaps even not to Massilia—sounds credible enough; but the text of the treaty says nothing of it (Polyb. iii. 27).

the proposed peace in reality rejected it merely for the purpose of exacting some further concessions from the enemy, or whether, remembering that Regulus had summoned Carthage to surrender her political independence, they were resolved to continue the war till they had gained that end—so that it was no longer a question of peace, but a question of conquest. If the refusal took place with the former view, it was probably mistaken; compared with the gain of Sicily every other concession was of little moment, and looking to the determination and the inventive genius of Hamilcar, it was very rash to stake the securing of the principal gain on the attainment of secondary objects. If on the other hand the party opposed to the peace regarded the complete political annihilation of Carthage as the only end of the struggle that would satisfy the Roman community, it displayed political tact and anticipation of coming events; but whether the resources of Rome would have sufficed to renew the expedition of Regulus and to pursue it as far as might be required not merely to break the courage but to breach the walls of the mighty Phœnician city, is another question, to which no one now can venture to give either an affirmative or a negative answer.

At last the settlement of the momentous question was intrusted to a commission which was to decide it upon the spot in Sicily. It confirmed the project in substance; only, the sum to be paid by Carthage for the costs of the war was raised to 3200 talents (£790,000), a third of which was to be paid down at once, and the remainder in ten annual instalments. The definitive treaty included, in addition to the surrender of Sicily, the cession also of the islands between Sicily and Italy, but this can only be regarded as an alteration of detail made on revision; for it is self-evident that Carthage, when surrendering Sicily, could hardly desire to retain the island of Lipara which had long been occupied by the Roman fleet, and the suspicion, that an ambiguous stipulation was intentionally introduced into the treaty, is unworthy and improbable.

Thus at length they came to terms. The unconquered general of a vanquished nation descended from the mountains which he had defended so long, and delivered to the new masters of the island the fortresses which the Phœnicians had held in their uninterrupted possession for at least four hundred years, and from whose walls all assaults of the

Hellenes had recoiled unsuccessful. The West had peace (513).

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Remarks on
the Roman
conduct of
the war.

Let us pause for a moment over the conflict, which extended the dominion of Rome beyond the circling sea that encloses the peninsula. It was one of the longest and most severe which the Romans ever waged; many of the soldiers who fought in the decisive battle were unborn when the contest began. Nevertheless, despite the incomparably noble incidents which it now and again presented, we can scarcely name any war which the Romans managed so wretchedly and with such vacillation, both in a military and in a political point of view. It could hardly be otherwise. The contest occurred amidst a transition in their political system—the transition from an Italian policy, which no longer sufficed, to the policy of a great state, which was not yet matured. The Roman senate and the Roman military system were excellently organized for a purely Italian policy. The wars which such a policy provoked were purely continental wars, and always rested on the capital, situated in the middle of the peninsula, as the primary basis of operations, and on the chain of Roman fortresses as a secondary basis. The problems to be solved were mainly tactical, not strategical; marches and operations occupied but a subordinate, battles held the first place; siege warfare was in its infancy; the sea and naval war hardly for a moment crossed men's thoughts. We can easily understand (especially if we bear in mind that in the battles of that period, where the naked weapon predominated, it was really the hand-to-hand encounter that proved decisive) how a deliberative assembly might direct such operations, and how any one who was mayor of the city might command the troops. All this was changed in a moment. The field of battle stretched away to an incalculable distance, to the unknown regions of another continent, and beyond broadly spreading seas; every wave might prove a pathway for the enemy, every harbour might send forth an invading fleet. The siege of strong places, particularly maritime fortresses, in which the first tacticians of Greece had failed, had now for the first time to be attempted by the Romans. A land army and the system of a civic militia no longer sufficed. It was necessary to create a fleet, and, what was more difficult, to employ it; it was necessary to find out the true points of attack and defence, to combine and to direct masses, to calculate and mutually

adjust expeditions extending over long periods and great distances; if these things were not attended to, even an enemy far weaker in the tactics of the field might easily vanquish a stronger opponent. Is there any wonder that the reins of government in such an exigency slipped from the hands of a deliberative assembly and of commanding burgomasters?

It was plain, that at the beginning of the war the Romans did not know what they were undertaking; it was only during the course of the struggle that the inadequacies of their system, one after another, forced themselves on their notice—the want of a naval power, the lack of fixed military leadership, the incapacity of their generals, the total uselessness of their admirals. In part these evils were remedied by energy and good fortune; as in the case of the construction of a fleet. That mighty creation, however, was but a grand makeshift, and always remained so. A Roman fleet was formed, but it was rendered national only in name, and was always treated with the affection of a stepmother; the naval service continued to be little esteemed in comparison with the high honour of serving in the legions; the naval officers were for the most part Italian Greeks; the crews were composed of subjects or even of slaves and outcasts. The Italian farmer was, and remained, distrustful of the sea; among the three things in his life which Cato regretted one was, that he had travelled by sea when he might have gone by land. This result arose partly out of the nature of the case, for the vessels were oared galleys and the service of the oar can scarcely be ennobled; but the Romans might at least have formed separate legions of marines and taken steps towards the rearing of a class of Roman naval officers. They might have taken advantage of the impulse of the nation and gradually effected the establishment of a naval force important not only in numbers but in sailing powers and practice, and for such a purpose they had an important nucleus in the privateering that was developed during the long war; but nothing of the sort was done by the government. Nevertheless the Roman fleet with its unwieldy grandeur was the noblest creation of genius in this war, and, as at its beginning, so at its close it was the fleet that turned the scale in favour of Rome.

Far more difficult to be overcome were those deficiencies, which could not be remedied without an alteration of the constitution. That the senate, according to the strength of

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the contending parties within it, should leap from one system of conducting the war to another, and perpetrate errors so incredible as the evacuation of Clupea and the reduction on several occasions of their fleet; that the general of one year should lay siege to Sicilian towns, and his successor, instead of urging their surrender, should pillage the African coast or think proper to risk a naval battle; and that at any rate the supreme command should by law change hands every year—all these anomalies could not be reformed without stirring constitutional questions the solution of which was more difficult than the building of a fleet, but as little could their retention be reconciled with the requirements of such a war. Above all, however, neither the senate nor the generals could at once accommodate themselves to the new mode of conducting war. The campaign of Regulus is an instance how singularly they adhered to the idea that superiority in tactics decides everything. There are few generals who have had such successes thrown as it were into their lap by fortune: in the year 498 he stood precisely where Scipio stood fifty years later, with this difference, that he had no Hannibal and no experienced army arrayed against him. But the senate withdrew half the army, as soon as they had satisfied themselves of the tactical superiority of the Romans; in blind reliance on that superiority the general remained where he was, to be beaten in strategy, and accepted battle when it was offered to him, to be beaten also in tactics. This was the more remarkable, as Regulus was an able and experienced general of his kind. The rustic method of warfare, by which Etruria and Samnium had been won, was the very cause of the defeat in the plain of Tunes. The principle, quite right in its own province, that every citizen is fit for a general, was no longer applicable; the new system of war demanded the employment of generals who had a military training and a military eye, and every burgomaster had not those qualities. The arrangement was however still worse, by which the chief command of the fleet was treated as an appanage to the chief command of the land army, and any one who chanced to be president of the city thought himself able to act the part not of general only, but of admiral too. The worst disasters which Rome suffered in this war, were attributable not to the storms and still less to the Carthaginians, but to the presumptuous folly of its own citizen-admirals.

Rome was victorious at last. But her acquiescence in a gain far less than had at first been demanded and indeed offered, as well as the energetic opposition which the peace encountered in Rome, very clearly indicate the indecisive and superficial character of the victory and of the peace; and if Rome was the victor, she was indebted for her victory, in part no doubt to the favour of the gods and to the energy of her citizens, but still more to the errors of her enemies in the conduct of the war—errors far surpassing even her own.

CHAPTER III.

THE EXTENSION OF ITALY TO ITS NATURAL BOUNDARIES.

Natural
boundaries
of Italy.

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264-241. THE Italian confederacy as it emerged from the crises of the fifth century—or, in other words, the State of Italy—united the various civic and cantonal communities from the Apennines to the Ionian Sea under the hegemony of Rome. But before the close of the fifth century these limits were already overpassed in both directions, and Italian communities belonging to the confederacy had sprung up beyond the Apennines and beyond the sea. In the north the republic, in revenge for ancient and recent wrongs, had already in 471 annihilated the Celtic Senones; in the south, through the great war from 490 to 513, it had dislodged the Phœnicians from the island of Sicily. In the north there belonged to the combination headed by Rome the Latin town of Ariminum (besides the burgess-settlement of Sena), in the south the community of the Mamertines in Messana, and as both were nationally of Italian origin, so both shared in the common rights and obligations of the Italian confederacy. It was probably the pressure of events at the moment rather than any comprehensive political calculation, that gave rise to these extensions of the confederacy; but it was natural that now at least, after the great successes achieved against Carthage, new and wider views of policy should dawn upon the Roman government—views which even otherwise were obviously enough suggested by the physical features of the peninsula. Alike in a political and in a military point of view, Rome was justified in shifting its northern boundary from the low and easily crossed Apennines to the mighty mountain-wall that separates northern from southern Europe,

the Alps, and in combining with the sovereignty of Italy the sovereignty of the seas and islands on the west and east of the peninsula; and now, when by the expulsion of the Phœnicians from Sicily the most difficult portion of the task had been already achieved, various circumstances united to facilitate its completion by the Roman government.

In the Western sea which engaged far more attention in Italy than the Adriatic, the most important position, the large and fertile island of Sicily copiously furnished with harbours, had been by the peace with Carthage transferred for the most part into the possession of the Romans. King Hiero of Syracuse indeed, who during the last twenty-two years of the war had adhered with unshaken steadfastness to the Roman alliance, had a fair claim to an extension of territory; but if Roman policy had begun the war with the resolution of tolerating only secondary states in the island, the views of the Romans at its close decidedly turned towards the seizure of Sicily for themselves. Hiero might be content that his territory—namely, in addition to the immediate district of Syracuse, the domains of Elorus, Neetum, Acræ, Leontini, Megara, and Tauromenium—and his independence in relation to foreign powers, were (for want of any pretext to curtail them) left to him in their former compass; he might well be content that the war between the two great powers had not ended in the complete overthrow of the one or of the other, and that there consequently still remained at least a possibility of the continuance of an intermediate power in Sicily. In the remaining and by far the larger portion of Sicily, at Panormus, Lilybæum, Agrigentum, Messana, the Romans permanently settled themselves, and only regretted that the possession of that beautiful island was not enough to convert the western waters into a Roman inland sea, so long as Sardinia still remained Carthaginian. Soon, however, after the conclusion of the peace, there appeared an unexpected prospect of wresting from the Carthaginians the second island of the Mediterranean. In Africa, immediately after peace had been concluded with Rome, the mercenaries and the subjects of the Phœnicians joined in a common revolt. The blame of the dangerous insurrection was mainly chargeable on the Carthaginian government. In the last years of the war Hamilcar had not been able to pay his Sicilian mercenaries as formerly from his own resources, and he had vainly requested that

Sicily a dependency of Italy.

Sardinia Roman.

The Libyan insurrection.

money might be sent to him from home; he might, he was told, send his forces to Africa to be paid off. He obeyed; but as he knew the men, he prudently embarked them in small subdivisions, that the authorities might pay them off by troops or might at least separate them, and he then laid down his command. But all his precautions were thwarted not so much by the emptiness of the exchequer, as by the bureaucratic mode of transacting business and the folly of the government. They waited till the whole army was once more united in Libya, and then endeavoured to curtail the pay promised to the men. Of course a mutiny broke out among the troops, and the hesitating and cowardly demeanour of the authorities showed the mutineers what they might dare. Most of them were natives of the districts ruled by, or dependent on, Carthage; they knew the feelings which had been provoked throughout these districts by the official slaughter after the expedition of Regulus (P. 47) and by the fearful pressure of taxation, and they knew also the character of their government, which never kept faith and never pardoned; they were well aware of what awaited them, should they disperse to their homes with pay exacted by mutiny. The Carthaginians had for long been digging the mine, and they now themselves filled it with men who could not but explode it. Like wildfire the revolution spread from garrison to garrison, from village to village; the Libyan women contributed their ornaments to pay the wages of the mercenaries; a number of Carthaginian citizens, amongst whom were some of the most distinguished officers of the Sicilian army, became the victims of the infuriated multitude; Carthage was already besieged on two sides, and the Carthaginian army marching out of the city was totally routed in consequence of the blundering of its unskilful leader.

241. When the Romans thus saw their hated and still much-dreaded foe involved in a greater danger than any ever occasioned by the Roman wars, they began more and more to regret the conclusion of the peace of 513 (which, if it was not in reality precipitate, now at least appeared so to all), and to forget how exhausted at that time their own state had been and how powerful had been their Carthaginian rival. Shame indeed forbade their entering into communication openly with the Carthaginian rebels; in fact, they gave an exceptional permission to the Carthaginians

to levy recruits for this war in Italy, and prohibited Italian mariners from dealing with the Libyans. But it may be doubted whether the government of Rome was very earnest in these acts of friendly alliance; for, in spite of them, the dealings between the African insurgents and the Roman mariners continued, and when Hamilcar, whom the extremity of the peril had recalled to command the Carthaginian army, had seized and imprisoned a number of Italian captains concerned in these dealings, the senate interceded for them with the Carthaginian government and procured their release. The insurgents themselves appeared to recognize in the Romans their natural allies. The garrisons in Sardinia, which like the rest of the army had declared in favour of the insurgents, offered the possession of the island to the Romans, when they saw that they were unable to hold it against the attacks of the unconquered mountaineers of the interior (about 515); and a similar offer came even from the community of Utica, which had likewise taken part in the revolt and was now hard pressed by the arms of Hamilcar. The latter offer was declined by the Romans, chiefly doubtless because its acceptance would have carried them beyond the natural boundaries of Italy and therefore further than the Roman government was then disposed to go; on the other hand they entertained the proposals of the Sardinian mutineers, and received from them the portion of Sardinia which had been in the hands of the Carthaginians (516). In this instance, more than in the affair of the Mamertines, the Romans were justly liable to the reproach that a great and victorious nation had not disdained to fraternize and share the spoil with a venal rabble of mercenaries, and had not sufficient self-denial to prefer the course enjoined by justice and by honour to the gain of the moment. The Carthaginians, whose troubles reached their height just about the period of the occupation of Sardinia, were silent for the time being as to the unwarrantable violence; but, after their peril had been, contrary to the expectations and probably contrary to the hopes of the Romans, averted by the genius of Hamilcar, and Carthage had been restored to her full sovereignty in Africa (517), Carthaginian envoys immediately appeared at Rome to require the restitution of Sardinia. But the Romans, not inclined to restore their booty, replied with frivolous or at any rate irrelevant complaints as to all sorts of injuries, which they alleged that the

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237.

Corsica.

Carthaginians had inflicted on the Roman traders, and hastened to declare war;* the principle, that in political power is the measure of right, appeared in its naked effrontery. Just resentment urged the Carthaginians to accept that offer of war; had Catulus insisted upon the cession of Sardinia five years before, the war would probably have pursued its course. But now, when both islands were lost, when Libya was in a ferment, and when the state was weakened to the utmost by its twenty-four years' struggle with Rome and the dreadful civil war that had raged for nearly five years more, they were obliged to submit. It was only after repeated entreaties, and after the Phœnicians had bound themselves to pay to Rome a ransom of 1200 talents (£292,000) for the warlike preparations which had been wantonly begun, that the Romans reluctantly desisted from war. Thus the Romans acquired Sardinia almost without a struggle; to which they added Corsica, the ancient possession of the Etruscans, where perhaps some detached Roman garrisons still remained over from the last war (P. 41). In Sardinia, however, and still more in the rugged Corsica, the Romans restricted themselves, just as the Phœnicians had done, to an occupation of the coasts. With the natives in the interior they were continually engaged in war, or to speak more correctly in hunting them like wild beasts; they baited them with dogs, and carried what they captured to the slave market; but they undertook no real conquest. They had occupied the island not on its own account, but for the security of Italy. Now that the confederacy possessed the three large islands, it might call the Tyrrhene Sea its own.

Method of
administra-
tion in the
transmarine
possessions.

The acquisition of the islands in the western sea of Italy introduced into the state administration of Rome a distinction, which to all appearance originated in mere considerations of convenience and almost accidentally, but nevertheless came to be of the deepest importance in the sequel—the distinction between the continental and transmarine forms of administration, or to use the appellations afterwards

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* That the cession of the islands lying between Sicily and Italy, which the peace of 513 prescribed to the Carthaginians, did not include the cession of Sardinia, is an ascertained fact; but the statement, that the Romans made that a pretext for their occupation of the island three years after the peace, is ill attested. Had they done so, they would merely have added diplomatic folly to political effrontery.

current, the distinction between Italy and the Provinces. Hitherto the two chief magistrates of the community, the consuls, had no legal limit to their field of action; on the contrary that field of action extended as far as the Roman government itself. Of course, however, in practice they made a division of functions between them, and, of course also, they were bound in every particular department of their allotted field by the existing enactments in regard to it; the jurisdiction, for instance, over Roman citizens had in every case to be left to the prætor, and in the Latin or other autonomous communities the existing treaties had to be respected. The four quæstors who had been since 487 distributed throughout Italy did not, formally at least, curtail the consular authority, for in Italy just as in Rome, they were regarded simply as auxiliary magistrates dependent on the consuls. This mode of administration appears to have been at first extended also to the territories taken from Carthage, and Sicily and Sardinia were governed for some years by quæstors under the superintendence of the consuls; but the Romans must very soon have become practically convinced that it was indispensable to have chief magistrates specially appointed for the transmarine regions. As they were obliged to abandon the concentration of the Roman jurisdiction in the person of the prætor as the community extended, and to send to the more remote districts depute judges (i. 449), so now (527) the concentration of administrative and military power in the person of the consuls had to be abandoned. For each of the new transmarine regions—viz. Sicily, and Sardinia with Corsica annexed to it—there was appointed a special auxiliary consul, who was in rank and title inferior to the consul and equal to the prætor, but otherwise was—like the consul in earlier times before the prætorship was instituted—in his own sphere of action at once commander-in-chief, chief magistrate, and supreme judge. The direct administration of finance alone was withheld from these new chief magistrates, as from the first it had been withheld from the consuls (i. 260); one or more quæstors were assigned to them, who were in all respects dependent on them and were regarded officially as sons, as it were, in the household of their respective prætors, but had specially to manage the finances and to render account of their administration to the senate after having laid down their office.

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Provincial prætors.

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Organiza-
tion of the
provinces.

Commer-
cium.

Property.

Autonomy.

This difference in the supreme administrative power was the only legal distinction between the continental and transmarine possessions. The principles in other respects, on which Rome had organized her dependencies in Italy, were transferred also to the extra-Italian districts. As a matter of course, these communities without exception forfeited their independence in external relations. As to internal intercourse, no provincial could thenceforth acquire valid property in the province out of the bounds of his own community, or perhaps even conclude a valid marriage. On the other hand the Roman government tolerated, at least in Sicily, the federative organization of the cities, which was fraught with little danger, and even the general Sicilian diets with their harmless right of petition and complaint.* In monetary arrangements it was not practicable at once to declare the Roman currency to be the only valid tender in the islands; but it seems from the first to have obtained legal circulation, and in like manner, at least as a rule, the right of coining the precious metals seems to have been withdrawn from the cities in Roman Sicily.† On the other hand not only was the landed property in all Sicily left untouched (the principle, that the land out of Italy fell by right of war to the Romans as their property, was still unknown in this century), but all the Sicilian and Sardinian communities retained self-administration and some sort of autonomy. The democratic constitutions were no doubt set aside in all the communities, and in every city the power was transferred to the hands of a council representing the civic aristocracy; and the Sicilian communities, at least, were required to institute a general valuation corresponding to the Roman census every fifth year. But both these measures were only the necessary result of subordination to the Roman senate,

* That this was the case may be inferred partly from the appearance of the "Siculi" against Marcellus (Liv. xxvi. 26, seq.), partly from the "conjoint petitions of all the Sicilian communities" (Cicero, *Verr.* ii. 42, 102; 45, 114; 50, 146; iii. 88, 204), partly from well-known analogy (Marquardt, *Handb.* iii. 1, 267). Because there was no *commercium* between the different nations, it by no means follows that there was no *concilium*.

† The right of coining gold and silver was not monopolized by Rome in the provinces so strictly as in Italy, evidently because gold and silver money not struck after the Roman standard was of less importance. But in their case too the mints were doubtless, as a rule, restricted to the coinage of copper, or at most silver, small money; even the most favourably treated communities of Roman Sicily, such as the Mamertines, the Centuripans, the Alæsinæ, the Segestans, and the Panormitans also in the main, coined only copper.

which in reality could not conduct the government with Greek *ecclesiæ*, or without a view of the financial and military resources of each dependent community; in the various districts of Italy also the same course was in both respects pursued.

But, side by side with this essential equality of rights, Tenths and customs. there was established a distinction between the Italian communities on the one hand, and the transmarine communities on the other—a distinction indeed only *de facto*, but yet very important in its effects. The transmarine communities furnished no fixed contingent to the army or fleet of the Romans;* and they lost the right of arms—at least so far that they could not be employed otherwise than on the summons of the Roman prætor for the defence of their own homes, and that the Roman government was at liberty to send Italian troops at its pleasure into the islands. In lieu of contingents a tenth of the field-produce of Sicily, and a tax of 5 per cent. on the value on all articles of commerce exported from or imported to the Sicilian harbours, were paid to Rome. Neither tax was in itself new. The imposts levied by the Persian king and the Carthaginian republic were substantially of the same character with that tenth; and in Greece also such a taxation had for long been, after Oriental precedent, associated with the Tyrannis and often also with a Hegemony. The Sicilians, in particular, had long paid their tenth either to Syracuse or to Carthage, and had long levied customs-dues on account of others. “We received,” says Cicero, “the Sicilian communities into our clientship and protection on such a footing, that they continued under the same law under which they had lived before, and obeyed the Roman community in the same manner in which they had obeyed their own rulers.” It is fair that this should not be overlooked; but to continue an injustice is to commit injustice. Viewed in relation not to the subjects, who merely changed masters, but to their new rulers, the abandonment of the equally wise and magnanimous principle of Roman statesmanship—viz., that Rome should accept from her subjects simply military aid, and never pecuniary compensation in lieu of it,—was of a fatal importance, in comparison with which all alleviations in the rates and the

* This is implied in Hiero's expression (Liv. xxii. 37): that he knew that the Romans made use of none but Roman and Latin infantry and cavalry, and employed “foreigners” at most only among the light-armed troops.

Communi-
ties ex-
empted.

mode of levying them, as well as all exceptions in detail, were as nothing. Such exceptions were, no doubt, made in various cases. Messana was directly admitted to the confederacy of the *togati*, and, like the Greek cities in Italy, furnished its contingent to the Roman fleet. Various other cities—Segesta and Halicyæ, which were the first towns of Carthaginian Sicily that joined the Roman alliance, Centuripa, an inland town on the east of the island, which was destined to keep a watch over the Syracusan territory in its neighbourhood,* Alæsa on the northern coast, which was the first of the free Greek towns to join the Romans, and above all Panormus, hitherto the capital of Carthaginian, and now destined to become that of Roman, Sicily—while not admitted to the Italian military confederacy, yet received in addition to other favours immunity from tribute and tenths, so that their position in a financial point of view was even more favourable than that of the Italian communities. The Romans thus applied to Sicily also the ancient rule of their policy, by subdividing the dependent communities into carefully graduated classes with different privileges; but the Sardinian and Sicilian communities on the whole occupied a position not of dependent alliance, but of recognized tributary subjection.

Italy and
the pro-
vinces.

It is true, that this thorough distinction between the communities that furnished contingents and those that paid tribute or at least did not furnish contingents, was not in law necessarily coincident with the distinction between Italy and the provinces. Transmarine communities might belong to the Italian confederacy; the Mamertines for example were substantially on a level with the Italian Sabelians, and there even existed no legal obstacle to the establishment of new communities with Latin rights in Sicily and Sardinia any more than in the country beyond the Apennines. Communities on the mainland might be deprived of the right of bearing arms and become tributary; this was already the case with certain Celtic districts on the Po, and the plan was adopted to a considerable extent in after times. But, in reality, the communities that fur-

* This is shown at once by a glance at the map, and also by the remarkable exceptional provision which allowed the Centuripans to settle in any part of Sicily. They required, as Roman spies, the utmost freedom of movement. Besides, Centuripa appears to have been among the first cities that went over to Rome (Diodorus, l. xxiii. p. 501).

nished contingents as decidedly preponderated on the mainland as the tributary communities in the islands; and while Italian settlements were not contemplated on the part of the Romans either in Sicily with its Hellenic civilization or in Sardinia, the Roman government had beyond doubt already determined not only to subdue the barbarian land between the Apennines and the Alps, but also, as their conquests advanced, to establish in it new communities of Italic origin and Italic rights. Thus their transmarine possessions were not merely reduced to a state of subjection, but were destined to remain subject in all time to come; whereas the official field recently marked off by law for the consuls, or, which is the same thing, the continental territory of the Romans, was to become a new and more extended Italy, which should reach from the Alps to the Ionian sea. In the first instance, indeed, this essentially geographical conception of Italy was not altogether coincident with the political conception of the Italian confederacy; it was partly wider, partly narrower. But even now the Romans regarded the whole space up to the boundary of the Alps as *Italia*, that is, as the present or future domain of the *togati*, and, just as was and still is the case in North America, the boundary was provisionally marked off in a geographical sense, that the field might be gradually occupied in a political sense also with the advance of colonization.*

* This distinction between Italy as the Roman mainland or consular province on the one hand, and the transmarine territory or prætorial provinces on the other, already appears variously applied in the sixth century. The ritual rule, that certain priests should not leave Rome (Val. Max. i. 1, 2), was explained to mean, that they were not allowed to cross the sea (Liv. *Ep.* 19, xxviii. 51. Tac. *Ann.* iii. 58, 71; Cic. *Phil.* xi. 8, 18; comp. Liv. xxviii. 38, 44, *Ep.* 59). The distinction is still more definitely brought out in the interpretation which was proposed in 544 to be put upon the old rule, that the consul could nominate the dictator only on "Roman ground": viz. that "Roman ground" comprehended all Italy (Liv. xxvii. 5). The erection of the Celtic land between the Alps and Apennines into a special province, distinct from that of the consuls and regularly subject to a separate chief magistrate, was the work of Sulla. Of course no one will consider it an objection to this view, that already in the sixth century Gallia or Ariminum is very often designated as the "official district" (*provincia*), ordinarily of one of the consuls. *Provincia*, as is well known, denoted in the older language not what we now call *province*, a definite space assigned as a district to a standing chief magistrate, but simply the functions prescribed for the particular magistrate by law, decree of the senate, or agreement; and in that sense it was certainly allowable, and was even for a time the rule, that one of the consuls should undertake the government of Northern Italy.

Events on
the Adri-
atic coasts.

244.

*

247-225.

In the Adriatic sea, at the entrance of which the important and long-contemplated colony of Brundisium had at length been founded before the close of the war with Carthage (510), the supremacy of Rome was from the very first decided. In the western sea Rome had been obliged to rid herself of rivals; in the eastern, the quarrels of the Hellenes themselves prevented any of the states in the Grecian peninsula from acquiring or retaining power. The most considerable of them, that of Macedon, had through the influence of Egypt been dislodged from the upper Adriatic by the Ætolians and from the Peloponnesus by the Achæans, and was scarcely even in a position to defend its northern frontier against the barbarians. How desirous the Romans were to keep down Macedonia and its natural ally, the king of Syria, and how closely they associated themselves with the Egyptian policy directed to that object, is shown by the remarkable offer which after the end of the war with Carthage they made to king Ptolemy III. Euergetes, to support him in the war which he waged with Seleucus II. Callinicus of Syria (who reigned 507-529) on account of the murder of Berenice, and in which Macedonia had probably taken part with the latter. Generally, the relations of Rome with the Hellenistic states became closer; the senate already negotiated even with Syria, and interceded with the Seleucus just mentioned on behalf of the Ilions, with whom the Romans claimed affinity.

No direct interference of the Romans in the affairs of the eastern powers took place for the present, simply because Rome had no need for her own ends to interfere. The Achæan league, the prosperity of which was arrested by the narrow-minded coterie-policy of Aratus, the Ætolian republic of military adventurers, and the decayed Macedonian empire kept down each other's power without the necessity of Roman intervention for the purpose; and the Romans of that time avoided rather than sought transmarine acquisitions. When the Acarnanians, appealing to the ground that they alone of all the Greeks had taken no part in the destruction of Ilion, besought the descendants of Æneas to help them against the Ætolians, the senate did indeed try a diplomatic mediation; but when the Ætolians returned an answer drawn up in their own saucy fashion, the antiquarian interest of the Roman senators by no means provoked them into undertaking a war, by which they would have freed the Macedonians from their hereditary foe (about 515).

239.

Even the evil of piracy, which was naturally in such a Illyrian state of matters almost the only trade that flourished on piracy. the Adriatic coast, and from which the commerce of Italy suffered greatly, was submitted to by the Romans with an undue measure of patience,—a patience intimately connected with their radical aversion to maritime war and their wretched marine. But at length it became too flagrant. Favoured by Macedonia, which no longer found occasion to continue its old function of protecting Hellenic commerce from the corsairs of the Adriatic for the benefit of its foes, the rulers of Scodra had induced the Illyrian tribes—nearly corresponding to the Dalmatians, Montenegrins, and northern Albanians of the present day—to unite in joint piratical expeditions on a great scale. With whole squadrons of their swift-sailing vessels with two banks of oars, the well known “Liburnian” cutters, the Illyrians waged war by sea and along the coasts against all and sundry. The Greek settlements in these regions, the island-towns of Issa (Lissa) and Pharos (Lesina), the important ports of Epidamnus (Durazzo) and Apollonia (to the north of Avlone on the Aous) of course suffered especially, and were repeatedly beleaguered by the barbarians. Further to the south, moreover, the corsairs established themselves in Phœnice, the most flourishing town of Epirus; partly voluntarily, partly by constraint, the Epirots and Acarnanians entered into an unnatural symmarchy with the foreign freebooters; the coast was insecure even as far as Elis and Messene. In vain the Ætolians and Achæans collected what ships they had, with a view to check the evil: in a battle on the open sea they were beaten by the pirates and their Grecian allies; the corsair fleet was able at length to take possession even of the rich and important island of Corcyra (Corfu). The complaints of Italian mariners, the appeals for aid of their old allies the Apolloniates, and the urgent entreaty of the besieged Issæans at length compelled the Roman senate to send at least ambassadors to Scodra. The brothers Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius went thither to demand that king Agron should put an end to the nuisance. The king answered that according to the common law of the Illyrians piracy was a lawful trade, and that the government had no right to put a stop to privateering; whereupon Lucius Coruncanius replied, that in that case Rome would make it her business to introduce better law among the Illyrians.

229.
Expedition
against
Scodra.

For this, certainly not very diplomatic, reply both envoys were—by the king's orders, as the Romans asserted—murdered on their way home, and the surrender of the murderers was refused. The senate had now no choice left to it. In the spring of 525 a fleet of 200 ships of the line, with a landing-army on board, appeared before Apollonia; the corsair-vessels vanished before the former, while the latter demolished the piratic strongholds; the queen Teuta, who after the death of her husband Agron conducted the government during the minority of her son Pinnes, besieged in her last retreat, was obliged to accept the conditions dictated by Rome. The rulers of Scodra were again confined both on the north and south to the original limits of their narrow domain, and had to quit their hold not only on the Greek towns, but also on the Ardiæi in Dalmatia, the Parthini around Epidamnus, and the Atintanes in northern Epirus; no armed Illyrian vessel, and not more than two unarmed in company, were to be allowed in future to sail to the south of Lissus (Alessio, between Scutari and Durazzo). The maritime supremacy of Rome in the Adriatic was asserted, in such a way as to secure the highest commendation and most permanent recognition, by the rapid and energetic suppression of the evil of piracy.

Acquisition
of territory
in Illyria.

But the Romans went further, and firmly established themselves on the east coast. The Illyrians of Scodra were rendered tributary to Rome; Demetrius of Pharos, who had passed over from the service of Teuta to that of the Romans, was installed, as a dependent dynast and ally of Rome, over the islands and coasts of Dalmatia; the Greek cities Corcyra, Epidamnus, Apollonia, and the communities of the Atintanes and Parthini were attached to Rome under mild forms of symmarchy. These acquisitions on the east coast of the Adriatic were not sufficiently extensive to require the appointment of a special auxiliary consul; governors of subordinate rank appear to have been sent to Corcyra and perhaps also to other places, and the superintendence of these possessions seems to have been intrusted to the chief magistrates who administered Italy.*

* A standing Roman commandant of Corcyra is apparently mentioned in Polyb. xxii. 15, 6 (erroneously translated by Liv. xxxviii. 11, comp. xlii. 37), and a similar one in the case of Issa in Liv. xliii. 9. We have, moreover, the analogy of the *præfectus pro legato insularum Balarum* (Orelli, 732), and of the governor of Pandataria (C. I. N. 3528). It appears, accordingly, to have

Thus the most important maritime stations in the Adriatic became subject, like Sicily and Sardinia, to the authority of Rome. What other result was to be expected? Rome was in want of a good naval station in the upper Adriatic,—a want which was not supplied by her possessions on the Italian shore; her new allies, especially the Greek commercial towns, saw in the Romans their deliverers, and doubtless did what they could permanently to secure so powerful a protection; in Greece itself no one was in a position to oppose the movement; on the contrary, the praise of the liberators was on every one's lips. It may be a question whether there was greater rejoicing or shame in Hellas, when, in place of the ten ships of the line of the Achæan league, the most warlike power in Greece, two hundred sail belonging to barbarians now entered her harbours and accomplished at a blow a task, which properly belonged to the Greeks, but in which they had failed so miserably. But if the Greeks were ashamed that the salvation of their oppressed countrymen had to come from abroad, they accepted the deliverance at least with a good grace; they did not fail to receive the Romans solemnly into the fellowship of the Hellenic nation by admitting them to the Isthmian games and the Eleusinian mysteries.

Impression
in Greece
and Mace-
donia.

Macedonia was silent; it was not in a condition to protest in arms, and disdained to do so in words. No resistance was encountered. Nevertheless Rome, by seizing the keys of access to her neighbour's house, had converted that neighbour into an adversary who, should he recover his power, or should a favourable opportunity occur, might be expected emphatically to break the silence. Had the energetic and prudent king Antigonus Doson lived longer, he would have taken up the gauntlet which the Romans had flung down, for, when some years after the dynast Demetrius of Pharos withdrew from the hegemony of Rome, prosecuted piracy con-

been a rule in the Roman administration to appoint non-senatorial *præfecti* for the more remote islands. But these "deputies," presuppose in the nature of the case the existence of a supreme magistrate who nominates and superintends them; and this supreme magistracy can only have been at this period that of the consuls. Subsequently, after the erection of Macedonia and Gallia Cisalpina into provinces, the supreme administration was committed to one of these two magistrates; the very territory now in question, the nucleus of the subsequent Roman province of Illyricum, belonged, as is well known, in part to Caesar's district of administration.

222.
221. 220.

trary to the treaty in concert with the Istrians, and subdued the Atintanes whom the Romans had declared independent, Antigonus formed an alliance with him, and the troops of Demetrius fought in the army of Antigonus at the battle of Sellasia (532). But Antigonus died (in the winter 533-4); and his successor Philip, still a boy, allowed the consul Lucius Æmilius Paullus to attack the ally of Macedonia, to destroy his capital, and to drive him from his kingdom into exile (535).

219
Northern
Italy.
241.

The mainland of Italy proper, south of the Apennines, enjoyed profound peace after the fall of Tarentum: the six days' war with Falerii (518) was little more than an interlude. But on the north, between the territories of the confederacy and the natural boundary of Italy—the chain of the Alps—there still extended a wide region not absolutely subject to the Romans. Beyond the Apennines they possessed nothing but the narrow space between the Æsis above Ancona and the Rubico below Cesena,* nearly the modern provinces of Forlì and Urbino. South of the Po the strong Celtic tribe of the Boii still held its ground (from Parma to Bologna); alongside of them, the Lingones on the east, and the Anari on the west (in the modern dukedom of Parma)—two smaller Celtic cantons that were probably clients of the Boii—peopled the plain. At the western end of the plain the Ligurians came in, who, mingled with isolated Celtic tribes, and settled on the Apennines westward from Arezzo and Pisa, occupied the region of the sources of the Po. The eastern portion of the plain north of the Po, nearly from Verona to the coast, was possessed by the Veneti, a race different from the Celts and probably of Illyrian extraction. Between these and the western mountains were settled the Cenomani (round Brescia and Cremona) who rarely acted with the Celtic nation and were probably largely intermingled with Veneti, and the Insubres (around Milan). The latter was the most considerable of the Celtic cantons in Italy, and was in constant communication not merely with the minor communities partly of Celtic, partly of non-Celtic extraction, that were scattered in the Alpine valleys, but also with the Celtic cantons beyond the Alps. The gates of the Alps, the

* According to the most careful recent investigations of the locality, the Rubico is the Fiumicino near Savignano, which however has now changed its channel in the upper part of its course.

mighty stream navigable for 230 miles, and the largest and most fertile plain of the then civilized Europe, still continued in the hands of hereditary foes of the Italian name, who, humbled indeed and weakened, but still scarce even nominally dependent and still troublesome neighbours, persevered in their barbarism, and, thinly scattered over the spacious plains, continued to pasture their flocks and to plunder. It was to be anticipated that the Romans would hasten to possess themselves of these regions; the more so as the Celts gradually began to forget their defeats in the campaigns of 471 and 472 and to bestir themselves again, and, what was still more dangerous, the Transalpine Celts began again to show themselves on the south of the Alps. 283. 282.

In fact the Boii had already renewed the war in 516, and their chiefs Atis and Galatas had, without, it is true, the authority of the general diet, summoned the Transalpine Gauls to make common cause with them. The latter had 238. Celtic wars.
numerously answered the call, and in 518 a Celtic army, 236. such as Italy had not seen for long, encamped before Ariminum. The Romans, for the moment much too weak to try a battle, concluded an armistice, and to gain time allowed envoys from the Celts to proceed to Rome, who ventured in the senate to demand the cession of Ariminum—it seemed as if the times of Brennus had returned. But an unexpected incident put an end to the war before it had well begun. The Boii, dissatisfied with their unbidden allies, and afraid probably for their own territory, fell into variance with the Transalpine Gauls. An open battle took place between the two Celtic hosts; and, after the chiefs of the Boii had been put to death by their own men, the Transalpine Gauls returned home. The Boii were thus delivered into the hands of the Romans, and the latter were at liberty to expel them like the Senones, and to advance at least to the Po; but they preferred to grant the Boii peace in return for the cession of some districts of their land (518). This was probably done, because they were just at that time expecting the renewed outbreak of war with Carthage; but, after that war had been averted by the cession of Sardinia, true policy required the Roman government to take possession as speedily and entirely as possible of the country up to the Alps, and accordingly the constant apprehensions of such a Roman invasion on the part of the Celts were sufficiently justified. The Romans, however, were in 236.

no haste; and so the Celts themselves began the war, either because the Roman assignations of land on the east coast (522), although not a measure immediately directed against them, made them apprehensive of danger; or because they perceived that a war with Rome for the possession of Lombardy was inevitable; or, as is perhaps most probable, because their Celtic impatience was once more weary of inaction and chose to arm for a new warlike expedition. With the exception of the Cenomani, who acted with the Veneti and declared for the Romans, all the Italian Celts concurred in the war, and they were joined by the Celts of the upper valley of the Rhone, or rather by a large number of adventurers belonging to them under the leaders Conco-litanus and Anercestus.* With 50,000 warriors on foot, and 20,000 on horseback or in chariots, the leaders of the Celts advanced to the Apennines (529). The Romans had not anticipated an attack on this side, and had not expected that the Celts, disregarding the Roman fortresses on the east coast and the protection of their own kinsmen, would venture to advance directly against the capital. Not very long before a similar Celtic swarm had in an exactly similar way overrun Greece. The danger was serious, and appeared still more serious than it really was. The belief that Rome's destruction was this time inevitable, and that the Roman soil was fated to become the property of the Gauls, was even in Rome so generally diffused among the multitude that the government reckoned it not beneath its dignity to allay the absurd superstitious belief of the mob by an act still more absurd, and to bury alive a Gaulish man and a Gaulish woman in the Roman Forum with a view to fulfil the sentence of destiny. At the same time they made more serious preparations. Of the two consular armies, each of which numbered about 25,000 infantry and 1100 ca-

* These, whom Polybius designates as the "Celts in the Alps and on the Rhone, who on account of their character of military adventurers are called *Gæsatæ* (free lances)," are in the Capitoline Fasti named *Germani*. It is possible that the contemporary annalists may have here mentioned Celts alone, and that it was the historical speculation of the age of Cæsar and Augustus that first induced the editors of these Fasti to treat them as "Germans." If, on the other hand, the mention of the Germans in the Fasti was based on contemporary records—in which case this is the earliest mention of the name—we must regard it as denoting not the Germanic races who were afterwards so called, but a Celtic horde; and this hypothesis may be the more readily adopted, since, according to the views of the best philologists, the name *Germani* is not of Germanic but of Celtic origin, and perhaps signifies "criers."

valry, one was stationed in Sardinia under Gaius Atilius Regulus, the other at Ariminum under Lucius Æmilius Papus. Both received orders to repair as speedily as possible to Etruria, the point of immediate danger. The Celts had already been under the necessity of leaving a garrison at home to face the Cenomani and Veneti, who were allied with Rome; now the levy of the Umbrians was directed to advance from their native mountains down into the plain of the Boii, and to inflict all the injury which they could think of on the enemy upon his own soil. The levy of the Etruscans and Sabines was to occupy the Apennines, and if possible to obstruct the passage till the regular troops could arrive. A reserve was formed in Rome of 50,000 men. Throughout all Italy, which on this occasion recognized its true champion in Rome, the men capable of service were enrolled, and stores and materials of war were collected.

All this, however, required time. For once the Romans had allowed themselves to be surprised, and it was too late at least to save Etruria. The Celts found the Apennines weakly defended, and plundered unopposed the rich plains of the Tuscan territory, which for long had seen no enemy. They were already at Clusium, three days' march from Rome, when the army of Ariminum, under the consul Papus, appeared on their flank, while the Etruscan militia, which after the passage of the Apennines had assembled in rear of the Gauls, followed the line of the enemy's march. Suddenly one evening, after the two armies had already encamped and the bivouac fires were kindled, the Celtic infantry again broke up and retreated on the road towards Fæsulæ (Fiesole): the cavalry occupied the advanced posts during the night, and followed the main force next morning. When the Tuscan militia, who had pitched their camp close upon the enemy, became aware of his departure, they imagined that the host had begun to disperse, and marched hastily in pursuit. The Gauls had laid their account with this very result: their infantry, which had rested and was drawn up in order, awaited on a well-chosen battle-field the Roman militia, which came up from its forced march fatigued and disordered. Six thousand men fell after a furious combat, and the rest of the militia, which had been compelled to seek refuge on a hill, would have perished, had not the consular army appeared just in time. This induced the

Battle of
Telamon.

Gauls to return homeward. Their dexterously contrived plan for preventing the union of the two Roman armies and annihilating the weaker in detail, had only partially been successful; now it seemed to them advisable first of all to place in security their considerable booty. For the sake of an easier line of march they proceeded from the district of Chiusi, where they were, to the level coast, and were marching along the shore, when they found an unexpected obstacle in the way. It was the Sardinian legions, which had landed at Pisa; and, when they arrived too late to obstruct the passage of the Apennines, had immediately put themselves in motion and were advancing along the coast in a direction opposite to the march of the Gauls. Near Telamon (at the mouth of the Ombrone) they fell upon the enemy. While the Roman infantry advanced with close front along the great road, the cavalry, led by the consul Gaius Atilius Regulus in person, made a side movement so as to take the Gauls in flank, and to acquaint the other Roman army under Papus as soon as possible with their arrival. A hot cavalry engagement took place, in which many brave Romans and Regulus fell; but he had not sacrificed his life in vain: his object was gained. Papus became aware of the conflict, and guessed how matters stood; he hastily arranged his legions, and on both sides the Celtic host was now pressed by the Romans. Courageously it made its dispositions for the double conflict, the Transalpine Gauls and Insubres against the troops of Papus, the Alpine Taurisci and the Boii against the Sardinian legions; the cavalry combat pursued its course apart on the flank. The forces were in numbers not unequally matched, and the desperate position of the Gauls impelled them to the most obstinate resistance. But the Transalpine Gauls, accustomed only to close fighting, gave way before the missiles of the Roman skirmishers; in the hand-to-hand combat the better temper of the Roman weapons placed the Gauls at a disadvantage; at last an attack in flank by the victorious Roman cavalry decided the day. The Celtic horsemen made their escape; the infantry, wedged in between the sea and the three Roman armies, had no means of flight. 10,000 Celts, with their king Concolitanus, were taken prisoners; 40,000 others lay dead on the field of battle; Anercestus and his attendants had, after the Celtic fashion, put themselves to death.

The victory was complete, and the Romans were firmly

resolved to prevent the recurrence of such surprises by the complete subjugation of the Celts on the south of the Alps. In the following year (530) the Boii submitted without resistance along with the Lingones; and in the year after that (531) the Anari; so that the plain as far as the Po was in the hands of the Romans. The conquest of the northern side of the river cost a more serious struggle. Gaius Flaminus crossed the river in the newly-acquired territory of the Anari (somewhere near Piacenza) in 531; but during the passage, and still more while making good his footing on the other side, he suffered so heavy losses, and found himself, with the river in his rear, in so dangerous a position, that he made a capitulation with the enemy to secure a free retreat, which the Insubres foolishly conceded. Scarce, however, had he escaped when he appeared in the territory of the Cenomani, and, united with them, advanced for the second time from the north into the canton of the Insubres. The Gauls perceived what was now the object of the Romans, when it was too late: they took from the temple of their goddess the golden standards called the "immoveable," and with their whole levy, 50,000 strong, they offered battle to the Romans. The situation of the latter was critical: they were stationed on a river (perhaps the Oglio), separated from home by the enemy's territory, and left to depend for aid in battle as well as for their line of retreat on the uncertain friendship of the Cenomani. There was, however, no choice. The Gauls fighting in the Roman ranks were placed on the left bank of the stream; on the right, opposite to the Insubres, the legions were drawn up, and the bridges were broken down that they might not be assailed, at least in the rear, by their dubious allies. In this way, it is true, the river cut off their retreat, and their homeward route lay through the hostile army. But the superiority of the Roman arms and of Roman discipline achieved the victory, and the army cut its way through: once more Roman tactics had redeemed the blunders of the general. The victory was due to the soldiers and officers, not to the generals, who gained a triumph only through popular favour in opposition to the just decree of the senate. Gladly would the Insubres have made peace; but Rome required unconditional subjection, and things had not yet come to that pass. They tried to maintain their ground with the help of their northern kinsmen; and, with 30,000

The Celts
 attacked in
 their own
 land. [224.

223.

223.

222, mercenaries whom they had raised amongst these and their own levy, they received the two consular armies advancing once more in the following year (532) from the territory of the Cenomani to invade their land. Various obstinate combats took place ; in a diversion, attempted by the Insubres against the Roman fortress of Clastidium (Casteggio, below Pavia), on the right bank of the Po, the Gallic king Viridomarus fell by the hand of the consul Marcus Marcellus. But, after a battle partially gained by the Celts but ultimately decided in favour of the Romans, the consul Gnaeus Scipio took by assault Mediolanum, the capital of the Insubres, and the capture of that town and of Comum terminated their resistance. Thus the Celts of Italy were completely vanquished, and as, just before, the Romans had shown to the Hellenes in the war with the pirates the difference between a Roman and a Greek sovereignty of the seas, so they had now brilliantly demonstrated that Rome knew how to defend the gates of Italy against freebooters on land very differently from the way in which Macedonia had guarded the gates of Greece, and that in spite of all internal quarrels Italy presented an united front to the common enemy, while Greece exhibited distraction and discord.

The Celts
conquered
by Rome

The boundary of the Alps was reached, in so far as the whole flat country on the Po was either rendered subject to the Romans, or, like the territories of the Cenomani and Veneti, was occupied by dependent allies. It needed time, however, to reap the consequences of this victory, and to Romanize the land. In this the Romans did not adopt an uniform mode of procedure. In the mountainous north-west of Italy and in the more remote districts between the Alps and the Po they tolerated, on the whole, the former inhabitants ; the numerous wars, as they are called, which 238. were waged with the Ligurians in particular (first in 516 appear to have been slave-hunts rather than wars, and, often as the cantons and valleys submitted to the Romans, Roman sovereignty in that quarter was ordinarily but an empty name. 221. The expedition to Istria also (533) appears not to have aimed at much more than the destruction of the last lurking-places of the Adriatic pirates, and the establishment of a communication by land along the coast between the Italian conquests of Rome and her acquisitions on the other shore. On the other hand the Celts in the districts south of the Po were doomed irretrievably to de

struction ; for, owing to the looseness of the ties connecting the Celtic nation, none of the northern Celtic cantons took part with their Italian kinsmen except for money, and the Romans looked on the latter not only as their national foes, but as the usurpers of their natural heritage. The extensive assignations of land in 522 had already filled the whole territory between Picenum and Ariminum with Roman colonists ; further measures of the same character were taken, and it was not difficult to dislodge and extirpate a half-barbarous population like the Celtic, but partially devoted to agriculture, and destitute of walled towns. The great northern highway, which had been, probably some eighty years earlier, carried by way of Otricoli to Narni, and had shortly before been prolonged to the newly-founded fortress of Spoletium (514), was now (534) carried, under the name of the "Flaminian" road, by way of the newly established market-village Forum Flaminii (near Foligno), through the pass of Furlo to the coast, and thence along the latter from Fanum (Fano) to Ariminum ; it was the first artificial road which crossed the Apennines and connected the two Italian seas. Great zeal was manifested in covering the newly-acquired fertile territory with Roman townships. Already on the Po itself the strong fortress of Placentia (Piacenza) had been founded to cover the passage of the river ; already had Cremona been laid out on the left bank, and the building of the walls of Mutina (Modena), in the territory acquired from the Boii on the right, had far advanced ; already preparations were being made for further assignations of land and for continuing the highway, when a sudden event interrupted the Romans in reaping the fruit of their successes.

232.

240. 220.

CHAPTER IV.

HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL.

241.
Situation of
Carthage
after the
peace.

THE treaty with Rome in 513 gave to the Carthaginians peace, but they paid for it dearly. That the tribute of the largest portion of Sicily now flowed into the enemy's exchequer instead of the Carthaginian treasury, was the least part of their loss. They felt a far keener regret, when they found that they had to abandon the hope of monopolizing all the lines of traffic between the eastern and the western Mediterranean, just as that hope seemed on the eve of fulfilment. They now beheld their whole system of commercial policy broken up, the south-western basin of the Mediterranean, which they had hitherto exclusively commanded, converted since the loss of Sicily into an open thoroughfare for all nations, and the commerce of Italy rendered completely independent of the Phœnicians. Nevertheless the peaceful Sidonians might perhaps have been disposed to acquiesce in this result. They had met with similar blows already; they had been obliged to share with the Massiliots, the Etruscans, and the Sicilian Greeks what they had previously possessed alone; even now the possessions which they retained, Africa, Spain, and the gates of the Atlantic Ocean, were sufficient to confer power and prosperity. But in truth, where was their security that these at least would continue in their hands?

The demands made by Regulus, and his very near approach to the obtaining of what he asked, could only be forgotten by those who were willing to forget; and if Rome should now renew from Lilybæum the enterprise which she had undertaken with so great success from Italy, Carthage

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During this war the patriot party had kept silence; now it spoke out the louder. On the one hand this catastrophe had brought to light the utterly corrupt and pernicious character of the ruling oligarchy, their incapacity, their coterie-policy, their inclination towards the Romans. On the other hand the seizure of Sardinia, and the threatening attitude which Rome on that occasion assumed, showed plainly even to the humblest that a declaration of war by Rome was constantly hanging like the sword of Damocles over Carthage, and that, if Carthage in her present circumstances went to war with Rome, the consequence must necessarily be the downfall of the Punic dominion in Libya. Probably there were in Carthage not a few who, despairing of the future of their country, counselled emigration to the islands of the Atlantic; who could blame them? But minds of the nobler order disdain to save themselves apart from their nation, and great natures enjoy the privilege of deriving enthusiasm from circumstances in which the multitude of good men despair. They accepted the new conditions, just as Rome dictated them; no course was left but to submit, and,

adding fresh bitterness to their former hatred, carefully to cherish and husband resentment—that last resource of an injured nation. They then took steps towards a political reform.* They had become sufficiently convinced of the incorrigibleness of the party in power: the fact that the governing lords even in the last war had neither forgotten their spite nor learned greater wisdom, was shown by the effrontery bordering on simplicity with which they now instituted proceedings against Hamilcar as the originator of the mercenary war, because he had without authority from the government promised money to his Sicilian soldiers. Had the club of officers and popular leaders desired to overthrow this rotten and wretched government, it would hardly have encountered much difficulty in Carthage itself; but it would have met with a more formidable obstacle in Rome, with which the chiefs of the government in Carthage already maintained relations that bordered on treason. To all the other difficulties of the position there fell to be added the circumstance, that the means of saving their country had to be created without allowing the Romans, or their own government with its Roman tendencies, to become rightly aware of what was doing.

So they left the constitution untouched, and the chiefs of the government in full enjoyment of their exclusive privileges and of the public property. It was merely proposed and carried, that of the two commanders-in-chief, who at the end of the Libyan war were at the head of the Carthaginian troops, Hanno and Hamilcar, the former should be recalled, and the latter should be nominated commander-in-chief for all Africa during an indefinite period. It was arranged that he should hold a position independent of the governing corporations—his antagonists called it an unconstitutional monarchical power, Cato calls it a dictatorship—and that he could only be recalled and placed upon his trial by the

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popular assembly.* Even the choice of a successor was to be vested not in the authorities of the capital, but in the army, that is, in the Carthaginians serving in the army as Gerusiasts or officers, who were named in treaties also along with the general. Of course the right of confirmation was reserved to the popular assembly. Whether this may or may not have been an usurpation, it clearly indicates that the war party regarded and treated the army as its special domain.

The duties of Hamilcar were modest in form. Wars with the Numidian tribes on the borders never ceased; only a short time previously the "city of a hundred gates," Theveste (Tebessa), in the interior had been occupied by the Carthaginians. The task of continuing this border warfare, which was allotted to the new commander-in-chief of Africa, was not in itself of such importance as to prevent the Carthaginian government, which was allowed to do as it liked in its own immediate sphere, from tacitly conniving at the decrees passed in reference to the matter by the popular assembly; and the Romans did not perhaps recognize its significance at all.

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Thus there was placed at the head of the army the man, who had given proof in the Sicilian and in the Libyan wars that fate had destined him, if any one, to be the saviour of his country. Never perhaps was the noble struggle of man with fate waged more nobly than by him. The army was intended to save the state; but what sort of army? The Carthaginian citizen militia had fought not badly under Hamilcar's leadership in the Libyan war; but he knew well, that it is one thing to lead out the merchants and mechanics of a city which is in the extremity of peril for once to battle, and another to form them into soldiers. The patriot party in Carthage furnished him with excellent officers, but it was of course almost exclusively the cultivated class that was represented in it. He had no citizen militia, at most a few squadrons of Liby-phœnician cavalry. The task was to form an army out of Libyan conscripts and mercenaries; a task possible in the hands of a general like

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Hamilcar, but even for him possible only on condition that he should be able to pay his men punctually and well. But he had learned, by experience in Sicily, that the state revenues of Carthage were expended in Carthage itself on matters much more urgent than the payment of the armies that fought against the enemy. The warfare which he waged, accordingly, had to support itself, and he had to carry out on a great scale, what he had already attempted on a smaller scale at Monte Pellegrino. But further, Hamilcar ^{The} was not only a military chief, he was also a party leader. In ^{citizens.} opposition to the implacable governing party, which eagerly but patiently waited for an opportunity of overthrowing him, he had to seek support among the citizens; and although their leaders might be ever so pure and noble, the multitude was deeply corrupt and accustomed by the unhappy system of corruption to give nothing without being paid for it. In particular emergencies, indeed, necessity or enthusiasm might for the moment prevail, as everywhere happens even with the most venal corporations; but, if Hamilcar wished to secure the permanent support of the Carthaginian community for his plan, which at the best could only be executed after a series of years, he had to supply his friends at home with regular consignments of money as the means of keeping the mob in good humour. Thus compelled to beg or to buy from the lukewarm and venal multitude permission to save it; compelled to wring from the arrogance of men whom he hated and whom he had constantly conquered, at the price of humiliation and of silence, the respite indispensable for his ends; compelled to conceal from those despised traitors to their country, who called themselves the lords of his native city, his plans and his contempt—the noble hero stood with few friends of congenial sentiments between enemies without and enemies within, building upon the irresolution of the one and of the other, at once deceiving both and defying both, if only he might gain means, money, and men for the contest with a land which, even were the army ready to strike the blow, it seemed difficult to reach and scarce possible to vanquish. He was still a young man, little beyond thirty, but he had apparently, when he was preparing for his expedition, a foreboding that he would not be permitted to attain the end of his labours, or to see otherwise than afar off the promised land. When he left Carthage he enjoined his son Hannibal, nine years of age, to

swear at the altar of the supreme God eternal hatred to the Roman name, and reared him and his younger sons Hasdrubal and Mago—the “lion’s brood” as he called them—in the camp as the inheritors of his projects, of his genius, and of his hatred.

Hamilcar
proceeds to
Spain.
236.

The new commander in chief of Libya departed from Carthage immediately after the termination of the mercenary war (perhaps in the spring of 518). He apparently meditated an expedition against the free Libyans in the west. His army, which was especially strong in elephants, marched along the coast; by its side sailed the fleet, led by his faithful associate Hasdrubal. Suddenly tidings came that he had crossed the sea at the pillars of Hercules and had landed in Spain, where he was waging war with the natives—with people who had done him no harm, and without orders from his government, as the Carthaginian authorities complained. They could not complain at any rate that he neglected the affairs of Africa; when the Numidians once more rebelled, his lieutenant Hasdrubal so effectually routed them that for a long period there was tranquillity on the frontier, and several tribes hitherto independent submitted to pay tribute. What he personally did in Spain, we are no longer able to trace in detail. His achievements compelled Cato the elder, who, a generation after Hamilcar’s death, beheld in Spain the still fresh traces of his working, to exclaim, notwithstanding all his hatred of the Carthaginians, that no king was worthy to be named by the side of Hamilcar Barca. Their results still show to us, at least in a general way, what was accomplished by Hamilcar as a soldier and a statesman in the nine last years of his life (518–526), till in the flower of his age, fighting bravely in the field of battle, he met his death like Scharnhorst just as his plans were beginning to reach maturity. During the next eight years (527–534) the heir of his office and of his plans, his son-in-law Hasdrubal, prosecuted in the spirit of his master the work which Hamilcar had begun. Instead of the small entrepôt for trade, which, along with the protectorate of Gades, was all that Carthage had hitherto possessed on the Spanish coast, and which she had treated as a dependency of Libya, a Carthaginian kingdom was founded in Spain by the generalship of Hamilcar, and confirmed by the adroit statesmanship of Hasdrubal. The fairest regions of Spain, the southern and eastern coasts,

Spanish
kingdom of
the Bar-
cides.

236–228.

227–220.

became Phœnician provinces. Towns were founded ; above all, "Spanish Carthage" (Cartagena) was established by Hasdrubal on the only good harbour along the south coast, containing the splendid "royal castle" of its founder. Agriculture flourished, and still more mining in consequence of the fortunate discovery of the silver-mines of Cartagena, which a century afterwards had a yearly produce of more than £360,000 (36,000,000 *sest.*). Most of the communities as far as the Ebro became dependent on Carthage and paid tribute to it. Hasdrubal skilfully by every means, even that of intermarriage, attached the chiefs to the interests of Carthage. Thus Carthage acquired in Spain a rich market for its commerce and manufactures ; and not only did the revenues of the province sustain the army, but there remained a balance to be remitted to Carthage and reserved for future use. This province at the same time formed and trained the army ; regular levies took place in the territory subject to Carthage ; the prisoners of war were incorporated with Carthaginian corps. Contingents and mercenaries, as many as were desired, were supplied by the dependent communities. During his long life of warfare the soldier found in the camp a second home, and found a substitute for patriotism in fidelity to his standard and enthusiastic attachment to his great leaders. Constant conflicts with the brave Iberians and Celts created a serviceable infantry, to co-operate with the excellent Numidian cavalry.

So far as Carthage was concerned, the Barcides were allowed to go on. The citizens were not asked for regular contributions, but on the contrary derived benefit from the acquisition ; commerce recovered in Spain what it had lost in Sicily and Sardinia ; and the Spanish war and the Spanish army with its brilliant victories and important successes soon became so popular that it was even possible in particular emergencies, such as after Hamilcar's fall, to effect the despatch of considerable reinforcements of African troops to Spain, and the governing party, whether well or ill affected, had to maintain silence, or at any rate to content themselves with complaining in private or in correspondence with their friends in Rome regarding the demagogic officers and the mob.

The Carthaginian government and the Barcides.

On the part of Rome too, nothing took place calculated seriously to affect the course of Spanish affairs. The first and chief cause of the inactivity of the Romans was un-

The Roman government and the Barcides.

CHAPTER IV.

HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL.

241.
Situation of
Carthage
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would undoubtedly fall, unless the perversity of the enemy or some special piece of good fortune should intervene to save it. No doubt they had peace for the present; but the ratification of that peace had hung on a thread, and they knew what public opinion in Rome thought of the terms on which it was concluded. It might be that Rome was not yet meditating the conquest of Africa and was content with Italy; but if the existence of the Carthaginian state depended on that contentment, the prospect was but a sorry one; and where was the security that the Romans might not find it convenient, even with a view to their Italian policy, to extirpate rather than reduce under subjection their African neighbour?

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The new commander in chief of Libya departed from Carthage immediately after the termination of the mercenary war (perhaps in the spring of 518). He apparently meditated an expedition against the free Libyans in the west. His army, which was especially strong in elephants, marched along the coast; by its side sailed the fleet, led by his faithful associate Hasdrubal. Suddenly tidings came that he had crossed the sea at the pillars of Hercules and had landed in Spain, where he was waging war with the natives—with people who had done him no harm, and without orders from his government, as the Carthaginian authorities complained. They could not complain at any rate that he neglected the affairs of Africa; when the Numidians once more rebelled, his lieutenant Hasdrubal so effectually routed them that for a long period there was tranquillity on the frontier, and several tribes hitherto independent submitted to pay tribute. What he personally did in Spain, we are no longer able to trace in detail. His achievements compelled Cato the elder, who, a generation after Hamilcar’s death, beheld in Spain the still fresh traces of his working, to exclaim, notwithstanding all his hatred of the Carthaginians, that no king was worthy to be named by the side of Hamilcar Barca. Their results still show to us, at least in a general way, what was accomplished by Hamilcar as a soldier and a statesman in the nine last years of his life (518–526), till in the flower of his age, fighting bravely in the field of battle, he met his death like Scharnhorst just as his plans were beginning to reach maturity. During the next eight years (527–534) the heir of his office and of his plans, his son-in-law Hasdrubal, prosecuted in the spirit of his master the work which Hamilcar had begun. Instead of the small entrepôt for trade, which, along with the protectorate of Gades, was all that Carthage had hitherto possessed on the Spanish coast, and which she had treated as a dependency of Libya, a Carthaginian kingdom was founded in Spain by the generalship of Hamilcar, and confirmed by the adroit statesmanship of Hasdrubal. The fairest regions of Spain, the southern and eastern coasts,

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So far as Carthage was concerned, the Barcides were allowed to go on. The citizens were not asked for regular contributions, but on the contrary derived benefit from the acquisition ; commerce recovered in Spain what it had lost in Sicily and Sardinia ; and the Spanish war and the Spanish army with its brilliant victories and important successes soon became so popular that it was even possible in particular emergencies, such as after Hamilcar's fall, to effect the despatch of considerable reinforcements of African troops to Spain, and the governing party, whether well or ill affected, had to maintain silence, or at any rate to content themselves with complaining in private or in correspondence with their friends in Rome regarding the demagogic officers and the mob.

The Carthaginian government and the Barcides.

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CHAPTER IV.

HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL.

241. **THE** treaty with Rome in 513 gave to the Carthaginians peace, but they paid for it dearly. That the tribute of the largest portion of Sicily now flowed into the enemy's exchequer instead of the Carthaginian treasury, was the least part of their loss. They felt a far keener regret, when they found that they had to abandon the hope of monopolizing all the lines of traffic between the eastern and the western Mediterranean, just as that hope seemed on the eve of fulfilment. They now beheld their whole system of commercial policy broken up, the south-western basin of the Mediterranean, which they had hitherto exclusively commanded, converted since the loss of Sicily into an open thoroughfare for all nations, and the commerce of Italy rendered completely independent of the Phœnicians. Nevertheless the peaceful Sidonians might perhaps have been disposed to acquiesce in this result. They had met with similar blows already; they had been obliged to share with the Massiliots, the Etruscans, and the Sicilian Greeks what they had previously possessed alone; even now the possessions which they retained, Africa, Spain, and the gates of the Atlantic Ocean, were sufficient to confer power and prosperity. But in truth, where was their security that these at least would continue in their hands?

Situation of
Carthage
after the
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The demands made by Regulus, and his very near approach to the obtaining of what he asked, could only be forgotten by those who were willing to forget; and if Rome should now renew from Lilybæum the enterprise which she had undertaken with so great success from Italy, Carthage

would undoubtedly fall, unless the perversity of the enemy or some special piece of good fortune should intervene to save it. No doubt they had peace for the present; but the ratification of that peace had hung on a thread, and they knew what public opinion in Rome thought of the terms on which it was concluded. It might be that Rome was not yet meditating the conquest of Africa and was content with Italy; but if the existence of the Carthaginian state depended on that contentment, the prospect was but a sorry one; and where was the security that the Romans might not find it convenient, even with a view to their Italian policy, to extirpate rather than reduce under subjection their African neighbour?

In short, Carthage could only regard the peace of 513 in the light of a truce, and could not but employ it in preparations for the inevitable renewal of the war; not for the purpose of avenging the defeat which she had suffered, nor even with the direct view of recovering what she had lost, but in order to secure for herself an existence that should not be dependent on the good-will of the enemy. But when a war of annihilation is surely, though in point of time indefinitely, impending over a weaker state, the wiser, more resolute, and more devoted men—who would immediately prepare for the unavoidable struggle, accept it at a favourable moment, and thus cover their defensive policy by offensive tactics—always find themselves hampered by an indolent and cowardly multitude of money-worshippers, of the aged and feeble, and of the thoughtless who wish merely to gain time, to live and die in peace, and to postpone at any price the final struggle. Thus there was in Carthage a party of peace and a party of war, both, as was natural, associating themselves with the political distinction which already existed between the conservatives and the reformers. The former found its support in the governing boards, the council of the Ancients and that of the Hundred, led by Hanno the Great, as he was called; the latter found its support in the leaders of the multitude, particularly the much-respected Hasdrubal, and in the officers of the Sicilian army, whose great successes under the leadership of Hamilcar, although they had been otherwise fruitless, had at least shown to the patriots a method which appeared to promise deliverance from the great danger that beset them. Vehement feuds had probably long subsisted between these parties, when the

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In short, Carthage could only regard the peace of 518 in the light of a truce, and could not but employ it in preparations for the inevitable renewal of the war; not for the purpose of avenging the defeat which she had suffered, nor even with the direct view of recovering what she had lost, but in order to secure for herself an existence that should not be dependent on the good-will of the enemy. But when a war of annihilation is surely, though in point of time indefinitely, impending over a weaker state, the wiser, more resolute, and more devoted men—who would immediately prepare for the unavoidable struggle, accept it at a favourable moment, and thus cover their defensive policy by offensive tactics—always find themselves hampered by an indolent and cowardly multitude of money-worshippers, of the aged and feeble, and of the thoughtless who wish merely to gain time, to live and die in peace, and to postpone at any price the final struggle. Thus there was in Carthage a party of peace and a party of war, both, as was natural, associating themselves with the political distinction which already existed between the conservatives and the reformers. The former found its support in the governing boards, the council of the Ancients and that of the Hundred, led by Hanno the Great, as he was called; the latter found its support in the leaders of the multitude, particularly the much-respected Hasdrubal, and in the officers of the Sicilian army, whose great successes under the leadership of Hamilcar, although they had been otherwise fruitless, had at least shown to the patriots a method which appeared to promise deliverance from the great danger that beset them. Vehement feuds had probably long subsisted between these parties, when the

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Libyan war intervened to suspend the strife. We have already related how that war arose. After the governing party had instigated the mutiny by their incapable administration which frustrated all the precautionary measures of the Sicilian officers, had converted that mutiny into a revolution by the operation of their inhuman system of government, and had at length brought the country to the verge of ruin by their military incapacity (particularly by that of their leader Hanno, the destroyer of their army), Hamilcar Barca, the hero of Ercte, was in the perilous emergency solicited by the government itself to save it from the effects of its blunders and crimes. He accepted the command, and had the magnanimity not to resign it even when they appointed Hanno as his colleague. Indeed, when the indignant army sent the latter home, Hamilcar had the self-control a second time to concede to him, at the urgent request of the government, a share in the command; and, in spite of his enemies and in spite of such a colleague, he was able by his influence with the insurgents, by his dexterous treatment of the Numidian sheiks, and by his unrivalled genius for organization and generalship, in a singularly short time to put down the revolt entirely and to recall rebellious Africa to its allegiance (end of 517).

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During this war the patriot party had kept silence; now it spoke out the louder. On the one hand this catastrophe had brought to light the utterly corrupt and pernicious character of the ruling oligarchy, their incapacity, their coterie-policy, their inclination towards the Romans. On the other hand the seizure of Sardinia, and the threatening attitude which Rome on that occasion assumed, showed plainly even to the humblest that a declaration of war by Rome was constantly hanging like the sword of Damocles over Carthage, and that, if Carthage in her present circumstances went to war with Rome, the consequence must necessarily be the downfall of the Punic dominion in Libya. Probably there were in Carthage not a few who, despairing of the future of their country, counselled emigration to the islands of the Atlantic; who could blame them? But minds of the nobler order disdain to save themselves apart from their nation, and great natures enjoy the privilege of deriving enthusiasm from circumstances in which the multitude of good men despair. They accepted the new conditions, just as Rome dictated them; no course was left but to submit, and,

adding fresh bitterness to their former hatred, carefully to cherish and husband resentment—that last resource of an injured nation. They then took steps towards a political reform.* They had become sufficiently convinced of the incorrigibleness of the party in power: the fact that the governing lords even in the last war had neither forgotten their spite nor learned greater wisdom, was shown by the effrontery bordering on simplicity with which they now instituted proceedings against Hamilcar as the originator of the mercenary war, because he had without authority from the government promised money to his Sicilian soldiers. Had the club of officers and popular leaders desired to overthrow this rotten and wretched government, it would hardly have encountered much difficulty in Carthage itself; but it would have met with a more formidable obstacle in Rome, with which the chiefs of the government in Carthage already maintained relations that bordered on treason. To all the other difficulties of the position there fell to be added the circumstance, that the means of saving their country had to be created without allowing the Romans, or their own government with its Roman tendencies, to become rightly aware of what was doing.

So they left the constitution untouched, and the chiefs of the government in full enjoyment of their exclusive privileges and of the public property. It was merely proposed and carried, that of the two commanders-in-chief, who at the end of the Libyan war were at the head of the Carthaginian troops, Hanno and Hamilcar, the former should be recalled, and the latter should be nominated commander-in-chief for all Africa during an indefinite period. It was arranged that he should hold a position independent of the governing corporations—his antagonists called it an unconstitutional monarchical power, Cato calls it a dictatorship—and that he could only be recalled and placed upon his trial by the

* Our accounts as to these events are not only imperfect but one sided, for of course it was the version of the Carthaginian peace party which was adopted by the Roman annalist. Even, however, in our mutilated and distorted accounts (the most important are those of Fabius *ap.* Polyb. iii. 8; Appian. *Hisp.* iv.; and Diodorus, xxv. p. 567) the relations of the parties appear clearly enough. Of the vulgar gossip by which its opponents sought to blacken the "revolutionary combination" (ἐταίρεια τῶν κοινηροτάτων ἀνθρώπων) specimens may be had in Nepos (*Ham.* 3), to which it will be difficult perhaps to find a parallel.

popular assembly.* Even the choice of a successor was to be vested not in the authorities of the capital, but in the army, that is, in the Carthaginians serving in the army as Gerusiasts or officers, who were named in treaties also along with the general. Of course the right of confirmation was reserved to the popular assembly. Whether this may or may not have been an usurpation, it clearly indicates that the war party regarded and treated the army as its special domain.

The duties of Hamilcar were modest in form. Wars with the Numidian tribes on the borders never ceased; only a short time previously the "city of a hundred gates," Theveste (Tebessa), in the interior had been occupied by the Carthaginians. The task of continuing this border warfare, which was allotted to the new commander-in-chief of Africa, was not in itself of such importance as to prevent the Carthaginian government, which was allowed to do as it liked in its own immediate sphere, from tacitly conniving at the decrees passed in reference to the matter by the popular assembly; and the Romans did not perhaps recognize its significance at all.

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The Roman government and the Barcides.

doubtedly their very want of acquaintance with the circumstances of the remote peninsula,—which was certainly also Hamilcar's main reason for selecting Spain and not, as might otherwise have been possible, Africa for the execution of his plan. The explanations with which the Carthaginian generals met the Roman commissioners sent to Spain to procure information on the spot, and their assurances that all this was done only to provide the means of promptly paying the war-contributions to Rome, could not possibly find belief in the senate. But the senators probably discerned only the immediate object of Hamilcar's plans, viz. to procure compensation in Spain for the tribute and the traffic of the islands which Carthage had lost; and they deemed an aggressive war on the part of the Carthaginians, and in particular an invasion of Italy from Spain (as is evident both from express statements to that effect and from the whole state of the case) as absolute impossibilities. Many, of course, among the peace party in Carthage saw further; but, whatever they might think, they could hardly be much inclined to enlighten their Roman friends as to the impending storm, which the Carthaginian authorities had long been unable to prevent—for that step would accelerate, instead of averting, the crisis; and even if they did so, such denunciations proceeding from partisans would justly be received with great caution at Rome. By degrees, certainly, the inconceivably rapid and mighty extension of the Carthaginian power in Spain could not but excite the observation and awaken the apprehensions of the Romans. In fact, in the course of the later years before the outbreak of war, they did attempt to set bounds to it. About the year 528, mindful of their newborn Hellenism, they concluded an alliance with the two Greek or semi-Greek towns on the east coast of Spain, Zacynthus or Saguntum (Murviedro, not far from Valencia), and Emporiæ (Ampurias); and when they acquainted the Carthaginian general Hasdrubal that they had done so, they at the same time warned him not to push his conquests over the Ebro, with which he promised compliance. This was not done to prevent an invasion of Italy by the land route—no treaty would fetter the general who should undertake such an enterprise—but partly to set a limit to the material power of the Spanish Carthaginians which began to be dangerous, partly to secure, in the free communities between the Ebro and the Pyrenees whom Rome thus took under

her protection, a *point d'appui* in case of its being necessary to land and make war in Spain. In reference to the impending war with Carthage, which the senate did not fail to see was inevitable, they hardly apprehended any greater inconvenience from the events that had occurred in Spain than that they might be compelled to send some legions thither, and that the enemy would be somewhat better provided with money and soldiers than, without Spain, he would have been; they were at any rate firmly resolved, as the plan of the campaign of 536 shows and as indeed could not but be the case, to begin and terminate the next war in Africa, —a course which would at the same time decide the fate of Spain. Further grounds for delay were suggested during the first years by the instalments from Carthage, which a declaration of war would have cut off, and then by the death of Hamilcar, which probably induced friends and foes to think that his projects must have died with him. Lastly, during the latter years when the senate certainly began to apprehend that it was not prudent to delay the renewal of the war, there was the very intelligible wish to dispose of the Gauls in the valley of the Po in the first instance, for these, threatened with extirpation, might be expected to avail themselves of any serious war undertaken by Rome to allure the Transalpine tribes once more to Italy, and to renew those Celtic migrations which were still fraught with peril. Of course, it was no regard either for the Carthaginian peace party or for existing treaties that withheld the Romans from action; moreover, if they desired war, the Spanish feuds furnished at any moment a ready pretext. The conduct of Rome in the circumstances is by no means unintelligible; but as little can it be denied, that the Roman senate in dealing with this matter displayed shortsightedness and slackness—faults which were still more inexcusably manifested in their mode of dealing at the same epoch with Gallic affairs. The policy of the Romans was always more remarkable for tenacity, cunning, and consistency, than for grandeur of conception or power of rapid organization—qualities in which the enemies of Rome from Pyrrhus down to Mithradates often surpassed her.

Thus the smiles of fortune inaugurated the brilliantly conceived project of Hamilcar. The means of war were acquired—a numerous army accustomed to combat and to conquer, and a constantly replenished exchequer; but in

218.

Hannibal.

Libyan war intervened to suspend the strife. We have already related how that war arose. After the governing party had instigated the mutiny by their incapable administration which frustrated all the precautionary measures of the Sicilian officers, had converted that mutiny into a revolution by the operation of their inhuman system of government, and had at length brought the country to the verge of ruin by their military incapacity (particularly by that of their leader Hanno, the destroyer of their army), Hamilcar Barca, the hero of Ercte, was in the perilous emergency solicited by the government itself to save it from the effects of its blunders and crimes. He accepted the command, and had the magnanimity not to resign it even when they appointed Hanno as his colleague. Indeed, when the indignant army sent the latter home, Hamilcar had the self-control a second time to concede to him, at the urgent request of the government, a share in the command; and, in spite of his enemies and in spite of such a colleague, he was able by his influence with the insurgents, by his dexterous treatment of the Numidian sheiks, and by his unrivalled genius for organization and generalship, in a singularly short time to put down the revolt entirely and to recall rebellious Africa to its allegiance (end of 517).

257.

During this war the patriot party had kept silence; now it spoke out the louder. On the one hand this catastrophe had brought to light the utterly corrupt and pernicious character of the ruling oligarchy, their incapacity, their coterie-policy, their inclination towards the Romans. On the other hand the seizure of Sardinia, and the threatening attitude which Rome on that occasion assumed, showed plainly even to the humblest that a declaration of war by Rome was constantly hanging like the sword of Damocles over Carthage, and that, if Carthage in her present circumstances went to war with Rome, the consequence must necessarily be the downfall of the Punic dominion in Libya. Probably there were in Carthage not a few who, despairing of the future of their country, counselled emigration to the islands of the Atlantic; who could blame them? But minds of the nobler order disdain to save themselves apart from their nation, and great natures enjoy the privilege of deriving enthusiasm from circumstances in which the multitude and good men despair. They accepted the new conditions, as Rome dictated them; no course was left but to submit, and

adding fresh bitterness to their former hatred, carefully to cherish and husband resentment—that last resource of an injured nation. They then took steps towards a political reform.* They had become sufficiently convinced of the incorrigibleness of the party in power: the fact that the governing lords even in the last war had neither forgotten their spite nor learned greater wisdom, was shown by the effrontery bordering on simplicity with which they now instituted proceedings against Hamilcar as the originator of the mercenary war, because he had without authority from the government promised money to his Sicilian soldiers. Had the club of officers and popular leaders desired to overthrow this rotten and wretched government, it would hardly have encountered much difficulty in Carthage itself; but it would have met with a more formidable obstacle in Rome, with which the chiefs of the government in Carthage already maintained relations that bordered on treason. To all the other difficulties of the position there fell to be added the circumstance, that the means of saving their country had to be created without allowing the Romans, or their own government with its Roman tendencies, to become rightly aware of what was doing.

So they left the constitution untouched, and the chiefs of the government in full enjoyment of their exclusive privileges and of the public property. It was merely proposed and carried, that of the two commanders-in-chief, who at the end of the Libyan war were at the head of the Carthaginian troops, Hanno and Hamilcar, the former should be recalled, and the latter should be nominated commander-in-chief for all Africa during an indefinite period. It was arranged that he should hold a position independent of the governing corporations—his antagonists called it an unconstitutional hierarchical power, Cato calls it a dictatorship—and that he could only be recalled and placed upon his trial by the

* Our accounts as to these events are not only imperfect but one sided, for of course it was the version of the Carthaginian peace party which was adopted by the Roman annalists. Even, however, in our mutilated and distorted accounts (the most important are those of Fabius *ap.* Polyb. iii. 8; Appian. *Hisp.* iv.; and Diodorus, xv. p. 567) the relations of the parties appear clearly enough. Of the vulgar gossip by which its opponents sought to blacken the "revolutionary combination" (ἐταίρελα τῶν κομητοῦντων ἀνθρώπων) special mention may be had in Nepos (*Ham.* 3), to which it will be difficult perhaps to find a parallel.

popular assembly.* Even the choice of a successor was to be vested not in the authorities of the capital, but in the army, that is, in the Carthaginians serving in the army as Gerusiasts or officers, who were named in treaties also along with the general. Of course the right of confirmation was reserved to the popular assembly. Whether this may or may not have been an usurpation, it clearly indicates that the war party regarded and treated the army as its special domain.

The duties of Hamilcar were modest in form. Wars with the Numidian tribes on the borders never ceased; only a short time previously the "city of a hundred gates," Theveste (Tebessa), in the interior had been occupied by the Carthaginians. The task of continuing this border warfare, which was allotted to the new commander-in-chief of Africa, was not in itself of such importance as to prevent the Carthaginian government, which was allowed to do as it liked in its own immediate sphere, from tacitly conniving at the decrees passed in reference to the matter by the popular assembly; and the Romans did not perhaps recognize its significance at all.

Hamilcar's
war pro-
jects.

The army.

Thus there was placed at the head of the army the man, who had given proof in the Sicilian and in the Libyan wars that fate had destined him, if any one, to be the saviour of his country. Never perhaps was the noble struggle of man with fate waged more nobly than by him. The army was intended to save the state; but what sort of army? The Carthaginian citizen militia had fought not badly under Hamilcar's leadership in the Libyan war; but he knew well, that it is one thing to lead out the merchants and mechanics of a city which is in the extremity of per-ly for once to battle, and another to form them into soldiome. The patriot party in Carthage furnished him with exce over officers, but it was of course almost exclusively the c and vated class that was represented in it. He had no citi milia, at most a few squadrons of Liby-phœnician cava bly. The task was to form an army out of Libyan conscripts f the mercenaries; a task possible in the hands of a general land of the

* The Barcine family conclude the most important state treaties, and their ratification of the governing board is a formality (Pol. iii. 21). Rome gave her protest before them and before the Senate (Pol. iii. 15). The position of that family towards Carthage in many points resembles that of the House of Orange towards the States-General.

Hamilcar, but even for him possible only on condition that he should be able to pay his men punctually and well. But he had learned, by experience in Sicily, that the state revenues of Carthage were expended in Carthage itself on matters much more urgent than the payment of the armies that fought against the enemy. The warfare which he waged, accordingly, had to support itself, and he had to carry out on a great scale, what he had already attempted on a smaller scale at Monte Pellegrino. But further, Hamilcar ^{The} was not only a military chief, he was also a party leader. In ^{citizens.} opposition to the implacable governing party, which eagerly but patiently waited for an opportunity of overthrowing him, he had to seek support among the citizens; and although their leaders might be ever so pure and noble, the multitude was deeply corrupt and accustomed by the unhappy system of corruption to give nothing without being paid for it. In particular emergencies, indeed, necessity or enthusiasm might for the moment prevail, as everywhere happens even with the most venal corporations; but, if Hamilcar wished to secure the permanent support of the Carthaginian community for his plan, which at the best could only be executed after a series of years, he had to supply his friends at home with regular consignments of money as the means of keeping the mob in good humour. Thus compelled to beg or to buy from the lukewarm and venal multitude permission to save it; compelled to wring from the arrogance of men whom he hated and whom he had constantly conquered, at the price of humiliation and of silence, the respite indispensable for his ends; compelled to conceal from those despised traitors to their country, who called themselves the lords of his native city, his plans and his contempt—the noble hero stood with few friends of congenial sentiments between enemies without and enemies within, building upon the irresolution of the one and of the other, at once deceiving both and defying both, if only he might gain means, money, and men for the contest with a land which, even were the army ready to strike the blow, it seemed difficult to reach and scarce possible to vanquish. He was still a young man, little beyond thirty, but he had apparently, when he was preparing for his expedition, a foreboding that he would not be permitted to attain the end of his labours, or to see otherwise than afar off the promised land. When he left Carthage he enjoined his son Hannibal, nine years of age, to

swear at the altar of the supreme God eternal hatred to the Roman name, and reared him and his younger sons Hasdrubal and Mago—the “lion’s brood” as he called them—in the camp as the inheritors of his projects, of his genius, and of his hatred.

Hamilcar
proceeds to
Spain.
236.

The new commander in chief of Libya departed from Carthage immediately after the termination of the mercenary war (perhaps in the spring of 518). He apparently meditated an expedition against the free Libyans in the west. His army, which was especially strong in elephants, marched along the coast; by its side sailed the fleet, led by his faithful associate Hasdrubal. Suddenly tidings came that he had crossed the sea at the pillars of Hercules and had landed in Spain, where he was waging war with the natives—with people who had done him no harm, and without orders from his government, as the Carthaginian authorities complained. They could not complain at any rate that he neglected the affairs of Africa; when the Numidians once more rebelled, his lieutenant Hasdrubal so effectually routed them that for a long period there was tranquillity on the frontier, and several tribes hitherto independent submitted to pay tribute. What he personally did in Spain, we are no longer able to trace in detail. His achievements compelled Cato the elder, who, a generation after Hamilcar’s death, beheld in Spain the still fresh traces of his working, to exclaim, notwithstanding all his hatred of the Carthaginians, that no king was worthy to be named by the side of Hamilcar Barca. Their results still show to us, at least in a general way, what was accomplished by Hamilcar as a soldier and a statesman in the nine last years of his life (518–526), till in the flower of his age, fighting bravely in the field of battle, he met his death like Scharnhorst just as his plans were beginning to reach maturity. During the next eight years (527–534) the heir of his office and of his plans, his son-in-law Hasdrubal, prosecuted in the spirit of his master the work which Hamilcar had begun. Instead of the small entrepôt for trade, which, along with the protectorate of Gades, was all that Carthage had hitherto possessed on the Spanish coast, and which she had treated as a dependency of Libya, a Carthaginian kingdom was founded in Spain by the generalship of Hamilcar, and confirmed by the adroit statesmanship of Hasdrubal. The fairest regions of Spain, the southern and eastern coasts,

Spanish
kingdom of
the Bar-
cides.

236–228.

227–220.

became Phœnician provinces. Towns were founded ; above all, "Spanish Carthage" (Cartagena) was established by Hasdrubal on the only good harbour along the south coast, containing the splendid "royal castle" of its founder. Agriculture flourished, and still more mining in consequence of the fortunate discovery of the silver-mines of Cartagena, which a century afterwards had a yearly produce of more than £360,000 (36,000,000 *sest.*). Most of the communities as far as the Ebro became dependent on Carthage and paid tribute to it. Hasdrubal skilfully by every means, even that of intermarriage, attached the chiefs to the interests of Carthage. Thus Carthage acquired in Spain a rich market for its commerce and manufactures ; and not only did the revenues of the province sustain the army, but there remained a balance to be remitted to Carthage and reserved for future use. This province at the same time formed and trained the army ; regular levies took place in the territory subject to Carthage ; the prisoners of war were incorporated with Carthaginian corps. Contingents and mercenaries, as many as were desired, were supplied by the dependent communities. During his long life of warfare the soldier found in the camp a second home, and found a substitute for patriotism in fidelity to his standard and enthusiastic attachment to his great leaders. Constant conflicts with the brave Iberians and Celts created a serviceable infantry, to co-operate with the excellent Numidian cavalry.

So far as Carthage was concerned, the Barcides were allowed to go on. The citizens were not asked for regular contributions, but on the contrary derived benefit from the acquisition ; commerce recovered in Spain what it had lost in Sicily and Sardinia ; and the Spanish war and the Spanish army with its brilliant victories and important successes soon became so popular that it was even possible in particular emergencies, such as after Hamilcar's fall, to effect the despatch of considerable reinforcements of African troops to Spain, and the governing party, whether well or ill affected, had to maintain silence, or at any rate to content themselves with complaining in private or in correspondence with their friends in Rome regarding the demagogic officers and the mob.

The Carthaginian government and the Barcides.

On the part of Rome too, nothing took place calculated seriously to affect the course of Spanish affairs. The first and chief cause of the inactivity of the Romans was un-

The Roman government and the Barcides.

230. be done on the Po. Thus everything directed Hannibal to northern Italy; and that the eyes of his father had already been turned to that quarter, is shown by the reconnoitring party of Carthaginians, whom the Romans, to their great surprise, encountered in Liguria in 524.

The reason for Hannibal's preference of the land route to that by sea is less obvious; for that neither the maritime supremacy of the Romans nor their league with Massilia could have prevented a landing at Genoa, is evident, and was shown by the sequel. Our authorities fail to furnish us with several of the elements on which a satisfactory answer to this question would depend, and which cannot be supplied by conjecture. Hannibal had to choose between two evils. Instead of exposing himself to the unknown and unforeseen contingencies of a sea voyage and of naval war, it must have seemed to him the better course to accept the assurances, which beyond doubt were seriously meant, of the Boii and Insubres, and the more so that, even if the army should land at Genoa, it would still have mountains to cross; he could hardly know exactly, how much smaller are the difficulties presented by the Apennines at Genoa than by the main chain of the Alps. At any rate the route which he took was the primitive Celtic route, by which many much larger hordes had crossed the Alps: the ally and deliverer of the Celtic nation might without temerity venture to traverse it.

Departure
of Hannibal.

218. So Hannibal collected the troops, destined for the grand army, in Cartagena at the beginning of the favourable season; there were 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, of whom about two-thirds were Africans and a third Spaniards. The 37 elephants which they took with them were probably destined rather to make an impression on the Gauls than for serious warfare. Hannibal's infantry no longer needed, like that led by Xanthippus, to shelter itself behind a screen of elephants, and the general had too much sagacity to employ otherwise than sparingly and with caution that two-edged weapon, which had as often occasioned the defeat of its own as of the enemy's army. With this force the general set out in the spring of 536 from Cartagena towards the Ebro. He so far informed his soldiers as to the measures he had taken, particularly as to the connections he had entered into with the Celts and the resources and object of the expedition, that even the common soldier,

whose military instincts lengthened war had developed, felt the clear perception and the steady hand of his leader, and followed him with steadfast confidence to the unknown and distant land; and the animated address, in which he laid before them the position of their country and the demands of the Romans, the slavery certainly reserved for their dear native land, and the disgrace of the imputation that they could surrender their beloved general and his staff, kindled a soldierly and public-spirited ardour in the hearts of all.

The Roman state was in a plight such as may easily befall even firmly-established and sagacious aristocracies. The Romans knew well perhaps what they wished to accomplish; and they took various steps; but nothing was done rightly, or at the right time. They might long ago have been masters of the gates of the Alps and have crushed the Celts; the latter were still formidable, and the former were open. They might either have had friendship with Carthage, had they honourably kept the peace of 513, or, had they not been disposed for peace, they might long ago have conquered Carthage: the peace was practically broken by the seizure of Sardinia, and they allowed the power of Carthage to recover itself undisturbed for twenty years. There was no great difficulty in maintaining peace with Macedonia; but they had forfeited her friendship for a trifling gain. There must have been a lack of some leading statesman to take a comprehensive and connected view of the position of affairs; on all hands either too little was done, or too much. Now the war began at a time and at a place which they had allowed the enemy to determine; and, with all their well-founded conviction of military superiority, they were perplexed as to the object to be aimed at and the course to be followed in their first operations. They had at their disposal more than half a million of serviceable soldiers; the Roman cavalry alone was less good, and relatively less numerous, than the Carthaginian, the former constituting about a tenth, the latter an eighth, of the whole number of troops taking the field. None of the states affected by the war had any fleet corresponding to the Roman fleet of 220 quinqueremes, which had just returned from the Adriatic to the western sea. The natural and proper application of this crushing superiority of force was self-evident. It had been long settled that the war ought to be opened with a landing in Africa. The subsequent turn taken by events had com-

Position of
Rome.

241.

Their un-
certain
plans for
the war.

219.

pelled the Romans to embrace in their scheme of the war a simultaneous landing in Spain, chiefly to prevent the Spanish army from appearing before the walls of Carthage. In accordance with this plan they ought above all, when the war had been practically opened by Hannibal's attack on Saguntum in the beginning of 535, to have thrown a Roman army into Spain before the town fell; but they neglected the dictates of interest no less than of honour. For eight months Saguntum held out in vain; when the town passed into other hands, Rome had not even equipped her armament for landing in Spain. The country, however, between the Ebro and the Pyrenees was still free, and its tribes were not only the natural allies of the Romans, but had also, like the Saguntines, received from Roman emissaries promises of speedy assistance. Catalonia may be reached by sea from Italy in not much longer time than from Cartagena by land: had the Romans started, like the Phœnicians, in April, after the formal declaration of war that had taken place in the interval, Hannibal might have encountered the Roman legions on the line of the Ebro.

Hannibal on
the Ebro.

218.

At length, certainly, the greater part of the army and of the fleet was got ready for the expedition to Africa, and the second consul Publius Cornelius Scipio was ordered to the Ebro; but he proceeded leisurely, and when an insurrection broke out on the Po, he allowed the army that was ready for embarkation to be employed there, and formed new legions for the Spanish expedition. So, although Hannibal encountered on the Ebro very vehement resistance, it proceeded only from the natives; and, as under existing circumstances time was still more precious to him than the blood of his men, he surmounted the opposition after some months with the loss of a fourth part of his army, and reached the line of the Pyrenees. That the Spanish allies of Rome would be sacrificed a second time by that delay might have been as certainly foreseen, as the delay itself might have been easily avoided; but probably even the expedition to Italy itself, which in the spring of 536 must not have been anticipated in Rome, would have been averted by the timely appearance of the Romans in Spain. Hannibal had by no means the intention of sacrificing his Spanish "kingdom," and throwing himself like a desperado on Italy. The time which he had spent in the siege of Saguntum and in the reduction of Catalonia, and the considerable corps which he

left behind for the occupation of the newly-won territory between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, sufficiently show that, had a Roman army disputed the possession of Spain with him, he would not have been content to withdraw from it; and (which was the principal matter) had the Romans been able to delay his departure from Spain for but a few weeks, winter would have closed the passes of the Alps before Hannibal reached them, and the African expedition would have departed without hindrance for its destination.

Arrived at the Pyrenees, Hannibal sent home a portion of his troops; a measure which he had resolved on from the first, with the view of showing to the soldiers their general's confidence of success, and of counteracting the presentiment that few would return home from the enterprise. With an army of 50,000 infantry and 9000 cavalry, wholly veteran soldiers, he crossed the Pyrenees without difficulty, and then took the coast route by Narbonne and Nimes through the Celtic territory, which was opened to the army partly by the connections previously formed, partly by Carthaginian gold, partly by arms. It was not till it arrived in the end of July at the Rhone opposite Avignon, that a serious resistance appeared to await it. The consul Scipio, who on his voyage to Spain had landed at Massilia (about the end of June), had there been informed that he had come too late and that Hannibal had crossed not only the Ebro but the Pyrenees. On receiving these accounts, which appear to have first opened the eyes of the Romans to the course and the object of Hannibal, the consul had temporarily abandoned his expedition to Spain, and had resolved in connection with the Celtic tribes of that region, who were under the influence of the Massiliots and thereby under that of Rome, to receive the Phœnicians on the Rhone, and to obstruct their passage of the river and their invasion of Italy. Fortunately for Hannibal, opposite to the point at which he meant to cross there lay at the moment only the general levy of the Celts, while the consul himself with his army of 22,000 infantry and 2000 horse was still stationed in Massilia, four days' march further down the stream. The messengers of the Gallic levy hastened to inform him. It was Hannibal's object to convey his army with its numerous cavalry and elephants across the rapid stream under the eyes of the enemy, and before Scipio should arrive; and he possessed not a single boat. He immediately gave directions

that all the boats belonging to the numerous navigators of the Rhone in the neighbourhood should be bought up at any price, and that the deficiency of boats should be supplied by rafts made from felled trees, so that all the numerous army could be conveyed over in one day. While this was done, a strong division under Hanno, son of Bomilcar, proceeded by forced marches up the stream till they reached a suitable point for crossing, which they found undefended, situated two short days' march above Avignon. Here they crossed the river on hastily constructed rafts, with the view of moving down on the opposite bank and taking the Gauls, who were obstructing the passage of the main army, in the rear. On the morning of the fifth day after they had reached the Rhone, and of the third after Hanno's departure, the preconcerted smoke-signals, which Hannibal was anxiously expecting from the division that had been detached, arose on the opposite bank. Just as the Gauls, seeing that the enemy's fleet of boats began to move, were hastening to occupy the bank, the camp behind them suddenly burst into flames. Surprised and divided, they were unable either to withstand the attack or to resist the passage, and they dispersed in hasty flight.

Scipio meanwhile held councils of war in Massilia as to the proper mode of occupying the ferries of the Rhone, and was not induced to move even by the urgent messages that came from the leaders of the Celts. He distrusted their accounts, and he contented himself with detaching a weak Roman cavalry division to reconnoitre on the left bank of the Rhone. This detachment found the whole enemy's army already transported to that bank, and occupied in bringing over the elephants which alone remained on the right bank of the stream; and, after it had warmly engaged some Carthaginian squadrons in the district of Avignon for the purpose of enabling it to complete its reconnaissance—the first encounter of the Romans and Carthaginians in this war—it hastily returned to report at head-quarters. Scipio now started in the utmost haste with all his troops for Avignon; but, when he arrived there, even the Carthaginian cavalry that had been left behind to cover the passage of the elephants had already taken its departure three days ago, and nothing remained for the consul but to return with weary troops and little credit to Massilia, and to revile the "cowardly flight" of the Carthaginians. Thus the Romans

had for the third time through pure negligence abandoned their allies and an important line of defence; and not only so, but they sacrificed the real means of repairing their error by passing after their first blunder from mistaken slackness to mistaken haste, and by still attempting without any prospect of success to do what might have been done with so much certainty a few days before. When once Hannibal was in the Celtic territory on the Roman side of the Rhone, he could no longer be prevented from reaching the Alps; but if Scipio had at the first accounts proceeded with his whole army to Italy—the Po might have been reached by way of Genoa in seven days—and had united with his corps the weak divisions in the valley of the Po, he might have at least prepared a formidable reception for the enemy. But not only did he lose precious time in the march to Avignon, but, able as otherwise he was, he wanted either the political courage or the military sagacity to change the destination of his corps as the change of circumstances required. He sent the main body under his brother Gñæus to Spain, and returned himself with a few men to Pisæ.

Hannibal, who after the passage of the Rhone had assembled the army and explained to his troops the object of his expedition, and had brought forward the Celtic chief Magilus, who had arrived from the valley of the Po, to address the army in person through an interpreter, meanwhile continued his march to the passes of the Alps without obstruction. Which of these passes he should choose, could not be at once determined either by the shortness of the route or by the disposition of the inhabitants, although he had no time to lose either in circuitous routes or in combat. He had necessarily to select a route which should be practicable for his baggage, his numerous cavalry, and his elephants, and in which an army could procure sufficient means of subsistence, either through friendliness or through force; for, although Hannibal had made preparations to convey provisions after him on beasts of burden, these could only meet for a few days the wants of an army which still, notwithstanding its great losses, amounted to nearly 50,000 men. Leaving out of view the coast route, which Hannibal abstained from taking not because the Romans obstructed it, but because it would have led him away from his destination, there were only two well-known routes leading across the Alps from Gaul to Italy in ancient

Hannibal's
passage of
the Alps.

times ;* the pass of the Cottian Alps (Mont Genevre) leading into the territories of the Taurini (by Susa or Fenestrelles to Turin), and that of the Graian Alps (the Little St. Bernard) leading into the territories of the Salassi (to Aosta and Ivrea). The former route is the shorter ; but, after leaving the valley of the Rhone, it passes by the impracticable and unfruitful valleys of the Drac, the Romanche, and the upper Durance, through a difficult and poor mountain country, and requires at least a seven or eight days' mountain march. A military road was first constructed there by Pompey, to furnish a shorter communication between the provinces of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul.

The route by the Little St. Bernard is somewhat longer ; but, after crossing the first Alpine wall that forms the eastern boundary of the Rhone valley, it keeps by the valley of the upper Isere, which stretches from Grenoble by Chambéry up to the very foot of the Little St. Bernard or, in other words, of the chain of the higher Alps, and is the broadest, most fertile, and most populous of all the Alpine valleys. The pass, moreover, of the Little St. Bernard, while not the lowest of all the natural passes of the Alps, is by far the easiest ; although no artificial road was constructed there, an Austrian corps with artillery crossed the Alps by that route in 1815. This route, which only leads over two mountain ridges, was, in fine, from the earliest times the great military route from the Celtic to the Italian territory. The Carthaginian army had thus in fact no choice. It was a fortunate coincidence, but not a motive influencing the decision of Hannibal, that the Celtic tribes allied with him in Italy inhabited the country up to the Little St. Bernard, while the route by Mont Genevre would have brought him directly into the territory of the Taurini, who were from ancient times at feud with the Insubres.

So the Carthaginian army marched in the first instance up the Rhone towards the valley of the upper Isere, not, as might be presumed, by the nearest route up the left bank of the lower Isere from Valence to Grenoble, but through the "island" of the Allobroges, the rich, and even then thickly peopled, low-lying region, which is enclosed on

* It was not till the middle ages that the route by Mont Cenis became a military road. The eastern passes, such as that over the Pœnine Alps or the Great St. Bernard (which, moreover, was only converted into a military road by Cæsar and Augustus), are, of course, in this case out of the question.

the north and west by the Rhone, on the south by the Isere, and on the east by the Alps. The reason of this movement was, that the nearest route would have led them through an impracticable and poor mountain country, while the "island" was level and extremely fertile, and was separated by but a single mountain-wall from the valley of the upper Isere. The march along the Rhone and across the "island" to the foot of the Alpine wall was accomplished in sixteen days: it presented little difficulty, and in the "island" itself Hannibal dexterously availed himself of a feud that had broken out between two chiefs of the Allobroges to attach to his interests one of the most important of the chiefs, who not only escorted the Carthaginians through the whole plain, but also supplied them with provisions, and furnished the soldiers with arms, clothing, and shoes. But the expedition narrowly escaped destruction at the crossing of the first Alpine chain, which rises into a precipitous wall, and over which only a single available path leads (over Mont du Chat, near the hamlet Chevelu). The population of the Allobroges had strongly occupied the pass. Hannibal learned the state of matters early enough to avoid surprise, and encamped at the foot, until after sunset the Celts dispersed to the houses of the nearest town: he then seized the pass in the night. Thus the summit was gained; but on the extremely steep path, which leads down from the summit to the lake of Bourget, the mules and horses slipped and fell. The assaults, which at all available points were made by the Celts upon the army in march, were very annoying, by reason not so much of the direct injury which they inflicted, as of the confusion which they occasioned; and when Hannibal with his light troops threw himself from above on the Allobroges, these were chased indeed without difficulty and with heavy loss down the mountain, but the confusion, in the train especially, was still further increased by the noise of the combat. So, when after much loss he arrived in the plain, Hannibal immediately attacked the nearest town, to chastise and terrify the barbarians, and at the same time to repair as far as possible his loss in sumpter animals and horses. After a day's repose in the pleasant valley of Chambery the army continued its march up the Isere, without being detained either by want of supplies or by attacks so long as the valley continued broad and fertile. It was only when on the fourth day they entered the territory of the Ceu-

trones (the modern Tarantaise) where the valley gradually contracts, that they had greater occasion to be on their guard. The Ceutrones received the army at the boundary of their country (somewhere about Conflans) with branches and garlands, furnished cattle for slaughter, guides, and hostages; and the Carthaginians marched through their territory as through a friendly land. When, however, the troops had reached the very foot of the Alps, at the point where the path leaves the Isere, and winds by a narrow and difficult defile along the brook Reclus up to the summit of the St. Bernard, all at once the militia of the Ceutrones appeared partly in the rear of the army, partly on the crests of the rocks enclosing the pass on the right and left, in the hope of cutting off the train and baggage. But Hannibal, whose unerring tact had seen in all the courtesies of the Ceutrones nothing but a scheme to secure at once immunity for their territory and a rich spoil, had, in expectation of such an attack, sent forward the baggage and cavalry, and covered the march with all his infantry. By this means he frustrated the design of the enemy, although he could not prevent them from moving along the overhanging mountain slopes parallel to the march of the infantry, and inflicting very considerable loss by hurling or rolling down stones upon it. At the "white stone" (still called *la roche blanche*), a high isolated chalk cliff standing at the foot of the St. Bernard and commanding the ascent to it, Hannibal encamped with his infantry, to cover the march of the horses and sumpter animals laboriously climbing upward throughout the whole night; and amidst continual and very bloody conflicts, he at length on the following day reached the summit of the pass. There, on the sheltered plain which spreads to the extent of two and a half miles round a little lake, the source of the Doria, he allowed the army to rest. Despondency had begun to seize the minds of the soldiers. The paths that were becoming ever more difficult, the provisions failing, the marching through defiles exposed to the constant attacks of foes whom they could not reach, the sadly thinned ranks, the hopeless situation of the stragglers and the wounded, the object which appeared chimerical to all save the enthusiastic leader and his immediate suite—all these things began to tell even on the African and Spanish veterans. But the confidence of the general remained ever the same; numerous stragglers

rejoined the ranks; the friendly Gauls were near; the watershed was reached, and the view of the descending path, so gladdening to the mountain-pilgrim, opened up: after a brief repose they prepared with renewed courage for the last and most difficult undertaking,—the downward march. In it the army was not materially annoyed by the enemy; but the advanced season—it was already the beginning of September—occasioned troubles in the descent, equal to those which had been occasioned in the ascent by the attacks of the barbarians. On the steep and slippery mountain-slope along the Doria, where the recently fallen snow had concealed and obliterated the paths, men and animals went astray and slipped, and were precipitated into the chasms. In fact, towards the end of the first day's march they reached a portion of the road about two hundred paces in length, on which avalanches are constantly descending from the precipices of the Cramont that overhang it, and where in cold summers snow lies throughout the whole year. The infantry crossed; but the horses and elephants were unable to pass over the smooth masses of ice, on which there lay but a thin covering of freshly fallen snow, and the general encamped above the difficult spot with the baggage, the cavalry, and the elephants. On the following day the horsemen, by zealous exertion in entrenching, prepared a path for horses and beasts of burden; but it was not until after a further labour of three days with constant reliefs, that the half-famished elephants could at length be conducted over. In this way the whole army was after a delay of four days once more united; and after a further three days' march through the valley of the Doria, which was ever widening and displaying greater fertility, and whose inhabitants the Salassi, clients of the Insubres, hailed in the Carthaginians their allies and liberators, the army arrived about the middle of September in the plain of Ivrea, where the exhausted troops were quartered in the villages, that by good nursing and a fortnight's repose they might recruit from their unparalleled hardships. Had the Romans had a corps, as they might have had, of 30,000 men thoroughly fresh and ready for action somewhere near Turin, and immediately forced on a battle, the prospects of Hannibal's great plan would have been very dubious; fortunately for him, once more, they were not where they should

have been, and they did not disturb the troops of the enemy in that repose which was so greatly needed.*

Results.

The object was attained, but at a heavy sacrifice. Of the 50,000 veteran infantry and the 9000 cavalry, which the army had numbered at the crossing of the Pyrenees, more than half had been sacrificed in the conflicts, the marches, and the passages of the rivers. Hannibal now, according to his own statement, numbered not more than 20,000 infantry—of whom three-fifths were Libyans and two-fifths Spaniards—and 6000 cavalry, part of whom were dismounted: the comparatively small loss of the latter proclaimed the excellence of the Numidian cavalry, no less than the consideration of the general in making a sparing use of troops so select. A march of 526 miles or about 83 moderate days' marching—the continuance and termination of which

* The much-discussed questions of topography, connected with this celebrated expedition, may be regarded as cleared up and substantially solved by the masterly investigations of Messrs. Wickham and Cramer. Respecting the chronological questions, which likewise present difficulties, a few remarks may be allowed to have a place here.

When Hannibal reached the summit of the St. Bernard, "the peaks were already beginning to be thickly covered with snow" (Pol. iii. 54); snow lay on the route (Pol. iii. 55), perhaps for the most part snow not freshly fallen, but proceeding from the fall of avalanches. At the St. Bernard winter begins about Michaelmas, and the falling of snow in September; when the Englishmen already mentioned crossed the mountain at the end of August, they found almost no snow on their road, but the slopes on both sides were covered with it. Hannibal thus appears to have arrived at the pass in the beginning of September; which is quite compatible with the statement that he arrived there "when the winter was already approaching"—for *συνδραμεν τὴν τῆς πλειάδος δύσιν*, (Pol. iii. 54) does not mean anything more than this, least of all the day of the heliacal setting of the Pleiades (about 26th October); comp. Ideler, *Chronol.* i. 241.

If Hannibal reached Italy nine days later, and therefore about the middle of September, there is room for the events that occurred from that time up to the battle of the Trebia towards the end of December (*πρὸς χειμερινὰς τροπὰς*, Pol. iii. 72), and in particular for the transporting of the army destined for Africa from Lilybæum to Placentia. This hypothesis further suits the statement that the day of departure was announced at an assembly of the army *ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκπρωτὴν ἑσπᾶν* (Pol. iii. 34), and therefore towards the end of March, and that the march lasted five (or according to App. vii. 4, six) months. If Hannibal was thus at the St. Bernard in the beginning of September, he must have reached the Rhone at the beginning of August—for he spent thirty days in making his way from the Rhone thither—and in that case it is evident that Scipio, who embarked at the beginning of summer (Pol. iii. 41), and so at latest by the commencement of June, must have spent much time on the voyage, or remained for a considerable period in singular inaction at Massilia.

were only rendered possible by unforeseen accidents and still more unforeseen blunders of the enemy, and which, while it was disturbed by no special misfortunes on a great scale that could not be anticipated, not only cost such sacrifices, but so fatigued and demoralized the army, that it needed a long rest in order to be again ready for action—is a military operation of doubtful value, and it may be questioned whether Hannibal himself regarded it as successful. Only in so speaking, we may not pronounce an absolute censure on the general: we see well the defects of the plan of operations pursued by him, but we cannot determine whether he was in a position to foresee them—his route lay through an unknown land of barbarians—or whether any other plan, such as that of taking the coast road or of embarking at Carthago or at Carthage, would have exposed him to fewer dangers. The cautious and masterly execution of the plan in its details at any rate deserves our admiration, and to whatever causes the result may have been due—whether it was due mainly to the favour of fortune, or mainly to the skill of the general—the grand idea of Hamilcar, that of taking up the conflict with Rome in Italy, was now realized. It was his genius that projected this expedition; and as the task of Stein and Scharnhorst was more difficult and nobler than that of York and Blücher, so the unerring tact of historical tradition has always dwelt on the last link in the great chain of preparatory steps, the passage of the Alps, with a greater admiration than on the battles of the Trasimene lake and of the plain of Cannæ.

CHAPTER V.

THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL TO THE BATTLE OF CANNÆ.

Hannibal
and the
Italian
Celts.

THE appearance of the Carthaginian army on the Roman side of the Alps changed all at once the situation of affairs, and disconcerted the Roman plan of war. Of the two principal armies of the Romans, one had landed in Spain and was already engaged with the enemy there: it was no longer possible to recall it. The second, which was destined for Africa under the command of the consul Tiberius Sempronius, was fortunately still in Sicily: in this instance Roman delay for once proved useful. Of the two Carthaginian squadrons destined for Italy and Sicily, the first was dispersed by a storm, and some of its vessels were captured by the Syracusans near Messina; the second had endeavoured in vain to surprise Lilybæum, and had thereafter been defeated in a naval engagement off that port. But the continuance of the enemy's squadrons in the Italian waters was so inconvenient, that the consul determined, before crossing to Africa, to occupy the small islands around Sicily, and to dislodge the Carthaginian fleet operating against Italy. The summer passed away in the conquest of Melita, in the chase after the enemy's squadron, which he expected to find at the Lipari islands while it had made a descent near Vibo (Monteleone) and pillaged the Bruttian coast, and, lastly, in gaining information as to a suitable spot for landing on the coast of Africa; so that the army and fleet were still at Lilybæum, when orders arrived from the senate that they should return with all possible speed for the defence of their homes.

In this way, while the two great Roman armies, each in

itself equal in numbers to that of Hannibal, remained at a great distance from the valley of the Po, the Romans were quite unprepared for an attack in that quarter. No doubt a Roman army was there, in consequence of an insurrection that had broken out among the Celts even before the arrival of the Carthaginian army. The founding of the two Roman strongholds of Placentia and Cremona, each of which received 6000 colonists, and more especially the preparations for the founding of Mutina in the territory of the Boii, had already in the spring of 536 driven the Boii to revolt before the time concerted with Hannibal; and the Insubres had immediately joined them. The colonists already settled in the territory of Mutina, suddenly attacked, took refuge in the town. The prætor Lucius Manlius, who held the chief command at Ariminum, hastened along with his single legion to relieve the blockaded colonists; but he was surprised in the woods, and no course was left to him after sustaining great loss but to establish himself upon a hill and to submit to a siege there on the part of the Boii, till a second legion sent from Rome under the prætor Lucius Atilius succeeded in relieving army and town, and in suppressing for the moment the Gaulish insurrection. This premature rising of the Boii on the one hand, by delaying Scipio's departure for Spain, essentially promoted Hannibal's plans; on the other hand, but for its occurrence he would have found the valley of the Po entirely unoccupied, except the fortresses. But the Roman corps, whose two severely thinned legions did not number 20,000 soldiers, had enough to do to keep the Celts in check, and did not think of occupying the passes of the Alps. The Romans only learned that the passes were threatened, when in August the consul Publius Scipio returned without his army from Massilia to Italy, and perhaps even then they gave little attention to the danger, because, forsooth, the foolhardy attempt would be frustrated by the Alps alone. Thus at the decisive hour and on the decisive spot there was not even a Roman outpost. Hannibal had full time to rest his army, to capture after a three days' siege the capital of the Taurini which closed its gates against him, and to induce or terrify into alliance with him all the Ligurian and Celtic communities in the upper basin of the Po, before Scipio, who had taken the command in the Po valley, encountered him.

218.

The latter, who, with an army considerably smaller and very

Scipio in
the valley
of the Po.

Conflict on
the Ticino.

weak in cavalry, had the difficult task of preventing the advance of the superior force of the enemy and of repressing the movements of insurrection which everywhere were spreading among the Celts, had crossed the Po probably at Placentia, and marched up the river to meet the enemy, while Hannibal after the capture of Turin marched downwards to relieve the Insubres and Boii. In the plain between the Ticino and the Sesia, not far from Vercelli, the Roman cavalry, which had advanced with the light infantry to make a reconnaissance in force, encountered the Punic cavalry sent out for the like purpose, both led by the generals in person. Scipio accepted battle when offered, notwithstanding the superiority of the enemy; but his light infantry, which was placed in front of the cavalry, dispersed before the charge of the heavy cavalry of the enemy, and while the latter engaged the masses of the Roman horsemen in front, the light Numidian cavalry, after having pushed aside the broken ranks of the enemy's infantry, took the Roman horsemen in flank and rear. This decided the combat. The loss of the Romans was very considerable. The consul himself, who made up as a soldier for his deficiencies as a general, received a dangerous wound, and owed his safety entirely to the devotion of his son of seventeen, who, courageously dashing into the ranks of the enemy, compelled his squadron to follow him and rescued his father. Scipio, enlightened by this combat as to the strength of his enemy, saw the error which he had committed in posting himself, with a weaker army, in the plain with his back to the river, and resolved to return to the right bank of the Po under the eyes of his antagonist. As the operations became contracted into a narrower space and his illusions regarding Roman invincibility departed, he recovered the use of his considerable military talent which the adventurous boldness of his youthful opponent's plans had for a moment paralyzed. While Hannibal was preparing for a pitched battle, Scipio by a rapidly projected and steadily executed march succeeded in reaching the right bank of the river which in an evil hour he had abandoned, and broke down the bridge over the Po behind his army; the Roman detachment of 600 men charged to cover the process of destruction were, however, intercepted and made prisoners. But as the upper course of the river was in the hands of Hannibal, he could not be prevented from marching up the stream, crossing on a bridge

of boats, and in a few days confronting the Roman army on the right bank. The latter had taken a position in the plain in front of Placentia; but the mutiny of a Celtic division in the Roman camp, and the Gallic insurrection breaking out afresh all around, compelled the consul to evacuate the plain, and to post himself on the hills behind the Trebia. This was accomplished without much loss, because the Numidian horsemen sent in pursuit lost their time in plundering, and setting fire to, the abandoned camp. In this strong position, with his left wing resting on the Apennines, his right on the Po and the fortress of Placentia, and covered in front by the Trebia (no inconsiderable stream at that season), Scipio was unable to save the rich stores of Clastidium (Casteggio), from which in this position he was cut off by the army of the enemy; nor was he able to avert the insurrectionary movement on the part of almost all the Gallic cantons, excepting the Cenomani who were friendly to Rome; but he completely checked the progress of Hannibal, and compelled him to pitch his camp opposite to that of the Romans. Moreover, the position taken up by Scipio, and the circumstance of the Cenomani threatening the borders of the Insubres, hindered the main body of the Gallic insurgents from directly joining the enemy, and gave to the second Roman army, which meanwhile had arrived at Ariminum from Lilybæum, the opportunity of reaching Placentia through the midst of the insurgent country without material hindrance, and of uniting itself with the army of the Po.

Scipio had solved his difficult task brilliantly and completely. The Roman army, now close on 40,000 strong, and though not a match for its antagonist in cavalry, at least equal in infantry, had simply to remain in its existing position, in order to compel the enemy either to attempt in the winter season the passage of the river and an attack upon the camp, or to suspend his advance and to test the fickle temper of the Gauls by the burden of winter quarters. Clear, however, as this was, it was no less clear that it was now December, and that under the course proposed the victory might perhaps be gained by Rome, but would not be gained by the consul Tiberius Sempronius, who held the sole command in consequence of Scipio's wound, and whose year of office expired in a few months. Hannibal knew the man, and neglected no means of alluring him to fight. The

The armies
at Placentia.

Battle on
the Trebia.

Celtic villages that had remained faithful to the Romans were cruelly laid waste, and, when this brought on a conflict between the cavalry, Hannibal allowed his opponents to boast of the victory. Soon, thereafter, on a raw rainy day a general engagement came on, unlooked for by the Romans. From the earliest hour of the morning the Roman light troops had been skirmishing with the light cavalry of the enemy; the latter slowly retreated, and the Romans eagerly pursued it through the deeply swollen Trebia, so as to follow up the advantage which they had gained. Suddenly the cavalry halted; the Roman vanguard found itself face to face with the army of Hannibal drawn up for battle on a field chosen by himself; it was lost, unless the main body should cross the stream with all speed to its support. Hungry, weary, and wet, the Romans came up, and hastened to form in order of battle, the cavalry, as usual, on the wings, the infantry in the centre. The light troops, who formed the vanguard on both sides, began the combat: but the Romans had already almost exhausted their missiles against the cavalry, and immediately gave way. In like manner the cavalry gave way on the wings, hard pressed by the elephants in front, and outflanked right and left by the far more numerous Carthaginian horse. But the Roman infantry proved itself worthy of its name: at the beginning of the battle it fought with very decided superiority against the infantry of the enemy, and even when the repulse of the Roman horse allowed the enemy's cavalry and light-armed troops to turn their attacks against the Roman infantry, it ceased indeed to gain on the foe, but it obstinately maintained its ground. At this stage a select Carthaginian band of 2000 men, half infantry, half cavalry, under the leadership of Mago, Hannibal's youngest brother, suddenly emerged from an ambush in the rear of the Roman army, and fell upon the densely entangled masses. The wings of the army and the rear ranks of the Roman centre were broken up and scattered by this attack, while the first division, 10,000 men strong, in compact array broke through the Carthaginian line, and made a passage for itself obliquely through the midst of the enemy, inflicting great loss on the opposing infantry and more especially on the Gallic insurgents. This brave body, pursued but feebly, thus reached Placentia. The remaining mass was for the most part slaughtered by the elephants and light troops of the enemy in attempting to cross the river:

only part of the cavalry and some divisions of infantry were able, by wading through the river, to gain the camp whither the Carthaginians did not follow them, and thus they too reached Placentia.* Few battles confer more honour on the Roman soldier than this on the Trebia, and few at the same time furnish graver impeachment of the general in command; although the candid judge will not forget that a commandership-in-chief expiring on a definite day was an unmilitary institution, and that figs cannot be reaped from thistles. The victory came to be costly even to the victors. Although the loss in the battle fell chiefly on the Celtic insurgents, yet a multitude of the veteran soldiers of Hannibal died afterwards from diseases engendered by that raw and wet winter day, and all the elephants perished except one.

The effect of this first victory of the invading army was, that the national insurrection now spread and assumed shape without hindrance throughout the Celtic territory. The remains of the Roman army of the Po threw themselves into the fortresses of Placentia and Cremona: completely cut off from home, they were obliged to procure their supplies by way of the river. The consul Tiberius Sempronius only escaped, as if by miracle, from being taken prisoner, when with a weak escort of cavalry he went to

Hannibal
master of
northern
Italy.

* Polybius's account of the battle on the Trebia is quite clear. If Placentia lay on the right bank of the Trebia where it falls into the Po, and if the battle was fought on the left bank, while the Roman encampment was pitched upon the right (both of which points have been disputed, but are nevertheless indisputable), the Roman soldiers must certainly have passed the Trebia in order to gain Placentia as well as to gain the camp. But those who crossed to the camp must have made their way through the disorganized portions of their own army and through the corps of the enemy that had gone round to their rear, and must then have crossed the river almost in hand to hand combat with the enemy. On the other hand the passage near Placentia was accomplished after the pursuit had slackened; the corps was several miles distant from the field of battle, and had arrived within reach of a Roman fortress; it may even have been the case, although it cannot be proved, that a bridge led over the Trebia at that point, and that the *tête de pont* on the other bank was occupied by the garrison of Placentia. It is evident that the first passage was just as difficult as the second was easy, and therefore with good reason Polybius, military judge as he was, merely says of the corps of 10,000, that in close columns it cut its way to Placentia (iii. 74, 6), without mentioning the passage of the river which in this case was unattended with difficulty.

The erroneousness of the view of Livy, which transfers the Phœnician camp to the right, the Roman to the left bank of the Trebia, has lately been repeatedly pointed out. We may only further mention, that the site of Clastidium, near the modern Casteggio, has now been established by inscriptions (*Orelli—Henzen*. 5117).

Rome on account of the elections. Hannibal, who would not hazard the health of his troops by further marches at that inclement season, bivouacked for the winter where he was; and, as a serious attempt on the larger fortresses would have led to no result, contented himself with annoying the enemy by attacks on the river-port of Placentia and other minor Roman positions. He employed himself mainly in organizing the Gallic insurrection: more than 60,000 foot soldiers and 4000 horsemen from the Celts are said to have joined his army.

Military and
poli- [217.
tical posi-
tion of
Hannibal.

No extraordinary exertions were made in Rome for the campaign of 537. The senate thought, and not unreasonably, that, despite the lost battle, their position was by no means fraught with serious danger. Besides the coast-garrisons, which were despatched to Sardinia, Sicily, and Tarentum, and the reinforcements which were sent to Spain, the two new consuls, Gaius Flaminius and Gnæus Servilius, obtained only as many men as were necessary to restore the four legions to their full complement; additions were made to the strength of the cavalry alone. The consuls had to protect the northern frontier, and stationed themselves accordingly on the two highways which led from Rome to the north, the western of which at that time terminated at Arretium, and the eastern at Ariminum; Gaius Flaminius occupied the former, Gnæus Servilius the latter. There they ordered the troops from the fortresses on the Po to join them, probably by water, and awaited the commencement of the favourable season, when they proposed to occupy in the defensive the passes of the Apennines, and then, resuming offensive operations, to descend into the valley of the Po and effect a junction somewhere near Placentia. But Hannibal by no means intended to defend the valley of the Po. He knew Rome better perhaps than the Romans knew it themselves, and was very well aware how decidedly he was the weaker party and continued to be so notwithstanding the brilliant battle on the Trebia; he knew too that his ultimate object, the humiliation of Rome, was not to be wrung from the unbending Roman pride either by terror or by surprise, but could only be gained by the complete subjugation of the haughty city. It was clearly apparent that the Italian federation was in political solidity and in military resources infinitely superior to an adversary, who received only precarious and irregular support from

home, and who was in the first instance dependent for aid in Italy solely on the vacillating and capricious nation of the Celts; and that the Phœnician foot soldier was, notwithstanding all the pains taken by Hannibal, far inferior in point of tactics to the legionary, had been completely proved by the defensive movements of Scipio and the brilliant retreat of the defeated infantry on the Trebia. From these convictions flowed the two fundamental principles which determined Hannibal's whole method of operations in Italy—viz., that the war should be carried on, somewhat adventurously, with constant changes in the plan and in the theatre of operations; and that its favourable issue could only be looked for as the result of political and not of military successes—of the gradual loosening and final breaking up of the Italian federation. This mode of carrying on the war was necessary, because the single element which Hannibal had to throw into the scale against so many disadvantages—his military genius—only told with its full weight, when he constantly foiled his opponents by unexpected combinations; he was undone, if the war became stationary. This aim was the aim dictated to him by right policy, because, mighty conqueror though he was in battle, he saw very clearly that on each occasion he vanquished the generals but not the city, and that after each new battle the Romans remained just as superior to the Carthaginians, as he was personally superior to the Roman commanders. That Hannibal even at the height of his fortune never deceived himself on this point, is a fact more wonderful than his most wondrous battles.

It was these motives, and not the entreaties of the Gauls that he should spare their country (which would not have influenced him), that induced Hannibal now to forsake, as it were, his newly acquired basis of operations against Italy, and to transfer the scene of war to Italy itself. Before doing so he gave orders that all the prisoners should be brought before him. He ordered the Romans to be separated and loaded with chains as slaves—the statement that Hannibal put to death all the Romans capable of bearing arms, who here and elsewhere fell into his hands, is beyond doubt at least strongly exaggerated. On the other hand, all the Italian allies were released without ransom, and charged to report at home that Hannibal waged war not against Italy, but against Rome; that he promised to every Italian community the restoration of its ancient independence and its

Hannibal
crosses the
Apennines.

ancient boundaries ; and that the deliverer was about to follow those whom he had set free, bringing release and revenge. So, when the winter ended, he started from the valley of the Po to search for a route through the difficult defiles of the Apennines. Gaius Flaminius, with the Etruscan army, was still for the present at Arezzo, intending to move from that point towards Lucca in order to protect the vale of the Arno and the passes of the Apennines, so soon as the season should allow. But Hannibal anticipated him. The passage of the Apennines was accomplished without much difficulty, at a point as far west as possible or, in other words, as distant as possible from the enemy ; but the marshy lowlands between the Serchio and the Arno were so flooded by the melting of the snow and the spring rains, that the army had to march four days in water, without finding any other dry spot for resting by night than was supplied by piling the baggage or by the sumpter animals that had fallen. The troops underwent unutterable sufferings, particularly the Gallic infantry, which marched behind the Carthaginians along tracks already rendered impassable : they murmured loudly and would undoubtedly have dispersed to a man, had not the Carthaginian cavalry under Mago, which brought up the rear, rendered flight impossible. The horses, assailed by a distemper in their hoofs, fell in heaps ; various diseases decimated the soldiers ; Hannibal himself lost an eye in consequence of ophthalmia.

Flaminius. But the object was attained. Hannibal encamped at Fiesole, while Gaius Flaminius was still waiting at Arezzo until the roads should become passable that he might blockade them. After the Roman defensive position had thus been turned, the best course for the consul, who might perhaps have been strong enough to defend the mountain passes but certainly was unable now to face Hannibal in the open field, would have been to wait till the second army, which had now become completely superfluous at Ariminum, should arrive. He himself, however, thought otherwise. He was a political party leader, raised to distinction by his efforts to limit the power of the senate ; indignant at the government in consequence of aristocratic intrigues concocted against him during his consulship ; carried away, through a perhaps justifiable opposition to their beaten track of partisanship, into a scornful defiance of tradition and custom ; intoxicated by a blind affection for the common people, and by quite as bitter a

hatred towards the party of the nobles ; and, in addition to all this, possessed with the fixed idea that he was a military genius. His campaign against the Insubres of 531, which to unprejudiced judges only showed that good soldiers often repair the errors of bad generals (P. 81), was regarded by him and by his adherents as an irrefragable proof that the Romans had only to put Gaius Flaminius at the head of the army in order to make a speedy end of Hannibal. Talk of this sort had procured for him his second consulship, and hopes of this sort had now brought to his camp so great a multitude of unarmed followers eager for spoil, that their number, according to the assurance of sober historians, exceeded that of the legionaries. Hannibal based his plan in part on this circumstance. So far from attacking him, he marched past him, and caused the country all around to be pillaged by the Celts, who thoroughly understood plundering, and by his numerous cavalry. The complaints and indignation of the multitude which had to submit to be plundered under the eyes of the hero who had promised to enrich them, and the protestation of the enemy that they did not believe him possessed of either the power or the resolution to undertake anything before the arrival of his colleague, could not but induce such a man to display his genius for strategy, and to give a sharp lesson to his inconsiderate and haughty foe.

223.

No plan was ever more successful. In haste, the consul followed the line of march of the enemy, who passed by Arezzo and moved slowly through the rich valley of the Chiana towards Perugia. He overtook him in the district of Cortona, where Hannibal, accurately informed of his antagonist's march, had had full time to select his field of battle,—a narrow defile between two steep mountain walls, closed at its outlet by a high hill and at its entrance by the Trasimene lake. With the flower of his infantry he barred the outlet ; the light troops and the cavalry placed themselves in concealment on either side. The Roman columns advanced without hesitation into the unoccupied pass ; the thick morning mist concealed from them the position of the enemy. As the head of the Roman line approached the hill, Hannibal gave the signal for battle ; the cavalry, advancing behind the heights, closed the entrance of the pass, and at the same time the mist rolling away revealed the Phœnician arms everywhere along the crests on the right and left. There was no battle ; it was a mere rout. Those that remained out

Battle on
the Trasimene lake.

of the defile were driven by the cavalry into the lake. The main body was annihilated in the pass itself almost without resistance, and most of them, including the consul himself, were cut down in the order of march. The head of the Roman column, formed of 6000 infantry, cut their way through the infantry of the enemy, and proved once more the irresistible might of the legions; but, cut off from the rest of the army and without knowledge of its fate, they marched on at random, were surrounded on the following day, on a hill which they had occupied, by a corps of Carthaginian cavalry, and—as the capitulation, which promised them a free retreat, was rejected by Hannibal—were all treated as prisoners of war. 15,000 Romans had fallen, and as many were captured; in other words, the army was annihilated. The slight Carthaginian loss—1500 men—again fell mainly upon the Gauls.* And, as if this were not enough, immediately after the battle on the Trasimene lake, the cavalry of the army of Ariminum under Gaius Centenius, 4000 strong, which Gnaeus Servilius had sent forward to the support of his colleague while he himself advanced by slow marches, was likewise surrounded by the Phœnician army, and partly slain, partly made prisoners. All Etruria was lost, and Hannibal might without hindrance march on Rome. The Romans prepared themselves for the worst; they broke down the bridges over the Tiber, and nominated Quintus Fabius Maximus dictator to repair the walls and conduct the defence, for which there was formed an army of reserve. At the same time two new legions were summoned under arms in the room of those annihilated, and the fleet, which might become of importance in the event of a siege, was put in order.

Hannibal on
the east
coast.

But Hannibal was more farsighted than king Pyrrhus. He did not march on Rome; nor even against Gnaeus Servilius, an able general, who had with the help of the fortresses on the northern road preserved his army hitherto uninjured, and would perhaps have kept his antagonist at bay. Once more a movement occurred which was quite un-

* The date of the battle, 23rd June according to the uncorrected calendar, must, according to the corrected calendar, fall somewhere in April, since Quintus Fabius resigned his dictatorship, after six months, in the middle of autumn (Liv. xxii. 31, 7; 32, 1), and must therefore have entered upon it about the beginning of May. The confusion of the calendar (i. 489) in Rome was even at this period very great.

expected. Hannibal marched past the fortress of Spoletium, which he attempted in vain to surprise, through Umbria, fearfully devastated the Picentine territory which was covered all over with Roman farmhouses, and halted on the shores of the Adriatic. The men and horses of his army had not yet recovered from the painful effects of their spring campaign; here he rested for a considerable time to allow his army to recruit its strength in a pleasant district and at a fine season of the year, and to reorganize his Libyan infantry after the Roman mode, the means for which were furnished to him by the mass of Roman arms among the spoil. From this point, moreover, he resumed his long interrupted communication with his native land, sending his messages of victory by water to Carthage. At length, when his army was sufficiently restored, and had been adequately exercised in the use of the new arms, he broke up and marched slowly along the coast into southern Italy.

Reorganiza-
tion of the
Carthagi-
nian army.

He had calculated correctly, when he chose this time for remodelling his infantry. The surprise of his antagonists, who were in constant expectation of an attack on the capital, allowed him at least four weeks of undisturbed leisure for the execution of the unprecedentedly bold experiment of changing completely his military system in the heart of an hostile country and with an army still comparatively small, and of attempting to oppose African legions to the invincible legions of Italy. But his hope that the confederacy would now begin to break up was not fulfilled. In this point of view the Etruscans, who had carried on their last war of independence mainly with Gallic mercenaries, were of less moment. The flower of the confederacy, particularly in a military point of view, consisted (next to the Latins) of the Sabellian communities, and with good reason Hannibal had now come into their neighbourhood. But one town after another closed its gates; not a single Italian community entered into alliance with the Phœnicians. This result was a great, in fact an all-important, point gained for Rome. It was felt, however, in the capital how imprudent it would be to put the fidelity of their allies to such a test without a Roman army to keep the field. The dictator Quintus Fabius combined the two supplementary legions formed in Rome with the army of Ariminum, and when Hannibal marched past the Roman fortress Luceria towards Arpi, the Roman standards ap-

War in
lower
Italy.

Fabius.

peared on his right flank at Aeca. Their leader, however, pursued a different course from his predecessors. Quintus Fabius was a man advanced in years, of a deliberation and firmness, which to not a few seemed procrastination and obstinacy. Zealous in his reverence for the good old times, for the political omnipotence of the senate, and for the command of the burgomasters, he looked—next to sacrifices and prayer—to a methodical prosecution of the war as the main means of saving the state. A political antagonist of Gaius Flaminius, and summoned to the head of affairs in virtue of the reaction against his foolish war-demagogism, he departed for the camp just as firmly resolved to avoid a pitched battle at any price, as his predecessor had been determined at any price to fight one; he was convinced beyond a doubt, that the first elements of strategy would forbid Hannibal to advance so long as a Roman army confronted him intact, and that accordingly it would not be difficult to weaken by petty conflicts and gradually to starve out the enemy's army, dependent as it was on foraging for its supplies.

March to
Capua and
back to
Apulia.

Hannibal, well served by his spies in Rome and in the Roman army, immediately learned how matters stood, and, as usual, adjusted the plan of his campaign in accordance with the individual character of the opposing leader. Passing the Roman army, he marched over the Apennines into the heart of Italy towards Beneventum, took the open town of Telesia on the boundary between Samnium and Campania, and thence turned against Capua, which was the most important of all the Italian cities dependent on Rome, and for that very reason had been oppressed and maltreated in a more vexatious manner than any other community had been by the Roman government. He had formed connections there, which led him to hope that the Campanians might revolt from the Roman alliance; but in this hope he was disappointed. So, retracing his steps, he took the road to Apulia. During all this march of the Carthaginian army the dictator had followed along the heights, and had condemned his soldiers to the melancholy task of looking on with arms in their hands, while the Numidian cavalry plundered the faithful allies far and wide, and the villages over all the plain rose in flames. At length he opened up to the exasperated Roman army the eagerly coveted prospect of attacking the enemy. When Hannibal had begun his retreat, Fabius intercepted his route near Casilinum (the modern

Capua), by strongly garrisoning that town on the left bank of Volturnus, and occupying the heights that secured the right bank with his main army, while a division of 4000 men encamped on the road itself that led along by the river. But Hannibal ordered his light-armed troops to climb the heights which rose immediately alongside of the road, and to drive before them a number of oxen with lighted faggots on their horns, so that it seemed as if the Carthaginian army were thus marching off during the night by torchlight. The Roman division, which blocked up the road, imagining that they were circumvented and that further covering of the road was superfluous, marched by a side movement to the same heights. Along the road thus left free Hannibal then retreated with the bulk of his army, without encountering the enemy; next morning he without difficulty, but with severe loss to the Romans, disengaged and recalled his light troops. Hannibal then continued his march unopposed in a northeasterly direction; and by a widely-circuitous route, after traversing and laying under contribution the lands of the Hirpinians, Campanians, Samnites, Pæignians, and Frentanians without resistance, he arrived with rich booty and a full chest once more in the region of Luceria, just when the harvest there was about to begin. Nowhere in his extensive march had he met with active opposition, but nowhere had he found allies. Clearly perceiving that no course remained for him but to take up winter quarters in the open field, he began the difficult operation of collecting the winter supplies requisite for the army, by means of its own agency, from the fields of the enemy. For this purpose he had selected the broad and mostly flat district of north Apulia, which furnished grain and grass in abundance, and which could be completely commanded by his excellent cavalry. An entrenched camp was constructed at Gerunium, twenty-three miles to the north of Luceria. Two-thirds of the army were daily despatched from it to bring in the stores, while Hannibal with the remainder took up a position to protect the camp and the detachments sent out.

War in
Apulia.

The master of the horse, Marcus Minucius, who held temporary command in the Roman camp in the absence of the dictator, deemed this a suitable opportunity for approaching the enemy more closely, and formed a camp in the territory of the Larinates: where on the one hand by his mere presence he checked the sending out of

Fabius and
Minucius.

detachments and thereby hindered the provisioning of the enemy's army, and on the other hand, in a series of successful conflicts in which his troops encountered isolated Phœnician divisions and even Hannibal himself, drove the enemy from their advanced positions and compelled them to concentrate themselves at Gerunium. On the news of these successes, which of course lost nothing in the telling, reaching the capital, the storm broke forth against Quintus Fabius. It was not altogether unwarranted. Prudent as it was on the part of Rome to abide by the defensive, and to expect success mainly to result from the cutting off of the enemy's means of subsistence, there was yet something strange in a system of defence and of starving out, under which the enemy had laid waste all central Italy without opposition beneath the eyes of a Roman army of equal numbers, and had provisioned himself sufficiently for the winter by an organized method of foraging on the greatest scale. Gnæus Scipio, when he commanded on the Po, had not adopted this view of a defensive attitude, and the attempt of his successor to imitate him at Casilinum had failed in such a way as to afford a copious fund of ridicule to the scoffers of the city. It was wonderful that the Italian communities had not wavered, when Hannibal so palpably showed them the superiority of the Phœnicians and the nullity of Roman aid; but how long could they be expected to bear the burden of a double war, and to allow themselves to be plundered under the very eyes of the Roman troops and of their own contingents? Finally, it could not be alleged that the condition of the Roman army compelled the general to adopt this mode of warfare. It was composed, indeed, in part of militia called out for the emergency, but the flower of it consisted of the legions of Ariminum accustomed to service; and, so far from being discouraged by the last defeats, it was indignant at the task fraught with so little honour which its general, "Hannibal's lackey," assigned to it, and it demanded with a loud voice to be led against the enemy. In the assemblies of the people the most violent invectives were directed against the obstinate old man. His political opponents, with the former prætor Marcus Terentius Varro at their head, laid hold of the quarrel (for the understanding of which we must not forget that the dictator was practically nominated by the senate, and the office was regarded as the palladium of the conservative party); and, in concert with the discontented

soldiers and the possessors of the plundered estates, they carried an unconstitutional and absurd resolution conferring the dictatorship, which was destined to obviate the evils of a divided command in times of danger, on Marcus Minucius, who had hitherto been Fabius' lieutenant, in the same way as on Quintus Fabius himself. Thus the Roman army, after its hazardous division into two separate corps had just been appropriately remedied, was once more divided; and not only so, but the two sections were placed under leaders who notoriously followed quite opposite plans of war. Quintus Fabius of course adhered more than ever to his methodical inaction; Marcus Minucius, compelled to justify in the field of battle his title of dictator, made a hasty attack with inadequate strength, and would have been annihilated had not his colleague averted greater misfortune by the seasonable interposition of a fresh corps. This last turn of matters justified in some measure the system of passive resistance. But in reality Hannibal had completely attained in this campaign all that arms could attain: not a single material operation had been frustrated either by his impetuous or by his deliberate opponent; and his foraging, though not unattended with difficulty, had yet been in the main so successful that the army passed the winter without complaint in the camp at Gerunium. It was not the *Cunctator* that saved Rome, but the compact structure of its confederacy and, not less perhaps, the national hatred with which the Phœnician hero was regarded by the men of the West.

Despite all its misfortunes, Roman pride stood no less unshaken than the Roman symmarchy. The donations which were offered by king Hiero of Syracuse and the Greek cities in Italy for the next campaign (the war affected the latter less severely than the other Italian allies of Rome, for they sent no contingents to the land army) were declined with thanks; the chieftains of Illyria were informed that they could not be allowed to neglect payment of their tribute; and even the king of Macedonia was once more summoned to surrender Demetrius of Pharos. The majority of the senate, notwithstanding the semblance of legitimation which recent events had given to the Fabian system of delay, had firmly resolved to depart from a mode of war that was slowly but certainly ruining the state; if the popular dictator had failed in his more energetic method of warfare, they laid the blame of the failure, and not without

New war-like preparations in Rome.

reason, on the fact that they had adopted a half-measure and had given him too few troops. This error they determined to avoid and to equip an army, such as Rome had never sent out before—eight legions, each raised a fifth above the normal strength, and a corresponding number of allies—enough to crush an opponent who was not half so strong. Besides this, a legion under the prætor Lucius Postumius was destined for the valley of the Po, in order, if possible, to draw off the Celts serving in the army of Hannibal to their homes. These resolutions were judicious; it remained only that they should come to an equally judicious decision respecting the supreme command. The stiff carriage of Quintus Fabius, and the attacks of the demagogues which it provoked, had rendered the dictatorship and the senate generally more unpopular than ever: amongst the people, not without the connivance of their leaders, the foolish report circulated that the senate was intentionally prolonging the war. As, therefore, the nomination of a dictator was not to be thought of, the senate attempted to procure the election of suitable consuls; but this only had the effect of thoroughly rousing suspicion and obstinacy. With difficulty the senate carried one of its candidates, Lucius Æmilius Paullus, who had with judgment conducted the Illyrian war in 535 (P. 76); an immense majority of the citizens assigned to him as colleague the candidate of the popular party, Marcus Terentius Varro, an incapable man, who was known only by his bitter opposition to the senate and more especially as the main author of the proposal to elect Marcus Minucius co-dictator, and who was recommended to the multitude solely by his humble birth and his coarse effrontery.

Paullus and
Varro.

219.

Battle of
Cannæ.

While these preparations for the next campaign were making in Rome, the war had already recommenced in Apulia. As soon as the season allowed him to leave his winter quarters, Hannibal, determining as usual the course of the war and assuming the offensive, set out from Gerunium in a southerly direction, and marching past Luceria crossed the Aufidus and took the citadel of Cannæ (between Canosa and Barletta) which commanded the plain of Canusium, and had hitherto served the Romans as one of their principal magazines. The Roman army which, since Fabius had conformably to the constitution resigned his dictatorship in the middle of autumn, was now commanded by Gnæus Servilius

and Marcus Regulus, first as consuls then as proconsuls, had been unable to avert a loss which they could not but feel. On military as well as on political grounds, it became more than ever necessary to arrest the progress of Hannibal by a pitched battle. With definite orders to this effect from the senate, accordingly, the two new commanders-in-chief, Paullus and Varro, arrived in Apulia in the beginning of the summer of 538. With the four new legions and a corresponding contingent of Italians which they brought up, the Roman army was raised to 80,000 infantry, half burgesses, half allies, and 6000 cavalry, of whom one-third were burgesses and two-thirds allies; whereas Hannibal's army numbered 10,000 cavalry, but only about 40,000 infantry. Hannibal wished nothing so much as a battle, not merely for the general reasons which we have explained above, but specially because the wide Apulian plain allowed him to develop the whole superiority of his cavalry, and because the providing supplies for his numerous army would soon, in spite of that excellent cavalry, be rendered very difficult by the immediate vicinity of an enemy twice as strong and resting on a chain of fortresses. The leaders of the Roman forces had also, as we have said, made up their minds on the general question of giving battle, and approached the enemy with that view; but the more sagacious of them saw Hannibal's position, and were disposed accordingly to wait in the first instance and simply to station themselves in the vicinity of the enemy, so as to compel him to retire and accept battle on ground less favourable to him. With this view, confronting the Carthaginian position at Cannæ on the right bank of the Aufidus, Paullus constructed two camps further up the stream, the larger likewise on the right bank, the smaller, at a distance of fully a mile from it and not much more distant from the enemy's camp, on the left, so as to prevent the foraging of the enemy on both banks of the river. But such military pedantry was disapproved by the democratic consul—so much had been said about men taking the field not to set sentinels, but to use their swords—and he gave orders accordingly to attack the enemy, wherever and whenever they found him. According to an old custom foolishly retained, the decisive voice in the council of war alternated between the commanders-in-chief day by day; it was necessary, therefore, to submit, and to let the hero of the pavement have his way. Only one division of 10,000 men was left in the

216.

principal Roman camp, charged to capture the Carthaginian encampment during the conflict and thus to intercept the retreat of the enemy's army across the river. The bulk of the Roman army, at early dawn on the 2nd August according to the uncorrected, probably in June according to the correct, calendar, crossed the river which at this season was shallow and did not materially hamper the movements of the troops, and took up a position in line near the smaller Roman camp—which lay nearest to the enemy, intermediate between the larger Roman camp and that of the Carthaginians, and which had already been the scene of outpost skirmishes—in the wide plain stretching westward from Cannæ on the left bank of the river. The Carthaginian army followed and likewise crossed the stream, on which rested the right Roman as well as the left Carthaginian wing. The Roman cavalry was stationed on the wings; the weaker portion consisting of burgesses, led by Paullus, on the right by the river; the stronger, consisting of the allies, led by Varro, on the left towards the plain. In the centre was stationed the infantry in unusually deep files, under the command of the proconsul Gnaeus Servilius. Opposite to this centre Hannibal arranged his infantry in the form of a crescent, so that the Celtic and Iberian troops in their national armour formed the advanced centre, and the Libyans, armed after the Roman fashion, formed the retreating wings on either side. On the side next the river the whole heavy cavalry under Hasdrubal was stationed, on the side towards the plain the light Numidian horse. After a short skirmish between the light troops the whole line was soon engaged. Where the light cavalry of the Carthaginians fought against the heavy cavalry of Varro, the conflict continued, amidst constant charges of the Numidians, without decisive result. In the centre, on the other hand, the legions completely overthrew the Spanish and Gallic troops that first encountered them; eagerly the victors pressed on and followed up their advantage. But meanwhile, on the right wing, fortune had turned against the Romans. Hannibal had merely sought to occupy the left cavalry wing of the enemy, that he might bring Hasdrubal with the whole regular cavalry to bear against the weaker right and to overthrow it first. After a brave resistance, the Roman horse gave way, and those that were not cut down were chased across the river and scattered in the plain; Paullus,

wounded, rode to the centre to avert, or, if not, to share the fate of the legions. These, in order the better to follow up the victory over the advanced infantry of the enemy, had changed their front disposition into a column of attack, which, in the shape of a wedge, penetrated the enemy's centre. In this position they were warmly assailed on both sides by the Libyan infantry wheeling in upon them right and left, and a portion of them were compelled to halt in order to defend themselves against the flank attack; by this means their advance was checked, and the mass of infantry, which was already too closely crowded, now had no longer room to develop itself at all. Meanwhile Hasdrubal, after having completed the defeat of the wing of Paullus, had collected and arranged his cavalry anew and led them behind the enemy's centre against the wing of Varro. His Italian cavalry, already sufficiently occupied with the Numidians, was rapidly scattered before the double attack, and Hasdrubal, leaving the pursuit of the fugitives to the Numidians, rallied his squadrons for the third time, to lead them against the rear of the Roman infantry. This last charge proved decisive. Flight was impossible, and no quarter was given. Never, perhaps, was an army of such size annihilated on the field of battle so completely, and with so little loss to its antagonist, as was the Roman army at Cannæ. Hannibal had lost not quite 6000 men, and two-thirds of that loss fell upon the Celts, who sustained the first shock of the legions. On the other hand, of the 76,000 Romans who had taken their places in line of battle 70,000 covered the field, amongst whom were the consul Lucius Paullus, the proconsul Gnæus Servilius, two-thirds of the staff-officers, and eighty men of senatorial rank. The consul Marcus Varro was saved solely by his quick resolution and his good steed, reached Venusia, and was not ashamed to survive the disaster. The garrison also of the Roman camp, 10,000 strong, were for the most part made prisoners of war; only a few thousand men, partly of these troops, partly of the line, escaped to Canusium. Nay, as if in this year Rome was to be altogether ruined, before its close the legion sent to Gaul fell into an ambush, and was, with its general Lucius Postumius, who was nominated as consul for the next year, totally destroyed by the Gauls.

This unexampled success appeared at length to mature the great political combination, for the sake of which Han-

Conse-
quences of
the battle
of Cannæ.

Prevention
of reinforce-
ments from
Spain.

218.

217.

nibal had come to Italy. He had indeed based his plan primarily upon his army; but with accurate knowledge of the power opposed to him he designed that army to be merely the vanguard, in support of which the powers of the west and east were gradually to unite their forces, so as to prepare destruction for the proud city. That support however, which seemed the most secure, namely the sending of reinforcements from Spain, had been frustrated by the boldness and firmness of the Roman general sent thither, Gnæus Scipio. After Hannibal's passage of the Rhone Scipio had sailed for Emporiæ, and had made himself master first of the coast between the Pyrenees and the Ebro, and then, after conquering Hanno, of the interior also (536). In the following year (537) he had completely defeated the Carthaginian fleet at the mouth of the Ebro, and after his brother Publius, the brave defender of the valley of the Po, had joined him with a reinforcement of 8000 men, he had even crossed the Ebro, and advanced as far as Saguntum. Hasdrubal had indeed in the succeeding year (538), after obtaining reinforcements from Africa, made an attempt in accordance with his brother's orders to conduct an army over the Pyrenees; but the Scipios opposed his passage of the Ebro, and totally defeated him, nearly at the same time that Hannibal conquered at Cannæ. The powerful tribe of the Celtiberians and numerous other Spanish tribes had joined the Scipios; they commanded the sea, the passes of the Pyrenees, and, by means of the trusty Massiliots, the Gallic coast also. Now, therefore, support to Hannibal was less than ever to be looked for from Spain.

Reinforce-
ment from
Africa.

On the part of Carthage as much had hitherto been done in support of her general in Italy as could be expected. Phœnician squadrons threatened the coasts of Italy and of the Roman islands and guarded Africa from a Roman landing, and there the matter ended. More substantial assistance was prevented not so much by the uncertainty as to where Hannibal was to be found and the want of a port of disembarkation in Italy, as by the fact that for many years the Spanish army had been accustomed to be self-sustaining, and above all by the murmurs of the peace party. Hannibal severely felt the consequences of this unpardonable inaction; in spite of all his saving of his money and of the soldiers he had brought with him, his chests were gradually emptied, the pay fell into arrear, and the ranks of his veterans began

to thin. But now the news of the victory of Cannæ reduced even the factious opposition at home to silence. The Carthaginian senate resolved to place at the disposal of the general considerable assistance in money and men partly from Africa, partly from Spain, including 4000 Numidian horse and 40 elephants, and to prosecute the war with energy in Spain as well as in Italy.

The long-discussed offensive alliance between Carthage and Macedonia had been delayed, first by the sudden death of Antigonus, and then by the indecision of his successor Philip and the unseasonable war waged by him and his Hellenic allies against the Ætolians (534–537). It was only now, after the battle of Cannæ, that Demetrius of Pharos found Philip disposed to listen to his proposal to cede to Macedonia his Illyrian possessions—which it was necessary, indeed, to wrest in the first place from the Romans—and it was only now that the court of Pella came to terms with Carthage. Macedonia undertook to land an invading army on the east coast of Italy, in return for which she received an assurance that the Roman possessions in Epirus should be restored to her.

Alliance
between Car-
thage and
Macedon.

220–217.

In Sicily king Hiero had during the years of peace maintained a policy of neutrality, so far as he could do so with safety, and he had shown a disposition to accommodate the Carthaginians during the perilous crises after the peace with Rome, particularly by sending supplies of corn. There is no doubt that he saw with the utmost regret a renewal of the breach between Carthage and Rome; but he had no power to avert it, and when it occurred he adhered with well-considered fidelity to Rome. But soon afterwards (in the autumn of 538) death removed the old man after a reign of fifty-four years. The grandson and successor of the prudent veteran, the young and incapable Hieronymus, entered at once into negotiations with the Carthaginian diplomatists; and, as they made no difficulty in consenting to secure to him by treaty, first Sicily so far as the old Carthagino-Sicilian frontier, and then, when he rose in the arrogance of his demands, the possession even of the whole island, he entered into alliance with Carthage, and ordered the Syracusan fleet to unite with the Carthaginian which had come to threaten Syracuse. The position of the Roman fleet at Lilybæum, which already had to deal with a second Carthaginian squadron stationed near the Ægates, became

Alliance be-
tween Car-
thage and
Syracuse.

216.

all at once very critical, while at the same time the force that was in readiness at Rome for embarkation to Sicily had, in consequence of the defeat at Cannæ, to be diverted to other and more urgent objects.

Capua and most of the communities of lower Italy pass over to Hannibal.

Above all came the decisive fact, that now at length the fabric of the Roman confederacy began to be unhinged, after it had survived unshaken the shocks of two severe years of war. There passed over to the side of Hannibal Arpi in Apulia, and Ugentum in Messapia, two old towns which had been greatly injured by the Roman colonies of Luceria and Brundisium; all the towns of the Bruttii—who took the lead—with the exception of the Petelini and the Consentini who had to be besieged before yielding; the greater portion of the Lucanians; the Picentes transplanted into the region of Salernum; the Hirpini; the Samnites with the exception of the Pentri; lastly and chiefly, Capua the second city of Italy, which was able to bring into the field 30,000 infantry and 4000 horse, and whose secession determined that of the neighbouring towns Atella and Calatia. The aristocratic party, indeed, attached by many ties to the interest of Rome everywhere and more especially in Capua, very earnestly opposed this change of sides, and the obstinate internal conflicts which arose regarding it diminished not a little the advantage which Hannibal derived from these accessions. He found himself obliged, for instance, to have one of the leaders of the aristocratic party in Capua, Decius Magius, who even after the entrance of the Phœnicians obstinately contended for the Roman alliance, seized and conveyed to Carthage; thus furnishing a demonstration, very inconvenient for himself, of the small value of the liberty and sovereignty which had just been solemnly guaranteed to the Campanians by the Carthaginian general. On the other hand, the south Italian Greeks adhered to the Roman alliance—a result to which the Roman garrisons no doubt contributed, but which was still more due to the very decided dislike of the Hellenes towards the Phœnicians and towards their new Lucanian and Bruttian allies, and their attachment on the other hand to Rome, which had zealously embraced every opportunity of displaying its Hellenism, and had exhibited towards the Greeks in Italy an unwonted gentleness. Thus the Campanian Greeks, particularly Neapolis, courageously withstood the attack of Hannibal in person: in Magna Græcia, Rhegium, Thurii, Metapontum, and Tarentum did the same notwith-

standing their very perilous position. Croton and Locri on the other hand were partly carried by storm, partly forced to capitulate, by the united Phœnicians and Bruttians; and the citizens of Croton were conducted to Locri, while Bruttian colonists occupied that important naval station. The Latin colonies in southern Italy, such as Brundisium, Venusia, Pæstum, Cosa, and Cales, of course maintained unshaken fidelity to Rome. They were the strongholds by which the conquerors held in check a foreign land, and the colonists were settled on the soil of the surrounding population, and at feud with their neighbours; they, too, would be the first to be affected, if Hannibal should keep his word and restore to every Italian community its ancient boundaries. This was likewise the case with all central Italy, the earliest seat of the Roman rule, where Latin manners and language already everywhere preponderated, and the people felt themselves to be the comrades rather than the subjects of their rulers. Hannibal's opponents in the Carthaginian senate did not fail to appeal to the fact that not one Roman citizen, or one Latin community had cast itself into the arms of Carthage. This groundwork of the Roman power could only be broken up, like the Cyclopean walls, stone by stone.

Such were the consequences of the day of Cannæ, in which the flower of the soldiers and officers of the confederacy, a seventh of the whole number of Italians capable of bearing arms, perished. It was a cruel but righteous punishment for the grave political errors with which not merely some foolish or miserable individuals, but the Roman people themselves, were justly chargeable. A constitution adapted for a small country town was no longer suitable for a great power; it was simply impossible that the question as to the leadership of the armies of the state in such a war could be left year after year to be decided by the Pandora's box of the balloting-urn. As a fundamental revision of the constitution, if practicable at all, could not at any rate be undertaken now, no course was left but at once to commit to the only authority which was in a position to undertake it—viz., the senate—the practical superintendence of the war, and in particular the bestowal and prolongation of the command, and to reserve to the comitia the mere formality of confirmation. The brilliant successes of the Scipios in the difficult arena of Spanish warfare showed what might in this way be achieved. But political demagogism, which was already gnawing at

Attitude of
the Romans.

the aristocratic foundations of the constitution, had seized on the management of the Italian war. The absurd accusation, that the nobles were conspiring with the enemy without, had made an impression on the "people." The heroes to whom political superstition looked for deliverance, Gaius Flaminius and Marcus Varro, both "new men" and friends of the people of the purest dye, had accordingly been empowered by the multitude itself to execute the plans of operations which, amidst the approbation of that multitude, they had explained in the Forum; and the results were the battles of the Trasimene lake and of Cannæ. Duty required that the senate, which now of course understood its task better than when it recalled half the army of Regulus from Africa, should take into its hands the management of affairs, and should oppose such mischievous proceedings; but when the first of those two defeats had for the moment placed the rudder in its hands, it had hardly acted in a manner unbiassed by the interests of party. Little as Quintus Fabius deserves to be compared with these Roman Cleons, he too conducted the war not as a mere military leader, but as the special political opponent of Gaius Flaminius; and, at a time when unity was needed, he did what he could to exasperate. The consequence was, first, that the most important instrument which the wisdom of their ancestors had placed in the hands of the senate for such uses,—the dictatorship,—broke down in his hands; and, secondly (at least indirectly), the battle of Cannæ. But the headlong fall of the Roman power was owing not to the fault of Quintus Fabius or Marcus Varro, but to the distrust between the government and the governed,—to the variance between the senate and the citizens. If the deliverance and revival of the state were still possible, the work had to begin with the re-establishment of unity and of confidence at home. To have perceived this, and, what is of more importance, to have done it, and done it with an abstinence from all recriminations however justly provoked, constitutes the glorious and imperishable honour of the Roman senate. When Varro—alone of all the generals who had command in the battle—returned to Rome, and the Roman senators met him at the gate and thanked him that he had not despaired of the salvation of his country, this was no empty phraseology concealing under sounding words their real vexation, nor was it bitter mockery over a poor wretch; it was the conclusion of peace

between the government and the governed. In presence of the gravity of the time and the gravity of such an appeal, the chattering of demagogues was silent; henceforth the only thought of the Romans was how they might be able jointly to avert the common peril. Quintus Fabius, whose tenacious courage at this decisive moment was of more service to the state than all his feats of war, and other senators of note took the lead in every movement, and restored to the citizens confidence in themselves and in the future. The senate preserved its firm and unbending attitude, while messengers from all sides hastened to Rome to report the loss of battles, the secession of allies, the capture of posts and magazines, and to request reinforcements for the valley of the Po and for Sicily—nay, even when Italy was abandoned, and Rome itself was almost without a garrison. Assemblages of the multitude at the gates were forbidden; onlookers and women were sent to their houses; the time of mourning for the fallen was restricted to thirty days that the service of the gods of joy, from which those clad in mourning attire were excluded, might not be too long interrupted—for so great was the number of the fallen, that there was scarcely a family which had not to lament its dead. Meanwhile the remnant saved from the field of battle had been assembled by two able military tribunes, Appius Claudius and Publius Scipio the younger, at Canusium. The latter managed, by his spirited bearing, and by the brandished swords of his faithful comrades, to change the views of those noble young lords who, in indolent despair of the salvation of their country, were thinking of escape beyond the sea. The consul Marcus Varro joined them with a handful of men; about two legions were gradually collected there; the senate gave orders that they should be reorganized, and degraded to serve in disgrace and without pay. The incapable general was on a suitable pretext recalled to Rome; the prætor, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, tried in the Gallic wars, who had been destined to depart for Sicily with the fleet from Ostia, assumed the chief command. The utmost exertions were made to organize an army capable of taking the field. The Latins were summoned to render aid in the common peril. Rome itself set the example, and called out all the men above boyhood, armed the debtor-serfs and criminals, and even incorporated in the army eight thousand slaves purchased by the state. As there was a want of arms, they took the old

spoils from the temples, and everywhere set the workshops and artisans in action. The senate was completed, not as timid patriots urged, from the Latins, but from the Roman citizens who had the best title. Hannibal offered a release of captives at the expense of the Roman treasury ; it was declined, and the Carthaginian envoy who had arrived with the deputation of captives was not admitted into the city : nothing should look as if the senate thought of peace. Not only were the allies to be prevented from believing that Rome was disposed to enter into negotiations, but even the meanest citizen was to be made to understand that for him as for all there was no peace, and that safety lay only in victory.

CHAPTER VI.

THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL FROM CANNÆ TO ZAMA.

THE aim of Hannibal in his expedition to Italy had been to break up the Italian confederacy: after three campaigns that aim had been attained, so far as it was at all attainable. It was clear that the Greek and Latin or Latinized communities of Italy, since they had not been shaken in their allegiance by the day of Cannæ, would not yield to terror, but only to force; and the desperate courage with which even in southern Italy isolated little country towns, such as the Bruttian Petelia, conducted their forlorn defence against the Phœnicians, showed very plainly what awaited them among the Marsians and Latins. If Hannibal had expected to accomplish greater results in this direction and to lead even the Latins against Rome, these hopes had proved vain. But it appears as if even in other respects the Italian coalition had by no means produced the results which Hannibal hoped for. Capua had at once stipulated that Hannibal should not have the right to call Campanian citizens compulsorily to arms; the citizens had not forgotten how Pyrrhus had acted in Tarentum, and they foolishly imagined that they should be able to withdraw at once from the Roman and from the Phœnician rule. Samnium and Luceria were no longer what they had been, when King Pyrrhus had thought of marching into Rome at the head of the Sabellian youth. Not only did the chain of Roman fortresses everywhere cut the nerves and sinews of the land, but the Roman rule for many years had rendered the inhabitants unused to arms—they furnished only a moderate contingent to the Roman armies—had appeased their ancient hatred, and had gained over a number of individuals everywhere to the interest of

The crisis.

the ruling community. They joined the conqueror of the Romans, indeed, after the cause of Rome seemed fairly lost, but they felt that the question was no longer one of liberty; it was simply the exchange of an Italian for a Phœnician master, and it was not enthusiasm, but despair that threw the Sabellian communities into the arms of the victor. Under such circumstances the war in Italy flagged. Hannibal, who commanded the southern part of the peninsula as far up as the Volturnus and Garganus, and who could not simply abandon these lands again as he had abandoned that of the Celts, had now a frontier to protect, which could not be left uncovered with impunity; and for the purpose of defending the districts he had gained against the fortresses which everywhere defied him and the armies advancing from the north, and at the same time of resuming the difficult offensive against central Italy, his forces—an army of about 40,000 men, without reckoning the Italian contingents—were far from sufficient.

Marcellus.

Above all, he found that other antagonists were opposed to him. Taught by fearful experience, the Romans adopted a more judicious system of conducting the war, appointed none but experienced generals to the charge of their armies, and left them, at least where it was necessary, for a longer period in command. These generals were neither mere spectators of the enemy's movements from the mountains, nor did they throw themselves on their adversary wherever they found him; they kept the true mean between inaction and precipitation, and, taking up their positions in entrenched camps under the walls of fortresses, they accepted battle where victory would lead to results and defeat would not be destruction. The soul of this new warfare was Marcus Claudius Marcellus. Instinctively, after the disastrous day of Cannæ, the senate and people had turned their eyes to this brave and experienced officer, and intrusted him at once with the actual supreme command. He had received his training in the troublesome warfare against Hamilcar in Sicily, and had given brilliant evidence of his talents as a leader as well as of his personal valour in the last campaigns against the Celts. Although far above fifty, he still glowed with all the ardour of the most youthful soldier, and only a few years before this he had, while general, cut down the mounted general of the enemy (P. 82)—the first and only Roman consul who achieved that feat of arms. His life was

consecrated to the two divinities, to whom he erected the splendid double temple at the Capene Gate, to Honour and to Valour: and, while the merit of rescuing Rome from the extremity of danger belonged to no single individual but on the contrary pertained to the Roman citizens collectively, and pre-eminently to the senate, yet no single man contributed more towards the structure reared by the common labour than Marcus Marcellus.

From the field of battle Hannibal had turned his steps to Campania. He knew Rome better than the simpletons, who in ancient and modern times have fancied that he might have terminated the struggle by a march on the enemy's capital. Modern warfare, it is true, decides a war on the field of battle; but in ancient times, when the system of attacking fortresses was far less developed than the system of defence, the most complete success in the field was on numberless occasions neutralized by the resistance of the walls of the capitals. The council and citizens of Carthage were not at all to be compared to the senate and people of Rome; the peril of Carthage after the first campaign of Regulus was infinitely more imminent than that of Rome after the battle of Cannæ; yet Carthage had made a stand and been completely victorious. With what colour could it be expected, that Rome would now deliver her keys to the victor, or even accept an equitable peace? Instead therefore of sacrificing practicable and important successes through such empty demonstrations, or losing time in the besieging of the two thousand Roman fugitives enclosed within the walls of Canusium, Hannibal had immediately proceeded to Capua before the Romans could throw in a garrison, and by his advance had induced this second city of Italy, after long hesitation, to join him. He probably hoped that, in possession of Capua, he would be able to seize one of the Campanian ports, where he might disembark the reinforcements which his great victories had wrung from the opposition at home.

When the Romans learned whither Hannibal had gone, they also left Apulia, where only a weak division was retained, and collected their remaining strength on the right bank of the Volturnus. With the two legions saved from Cannæ Marcus Marcellus marched to Teanum Sidicinum, where he was joined by such troops as were at the moment disposable from Rome and Ostia, and advanced—while the dictator Marcus Junius slowly followed with the

Hannibal
proceeds to
Campania.

Renewal of
the war in
Campania.

main army which had been hastily formed—as far as the Volturnus at Casilinum, with a view if possible to save Capua. That city he found already in the power of the enemy; but on the other hand the attempts of the enemy on Neapolis had been thwarted by the courageous resistance of the citizens, and the Romans were still in good time to throw a garrison into that important port. With equal fidelity the two other large coast towns, Cumæ and Nuceria, adhered to Rome. In Nola the struggle between the popular and senatorial parties, as to whether they should attach themselves to the Carthaginians or to the Romans, was still undecided. Informed that the former were gaining the superiority, Marcellus crossed the river at Caiatia, and marching along the heights of Suessula so as to evade the enemy's army, he reached Nola in sufficient time to hold it against the foes without and within, and in a sally repulsed Hannibal in person with considerable loss; a success which, as the first defeat sustained by Hannibal, was of far more importance from its moral effect than from its material results. In Campania indeed, Nuceria, Acerræ, and, after an obstinate siege prolonged into the following year (539), Casilinum also, the key of the Volturnus, were conquered by Hannibal, and the severest punishments were inflicted on the senates of these towns, which had adhered to Rome. But terror is a bad weapon of proselytism; the Romans succeeded, with comparatively trifling loss, in surmounting the perilous moment of their first weakness. The war in Campania came to a standstill; then winter came on, and Hannibal took up his quarters in Capua, the luxury of which was by no means fraught with benefit to his troops who for three years had not been under a roof. In the next year (539) the war already acquired another aspect. The tried general Marcus Marcellus, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who had distinguished himself in the campaign of the previous year as master of the horse to the dictator, and the veteran Quintus Fabius Maximus, took—Marcellus as proconsul, the two others as consuls—the command of the three Roman armies which were destined to surround Capua and Hannibal; Marcellus resting on Nola and Suessula, Maximus taking a position on the right bank of the Volturnus near Cales, and Gracchus on the coast near Liternum, covering Neapolis and Cumæ. The Campanians, who marched to Hamæ three miles from Cumæ with a view to surprise the Cumæans, were thoroughly

defeated by Gracchus; Hannibal, who had appeared before Cumæ to wipe out the stain, was himself worsted in a combat, and when the pitched battle offered by him was declined, retreated in ill humour to Capua. While the Romans in Campania thus not only maintained what they possessed, but also recovered Compulteria and other minor places, loud complaints were heard from the eastern allies of Hannibal. A Roman army under the prætor Marcus Valerius had taken position at Luceria, partly that it might, in connection with the Roman fleet, watch the east coast and the movements of the Macedonians; partly that it might, in connection with the army of Nola, pillage the revolted Samnites, Lucanians, and Hirpinians. To give relief to these, Hannibal turned first against his most active opponent, Marcus Marcellus; but the latter achieved under the walls of Nola no inconsiderable victory over the Punic army, and it was obliged to depart, without having cleared off the stain, from Campania for Arpi, in order at length to check the progress of the enemy's army in Apulia. Tiberius Gracchus followed it with his corps, while the two other Roman armies in Campania made arrangements to proceed next spring to the attack of Capua.

The war in
Apulia.

The clear vision of Hannibal had not been dazzled by his victories. It became every day more evident that he was not by their means gaining his end. Those rapid marches, and that almost romantic shifting and tossing of the war hither and thither, to which Hannibal was mainly indebted for his successes, were at an end; the enemy had become wiser; further enterprises were rendered almost impossible by the inevitable necessity of defending what had been gained. The offensive was not to be thought of; the defensive was difficult, and threatened every year to become more so. He could not conceal from himself that the second half of his great task, the subjugation of the Latins and the conquest of Rome, could not be accomplished with his own forces and those of his Italian allies alone. Its accomplishment depended on the council at Carthage, on the head-quarters at Cartagena, on the courts of Pella and of Syracuse. If all the resources of Africa, Spain, Sicily, and Macedonia should now be put forth in earnest against the common enemy; if Lower Italy should become the great rendezvous for the armies and fleets of the west, south, and east; he might hope successfully to finish what the vanguard under his leadership

Hannibal
reduced to
the de-
fensive.

His pros-
pects as to
reinforce-
ments.

had so brilliantly begun. The most natural and easy course would have been to send to him adequate support from home; and the Carthaginian state, which had remained almost unaffected by the war, and had been raised from its deep decline and brought so close to complete victory by a small band of resolute patriots acting of their own accord and at their own risk, could undoubtedly have done so. That it would have been possible to land from a Phœnician fleet a force of any desired strength at Locri or Croton, especially as long as the port of Syracuse remained open to the Carthaginians and the fleet at Brundisium was kept in check by Macedonia, is demonstrated by the unopposed disembarkation at Locri of 4000 Africans, whom Bomilcar about this time brought over from Carthage to Hannibal, and still more by Hannibal's undisturbed embarkation, when all had been already lost. But after the first impression of the victory of Cannæ had died away, the peace party in Carthage, which was at all times ready to purchase the downfall of its political opponents at the expense of its country, and which found faithful support in the shortsightedness and indolence of the citizens, refused the entreaties of the general for more decided support with the half simple, half malicious reply, that he in fact needed no help inasmuch as he was really victor; and thus contributed not much less than the Roman senate to save Rome. Hannibal, reared in the camp and a stranger to the machinery of civic factions, found no popular leader on whose support he could rely, such as his father had found in Hasdrubal; and he was obliged to seek abroad the means of saving his native country—means which it possessed in rich abundance at home.

For this purpose he might, at least with more prospect of success, reckon on the leaders of the Spanish patriot army, on the connections which he had formed in Syracuse, and on the intervention of Philip. Everything depended on bringing new forces into the field of war against Rome from Spain, Syracuse, or Macedonia; and for the attainment, or for the prevention, of this object wars were carried on in Spain, Sicily, and Greece. All of these were but means to an end, and historians have often erred in accounting them of greater importance. So far as the Romans were concerned, they were essentially defensive wars, the proper objects of which were to hold the passes of the Pyrenees, to

retain the Macedonian army in Greece, to defend Messana and to prevent communication between Italy and Spain. Of course this defensive warfare was, wherever it was possible, carried on by offensive means; and, as circumstances favoured its expansion, it led to the expulsion of the Phœnicians from Spain and Sicily, and to the dissolution of Hannibal's alliances with Syracuse and with Philip. The Italian war in itself fell for the time being into the shade, and melted away into conflicts about fortresses and razzias, which had no decisive effect on the main issue. Nevertheless, so long as the Phœnicians retained the offensive at all, Italy always remained the central object of operations; and all efforts were directed towards, as all interest centred in, the removal or the continuance of Hannibal's isolation in southern Italy.

Had it been possible, immediately after the battle of Cannæ, to bring into play all the resources on which Hannibal thought that he might reckon, he might have been tolerably certain of success. But the position of Hasdrubal at that time in Spain after the battle on the Ebro was so critical, that the supplies of money and men, which the victory of Cannæ had roused the Carthaginian citizens to furnish, were for the most part expended on Spain, but without producing any improvement in the position of affairs there. The Scipios transferred the theatre of war in the following campaign (539) from the Ebro to the Guadalquivir; and in Andalusia, in the very centre of the proper Carthaginian territory, they achieved at Illiturgi and Intibili two brilliant victories. In Sardinia communications entered into with the natives led the Carthaginians to hope that they should be able to master the island, which would have been of importance as an intermediate station between Spain and Italy. But Titus Manlius Torquatus, who was sent with a Roman army to Sardinia, completely destroyed the Carthaginian landing force, and reassured to the Romans the undisputed possession of the island (539). The legions from Cannæ sent to Sicily held their ground in the north and east of the island with courage and success against the Carthaginians and Hieronymus; the latter met his death towards the end of 539 by the hand of an assassin. Even in the case of Macedonia the ratification of the alliance was delayed, principally because the Macedonian envoys sent to Hannibal were captured on their

The sending
of rein-
forcements
temporarily
frustrated.

215.

215.

215.

homeward journey by the Roman vessels of war. In consequence the dreaded invasion of the east coast was temporarily suspended; and the Romans gained time to secure the very important station of Brundisium first by their fleet and then by the land army which before the arrival of Gracchus was employed for the protection of Apulia, and even to make preparations for an invasion of Macedonia in the event of war being declared. While in Italy the war thus came to a standstill, out of Italy nothing was done on the part of Carthage to accelerate the movement of new armies or fleets towards the seat of war. The Romans, again, had everywhere with the greatest energy put themselves in a state of defence, and in that defensive attitude had fought for the most part with good results wherever the genius of Hannibal was absent. Thus the short-lived patriotism, which the victory of Cannæ had awakened in Carthage, evaporated; the not inconsiderable forces which had been organized there were, either through factious opposition or through an useless attempt to conciliate the different opinions expressed in the council, so frittered away that they were nowhere of any real service, and but a very small portion arrived at the spot where they would have been most useful. At the close of 539 reflecting Roman statesmen might feel that the pressure of the danger was past, and that the only object now was to persevere in straining every nerve at all points, so as to bring to a happy termination the resistance so heroically begun.

215.

War in
Sicily.

215.

Siege of
Syracuse.

First of all the war in Sicily was brought to an end. It had formed no part of Hannibal's original plan to excite a war on the island; but partly through accident, chiefly through the boyish vanity of the imprudent Hieronymus, a land war had broken out there, which, doubtless because Hannibal had not planned it, the Carthaginian council took up with especial zeal. After Hieronymus was killed in 539, it seemed more than doubtful whether the citizens would persevere in the policy which he had pursued. If any city had reason to adhere to Rome, that city was Syracuse; for the victory of the Carthaginians over the Romans could not but give to the former, at any rate, the sovereignty of all Sicily, and no one could seriously believe that the promises made by Carthage to the Syracusans would be actually kept. Partly induced by this consideration, partly terrified by the threatening preparations of the Romans—who made every effort to bring once more under their complete control that

important island, the bridge between Italy and Africa, and now for the campaign of 540 sent their best general, Marcus Marcellus, to Sicily—the Syracusan citizens showed a disposition to obtain oblivion of the past by a timely return to the Roman alliance. But, amidst the dreadful confusion in the city (which after the death of Hieronymus was agitated alternately by endeavours to restore the ancient freedom of the people and by the attempts of numerous pretenders to seize the vacant throne, while the foreign captains of the mercenary troops were the real masters of the place) Hannibal's dexterous emissaries, Hippocrates and Epicydes, found opportunity to frustrate the projects of peace. They stirred up the multitude in the name of liberty; descriptions, exaggerated beyond measure, of the fearful punishment that the Romans were said to have inflicted on the Leontines who had just been re-conquered, awakened doubts even among the better portion of the citizens whether it was not too late to restore their old relations with Rome; while the numerous Roman deserters among the mercenaries, mostly runaway rowers from the fleet, were easily persuaded that a peace on the part of the citizens with Rome would be their death-warrant. So the chief magistrates were put to death, the armistice was broken, and Hippocrates and Epicydes undertook the government of the city. No course was left to the consul except to undertake a siege; but the skilful conduct of the defence, in which the Syracusan engineer Archimedes, celebrated as a learned mathematician, especially distinguished himself, compelled the Romans after besieging the city for eight months to convert the siege into a blockade by sea and land.

In the meanwhile Carthage, which hitherto had only supported the Syracusans with her fleets, on receiving news of their renewed rising in arms against the Romans, had despatched a strong land army under Himilco to Sicily, which landed without interruption at Heraclea Minoa and immediately occupied the important town of Agrigentum. To effect a junction with Himilco, the bold and able Hippocrates marched forth from Syracuse with an army: the position of Marcellus between the garrison of Syracuse and the two hostile armies began to be critical. With the help of some reinforcements, however, which arrived from Italy, he maintained his ground in the island and continued the blockade of Syracuse. On the other hand, the greater portion of the small inland towns were driven into the arms of

214.

Carthagi-
nian expe-
dition to
Sicily.

212.

The Carthaginian troops destroyed.

the Carthaginians not so much by the armies, as by the fearful severity of the Roman proceedings in the island, more especially the slaughter of the citizens of Enna, suspected of a design to revolt, by the Roman garrison which was stationed there. In 542, during a festival in the city the besiegers succeeded in scaling a portion of the extensive outer walls that had been deserted by the guard, and penetrating into the suburbs which stretched from the Island and the city proper on the shore (Achradina) towards the interior. The fortress of Euryalus, which, situated at the extreme western end of the suburbs, protected these and the principal road leading from the interior to Syracuse, was thus isolated and fell not long afterwards. When the siege of the city thus began to assume a turn favourable to the Romans, the two armies under Himilco and Hippocrates advanced to its relief, and attempted a simultaneous attack on the Roman position, combined with an attempt at landing on the part of the Carthaginian fleet and a sally of the Syracusan garrison; but the attack was repulsed on all sides, and the two relieving armies were obliged to content themselves with encamping before the city, in the marshy low grounds along the Anapus, which in the height of summer and autumn engender pestilences fatal to those that tarry in them. These pestilences had often saved the city, oftener even than the valour of its citizens; in the times of the first Dionysius, two Phœnician armies in the act of besieging the city had been in this way destroyed under its very walls. Now fate turned the special defence of the city into the means of its destruction; while the army of Marcellus quartered in the suburbs suffered but little, fevers desolated the Phœnician and Syracusan bivouacs. Hippocrates died; Himilco and most of the Africans died also; the survivors of the two armies, mostly natives of Sicily, dispersed into the neighbouring cities. Still the Carthaginians made an attempt to save the city from the sea side; but the admiral Bomilcar withdrew, when the Roman fleet offered him battle. Now Epicydes even, who commanded in the city, abandoned it as lost, and made his escape to Agrigentum. Syracuse would gladly have surrendered to the Romans; negotiations had already begun. But for the second time they were thwarted by the deserters: in another mutiny of the soldiers the chief magistrates and a number of respectable citizens were slain, and the government and the de-

fence of the city were intrusted by the foreign troops to their captains. Marcellus now entered into a negotiation with one of these, which gave into his hands one of the two portions of the city that were still free, the Island; upon which the citizens voluntarily opened to him also the gates of Achradina (in the autumn of 542). If mercy was to be shown in any case, it might, even according to the far from laudable principles of Roman public law as to the treatment of perfidious communities, have been extended to a city which manifestly had not been at liberty to act for itself, and which had repeatedly made the most earnest attempts to get rid of the tyranny of the foreign soldiers. Nevertheless, not only did Marcellus stain his military honour by permitting a general pillage of the wealthy mercantile city, in the course of which Archimedes and many other citizens were put to death, but the Roman senate lent a deaf ear to the complaints which the Syracusans afterwards presented regarding the fêted general, and neither returned to individuals their property nor restored to the city its freedom. Syracuse and the towns that had been previously dependent on it were classed among the communities tributary to Rome—Tauromenium and Neetum alone obtained the same privileges as Messana, while the territory of Leontini became Roman domain and its former proprietors Roman lessees—and no Syracusan citizen was henceforth allowed to reside in the "Island," the portion of the city that commanded the harbour.

212.
Conquest of
Syracuse.

Sicily thus appeared lost to the Carthaginians; but the genius of Hannibal exercised even from a distance its influence there. He despatched to the Carthaginian army, which remained at Agrigentum in perplexity and inaction under Hanno and Epicydes, a Libyan cavalry officer, Mutines, who took the command of the Numidian cavalry, and with his flying squadrons, fanning into an open flame the bitter hatred which the despotic rule of the Romans had excited over all the island, commenced a guerilla warfare on the most extensive scale and with the happiest results; so that he even, when the Carthaginian and Roman armies met on the river Himera, sustained some conflicts with Marcellus himself successfully. The relations, however, which prevailed between Hannibal and the Carthaginian council, were here repeated on a small scale. The general appointed by the council pursued with jealous envy the officer sent by Han-

Guerilla
war in
Sicily.

- nibal, and insisted upon giving battle to the proconsul without Mutines and the Numidians. The wish of Hanno was carried out, and he was completely beaten. Mutines was not induced to deviate from his course; he maintained himself in the interior of the country, occupied several small towns, and was enabled by the not inconsiderable reinforcements which joined him from Carthage gradually to extend his operations. His successes were so brilliant, that at length the commander-in-chief, who could not otherwise prevent the cavalry officer from eclipsing him, deprived him summarily of the command of the light cavalry, and intrusted it to his own son. The Numidian, who had now for two years preserved the island for his Phœnician masters, had the measure of his patience exhausted by this treatment. He and his horsemen who refused to follow the younger Hanno entered into negotiations with the Roman general Marcus Valerius Lævinus, and delivered to him Agrigentum. Hanno escaped in a boat, and went to Carthage to report to his superiors the disgraceful high treason of Hannibal's officer; the Phœnician garrison in the town was put to death by the Romans, and the citizens were sold into slavery (544). To secure the island from such surprises as the landing of 540, the city received a Roman colony; the old and glorious Akragas became the Roman fortress Agrigentum. After the whole of Sicily was thus subdued, the Romans exerted themselves to restore some sort of tranquillity and order to the distracted island. The rabble of banditti that haunted the interior were driven together *en masse* and conveyed to Italy, that from their head-quarters at Rhegium they might burn and destroy in the territories of Hannibal's allies. The government did its utmost to promote the restoration of agriculture which had been totally neglected in the island. The Carthaginian council more than once talked of sending a fleet to Sicily and renewing the war there; but the project went no further.
- Agrigentum occupied by the Romans.
210. the citizens were sold into slavery (544). To secure the
214. island from such surprises as the landing of 540, the city received a Roman colony; the old and glorious Akragas became the Roman fortress Agrigentum. After the whole of
- Sicily tranquillized. Sicily was thus subdued, the Romans exerted themselves to restore some sort of tranquillity and order to the distracted island. The rabble of banditti that haunted the interior were driven together *en masse* and conveyed to Italy, that from their head-quarters at Rhegium they might burn and destroy in the territories of Hannibal's allies. The government did its utmost to promote the restoration of agriculture which had been totally neglected in the island. The Carthaginian council more than once talked of sending a fleet to Sicily and renewing the war there; but the project went no further.
- Philip of Macedonia procrastinates.
217. Macedonia might have exercised an influence over the course of events more decisive than that of Syracuse. From the eastern powers neither aid nor resistance was for the moment to be looked for. Antiochus the Great, the natural ally of Philip, must, after the decisive victory of the Egyptians at Raphia in 587, have deemed himself fortunate in obtaining peace from the indolent Philopator on the basis of the *status quo ante*. The rivalry of the Lagidæ and the con-

stant apprehension of a renewed outbreak of the war on the one hand, and insurrections of pretenders in the interior and enterprises of all sorts in Asia Minor, Bactria, and the eastern satrapies on the other, prevented him from joining that great anti-Roman alliance which Hannibal had in view. The Egyptian court was decidedly on the side of Rome, with which it renewed alliance in 544; but it was not to be expected that Ptolemy Philopator would support Rome otherwise than by sending cargoes of corn. Accordingly there was nothing, save their own discord, to prevent Greece and Macedonia from throwing their decisive weight into the great Italian struggle; they might save the Hellenic name, if they had the self-control to stand by each other for but a few years against the common foe. Such sentiments were current in Greece. The prophetic saying of Agelaus of Naupactus, that he was afraid that the prize-fights in which the Hellenes now indulged at home might soon be over; his earnest warning to direct their eyes to the west, and not to allow a stronger power to impose on all the parties now contending a peace fraught with equal servitude—such sayings had essentially contributed to bring about the peace between Philip and the Ætolians (537), and it was a significant proof of the tendency of that peace, that the Ætolian league immediately nominated Agelaus as its *strategus*.

210.

217.

National patriotism was bestirring itself in Greece as in Carthage; for a moment it seemed possible to kindle a national Hellenic war against Rome. But the general in such a crusade must needs be Philip of Macedonia; and he lacked that enthusiasm and that faith in the nation, which alone could carry out such a war. He knew not how to solve the arduous problem of transforming himself from the oppressor into the champion of Greece. His very delay in the conclusion of the alliance with Hannibal damped the first and best zeal of the Greek patriots; and when he did enter into the conflict with Rome, his mode of conducting war was still less adapted to awaken sympathy and confidence. His first attempt, which was made in the very year of the battle of Cannæ (538), to obtain possession of the city of Apollonia, failed in a way almost ridiculous, for Philip turned back in all haste on receiving the totally groundless report that a Roman fleet was steering for the Adriatic. This took place before there was a formal breach with Rome; when the breach at length ensued, friend and

216.

215. foe expected a Macedonian descent on Lower Italy. From 539 a Roman fleet and army were stationed at Brundisium to meet it; Philip, who was without vessels of war, was constructing a flotilla of light Illyrian barks to convey his army across. But when the endeavour had to be made in earnest, his courage failed to encounter the dreaded quinqueremes at sea; he broke the promise which he had given to his ally Hannibal to attempt a descent, and with the view of still doing something he resolved to make an attack on his own share of the spoil, the Roman possessions in Epirus (540). Nothing would have come of this even at the best; but the Romans, who well knew that offensive was preferable to defensive protection, were by no means content, as Philip probably expected they would be, to remain spectators of the attack from the opposite shore. The Roman fleet conveyed a division of the army from Brundisium to Epirus; Oricum was recaptured from the king, a garrison was thrown into Apollonia, and the Macedonian camp was stormed. Thereupon Philip passed from partial action to total inaction, and notwithstanding all the complaints of Hannibal, who vainly tried to infuse into Philip's halting and shortsighted policy the energy of his own fire and decision, he allowed some years to elapse in armed inactivity.

Rome heads
a [212.
Greek
coalition
against
Macedonia.

Nor was Philip the first to renew the hostilities. The fall of Tarentum (542), by which Hannibal acquired an excellent port on that coast which was the most convenient for the landing of a Macedonian army, at length led the Romans to parry the blow at a distance, and to give the Macedonians so much employment at home that they could not think of an attempt on Italy. The national enthusiasm in Greece had of course evaporated long ago. With the help of the old feeling of opposition to Macedonia, and of the fresh acts of imprudence and injustice of which Philip had been guilty, the Roman admiral Lævinus found no difficulty in organizing against Macedon a coalition of the intermediate and minor powers under the protectorate of Rome. It was headed by the Ætolians, at whose diet Lævinus had personally appeared and had gained its support by a promise of the Acarnanian territory which the Ætolians had long coveted. They concluded with Rome an honourable agreement to rob the rest of the Greeks of men and land on the joint account, so that the land should belong to the Ætolians, the men and moveables to the Romans. They were

joined by the states of anti-Macedonian, or rather primarily of anti-Achæan, tendencies in Greece proper; in Attica by Athens, in the Peloponnesus by Elis and Messene, and especially by Sparta, the antiquated constitution of which had been just about this time overthrown by a daring soldier, Machanidas, in order that he might exercise despotic power under the name of king Pelops, a minor, and might establish a government of military adventurers sustained by bands of mercenaries. The coalition was joined moreover by those steadfast antagonists of Macedon, the chiefs of the half-barbarous Thracian and Illyrian tribes, and lastly by Attalus king of Pergamus, who followed out his own interest with sagacity and energy amidst the ruin of the two great Greek states which surrounded him, and had the acuteness even now to attach himself as a client to Rome when his alliance was still of some value.

It is neither agreeable nor necessary to follow the vicissitudes of this aimless struggle. Philip, although he was superior to each of his opponents and repelled their attacks on all sides with energy and personal valour, yet consumed his time and strength in that profitless defensive. Now he had to turn against the Ætolians, who in concert with the Roman fleet annihilated the unfortunate Acarnanians and threatened Locris and Thessaly; now an invasion of barbarians summoned him to the northern provinces; now the Achæans solicited his help against the predatory expeditions of Ætolians and Spartans; now king Attalus of Pergamus and the Roman admiral Publius Sulpicius, with their combined fleets, threatened the east coast or disembarked troops in Eubœa. The want of a war fleet paralyzed Philip in all his movements; he even went so far as to beg vessels of war from his ally Prusias of Bithynia, and even from Hannibal. It was only towards the close of the war that he resolved—as he should have done at first—to order the construction of 100 ships of war, of which however no use was made, if the order was executed at all. All who understood the position of Greece and sympathized with it lamented the unhappy war, in which the last energies of Greece preyed upon itself and the prosperity of the land was destroyed; repeatedly the commercial states, Rhodes, Chios, Mitylene, Byzantium, Athens, and even Egypt had attempted a mediation. In fact both parties had an interest in coming to terms. The Ætolians, to whom their Roman allies attached the chief importance, had,

Resultless
warfare.

Peace be-
tween
Philip and
the Greeks.

as well as the Macedonians, suffered greatly in consequence of the war; especially after the petty king of the Athamanes had been gained by Philip, and the interior of Ætolia had thus been laid open to Macedonian incursions. Many Ætolians even had their eyes gradually opened to the dishonourable and pernicious part which the Roman alliance condemned them to play; a cry of horror pervaded the whole Greek nation when the Ætolians, in concert with the Romans, sold Hellenic citizens, such as those of Anticyra, Oreus, Dmye, and Ægina, *en masse* into slavery. But the Ætolians were no longer free; they would run a great risk if of their own accord they concluded peace with Philip, and they found the Romans by no means disposed, especially after the favourable turn which matters were taking in Spain and in Italy, to desist from a war, which on their own part was carried on with merely a few ships, and the burden and injury of which fell mainly on the Ætolians. At length however the Ætolians resolved to listen to the mediating cities: and, notwithstanding the counter efforts of the Romans, a peace was arranged in the winter of 548-9 between the Greek powers. Ætolia had converted an over-powerful ally into a dangerous enemy; but the Roman senate, which just at that time was summoning all the resources of the exhausted state for the decisive expedition to Africa, did not deem it a fitting moment to resent the breach of the alliance. The war even with Philip could not have been carried on by the Romans without considerable exertions of their own after the withdrawal of the Ætolians; and it appeared to them more advantageous to terminate it also by a peace, whereby Rome retained all her possessions on the coast of Epirus except the worthless territory of the Atintanes. Under the circumstances Philip might deem himself fortunate in obtaining terms so favourable; but that issue proclaimed—what could not indeed be longer concealed—that all the unspeakable misery which ten years of a warfare waged with revolting inhumanity had brought upon Greece had been endured for no end, and that the noble and just combination, which Hannibal had projected and all Greece had for a moment joined, was shattered irretrievably.

206-205.
Peace be-
tween
Philip and
Rome.

Spanish
war.

In Spain, where the spirit of Hamilcar and Hannibal was powerful, the struggle was more severe. Its progress was marked by the singular vicissitudes incidental to the peculiar nature of the country and the habits of the people. The

farmers and shepherds, who inhabited the beautiful valley of the Ebro and the luxuriantly fertile Andalusia as well as the rough upland region traversed by numerous wooded mountain ranges that lay between them, could easily be congregated as an armed *levée en masse*, but it was difficult to lead them against the enemy, or even to keep them together at all. The inhabitants of the towns could just as little be combined for steady and united action, obstinately as they bade defiance to the oppressor behind their walls. They all appear to have made little distinction between the Romans and the Carthaginians; whether the troublesome guests who had established themselves in the valley of the Ebro, or those who had established themselves on the Guadalquivir, possessed a larger or smaller portion of the peninsula, was probably to the nation very much a matter of indifference; and for that reason the peculiarly Spanish trait of tenacity in partisanship was little prominent in this war, with isolated exceptions such as Saguntum on the Roman and Astapa on the Carthaginian side. But as neither the Romans nor the Africans had brought with them sufficient forces of their own, the war necessarily became on both sides a struggle to gain partisans, which was rarely decided by well-founded attachment, more usually by fear, money, or accident, and which, when it seemed about to end, resolved itself into a series of fortress sieges and guerilla conflicts whence it soon revived with fresh fury. The armies are as shifting as the sand dunes on the sea shore; on the spot where a hill stood yesterday, not a trace of it remains to-day. In general the superiority was on the side of the Romans, partly because they at first appeared in Spain as the deliverers of the land from Phœnician despotism, partly because of the fortunate selection of their leaders and of the stronger nucleus of trustworthy troops which these brought along with them. It is impossible, however, with the very imperfect and, in point of chronology especially, very confused accounts which have been handed down to us, to give a satisfactory view of a war so conducted.

The two lieutenant-governors of the Romans in the peninsula, Gnæus and Publius Scipio, both of them, but especially Gnæus, good generals and excellent administrators, accomplished their task with the most brilliant success. Not only was the barrier of the Pyrenees steadfastly maintained, and an attempt to re-establish the inter-

Successes of
the Scipios.

- rupted communication by land between the commander-in-chief of the enemy and his head-quarters sternly repulsed; not only had a Spanish New Rome been created, after the model of the Spanish New Carthage, by means of the comprehensive fortifications and harbour-works of Tarraco, but the
215. Roman armies had already in 539 fought with success in Andalusia (P. 145). Their expedition thither was repeated
214. in the following year (540) with still greater success. The Romans carried their arms almost to the pillars of Hercules, extended their protectorate in South Spain, and lastly, by regaining and re-establishing Saguntum, secured for themselves an important station on the line from the Ebro to Cartagena, repaying at the same time as far as possible an old debt which the nation owed. While the Scipios thus almost drove the Carthaginians out of Spain, they had the skill to raise up a dangerous enemy to them in western Africa itself in the person of the powerful west African prince Syphax, ruling in the modern provinces of Oran and Algiers, who entered into connections with the Romans (about 541). Had it been possible to supply him with a Roman army, great results might have been expected; but at that time not a man could be spared from Italy, and the Spanish army was too weak to be divided. But even Syphax's own troops, trained and led by Roman officers, excited so serious a ferment among the Libyan subjects of Carthage that the lieutenant-commander of Spain and Africa, Hasdrubal Barca himself, went to Africa with the flower of his Spanish troops. Little more is related of this Libyan war than the story of the cruel vengeance which Carthage, as was her wont, inflicted on the rebels, after the rival of Syphax, king Gala (in the modern province of Constantine), had declared for Carthage, and had by means of his brave son Massinissa defeated Syphax and compelled him to make peace.
- Syphax
against Car-
thage.
213.
- The Scipios
defeated
and killed.
211.
213. 212. This turn of affairs in Africa had an important effect on the war in Spain. Hasdrubal was able once more to proceed to that country (543), whither he was soon followed by considerable reinforcements, and by Massinissa himself. The Scipios, who during the absence of the enemy's general (541, 542) had continued to plunder and to gain partisans in the Carthaginian territory, found themselves unexpectedly assailed by forces so superior that they were under the necessity of either retreating behind the Ebro or calling out the Spaniards. They chose the latter course,

and took into their pay 20,000 Celtiberians; and then, in order the better to encounter the three hostile armies under Hasdrubal Barca, Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo, and Mago, they divided their army, and did not even keep their Roman troops together. They thus prepared the way for their own destruction. While Gnæus with his corps, containing a third of the Roman and all the Spanish troops, lay encamped opposite to Hasdrubal Barca, the latter had no difficulty in inducing the Spaniards in the Roman army in consideration of a sum of money to withdraw—which perhaps to their free-lance ideas of morals did not even seem a breach of fidelity, seeing that they did not pass over to the enemies of their paymaster. Nothing was left to the Roman general but hastily to begin his retreat, in which the enemy closely followed him. Meanwhile the second Roman army under Publius found itself vigorously assailed by the two other Punic armies under Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and Mago, and the dashing squadrons of Massinissa's horse gave to the Carthaginians a decided advantage. The Roman camp was almost surrounded. If the Spanish auxiliaries already on the way should arrive, the Romans would be completely hemmed in. The bold resolve of the proconsul to encounter with his best troops the advancing Spaniards, before their appearance should fill up the gap in the blockade, ended unfortunately. The Romans indeed had at first the advantage; but the Numidian horse, who were rapidly despatched after the troops that had issued forth, soon overtook them and prevented them both from following up the victory which they had already half gained, and from retreating, until the Punic infantry came up and at length the fall of the general converted the lost battle into a defeat. After Publius had thus fallen, Gnæus, who slowly retreating had with difficulty defended himself against the one Carthaginian army, found himself suddenly assailed at once by three, and all retreat cut off by the Numidian cavalry. Hemmed in upon a bare hill, which did not even afford a possibility of pitching a camp, the whole corps were cut down or taken prisoners. As to the fate of the general himself no certain information was ever obtained. A small division alone was conducted by Gaius Marcius, an excellent officer of the school of Gnæus, in safety to the other bank of the Ebro; and thither the legate Titus Fonteius also succeeded in bringing safely the portion of the corps of

Spain south
of the Ebro
lost to the
Romans.

Nero sent
to Spain.

210.

Publius
Scipio.

Publius that had been left in the camp; most even of the Roman garrisons scattered in the south of Spain were enabled to flee thither. In all Spain south of the Ebro the Phœnicians ruled without opposition; and the moment seemed not far distant, when the river would be crossed, the Pyrenees would be open, and the communication with Italy would be restored. But the emergency in the Roman camp called the right man to the command. The choice of the soldiers, passing over older and not incapable officers, summoned Gaius Marcius to become leader of the army; and his dexterous management and, quite as much perhaps, the envy and discord among the three Carthaginian generals, wrested from these the further fruits of their important victory. Such of the Carthaginians as had crossed the river were driven back, and the line of the Ebro was held in the meanwhile, till Rome gained time to send a new army and a new general. Fortunately the turn of the war in Italy, where Capua had just fallen, allowed this to be done. A strong legion—12,000 men—arriving under the proprætor Gaius Claudius Nero, restored the balance of arms. An expedition to Andalusia in the following year (544) was most successful; Hasdrubal Barca was beset and surrounded, and escaped a capitulation only by ignoble stratagem and open perfidy. But Nero was not the right general for the Spanish war. He was an able officer, but a harsh, irritable, unpopular man, who had little skill in the art of renewing old connections or of forming new ones, or in taking advantage of the injustice and arrogance with which the Carthaginians after the death of the Scipios had treated friend and foe in Further Spain and exasperated all against them.

The senate, which formed a correct judgment as to the importance and the peculiar character of the Spanish war, and had learned from the Uticenses brought in as prisoners by the Roman fleet the great exertions which were making in Carthage to send Hasdrubal and Massinissa with a numerous army over the Pyrenees, resolved to despatch to Spain new reinforcements and an extraordinary general of higher rank, the nomination of whom they deemed it expedient to leave to the people. For long (so runs the story) nobody announced himself as a candidate for the perilous and complicated office; but at last a young officer of twenty-seven, Publius Scipio (son of the general of the same name who had fallen in Spain), who had held the offices of military tri-

bune and ædile, came forward to solicit it. It is incredible that the Roman senate should have left to accident an election of such importance in an assembly which it had itself suggested, and equally incredible that ambition and patriotism should have so died out in Rome that no tried officer presented himself for the important post. If on the other hand the eyes of the senate turned to the young, talented, and experienced officer, who had brilliantly distinguished himself in the hotly contested days on the Trebia and at Cannæ, but who still had not the rank requisite for his coming forward as the successor of men who had been prætors and consuls, it was very natural to adopt this course, which as it were in courtesy constrained the people to admit the only candidate notwithstanding his defective qualification, and which could not but bring both him and the Spanish expedition, that was doubtless very unpopular, into favour with the multitude. If such was the object of this ostensibly unpremeditated candidature, it was perfectly successful. The son, who went to avenge the death of a father whose life he had saved nine years before at the Trebia; the young man of manly beauty and long locks, who with modest blushes offered himself in the absence of a better for the post of danger; the mere military tribune, whom the votes of the centuries now raised at once to the roll of the highest magistracies—all these circumstances made a wonderful and indelible impression on the citizens and farmers of Rome. And in truth Publius Scipio was one, who was himself enthusiastic, and who inspired enthusiasm. He was not one of the few who by their energy and iron will constrain the world to adopt, and to move in, new paths for centuries, or who grasp the reins of destiny for years till its wheels roll over them. Publius Scipio gained battles and conquered countries under the instructions of the senate; with the aid of his military laurels he took also a prominent position in Rome as a statesman; but a wide interval separates such a man from an Alexander or a Cæsar. As an officer, he rendered at least no greater service to his country than Marcus Marcellus; and as a politician, although not perhaps himself fully conscious of the unpatriotic and personal character of his policy, he injured his country at least as much, as he benefited it by his military skill. Yet a special charm lingers around the form of that graceful hero; it is surrounded, as with a dazzling halo, by the atmosphere

of serene and confident inspiration, in which Scipio with mingled credulity and adroitness always moved. With quite enough of enthusiasm to warm men's hearts, and enough of calculation to follow in every case the dictates of intelligence, while not leaving out of account the vulgar : not naïve enough to share the belief of the multitude in his divine inspirations, nor straightforward enough to set it aside, and yet in secret thoroughly persuaded that he was a man specially favoured of the gods—in a word, a genuine prophetic nature ; raised above the people, and not less aloof from them ; a man steadfast to his word and kingly in his bearing, who thought that he would humble himself by adopting the ordinary title of a king, but could never understand how the constitution of the republic should in his case be binding ; so confident in his own greatness that he knew nothing of envy or of hatred, courteously acknowledged other men's merits, and compassionately forgave other men's faults ; an excellent officer and a refined diplomatist without presenting the offensive special stamp of either calling, uniting Hellenic culture with the fullest national feeling of a Roman, an accomplished speaker and of graceful manners—Publius Scipio won the hearts of soldiers and of women, of his countrymen and of the Spaniards, of his rivals in the senate and of his greater Carthaginian antagonist. Soon his name was on every one's lips, and his was the star which seemed destined to bring victory and peace to his country.

Scipio goes
to Spain.
210-209.

Publius Scipio went to Spain in 544-5, accompanied by the proprætor Marcus Silanus, who was to succeed Nero and to serve as assistant and counsellor to the young commander-in-chief, and by his intimate friend Gaius Lælius as admiral, and furnished with a legion above the usual strength and a well-filled chest. His appearance on the scene was at once signalized by one of the boldest and most fortunate *coups de main* that are known in history. Of the three Carthaginian generals Hasdrubal Barca was stationed at the sources, Hasdrubal son of Gisco at the mouth, of the Tagus, and Mago at the pillars of Hercules ; the nearest of them was ten days' march from the Phœnician capital, New Carthage. Suddenly, in the spring of 545, ere the enemy's armies began to move, Scipio set out with his whole army of nearly 30,000 men and his fleet for this town, which he could reach by the coast route from the mouth of the Ebro in a few days, and surprised the Punic garrison, not above

Capture of
New Car-
thage.

1000 men strong, by a combined attack by sea and land. The town, situated on a tongue of land projecting into the harbour, found itself threatened at once on three sides by the Roman fleet, and on the fourth by the legions; and all help was far distant. Nevertheless the commandant Mago defended himself with resolution, and armed the citizens, as the soldiers did not suffice to man the walls. A sortie was attempted, but the Romans repelled it with ease, and without taking time to open a regular siege, began the assault on the landward side. Eagerly the assailants pushed their advance along the narrow land approach to the town; new columns constantly relieved those that were fatigued; the weak garrison was utterly exhausted; but the Romans had gained no advantage. Scipio had not expected any; the assault was merely designed to draw away the garrison from the side next to the harbour, where, having been informed that part of the latter was left dry at ebb-tide, he meditated a second attack. While the assault was raging on the landward side, Scipio sent a division with ladders over the shallow bank, "where Neptune himself showed them the way," and they had actually the good fortune to find the walls at that point undefended. Thus the city was won on the first day; whereupon Mago in the citadel capitulated. With the Carthaginian capital, there fell into the hands of the Romans 18 dismantled vessels of war and 63 transports, the whole war-stores, considerable supplies of corn, the war-chest of 600 talents (more than £140,000), the hostages of all the Spanish allies of Carthage, and ten thousand captives, among whom were eighteen Carthaginian Gerusiasts or Judges. Scipio promised the hostages permission to return home so soon as their respective communities should have entered into alliance with Rome, and employed the resources which the city afforded to reinforce and improve the condition of his army. He ordered the artisans of New Carthage, 2000 in number, to work for the Roman army, promising to them liberty at the close of the war, and he selected from the remaining multitude the able-bodied men to serve as rowers in the fleet. But the burgesses of the city were spared, and allowed to retain their liberty and former position. Scipio knew the Phœnicians and was aware that they would obey; and it was important that a city possessing the only good harbour on the east coast and rich silver-mines should be secured by something more than a garrison.

Success thus crowned the bold enterprise—bold, because it was not unknown to Scipio that Hasdrubal Barca had received orders from his government to advance towards Gaul and was engaged in fulfilling them, and because the weak division left behind on the Ebro was not in a position seriously to oppose that movement, should Scipio's return be delayed. But he was again at Tarraco, before Hasdrubal made his appearance on the Ebro. The hazard of the game, which the young general played when he abandoned his primary task in order to execute a dashing stroke, was concealed by the fabulous success which Neptune and Scipio had gained in concert. The marvellous capture of the Phœnician capital so abundantly justified all the expectations that had been formed at home regarding the wondrous youth, that none could venture to utter any adverse opinion. Scipio's command was indefinitely prolonged; he himself resolved no longer to confine his efforts to the mere task of guarding the passes of the Pyrenees. Already, in consequence of the fall of New Carthage, not only had the Spaniards on the north of the Ebro completely submitted, but even beyond the Ebro the most powerful princes had exchanged the Carthaginian for the Roman protectorate.

209–208. Scipio employed the winter of 545–6 in breaking up his fleet and increasing his land army with the men thus acquired, so that he might at once watch the north and assume the offensive in the south more energetically than before, and he marched in 546 to Andalusia. There he encountered Hasdrubal Barca, who was moving northward, in the execution of his long-cherished plan, to the help of his brother. A battle took place at Bœcula, in which the Romans claimed the victory, and professed to have made 10,000 captives; but Hasdrubal attained his end in the main, although at the sacrifice of a portion of his army. With his chest, his elephants, and the best portion of his troops, he forced his way to the north coast of Spain; marching along the shore, he reached the western passes of the Pyrenees which appear to have been unoccupied, and before the bad season set in he was in Gaul, where he took up quarters for the winter. It was evident that Scipio's resolve to combine offensive operations with the defensive, which he had been instructed to maintain, was inconsiderate and unwise. The immediate task assigned to the Spanish army, which not only Scipio's father and uncle, but

Scipio goes
to Andalusia.

208.

Hasdrubal
crosses the
Pyrenees.

even Gaius Marcius and Gaius Nero had accomplished with much inferior means, was not enough for the arrogance of the victorious general at the head of a numerous army; and he was mainly to blame for the extremely critical position of Rome in the summer of 547, when Hannibal's plan of a combined attack on the Romans was at length realized. But the gods covered the errors of their favourite with laurels. In Italy the peril fortunately passed over; the Romans were glad to accept the bulletin of the ambiguous victory of Bœcula, and when fresh tidings of victory arrived from Spain, they thought no further of the circumstance that they had had to combat the ablest general and the flower of the Hispano-Phœnician army in Italy.

207.

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212.
Tarentum
taken by
Hannibal.

Conflicts
around
Capua.

At the chief seat of war, Campania, the struggle went on with very varying success. The legions posted in the neighbourhood of Capua had not exactly invested the city, but had so greatly impeded the cultivation of the soil and the ingathering of the harvest, that the populous city was in urgent need of supplies from without. Hannibal accordingly collected a considerable convoy of grain, and directed the Campanians to receive it at Beneventum; but their tardiness gave the consuls Quintus Flaccus and Appius Claudius time to come up, to inflict a severe defeat on Hanno who protected the convoy, and to seize his camp and all his stores. The two consuls then surrounded the town, while Tiberius Gracchus stationed himself on the Appian way to prevent Hannibal from approaching to relieve it. But that brave officer fell in consequence of the shameful stratagem of a perfidious Lucanian; and his death was equivalent to a complete defeat, for his army, consisting mostly of the slaves whom he had manumitted, dispersed after the fall of their beloved leader. So Hannibal found the road to Capua open, and by his unexpected appearance compelled the two consuls to raise the blockade which they had barely begun. Their cavalry had already, before Hannibal's arrival, been thoroughly defeated by the Phœnician cavalry, which lay as a garrison in Capua under Hanno and Bostar, and by the equally excellent Campanian horse. The total destruction of the regular troops and free bands in Lucania led by Marcus Centenius, a man imprudently promoted from a subaltern to be a general, and the not much less complete defeat of the negligent and arrogant prætor Gnaeus Fulvius Flaccus in Apulia, closed the long series of the misfortunes of this year. But the obstinate perseverance of the Romans again neutralized the rapid success of Hannibal, at least at the most decisive point. As soon as Hannibal turned his back on Capua to proceed to Apulia, the Roman armies once more gathered around that city, one at Puteoli and Volturnum under Appius Claudius, another at Casilinum under Quintus Fulvius, and a third on the Nolan road under the prætor Gaius Claudius Nero. The three camps, well entrenched and connected by fortified lines, barred all access to the place, and the large, inadequately provisioned city could not but be compelled by mere blockade to surrender at no distant time, should no relief arrive. As the winter 212-211. of 542-3 drew to an end, the provisions were almost ex-

hausted, and pressing messengers, who with difficulty were able to steal through the well-guarded Roman lines, requested speedy help from Hannibal, who was employed in the siege of the citadel at Tarentum. With 33 elephants and his best troops he departed by forced marches from Tarentum for Campania, captured the Roman guard at Calatia, and took up his camp on mount Tifata, close by Capua, in the confident expectation that the Roman generals would now raise the siege as they had done the year before. But the Romans, who had had time to entrench their camps and their lines like a fortress, did not stir, and looked on unmoved from their ramparts, while on one side the Campanian horse, on the other the Phœnician squadrons dashed against their lines. A serious assault could not be contemplated by Hannibal; he could foresee that his advance would soon draw the other Roman armies after him to Campania, if even before their arrival the scarcity of supplies in a region so systematically plundered did not drive him away. Nothing could be done in that quarter.

Hannibal now tried the last expedient, which occurred to his inventive genius, to save the important city. After giving the Campanians information of his intention, and exhorting them to hold out, he started with his relieving army from Capua and took the road for Rome. With the same dexterous boldness which he had shown in his first Italian campaigns, he threw himself with a weak army between the armies and fortresses of the enemy, and led his troops through Samnium and along the Valerian Way past Tibur to the bridge over the Anio, which he passed and encamped on the opposite bank, five miles from the city. The children's children of the Romans still shuddered, when they were told of "Hannibal at the gate;" real danger there was none. The country houses and fields in the neighbourhood of the city were laid waste by the enemy; the two legions in the city, who went forth against them, prevented the investment of the walls. Besides, Hannibal had never expected to surprise Rome by a *coup de main*, such as Scipio soon afterwards executed against New Carthage, and still less had he meditated a siege in earnest; his only hope was that, under the first alarm, part of the besieging army of Capua would march to Rome and thus give him an opportunity of breaking up the blockade. Accordingly after a brief stay he departed. The Romans saw

Hannibal
marches
towards
Rome.

Success thus crowned the bold enterprise—bold, because it was not unknown to Scipio that Hasdrubal Barca had received orders from his government to advance towards Gaul and was engaged in fulfilling them, and because the weak division left behind on the Ebro was not in a position seriously to oppose that movement, should Scipio's return be delayed. But he was again at Tarraco, before Hasdrubal made his appearance on the Ebro. The hazard of the game, which the young general played when he abandoned his primary task in order to execute a dashing stroke, was concealed by the fabulous success which Neptune and Scipio had gained in concert. The marvellous capture of the Phœnician capital so abundantly justified all the expectations that had been formed at home regarding the wondrous youth, that none could venture to utter any adverse opinion. Scipio's command was indefinitely prolonged; he himself resolved no longer to confine his efforts to the mere task of guarding the passes of the Pyrenees. Already, in consequence of the fall of New Carthage, not only had the Spaniards on the north of the Ebro completely submitted, but even beyond the Ebro the most powerful princes had exchanged the Carthaginian for the Roman protectorate.

209–208.

Scipio goes
to Andalusia.

208.

Hasdrubal
crosses the
Pyrenees.

Scipio employed the winter of 545–6 in breaking up his fleet and increasing his land army with the men thus acquired, so that he might at once watch the north and assume the offensive in the south more energetically than before, and he marched in 546 to Andalusia. There he encountered Hasdrubal Barca, who was moving northward, in the execution of his long-cherished plan, to the help of his brother. A battle took place at Bœcula, in which the Romans claimed the victory, and professed to have made 10,000 captives; but Hasdrubal attained his end in the main, although at the sacrifice of a portion of his army. With his chest, his elephants, and the best portion of his troops, he forced his way to the north coast of Spain; marching along the shore, he reached the western passes of the Pyrenees which appear to have been unoccupied, and before the bad season set in he was in Gaul, where he took up quarters for the winter. It was evident that Scipio's resolve to combine offensive operations with the defensive, which he had been instructed to maintain, was inconsiderate and unwise. The immediate task assigned to the Spanish army, which not only Scipio's father and uncle, but

even Gaius Marcius and Gaius Nero had accomplished with much inferior means, was not enough for the arrogance of the victorious general at the head of a numerous army; and he was mainly to blame for the extremely critical position of Rome in the summer of 547, when Hannibal's plan of a combined attack on the Romans was at length realized. But the gods covered the errors of their favourite with laurels. In Italy the peril fortunately passed over; the Romans were glad to accept the bulletin of the ambiguous victory of Bæcula, and when fresh tidings of victory arrived from Spain, they thought no further of the circumstance that they had had to combat the ablest general and the flower of the Hispano-Phœnician army in Italy.

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212.
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the spirit of Hamilcar. Already 8000 Ligurians, raised by Phœnician gold, were ready to unite with Hasdrubal; if he gained the first battle, he might hope that like his brother he should be able to bring the Gauls and perhaps the Etruscans into arms against Rome. Italy, moreover, was no longer what it had been eleven years before; the state and its citizens were exhausted, the Latin league was shaken, their best general had just fallen in the field of battle, and Hannibal was not subdued. In reality Scipio might bless the star of his genius, if it averted the consequences of his unpardonable blunder from himself and from his country.

New arma-
ments.

Hasdrubal
and Hanni-
bal on the
march.
207.

As in the times of her utmost danger, Rome once more called out twenty-three legions. Volunteers were summoned to arm, and those legally exempt from military service were included in the levy. Nevertheless, they were taken by surprise. At a period early beyond the expectation of either friends or foes, Hasdrubal was on the Italian side of the Alps (546); the Gauls, now accustomed to such transits, were readily bribed to open their passes, and furnished what the army required. If the Romans had any intention of occupying the outlets of the Alpine passes, they were again too late; all at once they learned that Hasdrubal was on the Po, that he was calling the Gauls to arms as successfully as his brother had formerly done, and that Placentia had been invested. With all haste the consul Marcus Livius proceeded to the northern army; and it was full time that he should appear. Etruria and Umbria were in sullen ferment; volunteers from them reinforced the Punic army. His colleague Gaius Nero summoned the prætor Gaius Hostilius Tubulus from Venusia to join him, and hastened with an army of 40,000 men to intercept the march of Hannibal to the north. The latter collected all his forces in the Bruttian territory, and, advancing along the great road leading from Rhegium to Apulia, encountered the consul at Grumentum. An obstinate engagement took place in which Nero claimed the victory; but Hannibal was able at all events, although with some loss, to evade the enemy by one of his usual adroit detours, and to reach Apulia without hindrance. There he halted, and encamped at first at Venusia, then at Canusium: Nero, who had followed closely in his steps, encamped opposite to him at both places. That Hannibal voluntarily halted, and was not prevented from advancing by the Roman army, appears to admit of no

doubt. The reason for his taking up his position exactly at that point, and not further to the north, must have depended on arrangements concerted between Hannibal and Hasdrubal, or on conjectures as to the route of the latter's march, with which we are not acquainted. While the two armies thus lay inactive face to face, the despatch from Hasdrubal which was anxiously expected in Hannibal's camp was intercepted by the outposts of Nero. It stated that Hasdrubal intended to take the Flaminian road, in other words, to keep in the first instance along the coast and then, at Fanum, to turn across the Apennines towards Narnia, at which place he hoped to meet Hannibal. Nero immediately ordered the reserve in the capital to proceed to Narnia as the point selected for the junction of the two Punic armies, while the division stationed at Capua went to the capital, and a new reserve was formed there. Convinced that Hannibal was not acquainted with the purpose of his brother and would continue to await him in Apulia, Nero resolved on the bold experiment of hastening northward by forced marches with a small but select corps of 7000 men, and, in connection with his colleague, compelling Hasdrubal, if possible, to fight. He was able to do this, for the Roman army which he left behind still continued strong enough either to hold its ground against Hannibal if he should attack it, or to accompany him and to arrive simultaneously with him at the scene of action, should he depart.

Nero found Marcus Livius at Sena Gallica awaiting the Battle of enemy; both consuls at once marched against Hasdrubal, Sena. whom they found occupied in crossing the Metaurus. Hasdrubal wished to avoid a battle and to escape from the Romans by a detour, but his guides abandoned him; he lost his way on ground that was strange to him, and was at length attacked on the march by the Roman cavalry and detained, until the Roman infantry arrived and a battle became inevitable. Hasdrubal stationed the Spaniards on the right wing, with his ten elephants in front of it, and the Gauls on the left, which he held back. Long the fortune of battle wavered on the right wing, and the consul Livius who commanded there was hard pressed, till Nero, repeating as a tactical manœuvre the strategical operation which had succeeded so well, allowed the enemy opposite to him to remain as they stood, and marching round his own army fell upon the flank of the Spaniards. This decided the day. The severely bought

and very bloody victory was complete ; the army, which had no retreat, was destroyed, and the camp was taken by assault. Hasdrubal, when he saw the admirably conducted battle lost, sought and found like his father an honourable soldier's death. As an officer and a man, he was worthy to be the brother of Hannibal. On the day after the battle Nero started, and after scarcely fourteen days' absence once more confronted Hannibal in Apulia, whom no message had reached, and who had not stirred. The consul brought the message with him ; it was the head of Hannibal's brother, which the Roman ordered to be thrown into the enemy's outposts, repaying in this way his great antagonist, who scorned to war with the dead, for the honourable burial which he had given to Paullus, Gracchus, and Marcellus.

Hannibal
retires to
the Brut-
tian terri-
tory.

Hannibal saw that his hopes had been in vain, and that all was over. He abandoned Apulia and Lucania, even Metapontum, and retired with his troops to the land of the Brutians, whose ports formed his only means of withdrawal from Italy. By the energy of the Roman generals, and still more by a conjuncture of singular good fortune, a peril was averted from Rome, the greatness of which justified Hannibal's persevering stay in Italy, and which fully bears comparison with the magnitude of the peril of Cannæ. The joy in Rome was boundless ; business was resumed as in time of peace ; every one felt that the danger of the war was surmounted.

Stagnation
of the war
in Italy.

Nevertheless the Romans were in no hurry to terminate the war. The state and the citizens were exhausted by the excessive moral and material strain on their energies ; men gladly abandoned themselves to carelessness and repose. The army and fleet were reduced ; the Roman and Latin farmers were reconducted to their desolate homesteads ; the exchequer was filled by the sale of a portion of the Campanian domains. The administration of the state was regulated anew, and the abuses which had prevailed were remedied ; the repayment of the voluntary war-loan was begun, and the Latin communities that remained in arrears were compelled to fulfil their neglected obligations with heavy interest.

The war in Italy made no progress. It forms a brilliant proof of the strategic talent of Hannibal, as well as of the incapacity of the Roman generals now opposed to him, that after this he was still able for four years to keep the field,

and that all the superiority of his opponent could not compel him either to shut himself up in fortresses or to embark. It is true that he was obliged to retire further and further, not so much in consequence of the indecisive engagements which took place with the Romans, as because his Bruttian allies were always becoming more troublesome; and at last he could only reckon on the towns which his army garrisoned. Thus he voluntarily abandoned Thurii; Locri was, on the suggestion of Publius Scipio, recaptured by an expedition from Rhegium (549). As if at last his projects were to receive a brilliant justification at the hands of the very Carthaginian authorities who had thwarted them, these now, in their apprehension as to the anticipated landing of the Romans, revived of their own accord his plans (548, 549), and sent reinforcements and subsidies to Italy for Hannibal and to Spain for Mago, with orders to rekindle the war in Italy so as to achieve some further respite for the trembling possessors of the country houses of Libya and the shops of Carthage. An embassy was likewise sent to Macedonia, to induce Philip to renew the alliance and to land in Italy (549). But it was too late. Philip had made peace with Rome some months before; the impending political annihilation of Carthage was far from agreeable to him, but he took no step, openly at least, against Rome. A small Macedonian corps proceeded to Africa, the expenses of which, according to the assertion of the Romans, were defrayed by Philip: this may have been the case, but the Romans had at any rate no proof of it, as the subsequent course of events showed. No Macedonian landing in Italy was thought of.

Mago, the youngest son of Hamilcar, set himself to his task more earnestly. With the remains of the Spanish army, which he had conducted in the first instance to Minorca, he landed in 549 at Genoa, destroyed the city, and summoned the Ligurians and Gauls to arms. Gold and the novelty of the enterprise led them now, as always, to come to him in troops; he had formed connections even throughout Etruria, where political prosecutions never ceased. But the troops he had brought with him were too few for a serious enterprise against Italy proper; and Hannibal likewise was much too weak, and his influence in Lower Italy had fallen too far, to permit him to advance with any prospect of success. The rulers of Carthage were not willing

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Mago in Italy.

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to save their native country, when its salvation was possible; when they were willing, it was possible no longer.

The African
expedition
of Scipio.

205.

Nobody probably in the Roman senate doubted either that the war on the part of Carthage against Rome was at an end, or that the war on the part of Rome against Carthage must now be begun; but unavoidable as was the expedition to Africa, they were afraid to enter on its preparation. They required for it, above all, an able and beloved leader; and they had none. Their best generals had either fallen in the field of battle, or they were, like Quintus Fabius and Quintus Fulvius, too old for such an entirely new and probably tedious war. The victors of Sena, Gaius Nero and Marcus Livius, would perhaps have been equal to the task, but they were both in the highest degree unpopular aristocrats; it was doubtful whether they would succeed in procuring the command—matters had already reached such a pass that ability, as such, determined the popular choice only in times of grave anxiety—and it was more than doubtful whether these were the men to stimulate the exhausted people to fresh exertions. At length Publius Scipio returned from Spain, and the favourite of the multitude, who had so brilliantly fulfilled, or at any rate seemed to have fulfilled, the task with which it had intrusted him, was immediately chosen consul for the next year. He entered on office (549) with the firm determination of now realizing that African expedition which he had projected in Spain. In the senate, however, not only was the party favourable to a methodical conduct of the war unwilling to entertain the project of an African expedition so long as Hannibal remained in Italy, but the majority was by no means favourably disposed towards the young general himself. His Greek refinement and his modern culture and tone of thought were but little agreeable to the austere and somewhat boorish fathers of the city; and serious doubts existed both as to his conduct of the Spanish war and as to his military discipline. How much ground there was for the objection that he manifested too great an indulgence towards his officers of division, was very soon demonstrated by the disgraceful proceedings of Gaius Flaminius at Locri, the blame of which certainly was indirectly chargeable to the scandalous negligence which marked Scipio's supervision. In the proceedings in the senate regarding the organization of the African expedition and the appointment of a general for

it, the new consul, wherever usage or the constitution came into conflict with his private views, showed no great reluctance to set such obstacles aside, and very clearly indicated that in case of need he was disposed to rely for support against the governing board on his fame and his popularity with the people. These things could not but annoy the senate and awaken, moreover, serious apprehension, lest in the impending decisive war and the negotiations for peace that would probably ensue with Carthage, such a general would not be bound by the instructions which he received—an apprehension which his arbitrary management of the Spanish expedition was by no means fitted to allay. Both sides, however, displayed wisdom enough not to push matters too far. The senate itself could not fail to see that the African expedition was necessary, and that it was injudicious indefinitely to postpone it; it could not fail to see that Scipio was a very able officer and in so far was well adapted for the leader in such a war, and that he, if any one, would be able to induce the people to prolong his command as long as necessary, and to put forth their last energies. The majority came to the resolution not to refuse to Scipio the desired commission, after he had previously observed, at least in form, the respect due to the supreme governing board and had submitted himself beforehand to the decree of the senate. Scipio was to proceed this year to Sicily to superintend the building of the fleet, the preparation of siege materials, and the formation of the expeditionary army, and then in the following year to land in Africa. For this purpose the army of Sicily—still composed of those two legions that were formed from the remnant of the army of Cannæ—was placed at his disposal, because a weak garrison and the fleet were quite sufficient for the protection of the island; and he was permitted moreover to raise volunteers in Italy. It was evident that the senate did not organize the expedition, but merely allowed it: Scipio did not obtain half of the resources which had formerly been placed at the command of Regulus, and he got that very corps which for years had been subjected by the senate to intentional degradation. The African army was, in the view of the majority of the senate, a forlorn hope of disrated companies and volunteers, the loss of whom in any event the state needed not greatly to regret.

Any one else than Scipio would perhaps have declared

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Prepara-
tions in
Africa.

that the African expedition must either be undertaken with other means, or not at all; but Scipio's confidence accepted the terms as they stood, solely with the view of attaining the eagerly coveted command. He carefully avoided, as far as possible, the imposition of direct burdens on the people, that he might not injure the popularity of the expedition. Its expenses, particularly those of building the fleet which were considerable, were partly procured by what was termed a voluntary contribution of the Etruscan cities—that is, by a war tribute imposed as a punishment on the Arretines and other communities disposed to favour the Phœnicians—partly laid upon the cities of Sicily. In forty days the fleet was ready for sea. The crews were reinforced by volunteers, of whom seven thousand from all parts of Italy responded to the call of the beloved officer. So Scipio set sail for Africa in the spring of 550 with two strong legions of veterans (about 30,000 men), 40 vessels of war, and 400 transports, and landed successfully, without meeting the slightest resistance, at the Fair Promontory in the neighbourhood of Utica.

The Carthaginians, who had long expected that the plundering expeditions, which the Roman squadrons had frequently made during the last few years to the African coast, would be followed by a more serious invasion, had not only, in order to prevent it, endeavoured to bring about a revival of the Italo-Macedonian war, but had also made armed preparation at home to receive the Romans. Of the two rival Berber kings, Massinissa of Cirta (Constantine), the ruler of the Massylians, and Syphax of Siga (at the mouth of the Tafna westward from Oran), the ruler of the Massæsylians, they had succeeded in attaching the latter, who was far the more powerful and hitherto had been friendly to the Romans, by treaty and affinity closely to Carthage, while they cast off the other, the old rival of Syphax and ally of the Carthaginians. Massinissa had after desperate resistance succumbed to the united power of the Carthaginians and of Syphax, and had been obliged to leave his territories a prey to the latter; he himself wandered with a few horsemen in the desert. Besides the contingent to be expected from Syphax, a Carthaginian army of 20,000 foot, 6000 cavalry, and 140 elephants—Hanno had been sent out to hunt elephants for the very purpose—was ready to fight for the protection of the capital, under the command of Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, a general who had gained experience in Spain; in

the port there lay a strong fleet. A Macedonian corps under Sopater, and a consignment of Celtiberian mercenaries, were immediately expected.

On the report of Scipio's landing, Massinissa immediately arrived in the camp of the general whom not long before he had confronted as an enemy in Spain; but the landless prince brought in the first instance nothing beyond his personal ability to the aid of the Romans, and the Libyans, although heartily weary of levies and tribute, had acquired too bitter experience in similar cases to declare at once for the invaders. So Scipio began the campaign. So long as he was only opposed by the weaker Carthaginian army, he had the advantage, and was enabled after some successful cavalry skirmishes to proceed to the siege of Utica; but when Syphax arrived, according to report with 50,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, the siege had to be raised, and a fortified naval camp had to be constructed for the winter on a promontory, which easily admitted of entrenchment, between Utica and Carthage. Here the Roman general passed the winter of 550-1. From the disagreeable situation in which the spring found him, he extricated himself by a fortunate *coup de main*. The Africans, lulled into security by proposals of peace suggested by Scipio with more artifice than honour, allowed themselves to be surprised on one and the same night in their two camps; the reed huts of the Numidians burst into flames, and, when the Carthaginians hastened to their help, their own camp shared the same fate; the fugitives were slain without resistance by the Roman divisions. This nocturnal surprise was more destructive than many a battle; nevertheless the Carthaginians did not suffer their courage to sink, and they even rejected the advice of the timid, or rather of the judicious, to recall Mago and Hannibal. Just at this time the expected Celtiberian and Macedonian auxiliaries arrived; it was resolved once more to try a pitched battle on the "Great Plains," five days' march from Utica. Scipio hastened to accept it; with little difficulty his veterans and volunteers dispersed the hastily collected host of Carthaginians and Numidians, and the Celtiberians, who could not reckon on any mercy from Scipio, were cut down after obstinate resistance. After this double defeat, the Africans could no longer keep the field. An attack on the Roman naval camp attempted by the Carthaginian fleet, while not unsuccessful, was far from decisive, and was greatly outweighed

Scipio •
driven back
to the coast.

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Surprise of
the Cartha-
ginian
camp.

by the capture of Syphax, which Scipio's singular good fortune threw in his way, and by which Massinissa became to the Romans what Syphax had been at first to the Carthaginians.

•
Negotia-
tions for
peace.

After such defeats the Carthaginian peace party, which had been reduced to silence for sixteen years, was able once more to raise its head and openly to rebel against the government of the Barcides and the patriots. Hasdrubal son of Gisgo was in his absence condemned by the government to death, and an attempt was made to obtain an armistice and peace from Scipio. He demanded the cession of their Spanish possessions and of the islands of the Mediterranean, the transference of the kingdom of Syphax to Massinissa, the surrender of all their vessels of war except 20, and a war contribution of 4000 talents (nearly £1,000,000)—terms which seem so singularly favourable to Carthage, that the question obtrudes itself whether they were offered by Scipio more in his own interest or in that of Rome. The Carthaginian plenipotentiaries accepted them under reservation of their being ratified by the respective authorities, and accordingly a Carthaginian embassy was despatched to Rome. But the patriot party in Carthage were not disposed to give up the struggle so cheaply; faith in the nobleness of their cause, confidence in their great leader, even the example that had been set to them by Rome herself, stimulated them to persevere, apart from the fact that peace of necessity involved the return of the opposite party to the helm of affairs and their own consequent destruction. The patriotic party had the ascendancy among the citizens; it was resolved to allow the opposition to negotiate for peace, and meanwhile to prepare for a last and decisive effort. Orders were sent to Mago and Hannibal to return with all speed to Africa. Mago, who for three years (549–551) had been labouring to bring about a coalition in Northern Italy against Rome, had just at this time in the territory of the Insubres (around Milan) given battle to a far superior double army of the Romans, in which the Roman cavalry had been made to give way, and the infantry had been thrown into confusion; victory seemed on the point of declaring for the Carthaginians, when a bold attack by a Roman troop on the enemy's elephants, and above all a serious wound received by their beloved and able commander, turned the fortune of the day. The Phœnician army was obliged to retreat to the

Machina-
tions of the
Cartha-
ginian
patriots.

205–203.

Ligurian coast, where it received and obeyed the order to embark; but Mago died of his wound on the voyage.

Hannibal would probably have anticipated the order, had not the last negotiations with Philip presented to him a renewed prospect of rendering better service to his country in Italy than in Libya; when he received it at Croton, where he latterly had his head-quarters, he lost no time in complying with it. He caused his horses to be put to death as well as the Italian soldiers who refused to follow him over the sea, and embarked in the transports that had been long in readiness in the roadstead of Croton. The Roman citizens breathed freely, when the mighty Libyan lion, whose departure no one even now ventured to compel, voluntarily turned his back on Italian ground. On this occasion the decoration of a grass wreath was bestowed by the senate and burgesses on the only surviving Roman general who had traversed that troubled time with honour, the veteran of nearly ninety years, Quintus Fabius. To receive this wreath—which by the custom of the Romans the army that a general had saved presented to its deliverer—at the hands of the whole community was the highest distinction which had ever been bestowed upon a Roman citizen, and the last honour accorded to the old general, who died in the course of that same year (551). Hannibal, doubtless not under the protection of the armistice, but solely through his rapidity of movement and good fortune, arrived at Leptis without interruption, and the last of the “lion’s brood” of Hamilcar trode once more, after an absence of thirty-six years, his native soil. He had left it, when still almost a boy, to enter on that noble and yet so thoroughly fruitless career of heroism, in which he had set forth towards the west to return homewards from the east, having described a wide circle of victory around the Carthaginian sea. Now, when what he had wished to prevent, and what he would have prevented had he been allowed, was done, he was summoned to help and, if possible, to save; and he obeyed without complaint or reproach.

Hannibal
recalled to
Africa.

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On his arrival the patriot party came forward openly; the disgraceful sentence against Hasdrubal was cancelled; new connections were formed with the Numidian sheiks through the dexterity of Hannibal; and not only did the assembly of the people refuse to ratify the peace practically concluded, but the armistice was broken by the plundering of a Roman transport fleet driven ashore on

Recom-
mencement
of hostili-
ties.

202.

the African coast, and by the seizure even of a Roman vessel of war carrying Roman envoys. In just indignation Scipio started from his camp at Tunes (552) and traversed the rich valley of the Bagradas (Mejerda), no longer allowing the townships to capitulate, but causing the inhabitants of the villages and towns to be seized and sold *en masse*. He had already penetrated far into the interior, and was at Naraggara (to the west of Sicca, now Kaf, near Ras el Dschaber), when Hannibal, who had marched out from Hadrumetum, fell in with him. The Carthaginian general attempted to obtain better conditions from the Roman in a personal conference; but Scipio, who had already gone to the extreme verge of concession, could not possibly, after the breach of the armistice, agree to yield further, and it is improbable that Hannibal had any other object in this step than to show the multitude that the patriots were not absolutely opposed to peace. The conference led to no result.

Battle of
Zama.

The two armies accordingly came to a decisive battle at Zama (not far, probably, from Sicca).^{*} Hannibal arranged his infantry in three lines; in the first division the Carthaginian hired troops, in the second the African militia and the Phœnician civic force along with the Macedonian corps, in the third the veterans who had followed him from Italy. In front of the line were placed 80 elephants; the cavalry were stationed on the wings. Scipio likewise disposed his legions in three divisions, as was the wont of the Romans, and so arranged them that the elephants could pass through and along the line without breaking it. Not only was this disposition completely successful, but the elephants making their way to the sides disordered also the Carthaginian cavalry on the flank, so that Scipio's cavalry (which, moreover was by the arrival of Massinissa's troops rendered far superior to the enemy) had little trouble in dispersing them, and were soon engaged in full pursuit. The struggle in the case of the infantry was more severe. The conflict lasted long between the first divisions on both sides; at length in the extremely bloody hand-to-hand encounter both parties fell into confusion, and were obliged to seek a support in the second divisions. The Romans found that support; but the

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^{*} Neither the place nor time of the battle is properly determined. The former was probably no other than the well-known Zama regia; the time probably the spring of 552. The fixing of the day as the 19th October, on account of the eclipse, is not to be depended on.

Carthaginian militia showed itself so unsteady and wavering, that the mercenaries believed themselves betrayed, and a hand-to-hand combat arose between them and the Carthaginian civic force. But Hannibal now hastily withdrew what remained of the first two lines to the flanks, and pushed forward his choice Italian troops along the whole line. Scipio, on the other hand, gathered together in the centre as many of the first line as still were able to fight, and made the second and third divisions close up on the right and left of the first. Once more on the same spot began a still more fearful conflict; Hannibal's old soldiers never wavered, despite the superior numbers of the enemy, till the cavalry of the Romans and of Massinissa, returning from the pursuit of the beaten cavalry of the enemy, surrounded them on all sides. This not only terminated the struggle, but annihilated the Punic army; the same soldiers, who fourteen years before had given way at Cannæ, had retaliated on their conquerors at Zama. With a handful of men Hannibal arrived, a fugitive, at Hadrumetum.

After this day folly alone could counsel a continuance of Peace. the war on the part of Carthage. On the other hand, it was in the power of the Roman general immediately to begin the siege of the capital which was neither protected nor provisioned, and, unless unforeseen accidents should intervene, now to subject Carthage to the fate which Hannibal had wished to bring upon Rome. Scipio did not do so; he granted peace (533), but no longer upon the former terms. Besides the concessions which had already in the last negotiations been demanded in favour of Rome and of Massinissa, an annual contribution of 200 talents (£48,800) was imposed for fifty years on the Carthaginians; and they had to bind themselves that they would not wage war against Rome or its allies or indeed beyond the bounds of Africa at all, and that in Africa they would not wage war beyond their own territory without having sought the permission of Rome—the practical effect of which was that Carthage became tributary, and lost her political independence. It even appears that the Carthaginians were bound in certain cases to furnish ships of war to the Roman fleet.

Scipio has been accused of granting too favourable conditions to the enemy, lest he might be obliged to hand over the glory of terminating the most severe war which Rome had waged, along with his command, to a successor. The

charge might have had some foundation, had the first proposals been carried out; it seems to have no warrant in reference to the second. His position in Rome was not such as to make the favourite of the people, after the victory of Zama, seriously apprehensive of recall—already after the victory an attempt to supersede him had been referred by the senate to the citizens, and by them decidedly rejected; nor do the conditions themselves warrant such a charge. The Carthaginian city never, after its hands were thus tied and a powerful neighbour was placed by its side, made even an attempt to withdraw from Roman supremacy, still less to enter into rivalry with Rome. Besides every one, who cared to know, knew that the war just terminated had been undertaken much more by Hannibal than by Carthage, and that it was absolutely impossible to revive the gigantic plans of the patriot party. It might seem little in the eyes of the vengeful Italians, that only the five hundred surrendered ships of war perished in the flames, and not the hated city itself. Secret spite and official pedantry might zealously contend for the view, that an opponent is only really vanquished when he is annihilated, and might censure the man who had disdained rigorously to punish the crime of having made Romans tremble. Scipio thought otherwise; and we have no reason, and therefore no right, to assume that the Roman was in this instance influenced by vulgar motives rather than by the noble and magnanimous impulses which formed part of his character. It was not the consideration of his own possible recall or of the mutability of fortune, nor was it any apprehension of the outbreak of a Macedonian war at certainly no distant date, that prevented the self-reliant and confident hero, with whom everything had hitherto succeeded beyond belief, from completing the destruction of the unhappy city, which fifty years afterwards his adopted grandson was commissioned to execute, and which might indeed have been equally well accomplished now. It is much more probable that the two great generals, on whom the decision of the political question now devolved, offered and accepted peace on such terms in order to set just and reasonable limits on the one hand to the furious vengeance of the victors, on the other to the obstinacy and imprudence of the vanquished. The noble mindedness and statesmanlike gifts of the great antagonists are no less apparent in Hannibal's magnanimous submission

to what was inevitable, than in Scipio's wise abstinence from an extravagant and outrageous use of victory. Is it to be supposed that one so generous, unprejudiced, and intelligent should not have asked himself of what benefit it could be to his country, now that the political power of the Carthaginian city was annihilated, utterly to destroy that primitive seat of commerce and of agriculture, and wickedly to overthrow one of the main pillars of the then existing civilization? The time had not yet come when the first men of Rome lent themselves to demolish the civilization of their neighbours, and frivolously fancied that they could wash away from themselves the eternal infamy of the nation by shedding an idle tear.

Thus ended the second Punic, or as the Romans more correctly called it, the Hannibalic, war, after it had devastated the lands and islands from the Hellespont to the pillars of Hercules for seventeen years. Before this war the policy of the Romans had no higher aim than to acquire command of the mainland of the Italian peninsula within its natural boundaries, and of the Italian islands and seas; and it is clearly proved by their treatment of Africa on the conclusion of peace that they terminated the war with the impression, not that they had laid the foundation of empire over the states of the Mediterranean or of universal sovereignty, as it is called, but that they had rendered a dangerous rival innocuous and had given to Italy agreeable neighbours. It is true that the results of the war, the conquest of Spain in particular, little accorded with such an idea; but their very successes led them beyond their proper design, and it may in fact be affirmed that the Romans came into possession of Spain accidentally. The Romans achieved the sovereignty of Italy, because they strove for it; the hegemony (and the sovereignty which grew out of it) over the territories of the Mediterranean was to a certain extent thrown into the hands of the Romans by the force of circumstances, without intentional effort on their part to acquire it.

The immediate results of the war, out of Italy, were the conversion of Spain into two Roman provinces—provinces, Italy, however, engaged in perpetual insurrection; the union of the hitherto dependent kingdom of Syracuse with the Roman province of Sicily; the establishment of a Roman instead of the Carthaginian protectorate over the most important Numidian chiefs; and lastly the conversion of Car-

thage from a powerful commercial state into a defenceless mercantile town. In other words, it established the uncontested hegemony of Rome over the western region of the Mediterranean. Moreover, it brought about that decided contact between the state systems of the east and the west, which the first Punic war had only foreshadowed, and thereby gave rise to the closely impending decisive interference of Rome in the conflicts of the Alexandrian monarchies.

In Italy.

In Italy, first of all the Celts were now doomed to destruction, if their fate had not been decided even before; and the execution of the doom was only a question of time. Within the Roman confederacy the effect of the war was, to bring into more distinct prominence the ruling Latin nation, whose internal union had been tried and tested by the peril which, notwithstanding isolated instances of wavering, it had surmounted on the whole in faithful fellowship; and to depress still further the position of the non-Latin or Latinized Italians, particularly the Etruscans and the Sabellians of lower Italy. The heaviest punishment or rather vengeance was inflicted on the one hand on the most powerful, on the other hand on those who were at once the earliest and latest, allies of Hannibal—the community of Capua, and the land of the Bruttians. The Capuan constitution was abolished, and Capua was reduced from the second city into the first village of Italy; it was even proposed to raze the city and level it with the ground. The whole soil, with the exception of a few possessions of foreigners or of Campanians well disposed towards Rome, was declared by the senate to be public domain, and was thereafter parcelled out to small occupiers on temporary lease. The Picentes on the Silarus were similarly treated; their capital was razed, and the inhabitants were dispersed among the surrounding villages. The doom of the Bruttians was still more severe; they were converted *en masse* into a sort of bondsmen to the Romans, and were for ever excluded from the right of bearing arms. The other allies of Hannibal also dearly expiated their offence. The Greek cities suffered severely, with the exception of the few which had steadfastly adhered to Rome, such as the Campanian Greeks and the Rhegines. Punishment not much lighter awaited the Arpanians and a multitude of other Apulian, Lucanian, and Samnite communities, most of which lost portions of their territory. On part of the lands thus acquired new

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What blanks were produced by war and famine in the ranks of the Italian population, is shown by the instance of the burgesses of Rome, whose numbers during the war had

fallen almost a fourth. The statement, accordingly, that the whole number of Italians who fell in the war under Hannibal was 300,000, seems not at all exaggerated. Of course this loss fell chiefly on the flower of the burgesses, who in fact furnished the nucleus and the mass of the combatants. How fearfully the senate in particular was thinned, is shown by the filling up of its complement after the battle of Cannæ, when it had been reduced to 123 persons, and was with difficulty restored to its normal state by an extraordinary nomination of 177 senators. That, moreover, the seventeen years' war, which had been carried on simultaneously in all districts of Italy and towards all the four points of the compass abroad, must have shaken to the very heart the national economy, is abundantly evident; but our tradition does not suffice to illustrate the details. The state no doubt gained by the confiscations, and the Campanian territory, in particular, thenceforth remained an inexhaustible source of revenue to the state; but by this extension of the domain system the national prosperity of course lost just as much, as at other times it had gained by the breaking up of the state lands. Numbers of flourishing townships—four hundred, it was reckoned—were destroyed and ruined; the capital laboriously accumulated was consumed; the population were demoralized by a camp life; the good old traditional habits of the burgesses and yeomen were undermined, from the capital down to the smallest village. Slaves and desperadoes associated themselves in robber-bands, of the dangers of which an idea may be formed from the fact that in a single year (569) 7000 men had to be condemned for robbery in Apulia alone; the extension of the pastures, with their half-savage slave-herdsmen, favoured this mischievous barbarizing of the land. Italian agriculture saw its very existence endangered by the proof, first afforded in this war, that the Roman people could be supported by grain from Sicily and from Egypt instead of that which they reaped themselves.

185.

Nevertheless the Roman, whom the gods had allowed to survive the close of that gigantic struggle, might look with pride to the past and with confidence to the future. Many errors had been committed, but much suffering had also been endured; the people, whose whole youth capable of arms had for ten years hardly laid aside shield and sword, might excuse many faults. The living of different nations side by side in peace and amity upon the whole, although

maintaining an attitude of mutual antagonism—which appears to be the aim of the peoples of modern times—was a thing foreign to antiquity. In ancient times it was necessary to be either anvil or hammer; and in the final struggle between the victors victory remained with the Romans. Whether they would have the judgment to use it rightly—to attach the Latin nation by still closer bonds to Rome, gradually to Latinize Italy, to rule their dependents in the provinces as subjects and not to abuse them as slaves, to reform the constitution, to re-invigorate and to enlarge the tottering middle class—remained to be seen. If they should have the skill to accomplish these results, Italy might hope to see happy times, in which prosperity based on personal exertion under favourable circumstances, and the most decisive political supremacy over the then civilized world, would impart just self-reliance to every member of the great whole, furnish a worthy aim for every ambition, and open a career for every talent. It would, no doubt, be otherwise, should they fail to use aright their victory. But for the moment doubtful voices and gloomy apprehensions were silent; from all quarters the warriors and victors returned to their homes; thanksgivings and amusements, and rewards to soldiers and burgesses were the order of the day; the released prisoners of war were sent home from Gaul, Africa, and Greece; and at length the youthful conqueror moved in splendid procession through the decorated streets of the capital, to deposit his laurels in the house of the god by whose direct inspiration, as the pious whispered one to another, he had been guided in counsel and in action.

CHAPTER VII.

THE WEST FROM THE PEACE OF HANNIBAL TO THE CLOSE OF
THE THIRD PERIOD.

Subjugation of the valley of the Po. Celtic wars. 201. 200.

THE war waged by Hannibal had interrupted Rome in the extension of her dominion to the Alps or to the boundary of Italy, as was even now the Roman phrase, and in her organization and colonizing of the Celtic territories. It was evident that the task would now be resumed at the point where it had been broken off, and the Celts were well aware of this. In the very year of the conclusion of peace with Carthage (553) hostilities had recommenced in the territory of the Boii, who were the most immediately exposed to danger; and a first success obtained by them over the hastily assembled Roman levy, coupled with the persuasions of a Carthaginian officer, Hamilcar, who had been left behind from the expedition of Mago in northern Italy, produced in the following year (554) a general insurrection spreading beyond the two tribes immediately threatened, the Boii and Insubres. The Ligurians were driven to arms by the nearer approach of the danger, and even the youth of the Cenomani on this occasion listened less to the voice of their cautious chiefs than to the urgent appeal of their kinsmen who were in peril. Of the two fortresses constructed with a view to check the raids of the Gauls, Placentia and Cremona, the former was sacked—not more than 2000 of the inhabitants of Placentia saved their lives—and the second was invested. In haste the legions advanced to save what they could. A great battle took place before Cremona. The dexterous management and the professional skill of the Punic leader failed to make good the deficiencies of his troops; the Gauls were unable to

withstand the onset of the legions, and among the numerous dead who covered the field of battle was the Carthaginian officer. The Celts, nevertheless, continued the struggle; the same Roman army which had conquered at Cremona was next year (555), chiefly through the fault of its careless leader, almost destroyed by the Insubres; and it was not till 556 that Placentia could be partially re-established. But the league of the cantons associated for the desperate struggle suffered from intestine discord; the Boii and Insubres quarrelled, and the Cenomani not only withdrew from the national league, but purchased their pardon from the Romans by a disgraceful betrayal of their countrymen; during a battle in which the Insubres engaged the Romans on the Mincius, the Cenomani attacked in rear, and helped to destroy, their allies and comrades in arms (557). Thus humbled and deserted, the Insubres, after the fall of Comum, likewise consented to conclude a separate peace (558). The conditions, which the Romans prescribed to the Cenomani and Insubres, were certainly harder than they had been in the habit of granting to the members of the Italian confederacy; in particular, they were careful legally to confirm the barrier of separation between Italians and Celts, and to enact that no member of these two Celtic tribes should ever be capable of acquiring the citizenship of Rome. But they allowed these Transpadane Celtic tribes to retain their existence and their national constitution—so that they formed not *municipia*, but cantons representing their former divisions—and no tribute, as it would seem, was imposed on them. They were intended to serve as a bulwark for the Roman settlements south of the Po, and to ward off from Italy the incursions of the migratory northern tribes and the aggressions of the plundering inhabitants of the Alps, who were wont to make regular razzias in these districts. The process of Latinizing, moreover, made rapid progress in these regions; the Celtic nationality was evidently far from able to oppose such resistance to its influences, as the more civilized nations of Sabellians and Etruscans. The celebrated Latin comedian, Statius Cæcilius, who died in 586, was a manumitted Insubrian; and Polybius, who visited these districts towards the close of the sixth century, affirms, not perhaps without some exaggeration, that in that quarter only a few villages among the Alps remained Celtic. The Veneti, on the other hand, appear to have retained their nationality longer.

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Measures
adopted to
check the
immigra-
tions of the
Trans-
Alpine
Gauls.

- The chief efforts of the Romans in these regions were naturally directed to check the immigration of the Transalpine Celts, and to make the natural wall, which separates the peninsula from the interior of the continent, also its political boundary. That the terror of the Roman name had already penetrated to the adjacent Celtic cantons beyond the Alps is shown not only by the totally passive attitude which they maintained during the annihilation or subjugation of their Cisalpine countrymen, but still more by the official disapproval and disavowal which the Transalpine cantons—which term we must suppose primarily to apply to the Helvetii (between the lake of Geneva and the Main) and the Carni or Taurisci (in Carinthia and Styria)—expressed to the envoys from Rome, who complained of the attempts made by isolated Celtic bands to settle peacefully on the Roman side of the Alps. Not less significant was the humble spirit in which these same bands of emigrants first came to the Roman senate entreating an assignment of land, and then without remonstrance obeyed the rigorous order to return
- 186-179. over the Alps (568 *et seq.* 575), and allowed the town, which they had already founded not far from Aquileia, to be again destroyed. With wise severity the senate permitted no sort of exception to the principle that the gates of the Alps should be henceforth closed against the Celtic nation, and visited with heavy penalties those Roman subjects in Italy, who had instigated any such schemes of immigration. An attempt of this kind which was made on a route hitherto little known to the Romans, in the innermost recess of the Adriatic, and still more, as it would seem, a project of Philip of Macedon for invading Italy from the East as Hannibal had done from the West, gave occasion to the founding of a fortress in the extreme north-eastern corner of Italy—Aquileia,
- 183-181. the most northerly of the Italian colonies (571-573)—which was intended not only to close that route for ever against foreigners, but also to secure the command of the gulf which was specially convenient for navigation, and to check the piracy which was still not wholly extirpated in those waters. The establishment of Aquileia led to a war with the Istrians
- 178-177. (576-577), which was speedily terminated by the storming of some strongholds and the fall of the king, Æpulo, and which was remarkable for nothing except for the panic, which the news of the surprise of the Roman camp by a handful of barbarians occasioned in the fleet and throughout Italy.

A different course was adopted with the region on the south of the Po, which the Roman senate had determined to incorporate with Italy. The Boii, who were most immediately affected by this step, defended themselves with the resolution of despair. They even crossed the Po and made an attempt to rouse the Insubres once more to arms (560); they blockaded a consul in his camp, and he was on the point of succumbing; Placentia maintained itself with difficulty against the constant assaults of the exasperated natives. At length the last battle was fought at Mutina; it was long and bloody, but the Romans conquered (561); and thenceforth the struggle was no longer a war, but a slave hunt. The Roman camp soon was the only asylum in the Boian territory; thither the better part of the still surviving population began to take refuge; and the victors were able, without much exaggeration, to report to Rome that nothing remained of the nation of the Boii but old men and children. The nation was thus obliged to resign itself to the fate appointed for it. The Romans demanded the cession of half the territory (563); the demand could not be refused, and even within the diminished district which was left to the Boii, they soon disappeared, amalgamated with their conquerors.*

Colonizing
of the re-
gion on the
south of
the Po.

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After the Romans had thus cleared the ground for themselves, the fortresses of Placentia and Cremona, whose colonists had been mostly swept away or dispersed by the troubles of the last few years, were reorganized, and new

* According to the account of Strabo these Italian Boii were driven by the Romans over the Alps, and from them proceeded that Boian settlement in what is now Hungary between the Neusiedlersee and the Plattensee, which was attacked and annihilated in the time of Augustus by the Getæ who crossed the Danube, but which bequeathed to this district the name of the Boian desert. This account is far from agreeing with the well-attested representation of the Roman annals, according to which the Romans were content with the cession of half the territory; and, in order to explain the disappearance of the Italian Boii, we have really no need to assume a violent expulsion—the other Celtic peoples, although visited to a far less extent by war and colonization, disappeared not much less rapidly and totally from the ranks of the Italian nations. On the other hand, other accounts suggest the derivation of those Boii on the Plattensee from the main stock of the nation, which formerly had its seat in Bavaria and Bohemia before Germanic tribes pushed it towards the south. But it is altogether very doubtful whether the Boii, whom we find near Bordeaux, on the Po, and in Bohemia, were really scattered branches of one stock, or whether this is not an instance of mere similarity of name. The hypothesis of Strabo may have rested on nothing else than an inference from the similarity of name—an inference such as the ancients drew, often without due reason, in the case of the Cimbri, Veneti, and others.

thage from a powerful commercial state into a defenceless mercantile town. In other words, it established the uncontested hegemony of Rome over the western region of the Mediterranean. Moreover, it brought about that decided contact between the state systems of the east and the west, which the first Punic war had only foreshadowed, and thereby gave rise to the closely impending decisive interference of Rome in the conflicts of the Alexandrian monarchies.

In Italy.

In Italy, first of all the Celts were now doomed to destruction, if their fate had not been decided even before; and the execution of the doom was only a question of time. Within the Roman confederacy the effect of the war was, to bring into more distinct prominence the ruling Latin nation, whose internal union had been tried and tested by the peril which, notwithstanding isolated instances of wavering, it had surmounted on the whole in faithful fellowship; and to depress still further the position of the non-Latin or Latinized Italians, particularly the Etruscans and the Sabellians of lower Italy. The heaviest punishment or rather vengeance was inflicted on the one hand on the most powerful, on the other hand on those who were at once the earliest and latest, allies of Hannibal—the community of Capua, and the land of the Bruttians. The Capuan constitution was abolished, and Capua was reduced from the second city into the first village of Italy; it was even proposed to raze the city and level it with the ground. The whole soil, with the exception of a few possessions of foreigners or of Campanians well disposed towards Rome, was declared by the senate to be public domain, and was thereafter parcelled out to small occupiers on temporary lease. The Picentes on the Silarus were similarly treated; their capital was razed, and the inhabitants were dispersed among the surrounding villages. The doom of the Bruttians was still more severe; they were converted *en masse* into a sort of bondsmen to the Romans, and were for ever excluded from the right of bearing arms. The other allies of Hannibal also dearly expiated their offence. The Greek cities suffered severely, with the exception of the few which had steadfastly adhered to Rome, such as the Campanian Greeks and the Rhegines. Punishment not much lighter awaited the Arpanians and a multitude of other Apulian, Lucanian, and Samnite communities, most of which lost portions of their territory. On part of the lands thus acquired new

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i. e. the "pastoral" people, and the Arabs Shâwi, i. e. "shepherds," and to whom we give the name of Berbers or Kabyles. This people is, so far as its language has been hitherto investigated, related to no other known nation. In the Carthaginian period these tribes, with the exception of those dwelling immediately around Carthage or immediately on the coast, had on the whole maintained their independence, and had also substantially retained their pastoral and equestrian life, such as the inhabitants of the Atlas lead at the present day; although they were not strangers to the Phœnician alphabet and Phœnician civilization generally (P. 11), and instances occurred in which the Berber sheiks had their sons educated in Carthage and intermarried with the families of the Punic nobility. It was not the policy of the Romans to have direct possessions of their own in Africa; they preferred to rear a state there, which should not be of sufficient importance to dispense with Rome's protection, and yet should be sufficiently strong to keep down the power of Carthage now that it was restricted to Africa, and to render all freedom of movement impossible for the tortured city. They found what they sought among the native princes. About the time of the Hannibalic war the natives of north Africa were subject to three principal kings, each of whom, according to the custom there, had a multitude of princes bound to follow his banner; Bocchar king of the Mauri, who ruled from the Atlantic Ocean to the river Molochath (now Mulwia, on the boundary between Morocco and the French territory); Syphax king of the Massæsyli, who ruled from the last-named point to the "Perforated Promontory," as it was called (Seba Rûs, between Djidjeli and Bona), in the present provinces of Oran and Algiers; and Massinissa king of the Massyli, who ruled from the Tretum Promontorium to the boundary of Carthage, in the present province of Constantine. The most powerful of these, Syphax king of Siga, had been vanquished in the last war between Rome and Carthage and carried away captive to Rome, where he died in captivity. His wide dominions were mainly given to Massinissa; although Vermina the son of Syphax by humble petition recovered a small portion of his father's territory from the Romans (554), he was unable to deprive the earlier ally of the Romans of his position as the privileged oppressor of Carthage.

200.

Massinissa.

Massinissa became the founder of the Numidian kingdom;

and seldom has choice or accident hit upon a man so thoroughly fitted for his post. In body sound and supple up to extreme old age; temperate and sober like an Arab; capable of enduring any fatigue, of standing on the same spot from morning to evening, and of sitting four-and-twenty hours on horseback; tried alike as a soldier and a general amidst the romantic vicissitudes of his youth as well as on the battle-fields of Spain, and not less master of the more difficult art of maintaining discipline in his numerous household and order in his dominions; with equal unscrupulousness ready to throw himself at the feet of his powerful protector, or to tread under foot his weaker neighbour; and, in addition to all this, as accurately acquainted with the circumstances of Carthage where he was educated and had been on familiar terms in the noblest houses, as he was filled with an African bitterness of hatred towards his own and his people's oppressors,—this remarkable man became the soul of the revival of his nation, which had seemed on the point of perishing, and of whose virtues and faults he appeared as it were a living embodiment. Fortune favoured him, as in everything, so especially in the fact, that it allowed him time for his work. He died in the ninetieth year of his age (516–605), and in the sixtieth year of his reign, retaining to the last the full enjoyment of his bodily and mental powers, leaving behind him a son one year old, and possessing the reputation of having been the strongest man and the best and most fortunate king of his age. 238–149.

We have already narrated how palpably the Romans in their management of African affairs displayed their studied leaning towards Massinissa, and how zealously and constantly the latter availed himself of the tacit permission to enlarge his territory at the expense of Carthage. The whole interior to the border of the desert fell to the native sovereign as it were of its own accord, and even the upper valley of the Bagradas (Mejerda) with the rich town of Vaga became subject to the king; on the coast also to the east of Carthage he occupied the old Sidonian city of Great Leptis and other districts, so that his kingdom stretched from the Mauretanian to the Cyrenæan frontier, enclosed the Carthaginian territory on every side by land, and everywhere pressed, in the closest vicinity, on the Phoenicians. It admits of no doubt, that he looked on Carthage as his future capital; the Libyan party there is significant in that respect. But it was

Extension
and civiliza-
tion of
Numidia.

not only by the diminution of her territory that Carthage suffered injury. The roving shepherds were converted through their great king's efforts into another people. After the example of their king, who brought the fields under cultivation far and wide and bequeathed to each of his sons considerable landed estates, his subjects also began to settle and to practise agriculture. As he converted his shepherds into settled citizens, he converted also his hordes of plunderers into soldiers who were deemed by Rome worthy to fight side by side with her legions; and he bequeathed to his successors a richly-filled treasury, a well-disciplined army, and even a fleet. His residence Cirta (Constantine) became the stirring capital of a powerful state, and a chief seat of Phœnician civilization, which was zealously fostered at the court of the Berber king—fostered perhaps studiously with a view to the future Carthagino-Numidian kingdom. The hitherto degraded Libyan nationality thus rose in its own estimation, and the native manners and language made their way even into the old Phœnician towns, such as Great Leptis. The Berber began, under the ægis of Rome, to feel himself the equal or even the superior of the Phœnician; Carthaginian envoys at Rome had to submit to be told that they were aliens in Africa, and that the land belonged to the Libyans. The Punico-national civilization of North Africa, which still retained life and vigour even under the levelling times of the Empire, was far more the work of Massinissa than of the Carthaginians.

The state of
culture in
Spain.

In Spain the Greek and Punic towns along the coast, such as Emporiæ, Saguntum, New Carthage, Malaca, and Gades, submitted to the Roman rule the more readily, that, left to their own resources, they would hardly have been able to protect themselves from the natives; as for similar reasons Massilia, although far more important and more capable of self-defence than those towns, did not omit to secure a powerful support in case of need by closely attaching itself to the Romans, to whom it was in return very serviceable as an intermediate station between Italy and Spain. The natives, on the other hand, gave to the Romans endless trouble. It is true that there were not wanting the rudiments of a national Iberian civilization, although of its special character it is scarcely possible for us to acquire any clear idea. We find among the Iberians a widely diffused national writing, which divides itself into two chief kinds, that of the

valley of the Ebro, and the Andalusian (each of these being probably subdivided into various branches): this writing seems to have originated at a very early period, and to be traceable rather to the old Greek than to the Phœnician alphabet. There is a tradition that the Turdetani (round Seville) possessed laws from very ancient times, a metrical book of laws of 6000 verses, and even historical records. At any rate, this tribe is described as the most civilized of all the Spanish tribes, and at the same time the least warlike; indeed, it regularly carried on its wars by means of foreign mercenaries. To the same region probably we must refer Polybius' descriptions of the flourishing condition of agriculture and the rearing of cattle in Spain—so that, in the absence of opportunity of export, grain and flesh were to be had at nominal prices—and of the splendid royal palaces with golden and silver jars full of “barley wine.” At least a portion of the Spaniards, moreover, zealously embraced the elements of culture which the Romans brought along with them, so that the process of Latinizing made more rapid progress in Spain than anywhere else in the transmarine provinces. For example, warm baths after the Italian fashion came into use even at this period among the natives. Roman money, too, was to all appearance not only current in Spain far earlier than elsewhere out of Italy, but was imitated in Spanish coins; a circumstance in some measure explained by the rich silver-mines of the country. The so-called “silver of Osca” (now Huesca in Aragon), i. e. Spanish *denarii* with Iberian inscriptions, is mentioned in 559; and the commencement of their coinage cannot be placed much later, because the impression is imitated from that of the oldest Roman *denarii*.

195.

But, while in the southern and eastern provinces the culture of the natives may have so far prepared the way for Roman civilization and Roman rule that they encountered no serious difficulties there, the west and north on the other hand, and the whole of the interior, were occupied by numerous tribes more or less barbarous, who knew little of any kind of civilization—(in Intercatia, for instance, the use of gold and silver was still unknown in 600)—and who were on no better terms with each other than with the Romans. A characteristic trait in these free Spaniards was the chivalrous spirit of the men and, at least to an equal extent, of the women. When a mother sent forth her son to battle, she

150.

roused his spirit by the recital of the feats of his ancestors ; and the fairest maiden unasked offered her hand in marriage to the bravest man. Single combat was common, both with a view to determine the prize of valour, and for the settlement of lawsuits ; even disputes as to the succession among the relatives of princes were settled in this way. It not unfrequently happened that a well-known warrior confronted the ranks of the enemy and challenged an antagonist by name ; the defeated champion then surrendered his mantle and sword to his opponent, and even entered into relations of friendship and hospitality with him. Twenty years after the close of the second Punic war, the little Celtiberian community of Complèga (in the neighbourhood of the sources of the Tagus) sent a message to the Roman general, that unless he sent to them for every man that had fallen a horse, a mantle, and a sword, it would fare ill with him. Proud of their military honour, so that they frequently could not bear to survive the disgrace of being disarmed, the Spaniards were nevertheless disposed to follow any one who should enlist their services, and to stake their lives in any foreign quarrel. The summons was characteristic, which a Roman general well acquainted with the customs of the country sent to a Celtiberian band fighting in the pay of the Turdetani against the Romans—either to return home, or to enter the Roman service with double pay, or to fix day and place for battle. If no recruiting officer made his appearance, they met of their own accord in free bands, with the view of pillaging the more peaceful districts and even of capturing and occupying towns, quite after the manner of the Campanians. The wildness and insecurity of the inland districts are attested by the fact that the being sent into the interior westward of Cartagena was regarded by the Romans as a severe punishment, and that in periods of any excitement the Roman commandants of Further Spain took with them escorts of as many as 6000 men. They are still more clearly shown by the singular relations subsisting between the Greeks and their Spanish neighbours in the Græco-Spanish double city of Emporiæ, at the eastern extremity of the Pyrenees. The Greek settlers, who dwelt on a peninsula separated on the landward side from the Spanish part of the town by a wall, took care that this wall should be guarded every night by a third of their civic force, and that one of the superior magistrates should constantly superintend the watch at the only

gate; no Spaniard was allowed to set foot in the Greek city, and the Greeks conveyed their merchandize to the natives only in numerous and well-escorted companies.

These natives, full of restlessness and fond of war—full of the spirit of the Cid and of Don Quixote—had now to be tamed and, if possible, civilized by the Romans. In a military point of view the task was not difficult. It is true that the Spaniards showed themselves, not only when behind the walls of their cities or under the leadership of Hannibal, but even when left to themselves and in the open field of battle, no contemptible opponents; with their short two-edged sword which the Romans subsequently adopted from them, and their formidable assaulting columns, they not unfrequently made even the Roman legions waver. Had they been able to submit to military discipline and to political combination, they might perhaps have shaken off the foreign yoke imposed on them. But their valour was rather that of the guerilla than of the soldier, and they were utterly void of political sagacity. Thus in Spain there was no serious war, but as little was there any real peace; the Spaniards, as Cæsar afterwards very justly pointed out to them, never showed themselves quiet in peace or strenuous in war. However easy it was for a Roman general to scatter a host of insurgents, it was difficult for the Roman statesman to devise any suitable means of really pacifying and civilizing Spain. In fact, he could only deal with it by palliative measures; because the only really adequate expedient, a comprehensive Latin colonization, was not accordant with the general aim of Roman policy at this period.

Wars between the Romans and Spaniards.

The territory which the Romans acquired in Spain in the course of the second Punic war was from the beginning divided into two masses—the province formerly Carthaginian, which embraced in the first instance the present districts of Andalusia, Granada, Murcia, and Valencia, and the province of the Ebro, or the modern Arragon and Catalonia, the headquarters of the Roman army during the last war; out of these territories were formed the two Roman provinces of Further and Hither Spain. The Romans sought gradually to reduce to subjection the interior corresponding nearly to the two Castiles, which they comprehended under the general name of Celtiberia, while they were content with checking the incursions of the inhabitants of the western provinces, more especially those of the Lusitanians in the modern Portugal

The Romans maintain a standing army in Spain.

and the Spanish Estremadura, into the Roman territory ; with the tribes on the north coast, the Gallæcians, Asturians, and Cantabrians, they did not come into contact at all. The territories thus won, however, could not be maintained and secured without a standing garrison, for the governor of Hither Spain had no small trouble every year with the chastisement of the Celtiberians, and the governor of the more remote province found similar employment in repelling the Lusitanians. It was needful accordingly to maintain in Spain a Roman army of four strong legions, or about 40,000 men, year after year ; besides which the general levy had often to be called out in the districts occupied by Rome, to reinforce the legions. This was of great importance for two reasons : it was in Spain first that the military occupation of the land became continuous, at least on any great scale ; and it was there consequently that the military service acquired a permanent character. The old Roman custom of sending troops only where the exigencies of war at the moment required them, and of not keeping the men called to serve, except in very serious and important wars, under arms for more than a year, was found incompatible with the retention of the turbulent and remote Spanish provinces beyond the sea ; it was absolutely impossible to withdraw the troops from these, and very dangerous even to relieve them extensively. The Roman people began to perceive that dominion over a foreign nation is an annoyance not only to the slave, but to the master, and murmured loudly regarding the odious war-service of Spain. While the new generals with good reason refused to allow the relief of the existing corps in a body, the men mutinied and threatened that, if they were not allowed their discharge, they would take it themselves.

201. The wars themselves, which the Romans waged in Spain,
197. were but of subordinate importance. They began with Scipio's very departure (P. 165), and continued as long as the war under Hannibal lasted. After the peace with Carthage (in 553) there was a cessation of arms in the peninsula ; but only for a short time. In 557 a general insurrection broke out in both provinces ; the commander of the Further province was hard pressed ; the commander of Hither Spain was completely defeated, and was himself slain. It was necessary to take up the war in earnest, and although in the mean time the able prætor Quintus Minucius

had mastered the first danger, the senate resolved in 559 to send the consul Marcus Cato in person to Spain. On landing at Emporiæ, he actually found the whole of Hither Spain overrun by the insurgents; with difficulty that seaport and one or two strongholds in the interior were still held for Rome. A pitched battle took place between the insurgents and the consular army, in which, after an obstinate conflict man against man, the Roman military skill at length decided the day with its last reserve. The whole of Hither Spain thereupon sent in its submission: so little, however, was this submission meant in earnest, that on a rumour of the consul having returned to Rome the insurrection immediately recommenced. But the rumour was false; and after Cato had rapidly reduced the communities which had revolted for the second time and sold them *en masse* into slavery, he decreed a general disarming of the Spaniards in the Hither province, and issued orders to all the towns of the natives from the Pyrenees to the Guadalquivir to pull down their walls on one and the same day. No one knew how far the command extended, and there was no time to come to any understanding; most of the communities complied; and of the few that were refractory not many ventured, when the Roman army soon appeared before their walls, to await its assault. 195.

These energetic measures were certainly not without permanent effects. Nevertheless the Romans had almost every year to reduce to subjection some mountain valley or mountain stronghold in the "peaceable province," and the constant incursions of the Lusitanians into the Further province terminated occasionally in the severe defeat of the Romans. In 563, for instance, a Roman army was obliged after heavy loss to abandon its camp, and to return by forced marches into the more peaceful districts. It was not till after a victory gained by the prætor Lucius Æmilius Paullus in 565, and a second still more considerable gained by the brave prætor Gaius Calpurnius beyond the Tagus over the Lusitanians in 569, that quiet for some time prevailed. In Further Spain the nominal rule of the Romans over the Celtiberian tribes was converted into something more real by Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, who after a great victory over them in 573 compelled at least the adjacent cantons to submission; and especially by his successor Tiberius Gracchus (575, 576), who achieved results of a permanent character not only by 181. 179. 178. Gracchus. 185.

his arms, by which he reduced three hundred Spanish townships, but still more by his adroitness in adapting his system to the views and habits of the simple and haughty nation. He induced Celtiberians of note to take service in the Roman army, and so created a class of dependents; he assigned land to the roving tribes, and collected them in towns—the Spanish town Graccurris preserved the Roman's name—and so imposed a serious check on their freebooter habits; he regulated the relations of the several tribes to the Romans by just and wise treaties, and so stopped, as far as possible, the springs of future rebellion. His name was held in grateful remembrance by the Spaniards, and comparative peace henceforth reigned in the land, although the Celtiberians still from time to time winced under the yoke.

Admini-
stration of
Spain.

179. The system of administration in the two Spanish provinces was similar to that of the Sicilo-Sardinian province, but not identical. The superintendence was in both instances vested in auxiliary consuls, who were first nominated in 557, in which year also the regulation of the boundaries and the definitive organization of the two provinces took place. The
192. judicious enactment of the Bæbian law (562?), that the Spanish prætors should always be nominated for two years, was not seriously carried out in consequence of the increasing competition for the highest magistracies, and still more in consequence of the jealous supervision exercised over the powers of the magistrates by the senate; and in Spain also, except where deviations occurred in extraordinary circumstances, the Romans adhered to the system of annually changing the governors—a system especially injudicious in the case of provinces so remote and with which it was so difficult to gain an acquaintance. The dependent communities were universally tributary; but, instead of the Sicilian and Sardinian tenths and customs, in Spain fixed payments in money or other contributions were imposed by the Romans, just as formerly by the Carthaginians, on the several towns and tribes: the collection of these by military means was prohibited by a decree of the senate in 583, in consequence of the complaints of the Spanish communities. Grain was not furnished in their case except for compensation, and even then the governor might not levy more than a twentieth; besides, conformably to the just-mentioned ordinance of the supreme authority, he was bound to adjust the compensation in an equitable manner. On the other hand, the obligation
- 171.

of the Spanish subjects to furnish contingents to the Roman armies had an importance very different from that which belonged to it at least in peaceful Sicily, and it was strictly regulated in the several treaties. The right, too, of coining silver money of the Roman standard appears to have been very frequently conceded to the Spanish towns, and the monopoly of coining seems to have been by no means asserted by the Roman government with the same strictness as in Sicily. Rome had too much need of subjects in Spain, not to proceed with all possible caution and tenderness in the introduction and the working of the provincial constitution there. Among the communities specially favoured by Rome were the great cities along the coast of Greek, Punic, or Roman foundation, such as Saguntum, Gades, and Tarraco, which, as the natural pillars of the Roman rule in the peninsula, were admitted to alliance with Rome. On the whole, Spain was in a military as well as financial point of view a burden rather than a gain to the Roman commonwealth; and the question naturally occurs, Why did the Roman government, whose policy at that time evidently did not contemplate the acquisition of countries beyond the sea, not rid itself of so troublesome a possession? The not inconsiderable commercial connections of Spain, her important iron-mines, and her still more important silver-mines famous from ancient times even in the far East*—the working of which Rome, like Carthage, took into her own hands, and the management of which was regulated more especially by Marcus Cato (559)—must beyond doubt have co-operated to induce its retention; but their chief reason for retaining the peninsula in their own immediate possession was, that there were no states in that quarter of similar character to the Massiliot republic in the land of the Celts and the Numidian kingdom in Libya, so that they could not abandon Spain without putting it into the power of any adventurer to revive the Spanish empire of the Barcides.

195.

* 1 Maccab. viii. 3. "And Judas heard what the Romans had done in the land of Hispania to become masters of the silver and gold mines there."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE EASTERN STATES AND THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR.

The Hel-
lenic East.

THE work, which Alexander king of Macedonia had begun a century before the Romans acquired their first footing in the territory which he had called his own, had in the course of time—while adhering substantially to the great fundamental idea of Hellenizing the East—changed and expanded into the construction of a system of Helleno-Asiatic states. The unconquerable propensity of the Greeks for migration and colonizing, which had formerly carried their traders to Massilia and Cyrene, to the Nile and to the Black Sea, now enabled them to retain what the king had won; and under the protection of the *sarissæ*, Greek civilization peacefully domiciled itself everywhere throughout the ancient empire of the Achæmenidæ. The officers, who divided the heritage of the great commander, gradually settled their differences, and a system of equilibrium was established, the very oscillations of which manifest some sort of regularity.

The great
states.
Macedonia.
220.

Of the three states of the first rank belonging to this system—Macedonia, Asia, and Egypt—Macedonia under Philip the Fifth, who had occupied the throne since 534, was externally at least very much what it had been under Philip the Second the father of Alexander—a military state compact in form, and with its finances in good order. On its northern frontier matters had resumed their former footing, after the waves of the Gallic inundation had rolled away; the guard of the frontier kept the Illyrian barbarians in check without difficulty, at least in ordinary times. In the south, not only was Greece in general dependent on Macedonia, but a large portion of it—all Thessaly in its widest

sense from Olympus to the Sperchius and the peninsula of Magnesia, the large and important island of Eubœa, the provinces of Locris, Phocis, and Doris, and, lastly, a number of isolated positions in Attica and in the Peloponnesus, such as the promontory of Sunium, Corinth, Orchomenus, Heræa, the Triphylian territory—all these provinces and towns were directly subject to Macedon and received Macedonian garrisons; more especially the three important fortresses of Demetrias in Magnesia, Chalcis in Eubœa, and Corinth, “the three fetters of the Hellenes.” But the strength of the state lay above all in its hereditary soil, the province of Macedonia. The population, indeed, of that extensive territory was remarkably scanty; Macedonia, putting forth all her energies, was scarcely able to bring into the field as many men as were contained in an ordinary consular army of two legions; and it was unmistakeably evident, that the land had not yet recovered from the depopulation occasioned by the campaigns of Alexander and by the Gallic invasion. But, while in Greece proper the moral and political energy of the people had decayed, the day of national vigour seemed to have gone by, life appeared scarce worth living for, and even the better spirits there spent their time over their cups, in fencing with their rapiers, or in study by the midnight lamp; while in the East and Alexandria the Greeks were able perhaps to disseminate elements of culture among the dense native population and to diffuse among that population their language and their loquacity, their science and their pseudo-science, but in number were barely sufficient to supply the nations with officers, statesmen, and schoolmasters, and were far too few to form even in the cities a middle-class of the pure Greek type; there still existed, on the other hand, in northern Greece a goodly proportion of the old national vigour, which had produced the warriors of Marathon. Hence arose the confidence with which the Macedonians, Ætolians, and Acarnanians, wherever they made their appearance in the East, claimed and obtained acknowledgment of their superiority; and hence the transcendent position which they came to occupy at the courts of Alexandria and Antioch. There is a characteristic story, that an Alexandrian who had lived for a considerable time in Macedonia and had adopted the manners and the dress of that country, on returning to his native city, looked upon himself as a man and

upon the Alexandrians as little better than slaves. This sturdy vigour and unimpaired national spirit were turned to peculiarly good account by the Macedonians, as the most powerful and best organized of the states of northern Greece. There, no doubt, absolutism had emerged in opposition to the old constitution, which to some extent recognized different estates; but sovereign and subject by no means stood towards each other in Macedonia as they stood in Asia and Egypt, and the people still felt itself independent and free. In steadfast resistance to the public enemy under whatever name, in unshaken fidelity towards their native country and their hereditary government, and in persevering courage amidst the severest trials, no nation in ancient history bears so close a resemblance to the Roman people as the Macedonians; and the almost miraculous regeneration of the state after the Gallic invasion redounds to the imperishable honour of its leaders and of the people whom they led.

Asia.

The second of the great states, Asia, was nothing but Persia superficially remodelled and Hellenized,—the empire of “the king of kings,” as its master was wont to call himself in a style characteristic at once of his arrogance and of his weakness—with the same pretensions to rule from the Hellespont to the Punjab, and with the same disjointed organization; an aggregate of dependent states in various degrees of dependence, of insubordinate satrapies, and of half-free Greek cities. In Asia Minor more especially, which was nominally included in the empire of the Seleucidæ, the whole north coast and the greater part of the eastern interior were practically in the hands of native dynasties or of the Celtic hordes that had penetrated thither from Europe; a considerable portion of the west was in the possession of the king of Pergamus, and the islands and coast towns were some of them Egyptian, some of them free; so that little more was left to the great king than the interior of Cilicia, Phrygia, and Lydia, and a great number of titular claims, not easily made good, against free cities and princes—exactly similar in character to the sovereignty of the German emperor, in his day, beyond his hereditary dominions. The strength of the empire was expended in vain endeavours to expel the Egyptians from the provinces along the coast; in frontier strife with the eastern nations, the Parthians and Bactrians; in feuds with the Celts, who to the misfortune of Asia Minor had settled within its bounds; in constant

efforts to check the attempts of the eastern satraps and of the Greek cities of Asia Minor to achieve their independence; and in family quarrels and insurrections of pretenders. None indeed of the states founded by the successors of Alexander were free from such attempts, or from the other horrors which absolute monarchy in degenerate times brings in its train; but in the kingdom of Asia these evils were more injurious than elsewhere, because, from the lax composition of the empire, they usually led to the severance of particular portions from it for longer or shorter periods.

In marked contrast to Asia, Egypt formed a consoli-
dated and united state, in which the intelligent statecraft Egypt.
of the first Lagidæ, skilfully availing itself of ancient national and religious precedent, had established a completely absolute cabinet government, and in which even the worst misrule failed to provoke any attempt either at emancipation or disruption. Very different from the Macedonians, whose national attachment to royalty was based upon their personal dignity and was its political expression, the rural population in Egypt was wholly passive; the capital on the other hand was everything, and that capital was a dependency of the court. The remissness and indolence of its rulers, accordingly, paralyzed the state in Egypt still more than in Macedonia and in Asia; whereas in the hands of men, like the first Ptolemy and Ptolemy Euergetes, such a state machine proved itself extremely useful. It was one of the peculiar advantages of Egypt as compared with its two great rivals, that its policy did not grasp at shadows, but pursued definite and attainable objects. Macedonia, the home of Alexander, and Asia, the land where he had established his throne, never ceased to regard themselves as direct continuations of the Alexandrine monarchy and more or less loudly to assert their claim to represent it at least, if not to restore it. The Lagidæ never tried to found an universal empire, and never dreamt of conquering India; but, by way of compensation, they drew the whole traffic between India and the Mediterranean from the Phœnician ports to Alexandria, and made Egypt the first commercial and maritime state of this epoch, and the mistress of the eastern Mediterranean and of its coasts and islands. It is a significant fact, that Ptolemy III. Euergetes voluntarily restored all his conquests to Seleucus Callinicus, except the seaport of Antioch. Partly by this means, partly by its favourable geographical situa-

tion, Egypt attained, with reference to the two continental powers, an excellent military position either for defence or for attack. While an opponent even in the full career of success was hardly in a position seriously to threaten Egypt, which was almost inaccessible on any side to land armies, the Egyptians were able by sea to establish themselves not only in Cyrene, but also in Cyprus and the Cyclades, on the Phœnico-Syrian coast, on the whole south and west coast of Asia Minor, and even in Europe on the Thracian Chersonese. By their unexampled skill in turning to account the fertile valley of the Nile for the direct benefit of the treasury, and by a financial system—equally acute and unscrupulous—earnestly and adroitly calculated to foster material interests, the court of Alexandria was constantly superior to its opponents even as a moneyed power. Lastly, the intelligent munificence, with which the Lagidæ encouraged the tendency of the age towards earnest inquiry in all departments of enterprise and of knowledge, skilfully confining such inquiries within the bounds of absolute monarchy and entwining them with its interests, was productive of direct advantage to the state, whose ship-building and machine-making showed traces of the influence of Alexandrian mathematics; and not only so, but also rendered that new development of intellectual power—the most important and the greatest, which the Hellenic nation after its political dismemberment produced—subservient, so far as it would consent to be serviceable at all, to the Alexandrian court. Had the empire of Alexander continued to stand, Greek science and art would have found a state worthy and capable of containing them. Now, when the nation had fallen to pieces, a learned cosmopolitanism grew up in it luxuriantly, and was very soon attracted by the magnet of Alexandria, where scientific appliances and collections were inexhaustible, where kings composed tragedies and ministers wrote commentaries on them, and where pensions and academies flourished.

The mutual relations of the three great states are evident from this description. The maritime power, which ruled the coasts and monopolized the sea, was necessarily led after its first great success—the political separation of the European from the Asiatic continent—to direct its further efforts towards the weakening of the two great states on the mainland, and consequently towards the protection of the

several minor states ; whereas Macedonia and Asia, while regarding each other as rivals, recognized above all their common adversary in Egypt, and combined, or at any rate should have combined, against it.

Among the states of the second rank, merely an indirect importance, so far as concerned the contact between the east and the west, attached in the first instance to that series of states which, stretching from the southern end of the Caspian Sea to the Hellespont, filled the whole of northern Asia Minor : Atropatene (in the modern Aderbijan, south-west of the Caspian), next to it Armenia, Cappadocia in the interior of Asia Minor, Pontus on the south-east, and Bithynia on the south-west, shore of the Black Sea. All of these were fragments of the great Persian empire, and were ruled by Oriental, mostly old Persian, dynasties—the remote mountain-land of Atropatene was the true asylum of the ancient Persian system, over which even the expedition of Alexander had swept without leaving a trace—and all were in the same relation of temporary and superficial dependence on the Greek dynasty, which had taken or wished to take the place of the great kings in Asia. The kingdoms of Asia Minor.

Of greater importance in its general relations was the Celtic state in the interior of Asia Minor. There, intermediate between Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, and Phrygia, three Celtic tribes—the Tolistoboi, the Tectosages, and Trocmi—had settled, without abandoning either their native language and manners or their constitution and their trade as freebooters. The twelve tetrarchs, one of whom was appointed to preside over each of the four cantons in each of the three tribes, formed, with their council of 300 men, the supreme authority of the nation, and assembled at the “ holy place ” (*Drunemetum*), more especially for the pronouncing of capital sentences. Singular as this cantonal constitution of the Celts appeared to the Asiatics, equally strange seemed to them the adventurous and marauding habits of the northern intruders, who on the one hand furnished their unwarlike neighbours with mercenaries for every war, and on the other plundered or levied contributions from the surrounding districts. These rude but vigorous barbarians were the terror of the effeminate surrounding nations, and even of the great kings of Asia themselves, who, after many an Asiatic army had been destroyed by the Celts and king Antiochus I., Soter had even lost The Celts of Asia Minor.

261. his life in conflict against them (493), agreed at last to pay them tribute.

Pergamus.

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In consequence of bold and successful measures of opposition to these Gallic hordes, Attalus, a wealthy citizen of Pergamus, received the royal title from his native city and bequeathed it to his posterity. This new court was in miniature, what that of Alexandria was on a great scale. Here too the promotion of material interests and the fostering of art and literature formed the order of the day, and the government pursued a cautious and sober cabinet policy, the main object of which was on the one hand to weaken its two dangerous continental neighbours, on the other to establish an independent Greek state in the west of Asia Minor. A well-filled treasury contributed greatly to the importance of these rulers of Pergamus. They advanced considerable sums to the king of Syria, the repayment of which afterwards formed one of the Roman conditions of peace. They succeeded even in gaining territory in this way; Ægina, for instance, which the allied Romans and Ætolians had wrested in the last war from Philip's allies, the Achæans, was sold by the Ætolians, to whom it fell in terms of the treaty, to Attalus for 30 talents (£7320). But, notwithstanding the splendour of the court and the royal title, the commonwealth of Pergamus always retained something of an urban character; indeed, in its policy it usually went along with the free cities. Attalus himself, the Lorenzo de Medici of antiquity, remained throughout life a wealthy citizen; and the family life of the Attalid house, from which harmony and cordiality were not banished by the royal title, contrasted greatly with the disorders and scandals of nobler dynasties.

Greece.

In European Greece—exclusive of the Roman possessions on the west coast, in the most important of which and particularly in Corcyra Roman magistrates appear to have resided (P. 74), and the territories directly subject to Macedonia—the powers more or less in a position to pursue a policy of their own were the Epirots, Acarnanians, and Ætolians in northern Greece, the Boeotians and Athenians in central Greece, and the Achæans, Lacedemonians, Messenians, and Eleans in the Peloponnesus. Among these, the republics of the Epirots, Acarnanians, and Boeotians were in various ways closely knit to Macedonia—the Acarnanians more especially, because it was only Macedonian protection that enabled

Epirots,
Acarna-
nians,
Boeotians.

them to escape the destruction with which they were threatened by the Ætolians; none of them were of any consequence. Their internal condition was very various. The state of things may to some extent be illustrated by the fact, that among the Boeotians (among whom, it is true, matters reached their worst) it had become customary to make over every property, which did not descend to heirs in the direct line, to the *syssitia*; and, in the case of candidates for the public magistracies, for a quarter of a century the primary condition of election was that they should bind themselves not to allow any creditor, least of all a foreign one, to prosecute his debtor.

The Athenians were in the habit of receiving support against Macedon from Alexandria, and were in close league with the Ætolians. But they too were totally powerless, and hardly anything, save the halo of Attic poetry and art, distinguished these unworthy representatives of a glorious past amidst a multitude of petty towns of the same stamp.

The power of the Ætolian confederacy manifested a greater vigour. The energy of the northern Greek character was still unbroken there, although it had degenerated into a reckless impatience of discipline and control. It was a public law of Ætolia, that an Ætolian might serve as a mercenary against any state, even against a state in alliance with his own country; and, when the other Greeks urgently besought them to redress this scandal, the Ætolian diet declared that Ætolia might sooner be removed from its place than this principle from their national code. The Ætoli-^{The Æto-}lians might have been of great service to the Greek nation, had they not inflicted injury still greater than the possible benefit by their system of organized robbery, by their thorough hostility to the Achæan confederacy, and by their unhappy antagonism to the great state of Macedonia.

In the Peloponnesus, the Achæan league had united the best elements of Greece proper in a confederacy based on civilization, national spirit, and peaceful preparation for self-defence. But the vigour and more especially the military efficiency of the league had, notwithstanding its outward enlargement, been arrested by the selfish diplomacy of Aratus. The unfortunate variances with Sparta, and the still more lamentable invocation of Macedonian interference in the Peloponnesus, had so completely subjected the Achæan

league to Macedonian supremacy, that the chief fortresses of the country thenceforward received Macedonian garrisons, and it annually took the oath of fidelity to Philip.

Sparta,
Elis, Mes-
sene,

The policy of the weaker states in the Peloponnesus, Elis, Messene, and Sparta, was determined by their ancient enmity to the Achæan league—an enmity specially fostered by disputes regarding their frontiers—and their tendencies were Ætolian and anti-Macedonian, because the Achæans took part with Philip. The only one of these states possessing any importance was the Spartan military monarchy, which after the death of Machanidas had passed into the hands of one Nabis. With ever-increasing hardihood Nabis leaned on the support of vagabonds and itinerant mercenaries, to whom he assigned not only the houses and lands, but also the wives and children, of the citizens; and he assiduously maintained connections, and even entered into an actual association for the joint prosecution of piracy, with the great refuge of mercenaries and pirates, the island of Crete, where he possessed some townships. His predatory expeditions by land, and the piratical vessels which he maintained at the promontory of Malea, were dreaded far and wide; he was personally hated for his baseness and cruelty; but his rule was extending, and about the time of the battle of Zama he had even succeeded in gaining possession of Messene.

League of
the Greek
cities.

Lastly, the most independent position among the intermediate states was held by the free Greek mercantile cities on the European shore of the Propontis, along the coast of Asia Minor, and on the islands of the Ægean sea; they formed, at the same time, the brightest features in the confused and multifarious picture which was presented by the Hellenic state-system. Three of them, in particular, had after Alexander's death regained their full freedom, and by the activity of their maritime commerce had attained to respectable political power and even to considerable territorial possessions; namely, Byzantium the mistress of the Bosphorus, rendered wealthy and powerful by the transit dues which she levied and by the important corn trade carried on with the Black Sea; Cyzicus on the Asiatic side of the Propontis, the daughter and heiress of Miletus, maintaining the closest relations with the court of Pergamus; and lastly and above all, Rhodes. The Rhodians, who immediately after Alexander's death had expelled the Macedonian garrison, had, by their favourable position for commerce and navigation,

Rhodes.

secured the carrying trade of all the eastern Mediterranean ; and their well-handled fleet, as well as the tried courage of the citizens in the famous siege of 450, enabled them in that age of promiscuous and ceaseless hostilities to become the prudent and energetic advocates and, when occasion required, the champions of a neutral commercial policy. They compelled the Byzantines, for instance, by force of arms to concede to the vessels of Rhodes exemption from the transit dues of the Bosphorus ; and they did not permit the dynast of Pergamus to close the Black Sea. On the other hand they kept themselves, as far as possible, aloof from land warfare, although they had acquired no inconsiderable possessions on the opposite coast of Caria ; where war could not be avoided, they carried it on by means of mercenaries. With their neighbours on all sides they were in most friendly relations—with Syracuse, Macedonia, Syria, but more especially with Egypt—and they enjoyed high consideration at these courts, so that their mediation was not unfrequently invoked in the wars of the great states. But they interested themselves specially on behalf of the Greek maritime cities, which were so numerous spread along the coasts of the kingdoms of Pontus, Bithynia, and Pergamus, as well as on the coasts and islands of Asia Minor that had been wrested by Egypt from the Seleucidæ ; such as Sinope, Heracleia Pontica, Cius, Lampsacus, Abydos, Mitylene, Chios, Smyrna, Samos, Halicarnassus and various others. All these were in substance free, and had nothing to do with the lords of the soil except to request confirmation of their privileges and to pay, at the most, a moderate tribute : such encroachments, as from time to time were threatened by the dynasts, they skilfully warded off sometimes by cringing, sometimes by strong measures. In this case the Rhodians were their chief auxiliaries ; they emphatically supported Sinope, for instance, against Mithradates of Pontus. How firmly amidst the quarrels, and by means of the very differences, of the monarchs the liberties of these cities of Asia Minor were established, is shown by the fact, that the dispute between Antiochus and the Romans some years after this time related not to the freedom of these cities in itself, but to the question whether they were to ask confirmation of their charters from the king or not. This league of the cities was, in its peculiar attitude towards the lords of the soil as well as in other respects, a formal Hanseatic associa-

tion ; and the head of it was Rhodes, which negotiated and stipulated in treaties for itself and its allies. This league upheld the freedom of the cities against monarchical interests ; and while wars raged around their walls, public spirit and civic prosperity were sheltered in comparative peace within, and art and science flourished without the risk of being crushed by the tyranny of a dissolute soldiery or of being corrupted by the atmosphere of a court.

Philip, king
of Mace-
donia.

214-205.

Such was the state of things in the east, at the time when the wall of political separation between the east and the west was broken down and the eastern powers, Philip of Macedonia leading the way, were induced to interfere in the relations of the west. We have already set forth to some extent the origin of this interference and the course of the first Macedonian war (540-549) ; and we have pointed out what Philip might have accomplished during the second Punic war, and how little of all that Hannibal was entitled to expect and to count on was really fulfilled. A fresh illustration had been afforded of the truth, that of all hazards none is more hazardous than an absolute hereditary monarchy. Philip was not the man whom Macedonia at that time required ; yet his gifts were far from insignificant. He was a genuine king, in the best and worst sense of the term. A strong desire to rule in person and unaided was the fundamental trait of his character ; he was proud of his purple, but he was no less proud of other gifts, and he had reason to be so. He not only showed the valour of a soldier and the eye of a general, but he displayed a high spirit in the conduct of public affairs, whenever his Macedonian sense of honour was offended. Full of intelligence and wit, he won the hearts of all whom he wished to gain, and especially of those who were ablest and most refined, such as Flamininus and Scipio ; he was a pleasant boon companion, and, not by virtue of his rank alone, a dangerous wooer. But he was at the same time one of the most arrogant and flagitious characters, which that shameless age produced. He was in the habit of saying that he feared none save the gods ; but it seemed almost as if his gods were those to whom his admiral Dicaearchus regularly offered sacrifice—ungodliness (*Asebeia*) and lawlessness (*Paranoia*). The lives of his advisers and of the promoters of his schemes possessed no sacredness in his eyes, nor did he disdain to pacify his indignation against the Athenians and Attalus by the destruction of

venerable monuments and illustrious works of art; it is quoted as one of his maxims of state, that "whoever puts to death the father must also kill the sons." Perhaps cruelty was not, strictly, a pleasure to him; but he was indifferent to the lives and sufferings of others, and the disposition to relent, which alone renders men tolerable, found no place in his hard and stubborn heart. So abruptly and harshly did he proclaim the principle that no promise and no moral law are binding on an absolute king, that he thereby interposed the most serious obstacles to the success of his plans. No one can deny that he possessed sagacity and resolution, but these were, in a singular manner, combined with procrastination and supineness; which is perhaps partly to be explained by the fact, that he was called in his eighteenth year to the position of an absolute sovereign, and that his ungovernable fury against every one who disturbed his autocratic course by counter-argument or counter-advice scared away from him all independent counsellors. What various causes co-operated to produce the weak and contemptible management which he showed in the first Macedonian war, we cannot tell; it may have been due perhaps to that indolent arrogance which only puts forth its full energies against danger when it becomes imminent, or perhaps to his indifference towards a plan which was not of his own devising and his jealousy of the greatness of Hannibal which put him to shame. It is certain that his subsequent conduct betrayed no further trace of the Philip, through whose negligence the great scheme of Hannibal suffered shipwreck.

When Philip concluded his treaty with the Ætolians and Romans in 548-9, he seriously intended to make a lasting peace with Rome, and to devote himself exclusively in future to the affairs of the East. It admits of no doubt that he saw with regret the rapid subjugation of Carthage; and it may be, that Hannibal hoped for a second declaration of war from Macedonia, and that Philip secretly reinforced the last Carthaginian army with mercenaries (P. 179). But the tedious affairs in which he had meanwhile involved himself in the East, as well as the nature of the alleged support, and especially the total silence of the Romans as to such a breach of the peace while they were searching for grounds of war, place it beyond doubt, that Philip was by no means disposed in 551 to make up for what he ought to have done ten years before.

Macedonia
[206-205.]
and Asia
attack
Egypt.

203.

205. He had turned his eyes to an entirely different quarter. Ptolemy Philopator of Egypt had died in 549. Philip and Antiochus, the kings of Macedonia and Asia, had combined against his successor Ptolemy Epiphanes, a child of five years old, in order completely to gratify the ancient grudge which the monarchies of the mainland entertained towards the maritime state. The Egyptian state was to be broken up; Egypt and Cyprus were to fall to Antiochus; Cyrene, Ionia, and the Cyclades to Philip. Acting thoroughly on the principle of Philip who ridiculed such considerations, the kings began the war not merely without cause, but even without pretext, "just as the large fishes devour the little." The allies, moreover, had made their calculations correctly; more especially, Philip. Egypt had enough to do in defending herself against the nearer enemy in Syria, and was obliged to leave her possessions in Asia Minor and the Cyclades undefended when Philip threw himself upon them as his share of the spoil. In the year in which Carthage concluded peace with
201. Rome (553), Philip ordered a fleet equipped by the towns subject to him to take on board troops, and to sail along the coast of Thrace. There Lysimachia was taken from the Ætolian garrison, and Perinthus, which stood in the relation of clientship to Byzantium, was likewise occupied. Thus the peace was broken as respected the Byzantines; and as respected the Ætolians, who had just made peace with Philip, the good understanding was at least disturbed. The crossing to Asia was attended with no difficulties, for Prusias king of Bithynia was in alliance with Philip. By way of recompense, Philip helped him to subdue the Greek mercantile cities in his territory. Chalcedon submitted. Cius, which resisted, was taken by storm and levelled with the ground, and its inhabitants were reduced to slavery—a meaningless barbarity, which annoyed Prusias himself who wished to get possession of the town uninjured, and which excited profound indignation throughout the Hellenic world. The Ætolians, whose *strategus* had commanded in Cius, and the Rhodians, whose attempts at mediation had been summarily and craftily frustrated by the king, were especially offended.

The Rhodian league and Pergamus oppose Philip.

But even had it not been so, the interests of all Greek commercial cities were at stake. They could not possibly allow the mild and almost purely nominal Egyptian rule to be supplanted by a Macedonian despotism, with which civic self-government and freedom of commercial intercourse were

not at all compatible; and the fearful treatment of the Cians showed that the matter at stake was not the right of confirming the charters of the towns, but the life or death of one and all. Lampsacus had already fallen, and Thasos had been treated like Cius. No time was to be lost. Theophiliscus, the vigilant *strategus* of Rhodes, exhorted his citizens to avert the common danger by common resistance, and not to suffer the towns and islands to become one by one a prey to the enemy. Rhodes resolved on its course, and declared war against Philip. Byzantium joined it; as did also the aged Attalus, king of Pergamus, personally and politically the enemy of Philip. While the fleet of the allies was mustering on the Æolian coast, Philip directed a portion of his fleet to take Chios and Samos. With the other portion he appeared in person before Pergamus, which however he invested in vain; he had to content himself with traversing the flat country and leaving the traces of Macedonian valour on the temples which he destroyed far and wide. Suddenly he departed and re-embarked, to unite with his squadron which was at Samos. But the Rhodo-Pergamene fleet followed him, and forced him to accept battle in the straits of Chios. The number of the Macedonian decked vessels was smaller, but the multitude of their open boats made up for this inequality, and the soldiers of Philip fought with great courage. But he was at length defeated. Almost half of his decked vessels, 24 sail, were sunk or taken; 6000 Macedonian sailors and 3000 soldiers perished, amongst whom was the admiral Democrates; 2000 were taken prisoners. The victory cost the allies no more than 800 men and six vessels. But, of the leaders of the allies, Attalus had been cut off from his fleet, and compelled to let his own vessel run aground near Erythræ; and Theophiliscus of Rhodes, whose public spirit had decided the question of war and whose valour had decided the battle, died on the day after it of his wounds. Thus, while the fleet of Attalus went home and the Rhodian fleet remained temporarily at Chios, Philip, who falsely claimed the victory, was enabled to continue his voyage and to turn towards Samos, in order to occupy the Carian towns. On the Carian coast, the Rhodians, on this occasion unsupported by Attalus, gave battle for the second time to the Macedonian fleet under Heraclides, near the little island of Lade in front of the port of Miletus. The victory, claimed again by both sides, appears

to have been this time gained by the Macedonians; for while the Rhodians retreated to Myndus and thence to Cos, the Macedonians occupied Miletus, and a squadron under Dicaearchus the Ætolian occupied the Cyclades. Philip meanwhile prosecuted the conquest of the Rhodian possessions on the Carian mainland, and of the Greek cities: had he been disposed to attack Ptolemy in person, and had he not preferred to confine himself to the acquisition of his own share in the spoil, he was now in a position to think of an expedition to Egypt. In Caria no army opposed the Macedonians, and Philip traversed without hindrance the country from Magnesia to Mylasa; but every town in that country was a fortress, and the work of besieging was protracted without furnishing, or giving promise of, any material results. Zeuxis the satrap of Lydia supported the ally of his master with the same lukewarmness as Philip had manifested in promoting the interests of the Syrian king, and the Greek cities gave their support only under the pressure of force or fear. The provisioning of the army became daily more difficult; Philip was obliged to plunder those who hitherto had voluntarily supplied his wants, and then he had reluctantly to submit once more to beg. Thus the good season of the year gradually drew to an end, and in the interval the Rhodians had reinforced their fleet and had also been re-joined by that of Attalus, so that they were decidedly superior at sea. It seemed almost as if they might cut off the king's retreat and compel him to take up winter quarters in Caria, while the state of affairs at home, particularly the threatened intervention of the Ætolians and Romans, urgently demanded his return. Philip saw the danger; he left garrisons amounting together to 3000 men, partly in Myrina to keep Pergamus in check, partly in the petty towns round Mylasa,—Iassus, Bargylia, Euro-mus, and Pedasa—to secure for him the excellent harbour and a landing place in Caria; and, owing to the negligence with which the allies guarded the sea, he succeeded in safely reaching the Thracian coast with his fleet and arriving at home before the winter of 553-4.

201-200. Diplomatic intervention of Rome. In fact a storm was gathering against Philip in the west, which did not permit him to continue the plundering of defenceless Egypt. The Romans, who had at length in this year concluded peace on their own terms with Carthage, began to give serious attention to these complications

in the East. It has often been affirmed, that after the conquest of the West they forthwith proceeded to the subjugation of the East; a more thorough consideration will lead to a juster judgment. It is only dull prejudice which fails to see, that Rome at this period by no means grasped at the sovereignty of the Mediterranean states, but, on the contrary, simply desired to have neighbours that should not be dangerous in Africa and in Greece; and Macedonia was not properly dangerous to Rome. Its power certainly was far from small, and it is evident that the Roman senate reluctantly consented to the peace of 548-9, which left it in all its integrity; but how little any serious apprehensions of Macedonia were or could be entertained in Rome, is best shown by the small number of troops—who yet were never compelled to fight against a superior force—with which Rome carried on the next war. The senate perhaps would have gladly seen Macedonia humbled; but that humiliation would be too dearly purchased at the cost of a land war carried on in Macedonia with Roman troops: and accordingly, after the withdrawal of the Ætolians, the senate voluntarily concluded peace on the basis of the *status quo*. It is therefore far from being demonstrated, that the Roman government concluded this peace with any definite design of beginning the war at a more convenient season; and it is very certain that, at the moment, from the thorough exhaustion of the state and the extreme unwillingness of the citizens to enter into a second transmarine struggle, the Macedonian war was in a high degree unwelcome to the Romans. But now it was inevitable. They might have been satisfied with the Macedonian state as a neighbour, such as it stood in 549; but it was impossible that they could permit it to acquire the best part of Asiatic Greece and the important Cyrene, to crush the neutral commercial states, and thereby to double its power. Further, the fall of Egypt and the humiliation, perhaps the subjugation, of Rhodes could not but inflict deep wounds on the trade of Sicily and Italy; and could Rome remain a quiet spectator, while Italian commerce with the East was made dependent on the two great continental powers? Rome had, moreover, an obligation of honour to fulfil towards Attalus her faithful ally since the first Macedonian war, and had to prevent Philip, who had already besieged him in his capital, from expelling him from his own dominions. Lastly, the claim of Rome to extend her

206-205.

205.

protecting arm over all the Hellenes was by no means an empty phrase: the Neapolitans, Rhegines, Massiliots, and Emporienses could testify that that protection was accorded in earnest, and there is no question that at that time the Romans stood in a closer relation to the Greeks than any other nation—one little more remote than that of the Hellenic Macedonians. It is strange that any should dispute the right of the Romans to feel their human, as well as their Hellenic, sympathies revolted at the scandalous treatment of the Cians and Thasians. Thus, in fact, all political, commercial, and moral motives concurred in inducing Rome to undertake the second war against Philip—one of the most righteous which the city ever waged. It greatly redounds to the honour of the senate, that it immediately resolved on its course and did not allow itself to be deterred from making the necessary preparations either by the exhaustion of the state or by the unpopularity of such a declaration of war.

201. The proprætor Marcus Valerius Lævinus already in 553 made his appearance with the Sicilian fleet of 38 sail in the eastern waters.

The government, however, were at a loss to discover an ostensible pretext for the war; a pretext which they needed in order to satisfy the people, even although they had not been far too sagacious to undervalue, as was the manner of Philip, the importance of assigning a legitimate ground for hostilities. The support, which Philip was alleged to have granted to the Carthaginians after the peace with Rome, manifestly could not be proved. The Roman subjects, indeed, in the province of Illyria had for a considerable time complained of the Macedonian encroachments. In 551 a Roman envoy at the head of the Illyrian levy had driven Philip's troops from the Illyrian territory; and the senate had accordingly

203. declared to the king's envoys in 552, that if he sought war,

302. he would find it sooner than was agreeable to him. But these encroachments were simply the ordinary outrages which Philip practised towards his neighbours; a negotiation regarding them at the present moment would have led to his humbling himself and offering satisfaction, but not to war. With all the belligerent powers in the East the Roman community was nominally in friendly relations, and might have granted them aid in repelling Philip's attack. But Rhodes and Pergamus, which of course did not fail to request Roman aid, were formally the aggressors; and although

Alexandrian ambassadors besought the Roman senate to undertake the guardianship of the boy king, Egypt appears to have been by no means anxious to invoke the direct intervention of the Romans, which would put an end to her difficulties for the moment, but would at the same time open up the eastern seas to the great maritime power of the West. Aid to Egypt, moreover, must have been in the first instance rendered in Syria, and would have entangled Rome simultaneously in war with Asia and with Macedonia; which the Romans were naturally the more desirous to avoid, as they were firmly resolved not to intermeddle at least in Asiatic affairs. No course was left but to despatch in the mean time an embassy to the East for the purpose, first, of obtaining—what was not in the circumstances difficult—the sanction of Egypt to the interference of Rome in the affairs of Greece; secondly, of pacifying king Antiochus by abandoning Syria to him; and, lastly, of accelerating as much as possible a breach with Philip and promoting a coalition of the minor Græco-Asiatic states against him (end of 553). At Alexandria they had no difficulty in accomplishing their object: the court had no choice, and was obliged gratefully to receive Marcus Æmilius Lepidus, whom the senate had despatched as “guardian of the king” to uphold his interests, so far as that could be done without an actual intervention. Antiochus did not break off his alliance with Philip, nor did he give to the Romans the definite explanations which they desired; in other respects, however—whether from remissness, or influenced by the declarations of the Romans that they did not wish to interfere in Syria—he pursued his schemes in that direction and left things in Greece and Asia Minor to take their course.

201.

Meanwhile the spring of 554 had arrived, and the war had recommenced. Philip first threw himself once more upon Thrace, where he occupied all the places on the coast, in particular Maronea, Ænus, Elæus, and Sestus; he wished to have his European possessions secured against the risk of a Roman landing. He then attacked Abydos on the Asiatic coast, the acquisition of which was an object of great importance to him, for the possession of Sestus and Abydos would bring him into closer connection with his ally Antiochus, and he would no longer need to be apprehensive lest the fleet of the allies might intercept him in crossing to or from Asia Minor. That fleet commanded the Ægean sea

200.

Continuation of the war.

after the withdrawal of the weaker Macedonian squadron: Philip confined his operations by sea to maintaining garrisons on three of the Cyclades, Andros, Cythnos, and Paros, and fitting out privateers. The Rhodians proceeded to Chios, and thence to Tenedos, where Attalus, who had passed the winter at Ægina and had spent his time in listening to the declamations of the Athenians, joined them with his squadron. The allies might probably have arrived in time to help the Abydenes, who heroically defended themselves; but they stirred not, and so at last the city surrendered, after almost all who were capable of bearing arms had fallen in the struggle before the walls; a large portion of the inhabitants fell by their own hand after the capitulation—the mercy of the victor consisted in allowing the Abydenes three days' respite to die voluntarily. Here, in the camp before Abydos, the Roman embassy, which after the termination of its business in Syria and Egypt had visited and dealt with the minor Greek states, met with the king, and submitted the proposals which it had been charged to make by the senate, viz., that the king should wage no aggressive war against any Greek state, should restore the possessions which he had wrested from Ptolemy, and should consent to an arbitration regarding the injury inflicted on the Pergamenes and Rhodians. The object of the senate, which sought to provoke the king to a formal declaration of war, was not gained; the Roman ambassador, Marcus Æmilius Lepidus, obtained from the king nothing but the polite reply, that he would excuse what the envoy had said because he was young, handsome, and a Roman.

Meanwhile, however, the occasion for declaring war, which Rome desired, had been furnished from another quarter. The Athenians in their silly and cruel vanity had put to death two unfortunate Acarnanians, because these had accidentally strayed into their mysteries. When the Acarnanians, who were naturally indignant, asked Philip to procure them satisfaction, he could not refuse the just request of his most faithful allies, and he allowed them to levy men in Macedonia and, with these and their own troops, to invade Attica without a formal declaration of war. This, it is true, was no war in the proper sense of the term; and, besides, the leader of the Macedonian band, Nicanor, immediately gave orders to his troops to retreat, when the Roman envoys, who were at Athens at the time, used threaten-

ing language (in the end of 553). But it was too late. An Athenian embassy was sent to Rome to report the attack made by Philip on an ancient ally of the Romans; and, from the way in which the senate received it, Philip saw clearly what awaited him; so that he at once, in the very spring of 554, directed Philocles, his general in Greece, to lay waste the Attic territory and to reduce the city to extremities. 201.

The senate now had what they wanted; and, in the summer of 554, they were able to propose to the comitia a declaration of war "on account of an attack on a state in alliance with Rome." It was rejected on the first occasion almost unanimously: foolish or evil-disposed tribunes of the people complained that the senate would allow the citizens no rest; but the war was necessary and, in strictness, was already begun, so that the senate could not possibly recede. The citizens were induced to yield by representations and concessions. It is remarkable that these concessions were made mainly at the expense of the allies. The garrisons of Gaul, Lower Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia, amounting in all to 20,000 men, were exclusively taken from the allied contingents that were in active service—quite contrary to the former principles of the Romans. All the burgess troops, on the other hand, that had continued under arms from the Hannibalic war, were discharged; volunteers alone, it was alleged, were to be enrolled for the Macedonian war, but they were, as was afterwards found, for the most part forced volunteers—a fact which in the autumn of 555 give rise to a dangerous military revolt in the camp of Apollonia. Six legions were formed of the men newly called out; of these two remained in Rome and two in Etruria, and only two embarked at Brundisium for Macedonia, led by the consul Publius Sulpicius Galba. 200. Declaration of war [200. by Rome. 199.

Thus it was once more clearly demonstrated, that the sovereign burgess assemblies, with their shortsighted resolutions dependent often on mere accident, were no longer at all adapted to deal with the complicated and difficult relations into which Rome was drawn by her victories; and that their mischievous intervention in the working of the state machine led to dangerous modifications of the measures which in a military point of view were necessary, and to the still more dangerous course of treating the Latin allies as inferiors.

The position of Philip was very disadvantageous. The eastern states, which ought to have acted in unison against The Roman league.

all interference of Rome and probably under other circumstances would have done so, had been, mainly by Philip's fault, so incensed at each other, that they were not inclined to hinder, or were inclined even to promote, the Roman invasion. Asia, the natural and most important ally of Philip, had been neglected by him, and was moreover prevented from any immediate active interference by being entangled in the quarrel with Egypt and the Syrian war. Egypt had an urgent interest in keeping the Roman fleet out of the eastern waters; even now an Egyptian embassy intimated at Rome very plainly, that the court of Alexandria was ready to relieve the Romans from the trouble of interference in Attica. But the treaty for the partition of Egypt concluded between Asia and Macedonia threw that important state thoroughly into the arms of Rome, and compelled the cabinet of Alexandria to declare that it would only intermeddle in the affairs of European Greece with consent of the Romans. The Greek commercial cities, with Rhodes, Pergamus, and Byzantium at their head, were in a position similar, but of still greater perplexity. They would under other circumstances have beyond doubt done what they could to close the eastern seas against the Romans; but the cruel and annihilating policy of conquest pursued by Philip had driven them to an unequal struggle, in which for their self-preservation they were obliged to use every effort to obtain the interference of the great Italian power. In Greece proper also the Roman envoys, who were commissioned to organize a second league against Philip there, found the way already substantially paved for them by the enemy. Of the anti-Macedonian party, the Spartans, Eleans, Athenians, and Ætoliens, Philip might perhaps have gained the latter, for the peace of 548 had made a deep, and far from healed, breach in their friendly alliance with Rome; but apart from the old differences which subsisted between Ætolia and Macedonia regarding the Thessalian towns withdrawn by Macedonia from the Ætolian confederacy—Echinus, Larissa Cremaste, Pharsalus, and Thebes in Phthiotis—the expulsion of the Ætolian garrisons from Lysimachia and Cius had produced fresh exasperation against Philip in the minds of the Ætoliens. If they delayed to join the league against him, the chief reason of that delay was the ill-feeling that continued to prevail between them and the Romans.

It was a circumstance still more ominous, that even among the Greek states firmly attached to the interests of Macedon—the Epirots, Acarnanians, Bœotians, and Achæans,—the Acarnanians and Bœotians alone stood steadfastly by Philip. With the Epirots the Roman envoys negotiated not without success; Amynder, king of the Athamanes, in particular closely attached himself to Rome. Even among the Achæans, Philip had offended many by the murder of Aratus; while on the other hand he had thereby paved the way for a more free development of the confederacy. Under the leadership of Philopœmen (502–571, for the first time *strategus* in 546) it had reorganized its military system, recovered confidence in itself by successful conflicts with Sparta, and no longer blindly followed, as in the time of Aratus, the policy of Macedon. The Achæan league, which had to expect neither profit nor immediate injury from Philip's thirst for aggrandizement, alone in all Hellas looked at this war from an impartial and national-Hellenic point of view. It perceived—what there was no difficulty in perceiving—that the Hellenic nation was thereby surrendering itself to the Romans even before they wished or desired its surrender, and attempted accordingly to mediate between Philip and the Rhodians; but it was too late. The national patriotism, which had formerly terminated the federal war and had mainly contributed to the first war between Macedon and Rome, was extinguished; the Achæan mediation remained fruitless, and in vain Philip visited the cities and islands to rekindle the zeal of the nation—its apathy was the Nemesis for Cius and Abydos. The Achæans, as they could effect no change and were not disposed to render help to either party, remained neutral.

252–183.
208.

In the autumn of 554 the consul, Publius Sulpicius Galba, landed with his two legions and 1000 Numidian cavalry accompanied even by elephants derived from the spoils of Carthage, at Apollonia; on receiving accounts of which, the king returned in haste from the Hellespont to Thessaly. But, owing partly to the far advanced season, partly to the sickness of the Roman general, nothing was undertaken by him that year except a reconnaissance in force, in the course of which the places in the vicinity, and in particular the Macedonian colony Antipatria, were occupied by the Romans. For the next year a joint attack on Macedonia was concerted with the northern barbarians,

200.
Landing of
the Romans
in Macedonia.

more especially with Pleuratus, the then ruler of Scodra, and Bato, prince of the Dardani, who of course were eager to profit by the favourable opportunity.

More importance attached to the enterprises of the Roman fleet, which numbered 100 decked and 80 light vessels. While the rest of the ships took their station for the winter at Corcyra, a division under Gaius Claudius Cento proceeded to the Piræus to render assistance to the hard-pressed Athenians. But, when Cento found the Attic territory already sufficiently protected against the raids of the Corinthian garrison and the Macedonian corsairs, he sailed on and appeared suddenly before Chalcis in Eubœa, the chief stronghold of Philip in Greece, where his magazines, stores of arms, and prisoners were kept, and where the commandant Sopater was far from expecting a Roman attack. The undefended walls were scaled, and the garrison was put to death; the prisoners were liberated and the stores were burnt; unfortunately, there was a want of troops to hold the important position. On receiving news of this invasion, Philip immediately in vehement indignation started from Demetrias in Thessaly for Chalcis, and when he found no trace of the enemy there save the scene of ruin, he went on to Athens to retaliate. But his attempt to surprise the city was a failure, and even the assault was in vain, much as the king exposed his life; the approach of Gaius Claudius from the Piræus, and of Attalus from Ægina, compelled him to depart. Philip still tarried for some time in Greece; but in a political and in a military point of view his successes were equally insignificant. In vain he tried to induce the Achæans to take up arms in his behalf; and equally fruitless were his attacks on Eleusis and the Piræus, as well as a second attempt on Athens itself. Nothing remained for him but to gratify his natural exasperation, in an unworthy manner, by laying waste the country and destroying the trees of Academus, and then to return to the north.

Attempt of
the [198.
Romans
to invade
Macedonia.

Thus the winter passed away. With the spring of 555, the proconsul Publius Sulpicius broke up from his winter camp, determined to conduct his legions from Apollonia by the shortest route into Macedonia proper. This principal attack from the west was to be supported by three subordinate attacks; on the north by an invasion of the Dardani and Illyrians; on the east by an attack on the part of

the combined fleet of the Romans and allies, which assembled at Ægina; while lastly the Athamanes, and the Ætolians also, if the attempt to induce them to share in the struggle should prove successful, were to advance from the south. After Galba had crossed the mountains intersected by the Apsus (now the Beratinó), and had marched through the fertile plain of the Dassaretæ, he reached the mountain range which separates Illyria from Macedonia, and crossing it, entered the proper Macedonian territory. Philip had marched to meet him; but in the extensive and thinly peopled regions of Macedonia the antagonists for a time sought each other in vain; at length they met in the province of Lyncestis, a fertile but marshy plain not far from the north-western frontier, and encamped not 1000 paces apart. Philip's army, after he had been joined by the corps detached to occupy the northern passes, numbered about 20,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry; the Roman army was nearly as strong. The Macedonians however had the great advantage, that, fighting in their native land and well acquainted with its highways and byways, they had little trouble in procuring supplies of provisions, while they had encamped so close to the Romans that the latter could not venture to disperse for any extensive foraging. The consul repeatedly offered battle, but the king persisted in declining it; and the combats between the light troops, although the Romans gained some advantages in them, produced no material alteration. Galba was obliged to break up his camp and to pitch another a mile and a half off at Octolophus, where he conceived that he could more easily procure supplies. But here too the divisions sent out were destroyed by the light troops and cavalry of the Macedonians; the legions were obliged to come to their help, whereupon the Macedonian van-guard, which had advanced too far, were driven back to their camp with heavy loss; the king himself lost his horse in the action, and only saved his life through the magnanimous self-devotion of one of his troopers. From this perilous position the Romans were liberated through the better success of the subordinate attacks which Galba had directed the allies to make, or rather through the weakness of the Macedonian forces. Although Philip had instituted levies as large as possible in his own dominions, and had enlisted Roman deserters and other mercenaries, he had not been able to bring into the field

(over and above the garrisons in Asia Minor and Thrace) more than the army, with which in person he confronted the consul; and besides, in order to form even this, he had been obliged to leave the northern passes in the Pelagonian territory undefended. For the protection of the east coast he relied partly on the orders which he had given for the laying waste of the islands of Sciathos and Peparethos, which might have furnished a station to the enemy's fleet, partly on the garrisoning of Thasos and the coast and on the fleet organized at Demetrias under Heraclides. For the south frontier he had been obliged to reckon solely upon the more than doubtful neutrality of the Ætolians. These now suddenly joined the league against Macedon, and immediately in conjunction with the Athamanes penetrated into Thessaly, while simultaneously the Dardani and Illyrians overran the northern provinces, and the Roman fleet under Lucius Apustius, departing from Corcyra, appeared in the eastern waters, where the ships of Attalus, the Rhodians, and the Istrians joined it.

Philip, on learning this, voluntarily abandoned his position, and retreated in an easterly direction: whether he did so in order to repel the probably unexpected invasion of the Ætolians, or to draw the Roman army after him with a view to its destruction, or to take either of these courses according to circumstances, cannot well be determined. He managed his retreat so dexterously that Galba, who adopted the rash resolution of following him, lost his track, and Philip was enabled to reach by a side movement, and to occupy, the narrow pass which separates the provinces of Lyncestis and Eordæa, with the view of awaiting the Romans and giving them a warm reception there. A battle took place on the spot which he had selected, but the long Macedonian spears proved unserviceable on the wooded and uneven ground. The Macedonians were partly turned, partly broken, and lost many men.

Return of
the Ro-
mans.

But, although Philip's army was after this unfortunate action no longer able to prevent the advance of the Romans, the latter were themselves afraid to encounter further unknown dangers in an impassable and hostile country; and returned to Apollonia, after they had laid waste the fertile provinces of Upper Macedonia—Eordæa, Elymæa, and Orestis. Celetrum, the most considerable town of Orestis (now Castoria, on a peninsula in the lake of the same name),

had surrendered to them : it was the only Macedonian town that opened its gates to the Romans. In the Illyrian land Pelium, the city of the Dassaretæ, on the upper confluent of the Apsus, was taken by storm and strongly garrisoned to serve as a future basis for a similar expedition.

Philip did not disturb the Roman army in its retreat, but turned by forced marches against the Ætolians and Athamanians who, in the belief that the legions were occupying the attention of the king, were fearlessly and recklessly plundering the rich vale of the Peneius, defeated them completely, and compelled such as did not fall to save themselves one by one through the well-known mountain paths. The effective strength of the confederacy was not a little diminished by this defeat, and not less by the numerous enlistments made in Ætolia on Egyptian account. The Dardani were chased back over the mountains by Athenagoras, the leader of Philip's light troops, without difficulty and with severe loss. The Roman fleet also did not accomplish much ; it expelled the Macedonian garrison from Andros, visited Eubœa and Sciathos, and then made attempts on the Chalcidian peninsula, which were, however, vigorously repulsed by the Macedonian garrison at Mende. The rest of the summer was spent in the capture of Oreus in Eubœa, which was long delayed by the resolute defence of the Macedonian garrison. The weak Macedonian fleet under Heraclides remained inactive at Heraclea, and did not venture to dispute the possession of the sea with the enemy. The latter went early to winter quarters, the Romans proceeding to the Piræus and Corcyra, the Rhodians and Pergamenes going home.

Philip might on the whole congratulate himself upon the results of this campaign. The Roman troops, after an extremely troublesome campaign, stood in autumn precisely on the spot whence they had started in spring ; and, but for the well-timed interposition of the Ætolians and the unexpected success of the battle at the pass of Eordæa, not a man perhaps of their entire force would have again seen the Roman territory. The fourfold offensive had everywhere failed in its object, and not only did Philip in autumn see his whole dominions cleared of the enemy, but he was able to make an attempt—which, however, miscarried—to wrest from the Ætolians the strong town of Thaumaci, situated on the Ætolo-Thessalian frontier and commanding the plain of the Peneius. If Antiochus, for whose coming Philip vainly

supplicated the gods, should unite with him in the next campaign, he might anticipate great successes. For a moment it seemed as if Antiochus was disposed to do so; his army appeared in Asia Minor, and occupied some places belonging to king Attalus, who requested military protection from the Romans. The latter, however, were not anxious to urge the great king at this time to a breach; they sent envoys, who in fact obtained an evacuation of the dominions of Attalus. From that quarter Philip had nothing to hope for.

Philip encamps on the Aous.

198.

198.

Flamininus.

But the fortunate issue of the last campaign had so raised Philip's courage or his arrogance, that, after having assured himself afresh of the neutrality of the Achæans and the fidelity of the Macedonians by the sacrifice of some strong places and of the detested admiral Heraclides, he next spring (556) assumed the offensive and advanced into the territory of the Atintanes, with a view to form a well-entrenched camp in the narrow pass, where the Aous (Viossa) winds its way between the mountains Æropus and Asnaus. Opposite him encamped the Roman army reinforced by new arrivals of troops, and commanded first by the consul of the previous year, Publius Villius, and then from the summer of 556 by that year's consul, Titus Quinctius Flamininus. Flamininus, a talented man just thirty years of age, belonged to the younger generation, who began to lay aside the patriotism as well as the habits of their forefathers and, though not unmindful of their fatherland, were still more mindful of themselves and of Hellenism. A skilful officer and a better diplomatist, he was in many respects admirably adapted for the management of the troubled affairs of Greece. Yet it would perhaps have been better both for Rome and for Greece, if the choice had fallen on one less full of Hellenic sympathies, and if the general despatched thither had been a man who would neither have been bribed by delicate flattery nor stung by pungent sarcasm; who would not amidst literary and artistic reminiscences have overlooked the pitiful condition of the constitutions of the Hellenic states; and who, while treating Hellas according to its deserts, would have spared the Romans the trouble of striving after unattainable ideals.

The new commander-in-chief immediately had a conference with the king, while the two armies lay face to face inactive. Philip made proposals of peace; he offered to

restore all his own conquests, and to submit to an equitable arbitration regarding the damage inflicted on the Greek cities ; but the negotiations broke down, when he was asked to give up ancient possessions of Macedonia and particularly Thessaly. For forty days the two armies lay in the narrow pass of the Aous ; Philip would not retire, and Flamininus could not make up his mind whether he should order an assault, or leave the king alone and reattempt the expedition of the previous year. At length the Roman general was helped out of his perplexity by the treachery of some nobles among the Epirots who were otherwise well-disposed to Macedon, and especially of Charops. They conducted a Roman corps of 4000 infantry and 300 cavalry by mountain paths to the heights above the Macedonian camp ; and, when the consul attacked the enemy's army in front, the advance of that Roman division, unexpectedly descending from the mountains commanding the position, decided the battle. Philip lost his camp and entrenchments and nearly 2000 men, and hastily retreated to the pass of Tempe, the gate of Macedonia Proper. He gave up everything which he had held except the fortresses ; the Thessalian towns, which he could not defend, he destroyed ; Pheræ alone closed its gates against him, and thereby escaped destruction. The Epirots, induced partly by these successes of the Roman arms, partly by the judicious moderation of Flamininus, were the first to secede from the Macedonian alliance. On the first accounts of the Roman victory the Athamanes and Ætolians immediately invaded Thessaly, and the Romans soon followed ; the flat country was easily overrun, but the strong towns, which were friendly to Macedon and received support from Philip, fell only after a brave resistance, or withstood even the superior foe—especially Atrax on the left bank of the Peneius, where the phalanx stood in the breach as a substitute for the wall. Except these Thessalian fortresses and the territory of the faithful Acarnanians, all northern Greece was thus in the hands of the coalition.

Philip
driven
back to
Tempe.

Greece in
the power
of the Ro-
mans.

The south, on the other hand, was still in the main retained under the power of Macedon by the fortresses of Chalcis and Corinth, which maintained communication with each other through the territory of the Boeotians who were friendly to Macedon, and by the Achæan neutrality ; and as it was too late to advance into Macedonia this year, Flamininus resolved to direct his land army and fleet in the first place

The
Achæans
enter into
alliance
with Rome.

204.

against Corinth and the Achæans. The fleet, which had again been joined by the Rhodian and Pergamene ships, had hitherto been employed in the capture and pillage of two of the smaller towns in Eubœa, Eretria and Carystus; both however, as well as Oreus, were thereafter abandoned, and reoccupied by Philocles the Macedonian commandant of Chalcis. The united fleet proceeded thence to Cenchræ, the eastern port of Corinth, to threaten that strong fortress. On the other side Flamininus advanced into Phocis, and occupied the country, in which Elatea alone sustained a somewhat protracted siege: this district and Anticyra in particular on the Corinthian gulf were chosen as winter quarters. The Achæans, who thus saw the Roman legions approaching and the Roman fleet already on their own coast, abandoned their morally honourable, but politically untenable, neutrality. After the deputies from the towns most closely attached to Macedonia—Dyme, Megalopolis, and Argos—had left the diet, it resolved to join the coalition against Philip. Cycliades and other leaders of the Macedonian party went into exile; the troops of the Achæans immediately united with the Roman fleet and hastened to invest Corinth by land, which city—the stronghold of Philip against the Achæans—had been guaranteed to them on the part of Rome in return for their joining the coalition. Not only, however, did the Macedonian garrison, which was 1800 strong and consisted chiefly of Italian deserters, defend with determination the almost impregnable city, but Philocles also arrived from Chalcis with a division of 1500 men, which after relieving Corinth invaded the territories of the Achæans and, in concert with the citizens who were favourable to Macedonia, wrested from them Argos. But the recompense of such devotedness was, that the king delivered over the faithful Argives to the reign of terror of Nabis of Sparta. Philip hoped, after the accession of the Achæans to the Roman coalition, to gain over Nabis who had hitherto been the ally of the Romans; for his chief reason for joining the Roman alliance was that he was opposed to the Achæans and since 550 had been at open war with them. But the affairs of Philip were in too desperate a condition for any one to feel satisfaction in joining him now. Nabis accepted Argos from Philip, but he betrayed the traitor and remained in alliance with Flamininus, who, in his perplexity at being now allied with two powers that were at war with

each other, had in the mean time arranged an armistice of four months between the Spartans and Achæans.

Thus winter came on; and Philip once more availed himself of it to obtain if possible an equitable peace. At a conference held at Nicæa on the Maliac gulf the king appeared in person, and endeavoured to come to an understanding with Flaminius. With haughty politeness he dismissed the petulant arrogance of the minor chiefs, and by marked deference to the Romans as the only antagonists on an equality with him, he sought to obtain from them tolerable terms. Flaminius was sufficiently refined to feel himself flattered by the urbanity of the vanquished prince towards himself and his arrogant bearing in reference to the allies, whom the Romans as well as the king had learned to despise; but his powers were not ample enough to meet the king's wishes. He granted him a two months' armistice in return for the evacuation of Phocis and Locris, and referred him, as to the main matter, to his government. The Roman senate had long been of opinion, that Macedonia must give up all her possessions abroad; accordingly, when Philip's ambassadors appeared in Rome, they were simply asked whether they had full powers to renounce all Greece and in particular Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias, and when they said that they had not, the negotiations were immediately broken off, and it was resolved that the war should be prosecuted with energy. With the help of the tribunes of the people, the senate succeeded in preventing a change in the chief command—which had often proved so injurious—and in prolonging the command of Flaminius; he obtained considerable reinforcements, and the two former commanders, Publius Galba and Publius Villius, were instructed to place themselves at his disposal. Philip resolved once more to risk a pitched battle. To secure Greece, where all the states except the Acarnanians and Bœotians were now in arms against him, the garrison of Corinth was augmented to 6000 men, while he himself, straining the last energies of exhausted Macedonia and enrolling children and old men in the ranks of the phalanx, brought into the field an army of about 26,000 men, of whom 16,000 were Macedonian *phalangitæ*. Thus the fourth campaign, that of 557, began. Philip proceeds to Thessaly.

Vain attempts to arrange a peace.

197.

Bœotia, in consequence of which the Bœotians were compelled to join, at least nominally, the alliance against Macedonia. Content with having thus interrupted the communication between Corinth and Chalcis, he proceeded to the north, where alone a decisive blow could be struck. The great difficulties of provisioning the army in a hostile and for the most part desolate country, which had often hampered its operations, were now to be obviated by the fleet accompanying the army along the coast and carrying after it supplies sent from Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia. The decisive blow came, however, earlier than Flamininus had expected. Philip, impatient and confident as he was, could not endure to await the enemy on the Macedonian frontier: after assembling his army at Dium, he advanced through the pass of Tempe into Thessaly, and encountered the army of the enemy advancing to meet him in the district of Scotussa.

Battle of
Cynosce-
phalæ.

The Macedonian and Roman armies (the latter of which had been reinforced by the contingents of the Apolloniates and the Athamanes, by the Cretans sent by Nabis, and especially by a strong band of Ætoliens) contained nearly equal numbers of combatants, each about 26,000 men; the Romans, however, had the superiority in cavalry. In front of Scotussa, on the plateau of the Karadagh, during a gloomy day of rain, the Roman vanguard unexpectedly encountered that of the enemy, which occupied a high and steep hill named Cynoscephalæ, that lay between the two camps. Driven back into the plain, the Romans were reinforced from the camp by the light troops and the excellent corps of Ætolian cavalry, and now in turn forced the Macedonian vanguard back upon and over the height. But here the Macedonians again found support in their whole cavalry and the larger portion of their light infantry; the Romans, who had ventured forward imprudently, were pursued with great loss almost to their camp, and would have wholly taken to flight, had not the Ætolian horsemen prolonged the combat in the plain until Flamininus could bring up his rapidly arranged legions. The king yielded to the impetuous cry of his victorious troops demanding the continuance of the conflict, and hastily drew up his heavy-armed soldiers for the battle, which neither general nor soldiers had expected on that day. It was important to occupy the hill, which for the moment was quite denuded of troops. The right wing of the phalanx, led by the king in person, arrived

early enough to form without trouble in battle order on the height; the left had not yet come up, when the light troops of the Macedonians, put to flight by the legions, rushed up the hill. Philip quickly pushed the fugitive crowd past the phalanx into the middle division, and, without waiting till Nicanor had arrived on the left wing with the other half of the phalanx, which followed more slowly, he ordered the right phalanx to couch their spears and to charge down the hill on the legions, and the rearranged light infantry simultaneously to turn them and take them in flank. The attack of the phalanx, irresistible on so favourable ground, shattered the Roman infantry, and the left wing of the Romans was completely beaten. Nicanor on the other wing, when he saw the king give the attack, ordered the other half of the phalanx to advance in all haste; by this movement it was thrown into confusion, and while the first ranks were already rapidly following the victorious right wing down the hill, and were still more thrown into disorder by the inequality of the ground, the last files were just gaining the height. The right wing of the Romans under these circumstances soon overcame the enemy's left; the elephants alone, stationed upon this wing, made sad havoc in the broken Macedonian ranks. While a fearful slaughter was taking place at this point, a resolute Roman officer collected twenty companies, and with these threw himself on the victorious Macedonian wing, which had advanced so far in pursuit of the Roman left that the Roman right came to be in its rear. Against an attack from behind the phalanx was defenceless, and this movement ended the battle. From the complete breaking up of the two phalanxes we may well believe that the Macedonian loss amounted to 13,000, partly prisoners, partly fallen—but chiefly the latter, because the Roman soldiers were not acquainted with the Macedonian sign of surrender, the raising of the *sarissa*. The loss of the victors was slight. Philip escaped to Larissa, and, after burning all his papers that nobody might be compromised, evacuated Thessaly and returned home. Simultaneously with this great defeat, the Macedonians suffered other discomfitures at all the points which they still occupied; in Caria the Rhodian mercenaries defeated the Macedonian corps stationed there and compelled it to shut itself up in Stratonicea; the Corinthian garrison was defeated by Nicostratus and his Achæans with severe loss, and Leucas in Acarnania was taken by assault after a heroic resist-

ance. Philip was completely vanquished; his last allies, the Acarnanians, yielded on the news of the battle of Cynoscephalæ.

Preliminaries of peace.

It was completely in the power of the Romans to dictate peace; they used their power without abusing it. The empire of Alexander might be annihilated; at a conference of the allies this proposal was actually brought forward by the Ætolians. But what would be the effect of such a course, save to demolish the rampart protecting Hellenic culture from the Thracians and Celts? Already during the war just ended the flourishing Lysimachia on the Thracian Chersonese had been totally destroyed by the Thracians—a serious warning for the future. Flamininus, who had clearly perceived the bitter animosities subsisting among the Greek states, could never consent that the great Roman power should carry into effect the spiteful projects of the Ætolian confederacy, even if his Hellenic sympathies had not been as much won by the polished and chivalrous king as his Roman national feeling was offended by the boastings of the Ætolians, the “victors of Cynoscephalæ,” as they called themselves. He replied to the Ætolians that it was not the custom of Rome to annihilate the vanquished, and that, besides, they were their own masters and were at liberty to put an end to Macedonia if they could. The king was treated with all possible respect, and, on his declaring himself ready now to entertain the demands formerly made, an armistice for a considerable term was agreed to by Flamininus in return for the payment of a sum of money and the furnishing of hostages, among whom was the king’s son Demetrius,—an armistice which Philip greatly needed in order to expel the Dardani out of Macedonia.

Peace with Macedonia.

The definitive regulation of the complicated affairs of Greece was intrusted by the senate to a commission of ten persons, the head and soul of which was Flamininus. Philip obtained from it terms similar to those granted to Carthage. He lost all his foreign possessions in Asia Minor, Thrace, Greece, and in the islands of the Ægean sea; while he retained Macedonia proper undiminished, with the exception of some unimportant stripes on the frontier and the province of Orestis, which was declared free—a stipulation which Philip felt very keenly, but which the Romans could not avoid prescribing, for with his known character it was impossible to leave him free to dispose of subjects who

had once revolted from their allegiance. Macedonia was further bound not to conclude any foreign alliances without the previous knowledge of Rome, and not to send garrisons abroad; she was bound, moreover, not to make war out of Macedonia against civilized states or against any allies of Rome at all, and she was to maintain no army exceeding 5000 men, no elephants, and not more than five decked ships; the rest were to be given up to the Romans. Lastly, Philip entered into symmachy with the Romans, which obliged him to send a contingent when requested; indeed, Macedonian troops immediately after this fought side by side with the legions. Moreover, he paid a contribution of 1000 talents (£244,000).

After Macedonia had thus been reduced to complete political nullity and was left in possession of only as much power as was needful to guard the frontier of Hellas against the barbarians, the Romans proceeded to dispose of the possessions ceded by the king. The Romans, who just at that time were learning by experience in Spain that transmarine provinces are a very dubious gain, and who had by no means begun the war with a view to the acquisition of territory, took none of the spoil for themselves, and thus compelled their allies also to moderation. They resolved to declare all the states of Greece, which had previously been under Philip, free; and Flaminius was commissioned to read the decree to that effect to the Greeks assembled at the Isthmian games (558). Thoughtful men perhaps asked whether freedom was a blessing capable of being thus bestowed, and what was the value of freedom to a nation apart from union and unity; but the rejoicing was great and sincere, as the intention of the senate was sincere in conferring the freedom.*

Greece free.

196.

The only exceptions to this general rule were, the Illyrian Scodra provinces eastward of Epidamnus, which fell to Pleuratus the ruler of Scodra, and rendered that state of robbers and pirates, which a century before had been humbled by the Romans (P. 74), once more one of the most powerful of the petty principalities in those regions; some districts in western Thessaly, which Amynder had occupied and was

* There are still extant gold staters, with the head of Flaminius and the inscription "*T. Quinoti (us)*," struck in Greece under the government of the liberator of the Hellenes. The use of the Latin language is a significant compliment.

allowed to retain ; and the three islands of Paros, Scyros, and Imbros, which were presented to Athens in return for the many hardships which she had suffered, and her still more numerous addresses of thanks and courtesies of all sorts. The Rhodians, of course, retained their Carian possessions, and the Pergamenes retained Ægina. The remaining allies were only indirectly rewarded by the accession of the newly liberated cities to the several confederacies. The Achæans were the best treated, although they were the latest in joining the coalition against Philip ; apparently for the honourable reason, that this federation was the best organized and most respectable of all the Greek states. All the possessions of Philip in the Peloponnesus and on the Isthmus, and consequently Corinth in particular, were incorporated with their league. With the Ætolians on the other hand the Romans used little ceremony ; they were allowed to admit the towns of Phocis and Locris into their symmachy, but their proposals to extend it also to Acarnania and Thessaly were in part decidedly rejected, in part postponed, and the Thessalian cities were organized into four small independent confederacies. The Rhodian city-league reaped the benefit of the liberation of Thasos, Lemnos, and the towns of Thrace and Asia Minor.

The Achæan
league en-
larged.

The Æto-
lians.

War
against
Nabis of
Sparta.

234.

195.

The regulation of the affairs of the Greek states, both as respected their mutual relations and their internal condition, was attended with difficulty. The most urgent matter was the war which had been carried on between the Spartans and Achæans since 550, in which the duty of mediating necessarily fell to the Romans. But after various attempts to induce Nabis to yield, and particularly to give up the city of Argos belonging to the Achæan league, which Philip had surrendered to him, no course at last was left to Flamininus but to have war declared against the obstinate freebooter-chief, who reckoned on the well-known grudge of the Ætolians against the Romans and on the advance of Antiochus into Europe, and pertinaciously refused to restore Argos. This was done, accordingly, by all the Hellenes at a great diet in Corinth, and Flamininus advanced into the Peloponnesus accompanied by the fleet and the Romano-allied army, which included a contingent sent by Philip and a division of Lacedæmonian emigrants under Agesipolis, the legitimate king of Sparta (559). In order to crush his antagonist immediately by an overwhelming superiority of force, no

less than 50,000 men were brought into the field, and, the other towns being disregarded, the capital itself was at once invested; but the desired result was not attained. Nabis had sent into the field a considerable army amounting to 15,000 men, of whom 5000 were mercenaries, and he had confirmed his rule afresh by a complete reign of terror—by the execution *en masse* of the officers and inhabitants of the country whom he suspected. Even when he himself after the first successes of the Roman army and fleet resolved to yield and to accept the comparatively favourable terms of peace proposed by Flamininus, “the people,” viz. the banditti whom Nabis had domiciled in Sparta, not without reason apprehensive of a reckoning after the victory, and deceived by accompanying lies as to the nature of the terms of peace and as to the advance of the Ætolians and Asiatics, rejected the peace offered by the Roman general, so that the struggle began anew. A battle took place in front of the walls and an assault was made upon the town; which was already scaled by the Romans, when the setting on fire of the captured streets compelled the assailants to retire.

At last the obstinate resistance came to an end. Sparta retained its independence and was neither compelled to receive back the emigrants nor to join the Achæan league; even the existing monarchical constitution, and Nabis himself, were left intact. On the other hand Nabis had to cede his foreign possessions, Argos, Messene, the Cretan cities, and the whole coast besides; to bind himself neither to conclude foreign alliances, nor to wage war, nor to keep any other vessels than two open boats; and lastly to disgorge all his plunder, to give to the Romans hostages, and to pay to them a war-contribution. The towns on the Laconian coast were given to the Spartan emigrants, and this new community, who named themselves the “free Laconians,” in contrast to the monarchically governed Spartans, were directed to enter the Achæan league. The emigrants did not receive back their property, as the district assigned to them was regarded as a compensation for it; it was stipulated on the other hand, that their wives and children should not be detained in Sparta against their will. The Achæans, although by these arrangements they gained the accession of the free Laconians as well as Argos, were yet far from content; they had expected that the dreaded and hated Nabis would be superseded, that the emigrants would be brought

Settle-
ment of
Spartan
affairs.

back, and that the Achæan symmarchy would be extended to the whole Peloponnesus. Unprejudiced persons, however, will not fail to see that Flamininus managed these difficult affairs as fairly and justly, as it was possible to manage them where two political parties, both chargeable with unfairness and injustice, stood opposed to each other. With the old and deep hostility subsisting between the Spartans and Achæans, the incorporation of Sparta into the Achæan league would have been equivalent to placing Sparta under the Achæan yoke, a course no less contrary to equity than to prudence. The restitution of the emigrants, and the complete restoration of a government that had been set aside for twenty years, would only have substituted one reign of terror for another ; the plan adopted by Flamininus was the right one, just because it failed to satisfy either of the extreme parties. At length thorough provision appeared to be made that the Spartan system of robbery by sea and land should cease, and that the government there, such as it was, should prove troublesome, if at all, only to its own subjects. It is possible that Flamininus, who knew Nabis and could not be aware how desirable it was that he should personally be superseded, omitted to take such a step from the mere desire to have done with the matter and not to mar the fair impression of his successes by complications that might be prolonged beyond all calculation ; it is possible, moreover, that he sought to preserve Sparta as a counterpoise to the power of the Achæan confederacy in the Peloponnesus. But the former objection relates to a point of secondary importance ; and as to the latter view, it is far from probable that the Romans condescended to fear the Achæans.

Final settle-
ment of
Greece.

Peace was thus established, externally at least, among the petty Greek states. But the internal condition of the several communities also furnished employment to the Roman arbiter. The Bœotians openly displayed their Macedonian tendencies, even after the expulsion of the Macedonians from Greece ; although Flamininus had at their request allowed the Bœotians who were in the service of Philip to return home, Brachyllas, the most decided partisan of Macedonia, was elected to the presidency of the Bœotian confederacy, and Flamininus was otherwise irritated in various ways. He bore it with unparalleled patience ; but the Bœotians friendly to Rome, who knew what awaited them after

the departure of the Romans, determined to put Brachyllas to death, and Flaminius, whose permission they deemed it necessary to ask, at least did not forbid them. Brachyllas was accordingly killed; upon which, the Bœotians were not content with prosecuting the murderers, but lay in wait for the Roman soldiers passing singly or in small parties through their territories, and killed 500 of them. This was too much to be endured; Flaminius imposed on them a fine of a talent for every soldier; and when they did not pay it, he collected the nearest troops and besieged Coronea (558). Now they betook themselves to entreaty; in fact, Flaminius desisted on the intercession of the Achæans and Athenians, exacting but a very moderate fine from those who were guilty; and although the Macedonian party remained continuously at the helm in the petty province, the Romans met their puerile opposition simply with the forbearance of superior power. In the rest of Greece Flaminius contented himself with exerting his influence, so far as he could do so without violence, over internal affairs, more especially in the case of the newly-freed communities; with placing the ascendancy in the councils and courts in the hands of the more wealthy and bringing the anti-Macedonian party to the helm; and with attaching as much as possible the civic commonwealths to the Roman interest, by adding everything, which in each community should have fallen by martial law to the Romans, to the common property of the city concerned. The work was finished in the spring of 560; Flaminius once more assembled the deputies of all the Greek communities at Corinth, exhorted them to a rational and moderate use of the freedom conferred on them, and requested as the only return for the kindness of the Romans, that they would within thirty days send to him the Italian captives who had been sold into Greece during the Hannibalic war. Then he evacuated the last fortresses, in which Roman garrisons were stationed, Demetrias, Chalcis along with the smaller forts dependent upon it in Eubœa, and Acrocorinthus—thus practically giving the lie to the assertion of the Ætolians that Rome had inherited from Philip the “fetters” of Greece—and departed homeward with all the Roman troops and the liberated captives.

196.

194.

It is only contemptible disingenuousness, or weakly senti- Results.
mentality, which can fail to perceive that the Romans were

entirely in earnest in the liberation of Greece ; and the reason, why the plan so nobly projected resulted in so wretched a structure, is to be sought only in the complete moral and political disorganization of the Hellenic nation. It was no small matter, that a mighty nation should have suddenly with its powerful arm brought the land, which it had been accustomed to regard as its primitive home and as the shrine of its intellectual and higher interests, into the possession of full freedom, and should have conferred on every community in it deliverance from foreign taxation and foreign garrisons and the unlimited right of self-government ; it is mere paltriness that sees in this nothing save political calculation. Political calculation suggested to the Romans the possibility of liberating Greece ; it was converted into a reality by the Hellenic sympathies that were at that time indescribably powerful in Rome, and above all in Flamininus himself. If the Romans are liable to any reproach, it is that all of them, and in particular Flamininus who overcame the well-founded scruples of the senate, allowed the magic charm of the Hellenic name to prevent them from perceiving in all its extent the wretched character of the Greek states of that period, and from putting a stop at once to the proceedings of communities who, owing to the impotent antipathies that prevailed alike in their internal and their mutual relations, neither knew how to act nor how to keep quiet. As things stood, it was really necessary at once to put an end to such a freedom, equally pitiful and pernicious, by means of a superior power permanently present on the spot ; the feeble policy of sentiment, with all its apparent humanity, was far more cruel than the sternest occupation would have been. In Boeotia for instance Rome had, if not to instigate, at least to permit, a political murder, because the Romans had resolved to withdraw their troops from Greece and, consequently, could not prevent the Greeks friendly to Rome from seeking their remedy in the usual manner of the country. But Rome herself also suffered from the effects of this indecision. The war with Antiochus would not have arisen but for the political blunder of liberating Greece, and it would not have been dangerous but for the military blunder of withdrawing the garrisons from the principal fortresses on the European frontier. History has a Nemesis for every sin—for an impotent craving after freedom, as well as for an injudicious generosity.

CHAPTER IX.

THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA.

IN the kingdom of Asia the diadem of the Seleucidæ had been worn since 531 by king Antiochus the Third, the great-great-grandson of the founder of the dynasty. He had, like Philip, begun to reign at nineteen years of age, and had displayed sufficient energy and enterprise, especially in his first campaigns in the East, to warrant his being without ludicrous impropriety addressed in courtly style as "the Great." He had succeeded—more, however, through the negligence of his opponents and of the Egyptian Philopator in particular, than through any ability of his own—in restoring in some degree the integrity of the monarchy, and in reuniting with his crown, first, the eastern satrapies of Media and Parthyene, and then the separate state which Achæus had founded on this side of the Taurus in Asia Minor. A first attempt to wrest from the Egyptians the coast of Syria, the loss of which he sorely felt, had, in the year of the battle of the Trasimene Lake, met with a bloody repulse from Philopator at Raphia; and Antiochus had taken good care not to resume the contest with Egypt, so long as a man—even though he were but an indolent one—occupied the Egyptian throne. But, after Philopator's death (549), the right moment for crushing Egypt appeared to have arrived; and with that view Antiochus entered into concert with Philip, and had thrown himself upon Cœle-Syria while Philip attacked the cities of Asia Minor. When the Romans interposed in that quarter, it seemed for a moment as if Antiochus would make common cause with Philip against them—the course dictated by the position of

Antiochus
the Great.
223.

205.

198. affairs, as well as by the treaty of alliance. But, not far-seeing enough to repel at once with all his energy any interference whatever by the Romans in the affairs of the East, Antiochus thought that his best course was to take advantage of the subjugation of Philip by the Romans (which might easily be foreseen), in order to secure the kingdom of Egypt, which he had previously been willing to share with Philip, for himself alone. Notwithstanding the intimate relations of Rome with the court of Alexandria and her royal ward, the senate by no means intended to be in reality, what it was in name, his "guardian;" firmly resolved to give itself no concern about Asiatic affairs except in case of extreme necessity, and to limit the sphere of the Roman power by the Pillars of Hercules and the Hellespont, it allowed the Great King to take his course. He himself did not probably contemplate in earnest the conquest of Egypt proper—which was more easily talked of than achieved—but he contemplated the subjugation of the foreign possessions of Egypt one after another, and at once attacked those in Cilicia as well as in Syria and Palestine. The great victory, which he gained in 556 over the Egyptian general Scopas at Mount Panium near the sources of the Jordan, not only gave him complete possession of that region as far as the frontier of Egypt proper, but so terrified the Egyptian guardians of the young king that, to prevent Antiochus from invading Egypt, they submitted to a peace and sealed it by the betrothal of their ward to Cleopatra the daughter of Antiochus. When he had thus achieved his first object, he proceeded in the following year, that of the battle of Cynoscephalæ, with a strong fleet of 100 decked and 100 open vessels to Asia Minor, to take possession of the districts that formerly belonged to Egypt on the south and west coast of Asia Minor—it is probable that the Egyptian government had ceded these districts, which were actually in the hands of Philip, to Antiochus under the peace, and had renounced their foreign possessions generally in Antiochus' favour,—and to recover the Greeks of Asia Minor as a whole to his empire. At the same time a strong Syrian land-army assembled in Sardes.

Difficulties
with Rome. This enterprise had an indirect bearing on the Romans, who from the first had demanded that Philip should withdraw his garrisons from Asia Minor and should leave to the Rhodians and Pergamenes their territory and to the free

cities their former constitution unimpaired, and who had now to witness Antiochus taking possession of them in Philip's place. Attalus and the Rhodians found themselves now directly threatened by Antiochus with precisely the same danger as had driven them a few years before into the war with Philip; and they naturally sought to involve the Romans in this war as well as in that which had just terminated. Already in 555-6 Attalus had requested from the Romans military aid against Antiochus, who had occupied his territory while the troops of Attalus were employed in the Roman war. The more energetic Rhodians even declared to king Antiochus, when in the spring of 557 his fleet appeared off the coast of Asia Minor, that they would regard its passing beyond the Chelidonian islands (off the Lycian coast) as a declaration of war; and, when Antiochus did not regard the threat, they, emboldened by the accounts that had just arrived of the battle of Cynoscephalæ, had immediately begun the war and had actually protected against the king the most important of the Carian cities, Caunus, Halicarnassus, and Myndus, and the island of Samos. Most of the half-free cities had submitted to Antiochus, but some of them, more especially the important cities of Smyrna, Alexandria Troas, and Lampsacus, had, on learning the discomfiture of Philip, likewise taken courage to resist the Syrian; and their urgent entreaties were combined with those of the Rhodians.

199-198.

197.

It admits of no doubt, that Antiochus, so far as he was at all capable of forming a resolution and adhering to it, had already made up his mind not only to attach to his empire the Egyptian possessions in Asia, but also to make conquests on his own behalf in Europe and, if not to seek, at any rate to risk on that account a war with Rome. The Romans had thus every reason to comply with that request of their allies, and to interfere directly in Asia; but they showed little inclination to do so. They not only delayed as long as the Macedonian war lasted, and gave to Attalus nothing but the protection of diplomacy (which, so far, proved in the first instance effective); but even after their victory, while they spoke as though the cities which had been in the hands of Ptolemy and Philip ought not to be taken possession of by Antiochus, and while the freedom of the Asiatic cities, Abydos, Cius, and Myrina, figured in Roman documents, they took not the smallest step to give effect to

136. it, and allowed king Antiochus to employ the favourable opportunity presented by the withdrawal of the Macedonian garrisons to introduce his own. In fact, they even went so far as to submit to his landing in Europe in the spring of 558 and invading the Thracian Chersonese, where he occupied Sestus and Madytus and spent a considerable time in the chastisement of the Thracian barbarians and the restoration of the destroyed Lysimachia, which he had selected as his chief stronghold and as the capital of the newly instituted satrapy of Thrace. Flamininus indeed, who was intrusted with the conduct of these affairs, sent to the king at Lysimachia envoys, who talked of the integrity of the Egyptian territory and of the freedom of all the Hellenes; but nothing came of it. The king talked in reply of his undoubted legal title to the ancient kingdom of Lysimachus conquered by his ancestor Seleucus, explained that he was employed not in making territorial acquisitions but only in preserving the integrity of his hereditary dominions, and declined the intervention of the Romans in his disputes with the cities subject to him in Asia Minor. With justice he was enabled to add that peace had already been concluded with Egypt, and that the Romans were thus deprived of any formal pretext for interfering.* The sudden return of the king to Asia occasioned by a false report of the death of the young king of Egypt, and the projects which it suggested of a landing in Cyprus or even at Alexandria, led to the breaking off of the conferences without coming to any conclusion, still less producing any result.
195. In the following year, 559, Antiochus returned to Lysimachia with his fleet and army reinforced, and employed himself in organizing the new satrapy which he destined for his son Seleucus. Hannibal, who had been obliged to flee from Carthage, came to him at Ephesus; and the singularly honourable reception accorded to the exile was equivalent to a declaration of war against Rome.
194. Nevertheless Flamininus in the spring of 560 withdrew all the Roman garrisons from Greece. This was under the existing circumstances at least a mischievous error, if not a criminal

* The definite testimony of Hieronymus, who places the betrothal of the Syrian princess Cleopatra with Ptolemy Epiphanes in 556, taken in connection with the hints in Liv. xxxiii. 40 and Appian. *Syr.* 3, and with the actual accomplishment of the marriage in 561, puts it beyond a doubt that the interference of the Romans in the affairs of Egypt was in this case formally unprovoked.

acting in opposition to his own better knowledge; for we cannot dismiss the idea that Flamininus, in order to carry home with him the undiminished glory of having wholly terminated the war and liberated Hellas, contented himself with superficially covering up for the time the smouldering embers of revolt and war. The Roman statesman might perhaps be right, when he pronounced any attempt to bring Greece directly under the dominion of the Romans, and any intervention of the Romans in Asiatic affairs, to be a political blunder; but the opposition fermenting in Greece, the feeble arrogance of the Asiatic king, the residence, at the Syrian head-quarters, of the bitter enemy of the Romans who had already raised the west in arms against Rome—all these were clear signs of the imminence of a fresh appeal to arms on the part of the Hellenic East, which would necessarily seek at least to transfer Greece from the clientship of Rome to that of the states opposed to Rome, and, if that object should be attained, would immediately extend the circle of its operations. It is plain that Rome could not allow this to take place. When Flamininus, ignoring all these sure indications of war, withdrew the garrisons from Greece, and yet at the same time made demands on the king of Asia which he had no intention of employing his army to support, he overdid his part in words as much as he fell short in action, and forgot his duty as a general and as a citizen in the indulgence of his personal vanity—a vanity which wished to enjoy the credit of having conferred peace on Rome and freedom on the Greeks of both continents.

Antiochus employed the unexpected respite in strengthening his position at home and his relations with his neighbours before beginning the war—in which he was the more resolved to engage, the more the enemy appeared to procrastinate. He now (561) gave his daughter Cleopatra, previously betrothed, in marriage to the young king of Egypt. That he at the same time promised to restore the provinces wrested from his son-in-law, was afterwards affirmed on the part of Egypt, but probably without warrant; at any rate the land remained actually attached to the Syrian kingdom.* He offered to restore to Eumenes,

Preparations of Antiochus for war with Rome. 193.

* For this we have the testimony of Polybius (xxviii. 1), which the sequel of the history of Judæa completely confirms; Eusebius (p. 117, *Mat*) is mistaken in making Philometor ruler of Syria. We certainly find that about

197. who had in 557 succeeded his father Attalus on the throne of Pergamus, the towns taken from him, and to give him also one of his daughters in marriage, if he would abandon the Roman alliance. In like manner he bestowed a daughter on Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, and gained the Galatians by presents, while he reduced by arms the Pisidians who were constantly in revolt, and other small tribes. Extensive privileges were granted to the Byzantines; respecting the cities in Asia Minor, the king declared that he would concede the independence of the old free cities such as Rhodes and Cyzicus, and would be content in the case of the others with a mere formal recognition of his supremacy; indeed, he gave them to understand that he was ready to submit to the arbitration of the Rhodians. In European Greece he could safely count on the Ætoli-ans, and he hoped to induce Philip again to take up arms. In fact, a plan of Hannibal obtained the royal approval, according to which he was to receive from Antiochus a fleet of 100 sail and a land army of 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, and was to employ them in kindling first a third Punic war in Carthage, and then a second Hannibalic war in Italy; Tyrian emissaries proceeded to Carthage to pave the way for an appeal to arms there (P. 203). Finally, good results were anticipated from the Spanish insurrection, which, at the time when Hannibal left Carthage, was at its height (P. 210).

Ætolian in-
trigues
against
Rome.

While the storm was thus gathering from far and wide against Rome, it was on this, as on all occasions, the Hellenes implicated in the enterprise, who, while they were of least moment, took the most important steps and acted with the utmost impatience. The exasperated and arrogant Ætoli-ans began by degrees to persuade themselves that Philip had been vanquished by them and not by the Romans, and could not even wait till Antiochus should advance into Greece. Their policy is briefly expressed in the reply, which their *strategus* gave soon afterwards to Flamininus, when he requested a copy of the declaration of war against Rome: that he would deliver it to him in person, when the Ætolian army should

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187. 567 farmers of the Syrian taxes made their payments at Alexandria (Joseph. xii. 4, 7); but this doubtless took place, without detriment to the rights of sovereignty, simply because the dowry of Cleopatra constituted a charge on those revenues; and from this very circumstance probably arose the subsequent dispute.

encamp by the Tiber. The Ætolians acted as the agents of the Syrian king in Greece and deceived both parties, by representing to the king that all the Hellenes were waiting with open arms to receive him as their true deliverer, and by telling those in Greece who were disposed to listen to them that the landing of the king was nearer than it was in reality. Thus they actually succeeded in inducing the foolish selfishness of Nabis to throw off the mask and to rekindle in Greece the flame of war two years after Flaminius's departure, in the spring of 562; but in doing so they missed their aim. Nabis attacked Gythium, one of the towns of the free Laconians that by the last treaty had been annexed to the Achæan league, and took it; but the experienced *strategus* of the Achæans, Philopœmen, defeated him at the Barbothenian mountains, and the tyrant brought back barely a fourth part of his army to his capital, in which Philopœmen shut him up. As such a commencement was no sufficient inducement for Antiochus to come to Europe, the Ætolians resolved to possess themselves of Sparta, Chalcis, and Demetrias, and by gaining these important towns to prevail upon the king to embark. In the first place they thought to become masters of Sparta, by arranging that the Ætolian Alexamenus should march with 1000 men into the town under pretext of bringing a contingent in terms of the alliance, and should embrace the opportunity of making away with Nabis and of occupying the town. This was done, and Nabis was killed at a review of the troops; but, when the Ætolians dispersed to plunder the town, the Lacedæmonians found time to rally and slew them to a man. The city was then induced by Philopœmen to join the Achæan league. This laudable project of the Ætolians had thus not only deservedly failed, but had precisely the opposite effect of uniting almost the whole Peloponnesus in the hands of the other party. It fared little better with them at Chalcis, for the Roman party there called in the citizens of Eretria and Carystus in Eubœa, who were favourable to Rome, to render seasonable aid against the Ætolians and the Chalcidian exiles. On the other hand the occupation of Demetrias was successful, for the Magnetes to whom the city had been assigned were, not without reason, apprehensive that it had been promised by the Romans to Philip as a prize in return for his aid against Antiochus; several squadrons of Ætolian horse moreover managed to

steal into the town under the pretext of escorting Eurylochus, the recalled head of the opposition to Rome. Thus the Magnetes passed over, partly of their own accord, partly by compulsion, to the side of the Ætolians, and the latter did not fail to make good use of the fact at the court of the Seleucide.

Rupture
between
Antiochus
and the
Romans.
193

192.

192.

192.

Antiochus took his resolution. A rupture with Rome, in spite of endeavours to postpone it by the diplomatic expedient of embassies, could no longer be avoided. Already in the spring of 561 Flamininus, who continued to have a decisive voice in the senate as to eastern affairs, had expressed the Roman ultimatum to the envoys of the king, Menippus and Hegesianax; viz., that he should either evacuate Europe and dispose of Asia at his pleasure, or retain Thrace and submit to a Roman protectorate over Smyrna, Lampsacus, and Alexandria Troas. These demands had been again discussed at Ephesus, the chief stronghold and head-quarters of the king in Asia Minor, in the spring of 562, between Antiochus and the envoys of the senate, Publius Sulpicius and Publius Villius; and they had separated with the conviction on both sides that a peaceful settlement was no longer possible. Thenceforth war was resolved on in Rome. In that very summer of 562 a Roman fleet of 30 sail, with 3000 soldiers on board, under Aulus Atilius Serranus appeared off Glythium, where their arrival accelerated the conclusion of the treaty between the Achæans and Spartans; the eastern coasts of Sicily and Italy were strongly garrisoned, so as to be secure against any attempts at a landing; a land army was expected in Greece in the autumn. In the spring of 562 Flamininus, by direction of the senate, had proceeded to Greece to thwart the intrigues of the opposite party, and to counteract as far as possible the evil effects of the ill-timed evacuation of the country. The Ætolians had already gone so far as formally to declare war in their diet against Rome. Flamininus succeeded in preserving Chalcis to the Romans by throwing into it a garrison of 500 Achæans and 500 Pergamenes. He made an attempt also to recover Demetrias; and the Magnetes wavered. Though some towns in Asia Minor, which Antiochus had proposed to subdue before beginning the great war, still held out, he could no longer delay his landing, unless he was willing to let the Romans recover all the advantages which they had surrendered two years before by

withdrawing their garrisons from Greece. He collected the vessels and troops which were at hand—he had but 40 decked vessels and 10,000 infantry, along with 500 horse and 6 elephants—and started from the Thracian Chersonese for Greece, where he landed in the autumn of 562 at Pteleum on the Pagasæan gulf, and immediately occupied the adjoining Demetrias. About the same time a Roman army of nearly 25,000 men under the prætor Marcus Bæbius landed at Apollonia. The war was thus begun on both sides. 192.

Everything depended on the extent to which that comprehensive planned coalition against Rome, of which Antiochus came forward as the head, would be realized. As to the plan, first of all, of stirring up enemies to the Romans in Carthage and Italy, it was the fate of Hannibal at the court of Ephesus, as through his whole career, to have projected his grand and noble schemes for the behoof of people narrow-minded and mean. Nothing was done towards their execution, except that some Carthaginian patriots were compromised; no choice was left to the Carthaginians but to show unconditional submission to Rome. The camarilla would have nothing to do with Hannibal—he was too inconveniently great for court cabals; and, after having tried all sorts of absurd expedients—such as accusing the general, with whose name the Romans frightened their children, of concert with the Roman envoys—they succeeded in persuading Antiochus the Great, who like all insignificant monarchs plumed himself greatly on his independence and was influenced by nothing so easily as by the fear of being ruled, into the wise belief that he ought not to allow himself to be thrown into the shade by that illustrious man. Accordingly it was in solemn council resolved that the Phœnician should be employed in future only for subordinate enterprises and for giving advice—with the reservation, of course, that that advice should never be followed. Hannibal revenged himself on the mob of courtiers, by accepting every commission and brilliantly executing all.

In Asia Cappadocia adhered to the Great King; Prusias of Bithynia on the other hand took, as usual, the side of the stronger. King Eumenes remained faithful to the old policy of his house, which was now at length to yield to him its true fruit. He had not only persisted in refusing the offers of Antiochus, but had constantly urged the

Attitude of
the minor
powers.
Carthage
and Hanni-
bal.

States of
Asia Minor.

Romans to a war, from which he anticipated the aggrandizement of his kingdom. The Rhodians and Byzantines likewise joined their old allies. Egypt too took the side of Rome and offered support in supplies and men; which, however, the Romans did not accept.

Macedonia.

In Europe the result mainly depended on the position which Philip of Macedon would take up. True policy ought perhaps to have induced him, notwithstanding all the injuries or short-comings of the past, to unite with Antiochus. But Philip was ordinarily influenced not by such considerations, but by his likings and dislikings; and his hatred was naturally directed much more against the faithless ally, who had left him to contend alone with the common enemy, had sought merely to seize his own share in the spoil, and had become a burdensome neighbour to him in Thrace, than against the conqueror, who had treated him respectfully and honourably. Antiochus had, moreover, given deep offence to the hot temper of Philip by the setting up of absurd pretenders to the Macedonian crown, and by the ostentatious burial of the Macedonian bones bleaching at Cynoscephalæ. Philip therefore placed his whole force with cordial zeal at the disposal of the Romans.

The lesser
Greek
States.

The second power of Greece, the Achæan league, adhered no less decidedly than the first to the alliance with Rome. Of the smaller powers, the Thessalians and the Athenians held by Rome; among the latter an Achæan garrison introduced by Flamininus into the citadel brought the patriotic party, which was somewhat numerous, to reason. The Epirots exerted themselves to keep on good terms, if possible, with both parties. Thus, in addition to the Ætolians and the Magnetes who were joined by a portion of the neighbouring Perhæbians, Antiochus was supported only by Amynder, the weak king of the Athamanes, who allowed himself to be dazzled by foolish designs on the Macedonian crown; by the Boeotians, among whom the party opposed to Rome was still at the helm; and by the Eleans and Messenians in the Peloponnesus, who were in the habit of taking part with the Ætolians against the Achæans. This was indeed a hopeful beginning; and the title of commander-in-chief with absolute power, which the Ætolians decreed to the Great King, seemed insult added to injury. There had been, just as usual, lying on both sides. Instead of the countless hordes of Asia, the king brought up a force scarcely half as strong as

an ordinary consular army; and instead of the open arms with which all the Hellenes were to welcome their deliverer from the Roman yoke, one or two sets of klephts and some dissolute city train-bands fraternized with the king.

For the moment, indeed, Antiochus anticipated the Ro- Antiochus
in Greece.
mans in Greece proper. Chalcis was garrisoned by the Greek allies of the Romans, and refused the first summons; but the fortress surrendered when Antiochus advanced with all his force; and a Roman division, which arrived too late to occupy it, was annihilated by Antiochus at Delium. Eubœa was thus lost to the Romans. Antiochus also made an attempt in winter, in concert with the Ætolians and Acarnanians, to gain Thessaly; Thermopylæ was occupied, Pheræ and other towns were taken, but Appius Claudius came up with 2000 men from Apollonia, relieved Larisa, and took up his position there. Antiochus tired of the winter campaign preferred to return to his pleasant quarters at Chalcis, where he spent his time merrily, and even, in spite of his fifty years and his warlike schemes, married a fair Chalcidian. So the winter of 562-3 passed, without Antio- 192-191
chus doing much more than sending letters hither and thither through Greece: a Roman officer remarked, that he waged war by means of pen and ink.

In the beginning of spring 563 the Roman staff arrived at Apollonia. The commander-in-chief was Manius Acilius Gla- 191.
Landing of
the Romans.
brius, a man of humble origin, but an able general dreaded both by his soldiers and by the enemy; the admiral was Gaius Livius; and among the military tribunes were Marcus Porcius Cato, the conqueror of Spain, and Lucius Valerius Flaccus, who after the old Roman wont did not disdain, although they had been consuls, to re-enter the army as simple commandants of legions. They brought with them reinforcements in ships and men, including Numidian cavalry and Libyan elephants sent by Massinissa, and the permission of the senate to accept auxiliary troops to the number of 5000 from the extra-Italian allies, so that the whole number of the Roman forces was raised to about 40,000 men. The king, who in the beginning of spring had gone to Ætolia and had thence made an aimless expedition to Acarnania, on learning the arrival of Glabrio, returned to his head-quarters to begin the campaign in earnest. But through his own inconceivable negligence and that of his lieutenants in Asia no reinforcements reached him, so that he had nothing but the

weak army—now further decimated by sickness and desertion in its dissolute winter-quarters—with which he had landed at Pteleum in the autumn of the previous year. The Ætolians too, who had professed to send such enormous numbers into the field, now, when their support was of moment, brought to their commander-in-chief no more than 4000 men. The Roman troops had already begun operations in Thessaly, where the vanguard in concert with the Macedonians drove the garrisons of Antiochus out of the Thessalian towns and occupied the territory of the Athamans. The consul with the main army followed; the whole force of the Romans assembled at Larisa.

Battle at
Thermopy-
læ.

Instead of returning with all speed to Asia and evacuating the field before an enemy in every respect superior, Antiochus resolved to entrench himself at Thermopylæ, which he had occupied, and there to await the arrival of the great army from Asia. He himself took up a position in the principal pass, and commanded the Ætolians to occupy the heights, by which Xerxes had formerly succeeded in turning the Spartans. But only half of the Ætolian contingent thought fit to comply with this command of the general; the other 2000 men threw themselves into the neighbouring town of Heraclea, where they took no other part in the battle than that of attempting during its progress to surprise and plunder the Roman camp. Even the Ætolians posted on the heights discharged their duty of watching with remissness and reluctance; their post on the Callidromus allowed itself to be surprised by Cato, and the Asiatic phalanx, which the consul had meanwhile assailed in front, dispersed, when the Romans hastening down the mountain fell upon its flank. As Antiochus had made no provision for any case and had not thought of retreat, the army was destroyed partly on the field of battle, partly during its flight; with difficulty a small band reached Demetrias, and the king himself escaped to Chalcis with 500 men. He embarked in haste for Ephesus; Europe was lost to him all but his possessions in Thrace, and even the fortresses could be no longer defended. Chalcis surrendered to the Romans, and Demetrias to Philip, who received permission—as a compensation for the conquest of the town of Lamia in Achaia Phthiotis which he was on the point of accomplishing and then abandoned by orders of the consul—to make himself master of all the communities that had gone over to An-

Greece oc-
cupied by
the Romans.

tiochus in Thessaly proper, and even of the territories bordering on Ætolia, the districts of Dolopia and Aperantia. All the Greeks that had pronounced in favour of Antiochus hastened to make their peace; the Epirots humbly besought pardon for their ambiguous conduct, the Boeotians surrendered at discretion, the Eleans and Messenians, the latter after some struggle, submitted to the Achæans. The prediction of Hannibal to the king was fulfilled, that no dependence at all could be placed upon the Greeks who would submit to any conqueror. Even the Ætolians, when their corps shut up in Heraclea had been compelled after obstinate resistance to capitulate, attempted to make their peace with the sorely provoked Romans; but the stringent demands of the Roman consul, and a consignment of money seasonably arriving from Antiochus, emboldened them once more to break off the negotiations and to sustain for two whole months a siege in Naupactus. The town was already reduced to extremities, and its capture or capitulation could not have been long delayed, when Flamininus, constantly striving to save every Hellenic community from the worst consequences of its own folly and from the severity of his ruder colleagues, interposed and arranged, in the first instance, an armistice on tolerable terms. This terminated, at least for the present, all resistance in Greece.

Resistance
of the
Ætolians.

A more serious war was impending in Asia—a war which appeared to the Romans of a very hazardous character, on account not so much of the enemy, as of the great distance and the insecurity of the communications with home, while yet, owing to the short-sighted selfishness of Antiochus, the struggle could not well be terminated otherwise than by such an attack on the enemy in his own country. The first object was to secure the sea. The Roman fleet, which during the campaign in Greece was charged with the task of interrupting the communications between Greece and Asia Minor, and which had been successful about the time of the battle at Thermopylæ in seizing a strong Asiatic transport fleet near Andros, was thereafter employed in making preparations for the crossing of the Romans to Asia next year and first of all in driving the enemy's fleet out of the Ægean sea. It lay in the harbour of Cyssus on the southern shore of the tongue of land that projects from Ionia towards Chios; thither the Roman fleet proceeded in search of it, consisting of 75 Roman, 24 Pergamene, and 6

Maritime
war, and
prepara-
tions for
crossing
to Asia.

Carthaginian, decked vessels under the command of Gaius Livius. The Syrian admiral, Polyxenidas, a Rhodian emigrant, had only 70 decked vessels to oppose to it; but, as the Roman fleet still expected the ships of Rhodes, and as Polyxenidas relied on the superior naval quality of his vessels, those of Tyre and Sidon in particular, he immediately accepted battle. At the outset the Asiatics succeeded in sinking one of the Carthaginian vessels; but, when they came to grapple, Roman valour prevailed, and it was owing solely to the swiftness of their oaring and sailing that the enemy lost no more than 23 ships. During the pursuit the Roman fleet was joined by 25 ships from Rhodes, and the superiority of the Romans in those waters was now doubly decisive. The enemy's fleet thenceforth kept the shelter of the harbour of Ephesus, and, as it could not be induced to risk a second battle, the Roman and allied fleet broke up for the winter; the Roman ships of war proceeded to the harbour of Cane in the neighbourhood of Pergamus.

Both parties were busy during the winter in preparing for the next campaign. The Romans sought to gain over the Greeks of Asia Minor; Smyrna, which had perseveringly resisted all the attempts of the king to get possession of it, received the Romans with open arms, and the Roman party gained the ascendancy in Samos, Chios, Erythræ, Clazomenæ, Phocæa, Cyme, and other places. Antiochus was resolved, if possible, to prevent the Romans from crossing to Asia, and with that view he made zealous naval preparations—ordering Polyxenidas on the one hand to fit out and augment the fleet stationed at Ephesus, and Hannibal on the other to equip a new fleet in Lycia, Syria, and Phœnicia; while he further collected in Asia Minor a powerful land army from all regions of his extensive empire. Early next
190. year (564) the Roman fleet resumed its operations. Gaius Livius left the Rhodian fleet—which had appeared in good time this year, numbering 36 sail—to observe that of the enemy in the offing of Ephesus, and proceeded with the greater portion of the Roman and Pergamene vessels to the Hellespont in accordance with his instructions, to pave the way for the passage of the land army by the capture of the fortresses there. Sestus was already occupied and Abydos reduced to extremities, when the news of the defeat of the Rhodian fleet recalled him. The Rhodian admiral Pausistratus, lulled into security by the representations of his

countryman that he wished to desert from Antiochus, had allowed himself to be surprised in the harbour of Samos ; he himself fell, and all his vessels were destroyed except five Rhodian and two Coan ships ; Samos, Phocæa, and Cyme on hearing the news went over to Seleucus, who held the chief command by land in those provinces for his father. But when the Roman fleet arrived partly from Cane, partly from the Hellespont, and was after some time joined by twenty new ships of the Rhodians at Samos, Polyxenidas was once more compelled to shut himself up in the harbour of Ephesus. As he declined the offered naval battle, and as, owing to the small numbers of the Roman force, an attack by land was out of the question, nothing remained for the Roman fleet but to take up its position in like manner at Samos. A division meanwhile proceeded to Patara on the Lycian coast, partly to relieve the Rhodians from the very troublesome attacks that were from that point directed against them, partly and chiefly to prevent the hostile fleet, which Hannibal was expected to bring up, from entering the *Ægean* sea. When the squadron sent against Patara achieved nothing, the new admiral Lucius *Æmilius* Regillus, who had arrived with 20 war-vessels from Rome and had relieved *Gaius* Livius at Samos, was so indignant that he proceeded thither with the whole fleet ; his officers with difficulty succeeded, while they were on their voyage, in making him understand that the primary object was not the conquest of Patara, but the command of the *Ægean* sea, and in inducing him to return to Samos. On the main land Seleucus had in the meanwhile begun the siege of Pergamus, while Antiochus with his main army ravaged the Pergamene territory and the possessions of the *Mytilenæans* on the mainland ; they hoped to crush the hated *Attalids*, before Roman aid appeared. The Roman fleet was sent to *Elæa* and the port of *Adramyttium* to help their ally ; but, as the admiral wanted troops, he accomplished nothing. Pergamus seemed lost ; but the laxity and negligence with which the siege was conducted allowed *Eumenes* to throw into the city *Achæan* auxiliaries under *Diophanes*, whose bold and successful sallies compelled the *Gallic* mercenaries, whom Antiochus had intrusted with the siege, to raise it. In the southern waters too the projects of Antiochus were frustrated. The fleet equipped and led by Hannibal, after having been long detained by the constant

190. westerly winds, attempted at length to reach the *Ægean*; but at the mouth of the *Eurymedon*, off *Aspendus* in *Pamphylia*, it encountered a *Rhodian* squadron under *Eudamus*; and in the battle, which ensued between the two fleets, the excellence of the *Rhodian* ships and naval officers carried the victory over *Hannibal's* tactics and his numerical superiority. It was the first naval battle, and the last battle against *Rome*, fought by the great *Carthaginian*. The victorious *Rhodian* fleet then took its station at *Patara*, and there prevented the intended junction of the two *Asiatic* fleets. In the *Ægean* sea, the *Romano-Rhodian* fleet at *Samos*, after being weakened by detaching the *Pergamene* ships to the *Hellespont* to support the land army which had arrived there, was now in turn attacked by that of *Polyxenidas*, who now numbered nine sail more than his opponents. On December 23 of the uncorrected calendar, according to the corrected calendar about the end of August, in 564, the battle took place at the promontory of *Myonnesus* between *Teos* and *Colophon*; the *Romans* broke through the line of the enemy, and totally surrounded the left wing, so that they took or sank 42 ships. An inscription in *Saturnian* verse over the temple of the *Lares Permarini*, which was built in the *Campus Martius* in memory of this victory, for many centuries thereafter proclaimed to the *Romans* how the fleet of the *Asiatics* had been defeated before the eyes of king *Antiochus* and of all his land army, and how the *Romans* thus "settled the mighty strife and subdued the kings." Thenceforth the enemy's ships no longer ventured to show themselves on the open sea, and made no further attempt to impede the crossing of the *Roman* land army.

Expedition
to Asia.

The conqueror of *Zama* had been selected at *Rome* to conduct the war on the *Asiatic* continent; he practically exercised the supreme command in room of the nominal commander-in-chief, his brother *Lucius Scipio*, whose intellect was insignificant, and who had no military capacity. The reserve hitherto stationed in *Lower Italy* was destined for *Greece*, the army under *Glabrio* for *Asia*: when it became known who was to command it, 5000 veterans from the *Hannibalic* war voluntarily enrolled, to fight once more under their beloved leader. In the *Roman* July, but according to the true time in *March*, the *Scipios* arrived at the army to commence the *Asiatic* campaign; but they were

disagreeably surprised to find themselves involved, in the first instance, in an endless struggle with the desperate Ætolians. The senate, finding that Flaminius pushed his boundless consideration for the Hellenes too far, had left the Ætolians to choose between paying an utterly exorbitant war contribution and unconditional surrender, and thus had driven them anew to arms; none could tell, when this warfare among mountains and strongholds would come to an end. Scipio got rid of the inconvenient obstacle by granting a six-months' armistice, and then entered on his march to Asia. As the one fleet of the enemy was only blockaded in the Ægean sea, and the other, which was coming up from the south, might daily arrive there in spite of the squadron charged to intercept it, it seemed advisable to take the land route through Macedonia and Thrace and to cross the Hellespont. In that direction no real obstacles were to be anticipated; for Philip of Macedonia might be entirely depended on. Prusias, king of Bithynia, was in alliance with the Romans, and the Roman fleet could easily establish itself in the straits. The long and weary march along the coast of Macedonia and Thrace was accomplished without material loss; Philip made provision on the one hand for supplying their wants, on the other for their friendly reception by the Thracian barbarians. They had lost so much time however, partly with the Ætolians, partly on the march, that the army only reached the Thracian Chersonese about the time of the battle of Myonnesus. But the marvellous good fortune of Scipio now in Asia, as formerly in Spain and Africa, cleared his path of all difficulties. On the news of the battle of Myonnesus Antiochus so completely lost his judgment, that, in Europe, he caused the strongly-garrisoned and well-provisioned fortress of Lysimachia to be evacuated by the garrison and by the inhabitants who were faithfully devoted to the restorer of their city, but forgot even to withdraw the garrisons or to destroy the rich magazines at Ænus and Maronea; and, on the Asiatic coast, he opposed not the slightest resistance to the landing of the Romans, but on the contrary, while it was taking place, spent his time at Sardes in grumbling at his destiny. It is scarcely doubtful that, had he but provided for the defence of Lysimachia down to the no longer distant close of the summer, and moved forward his great army to the Hellespont, Scipio would have been compelled to take up winter quarter on

Passage of
the Helles-
pont by the
Romans.

the European shore, in a position far from being, in a military or political point of view, secure.

While the Romans, after disembarking on the Asiatic shore, paused for some days to refresh themselves and to await their leader who was detained behind by religious duties, ambassadors from the Great King arrived in their camp to negotiate for peace. Antiochus offered half the expenses of the war, and the cession of his European possessions as well as of all the Greek cities in Asia Minor that had gone over to Rome; but Scipio demanded the whole costs of the war and the surrender of all Asia Minor. The former terms, he declared, might have been accepted, had the army still been before Lysimachia, or even on the European side of the Hellespont; but they did not suffice now, when the steed felt the bit and knew its rider. The attempts of the Great King to purchase peace from his antagonist after the Oriental manner by sums of money—he offered the half of his year's revenues!—failed as they deserved; the proud burgess, in return for the gratuitous restoration of his son who had fallen a captive, rewarded the Great King with the friendly advice to make peace on any terms. This was not in reality necessary: had the king possessed the resolution to prolong the war and to draw the enemy after him by retreating into the interior, a favourable issue was still by no means impossible. But Antiochus, irritated by the probably intentional arrogance of his antagonist, and too indolent for any persevering and consistent warfare, hastened with the utmost eagerness to expose his unwieldy, unequal, and undisciplined mass of an army to the shock of the Roman legions.

Battle of
Magnesia.
190.

In the valley of the Hermus, near Magnesia at the foot of Mount Sipylus not far from Smyrna, the Roman troops fell in with the enemy late in the autumn of 564. The force of Antiochus numbered close on 80,000 men, of whom 12,000 were cavalry; the Romans—who had along with them about 5000 Achæans, Pergamenes, and Macedonian volunteers—had not nearly half that number, but they were so sure of victory, that they did not even await the recovery of their general who had remained behind sick at Elæa; Gnæus Domitius took the command in his stead. Antiochus, in order to be able even to dispose of his immense mass of troops, formed two divisions. In the first were placed the mass of the light troops, the peltasta, bowmen,

slingers, the mounted archers of the Mysians, Dahæ, and Elymæans, the Arabs on their dromedaries, and the scythe-chariots. In the second division the heavy cavalry (the Cataphractæ, a sort of cuirassiers) were stationed on the flanks; next to these, in the intermediate division, the Gallic and Cappadocian infantry; and in the very centre the phalanx armed after the Macedonian fashion, 16,000 strong, the flower of the army; which, however, had not room enough in the narrow space, and had to be drawn up in double files 82 deep. In the space between the two divisions were placed 54 elephants, distributed among the companies of the phalanx and of the heavy cavalry. The Romans stationed but few squadrons on the left wing, where the river gave protection; the mass of the cavalry and all the light armed were placed on the right, which was led by Eumenes; the legions stood in the centre. Eumenes began the battle by despatching his archers and slingers against the scythe-chariots with orders to shoot at the teams; in a short time not only were these thrown into disorder, but the camel-riders stationed next to them were also carried away, and even in the second line the left wing of heavy cavalry placed behind fell into confusion. Eumenes now threw himself with all the Roman cavalry, numbering 3000 horse, on the mercenary infantry, which was placed in the second line between the phalanx and the left wing of heavy cavalry, and, when these gave way, the cuirassiers who had already fallen into disorder also fled. The phalanx, which had just allowed the light troops to pass through and was preparing to advance against the Roman legions, was hampered by the attack of the cavalry in flank, and compelled to stand still and to form front on both sides—a movement which the depth of its disposition favoured. Had the heavy Asiatic cavalry been at hand, the battle might have been restored; but the left wing was shattered, and the right, led by Antiochus in person, had driven before it the little division of Roman cavalry opposed to it, and had reached the Roman camp, which was with great difficulty defended from its attack. In this way the cavalry were at the decisive moment absent from the scene of action. The Romans were careful not to assail the phalanx with their legions, but sent against it archers and slingers, not one of whose missiles failed to take effect on the densely crowded mass. The phalanx nevertheless retired slowly and in good order, till

the elephants stationed in the interstices became frightened and broke the ranks. Then the whole army dispersed in tumultuous flight; an attempt to hold the camp failed, and only increased the number of the dead and the prisoners. The estimate of the loss of Antiochus at 50,000 men is, considering the infinite confusion, not incredible; the legions of the Romans had never been engaged, and the victory, which gave them a third continent, cost them 24 horsemen and 300 foot soldiers. Asia Minor submitted; including even Ephesus, whence the admiral hastily withdrew his fleet, and Sardes the residence of the court.

Conclusion
of peace.

The king sued for peace and consented to the terms proposed by the Romans, which, as usual, were just the same as those offered before the battle and consequently included the cession of Asia Minor. Till they were ratified, the army remained in Asia Minor at the expense of the king; which came to cost him not less than 3000 talents (£732,000). Antiochus himself in his reckless fashion soon made a jest of losing half his kingdom; it was in keeping with his character, that he declared himself grateful to the Romans for saving him the trouble of governing too large a kingdom. But with the day of Magnesia Asia was erased from the list of great states; and never perhaps did a great power fall so rapidly, so thoroughly, and so ignominiously as the kingdom of the Seleucidæ under this Antiochus the Great.

187. He himself was soon afterwards (567) slain by the indignant inhabitants of Elymais at the head of the Persian gulf, on occasion of the plundering of a temple of Bel, with the treasures of which he had sought to replenish his empty coffers.

Expedition
against the
Celts of
Asia Minor.

After having obtained the victory, the Roman government had to regulate the affairs of Asia Minor and of Greece. In the former Antiochus was conquered, but his allies and satraps in the interior, the Phrygian, Cappadocian, and Paphlagonian dynasts, trusting to their distance, delayed their submission, and the Celts of Asia Minor, who had not strictly been in alliance with Antiochus but had merely after their custom allowed him to raise mercenaries in their land, in like manner saw no reason why they should trouble themselves about the Romans. To the new Roman commander-in-chief, Gnaeus Manlius Volso, who in the spring of 565 relieved Lucius Scipio in Asia Minor, this afforded a welcome pretext for his perform-

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ing in his turn a service to his country and asserting the Roman protectorate over the Hellenes in Asia, just as had been done already in Spain and Gaul; although the more austere men in the senate failed to see either ground or object for such a war. The consul started from Ephesus, levied contributions from the cities and princes on the upper Mæander and in Pamphylia without cause and without measure, and then turned northward against the Celts. The most westerly canton of these, the Tolistoboi, had retired with their property to Mount Olympus, and the middle canton, the Tectosages, to Mount Magaba, in the hope that they would be able to defend themselves there, till winter should compel the foreigners to retire. But the missiles of the Roman slingers and archers—which so often turned the scale against the Celts unacquainted with such weapons, somewhat in the same way as in modern times fire-arms have turned the scale against savage tribes—reached the heights, and the Celts succumbed in a battle, which was often paralleled both before and afterwards on the Po and on the Seine, but which in Asia appeared no less singular than the whole phenomenon of this northern race emerging amidst the Greek and Phrygian nations. The number of the slain at both places was very great, and that of the prisoners still greater. The survivors escaped over the Halys to the third Celtic canton of the Trocmi, whom the consul did not disturb, as he did not venture to cross the frontier agreed on in the preliminaries between Scipio and Antiochus.

The affairs of Asia Minor were regulated partly by the peace with Antiochus (565), partly by the ordinances of a Roman commission presided over by the consul Volso. Antiochus had to furnish hostages, one of whom was his younger son of the same name, and to pay a war-contribution—proportional in amount to the treasures of Asia—of 15,000 Euboic talents (£8,660,000), a fifth of which was to be paid at once and the remainder in twelve annual instalments. He was compelled, moreover, to cede all his possessions in Europe, and all the territory in Asia Minor to the west of the river Halys and of the mountain-chain of the Taurus, which separates Cilicia and Lycaonia, so that he retained nothing in the Anatolian peninsula but Cilicia. His protectorate over the kingdoms and principalities of Asia Minor of course ceased. Even beyond the Roman frontier Cappadocia assumed an independent attitude towards Asia

Regulation
of [189
Asiatic
affairs.

or Syria, as the kingdom of the Seleucidæ was now more commonly and appropriately called ; and not only so, but the satraps of the two Armenias, Artaxias and Zariadris, became transformed, under the influence of Rome if not exactly in conformity to the Roman treaty of peace, into independent kings and founders of new dynasties. The Syrian king forfeited the right of waging aggressive wars against the states of the west, or, in the event of a defensive war, of acquiring territory from them on the conclusion of peace. He was prohibited from navigating the sea to the west of the mouth of the Calycadnus in Cilicia with ships of war, except for the conveyance of envoys, hostages, or tribute ; from keeping more than ten decked vessels, except in the event of a defensive war ; from taming war-elephants ; and finally, from levying mercenaries in the western states, or receiving political fugitives and deserters from these states at his court. He gave up the vessels of war which he possessed beyond the prescribed number, the elephants, and the political refugees who had taken shelter with him. The Great King received, by way of compensation, the title of a friend of the Roman commonwealth. The state of Syria was thus by land and sea completely and for ever expelled from the west ; it is a significant indication of the feeble and loose organization of the kingdom of the Seleucidæ, that it alone, of all the great states conquered by Rome, never after the first conquest made a second appeal to the decision of arms.

Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, whose land lay beyond the boundary laid down by the Romans for their protectorate, escaped with a money fine of 600 talents (£146,000) ; which was afterwards, on the intercession of his son-in-law Eumenes, abated to half that sum.

Prusias, king of Bithynia, retained his territory as it stood, and so did the Celts ; but they were obliged to promise that they would no longer send armed bands beyond their bounds—a step which put an end to the disgraceful contributions, which many of the towns of Asia Minor had paid to them. Rome thus conferred on the Asiatic Greeks a real benefit, which they did not fail to repay with golden chaplets and transcendental panegyrics.

In the western portion of Asia Minor the regulation of the territorial arrangements was not without difficulty, especially as the dynastic policy of Eumenes there came into col-

The free
Greek
cities.

lision with that of the Greek Hansa. At last an understanding was arrived at to the following effect. All the Greek cities, which were free and had joined the Romans on the day of the battle of Magnesia, had their liberties confirmed, and all of them, excepting those previously tributary to Eumenes, were relieved from the payment of tribute to the different dynasts for the future. In this way the towns of Dardanus and Ilium, whose ancient affinity with the Romans was traced to the times of Æneas, became free, along with Cyme, Smyrna, Clazomenæ, Erythræ, Chios, Colophon, Miletus, and other names of old renown. Phocæa also, which in spite of its capitulation had been plundered by the soldiers of the Roman fleet—although it did not fall under the category designated in the treaty—received back, by way of compensation, its territory and its freedom. Most of the cities of the Græco-Asiatic Hansa acquired additions of territory and other advantages. Rhodes of course received most consideration; it obtained Lycia exclusive of Telmissus, and the greater part of Caria south of the Mæander; besides, Antiochus guaranteed the property and the claims of the Rhodians within his kingdom, as well as that exemption from customs-dues which they had hitherto enjoyed.

All the rest, forming by far the largest share of the spoil, fall to the Attalids, whose ancient fidelity to Rome, as well as the calamities endured by Eumenes in the war and his personal merit in connection with the issue of the decisive battle, were rewarded by Rome as no king ever rewarded his ally. Eumenes received, in Europe, the Chersonese with Lysimachia; in Asia—in addition to Mysia which he already possessed—the provinces of Phrygia on the Hellespont, Lydia with Ephesus and Sardes, the northern district of Caria to the Mæander with Tralles and Magnesia, Great Phrygia and Lycaonia along with a portion of Cilicia, the district of Milyas between Phrygia and Lycia, and, as a port on the southern sea, the Lycian town Telmissus. There was a dispute afterwards between Eumenes and Antiochus regarding Pamphylia, whether it lay on this side of or beyond the Taurus, and whether accordingly it belonged to the former or to the latter. Besides he acquired the sovereign protectorate over, and the right of receiving tribute from, those Greek cities which did not receive absolute freedom; but it was stipulated in this case that the cities should retain their charters, and that the tribute should not be heightened.

Extension
of the king-
dom of
Pergamus.

Moreover, Antiochus had to bind himself to pay to Eumenes the 350 talents (£85,000) which he owed to his father Attalus, and likewise to pay a compensation of 127 talents (£31,000) for arrears in the supplies of corn. Lastly, Eumenes obtained the royal forests and the elephants delivered up by Antiochus, but not the ships of war, which were burnt: the Romans tolerated no naval power by the side of their own. By these means the kingdom of the Attalids became in the east of Europe and Asia, what Numidia was in Africa, a powerful state with an absolute constitution dependent on Rome, destined and able to keep in check both Macedonia and Syria, without needing, except in extraordinary cases, Roman support. With this creation, dictated by policy, the Romans had as far as possible combined the liberation of the Asiatic Greeks, which was dictated by republican and national sympathy and by vanity. About the affairs of the more remote east, beyond the Taurus and Halys, they were firmly resolved to give themselves no concern. This is clearly shown by the terms of the peace with Antiochus, and still more decidedly by the peremptory refusal of the senate to guarantee to the town of Soli in Cilicia the freedom which the Rhodians requested for it. With equal fidelity they adhered to the fixed principle of acquiring no direct transmarine possessions. After the Roman fleet had made an expedition to Crete and had accomplished the release of the Romans sold thither into slavery, the fleet and land army left Asia towards the end of the summer of 566; on which occasion the land army, which again marched through Thrace, owing to the negligence of the general suffered greatly on the route from the attacks of the barbarians. The Romans brought nothing home from the East but honour and gold, which were, even at this period, usually conjoined in the practical shape assumed by the address of thanks—the golden chaplet.

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Settlement
of Greece.190
Conflicts
and peace
with the
Ætolians.

European Greece also had been agitated by this Asiatic war, and needed re-organization. The Ætolians, who had not yet learned to reconcile themselves to their insignificance, had, after the armistice concluded with Scipio in the spring of 564, rendered intercourse between Greece and Italy difficult and unsafe by means of their Cephallenian corsairs; and not only so, but even perhaps while the armistice yet lasted, they, deceived by false reports as to the state of things in Asia, had the folly to place Amynder once

more on his Athamanian throne, and to carry on a desultory warfare with Philip in the districts occupied by him on the borders of Ætolia and Thessaly, in the course of which Philip suffered several discomfitures. After this, as a matter of course, Rome replied to their request for peace by the landing of the consul, Marcus Fulvius Nobilior. He arrived among the legions in the spring of 565, and after a fifteen days' siege gained possession of Ambracia by a capitulation honourable for the garrison; while simultaneously the Macedonians, Illyrians, Epirots, Acarnanians, and Achæans fell upon the Ætolians. There was no such thing as resistance in the strict sense; after repeated entreaties of the Ætolians for peace the Romans at length desisted from the war, and granted conditions which must be reckoned reasonable when viewed with reference to such pitiful and malignant opponents. The Ætolians lost all cities and territories which were in the hands of their adversaries, more especially Ambracia which afterwards became free and independent in consequence of an intrigue concocted in Rome against Marcus Fulvius, and Cenia which was given to the Acarnanians; they likewise ceded Cephallenia. They lost the right of making peace and war, and were in that respect dependent on the foreign relations of Rome. Lastly, they paid a large sum of money. Cephallenia opposed this treaty on its own account, and only submitted when Marcus Fulvius landed on the island. In fact, the inhabitants of Same, who feared that they would be dispossessed from their well-situated town by a Roman colony, revolted after their first submission and sustained a four months' siege; the town, however, was finally taken and the inhabitants were sold *en masse* into slavery.

189.

In this case also Rome adhered to the principle of confining herself to Italy and the Italian islands. She took no portion of the spoil for herself, except the two islands of Cephallenia and Zacynthus, which formed a desirable supplement to the possession of Corcyra and other naval stations in the Adriatic. The rest of the territorial gain went to the allies of Rome. But the two most important of these, Philip and the Achæans, were by no means content with the share of the spoil granted to them. Philip felt himself aggrieved, and not without reason. He could safely affirm that the leading difficulties in the last war—difficulties which arose not from the character of the enemy, but from the

Macedonia

distance and the uncertainty of the communications—had been overcome mainly by his loyal aid. The senate recognized this, by remitting his arrears of tribute and sending back his hostages; but he did not receive those additions to his territory which he expected. He got the territory of the Magnetes, with Demetrias which he had taken from the Ætolians; besides, there practically remained in his hands the districts of the Dolopes and Athamanes and a part of Thessaly, from which also the Ætolians had been expelled by him. In Thrace the interior remained under Macedonian protection, but nothing was fixed as to the coast towns and the islands of Thasos and Lemnos which were *de facto* in Philip's hands, while the Chersonese was even expressly given to Eumenes; and it was not difficult to see that Eumenes received possessions in Europe, simply that he might in case of need keep not only Asia but Macedonia in check. The exasperation of the proud and in many respects chivalrous king was natural; it was not chicane, however, but an unavoidable political necessity that induced the Romans to take this course. Macedonia had to suffer as she did for having once been a power of the first rank, and for having waged war on equal terms with Rome; there was much better reason in her case than in that of Carthage for guarding against the revival of her former attitude of power.

The
Achæans.

It was otherwise with the Achæans. They had, in the course of the war with Antiochus, gratified their long cherished wish to include the whole Peloponnesus within their confederacy; for first Sparta, and then, after the expulsion of the Asiatics from Greece, Elis and Messene also, had more or less reluctantly joined it. The Romans had allowed this to take place, and had even tolerated the intentional disregard of Rome which marked their proceedings. When Messene declared that she wished to submit to the Romans but not to enter the confederacy, and the latter thereupon employed force, Flamininus had not failed to remind the Achæans that such separate arrangements as to the disposal of a part of the spoil were in themselves unjust, and were, in the relation in which the Achæans stood to the Romans, more than unseemly; but yet, through his very impolitic complaisance towards the Hellenes, he had substantially allowed the Achæans their will. But the matter did not end there. The Achæans, tormented by their

dwarfish desire for aggrandizement, would not relax their hold on the town of Pleuron in Ætolia which they had occupied during the war, but compelled it to become a member of their league; they bought Zacynthus from Amynander the lieutenant of the last possessor, and would gladly have acquired Ægina also. It was with reluctance that they gave up the former island to Rome, and they heard with great displeasure the good advice of Flamininus that they should content themselves with their Peloponnesus.

The Achæans believed it their duty to display the independence of their state all the more, the less they really had; they talked of the rights of war, and of the faithful aid of the Achæans in the wars of the Romans; they asked the Roman envoys at the Achæan diet why Rome should concern herself about Messene when Achaia put no questions as to Capua; and the spirited patriot, who had thus spoken, was applauded and was sure of votes at the elections. All this would have been very right and very dignified, had it not been much more ridiculous. There was a profound justice and a still more profound melancholy in the fact, that Rome, however earnestly she endeavoured to establish the freedom and to earn the thanks of the Hellenes, yet gave them nothing but anarchy, and reaped nothing but ingratitude. Undoubtedly very generous sentiments lay at the bottom of the Hellenic antipathy to the protecting power, and the personal bravery of the individual men who took the lead in the movement was unquestionable; but this Achæan patriotism remained not the less a folly, and a genuine historical caricature. With all that ambition and all that national sensibility, the whole nation was, from the highest to the lowest, pervaded by the most thorough sense of impotence. Every one was constantly listening to learn the sentiments of Rome, the liberal man no less than the servile: they thanked heaven, when the dreaded decree was not issued; they were sulky, when the senate gave them to understand that they would do well to surrender voluntarily in order that they might not need to be compelled; they did what they were obliged to do, if possible, in a way offensive to the Romans, "to save forms;" they reported, explained, equivocated, delayed, and when all this no longer availed, yielded with a patriotic sigh. Their proceedings might have claimed indulgence at any rate, if not approval, had their leaders been resolved to fight, and had they preferred the destruction of

The
Achæan
patriots.

the nation to its bondage; but neither Philopœmen nor Lycortas thought of any such political suicide—they wished, if possible, to be free, but they wished, above all, to live. Besides all this, the dreaded intervention of Rome in the internal affairs of Greece was not the arbitrary act of the Romans, but was always invoked by the Greeks themselves, who, like boys, brought down on their own heads the rod which they feared. The reproach repeated *ad nauseam* by the mass of the learned in Hellenic and post-Hellenic times—that the Romans strove to stir up internal discord in Greece—is one of the most foolish absurdities which scholars dealing with politics have ever invented. It was not the Romans that carried strife to Greece—which in truth would have been “carrying owls to Athens”—but the Greeks that carried their dissensions to Rome.

Quarrels between the Achæans and Spartans.

188.

The Achæans in particular, who, in their eagerness to enlarge their territory, totally failed to see how much it would have been for their own good that Flamininus had not incorporated the towns of Ætolian sympathies with their league, acquired in Lacedæmon and Messene a very hydra of intestine strife. Members of these communities were incessantly at Rome, entreating and beseeching to be released from the odious connection; and amongst them, characteristically enough, were even those who were indebted to the Achæans for their return to their native land. The Achæan league was incessantly occupied in the work of reformation and restoration at Sparta and Messene; the wildest refugees from these quarters dictated the measures of the diet. Four years after the nominal admission of Sparta to the confederacy open war broke out, and was followed by an insanely thorough restoration, in which all the slaves on whom Nabis had conferred citizenship were once more sold into slavery, and a row of columns was built from the proceeds in the Achæan city of Megalopolis; the old state of property in Sparta was re-established, the laws of Lycurgus were superseded by Achæan laws, and the walls were pulled down (566). At last the Roman senate was summoned by all parties to arbitrate in reference to the whole matter—an annoying task, which was the righteous punishment of the sentimental policy that the senate had pursued. Far from mixing itself up too much in these affairs, the senate not only bore the pungent sarcasms of Achæan conceit with exemplary composure, but even manifested a culpable in-

difference while the worst outrages were committed. The Achæans were heartily glad when, after that restoration, the news arrived from Rome that the senate had found fault with it, but had not annulled it. Nothing was done for the Lacedæmonians by Rome, except that the senate, shocked at the judicial murder of from sixty to eighty Spartans committed by the Achæans, deprived the diet of criminal jurisdiction over the Spartans—truly a heinous interference with the internal affairs of an independent state! The Roman statesmen gave themselves as little concern as possible about this tempest in a nut-shell, as is best shown by the many complaints regarding the superficial, contradictory, and obscure decisions of the senate; in fact, how could its decisions be expected to be clear, when there were four parties from Sparta simultaneously speaking against each other at its bar? Then the personal impression, which most of these Peloponnesian statesmen produced in Rome, was not favourable; even Flamininus shook his head, when one of them showed him on the one day how to perform some dance, and on the next entertained him with affairs of state. Matters went so far, that the senate at last lost patience and informed the Peloponnesians that it could no longer listen to them, and that they might do what they chose (572). This was natural enough, but it was not right; situated as the Romans were, they were under a moral and political obligation earnestly and consistently to rectify this melancholy state of things. Callicrates the Achæan, who went to the senate in 575 to enlighten it as to the state of matters in the Peloponnesus and to demand a consistent and sustained intervention, may as a man have had somewhat less ability than his countryman Philopœmen who was the main founder of that patriotic policy; but he was in the right.

182.

179.

Thus the protectorate of the Roman community now embraced all the states from the eastern to the western end of the Mediterranean. There nowhere existed a state, that the Romans would have deemed it worth while to fear. But there still lived a man, to whom Rome accorded that rare honour—the homeless Carthaginian, who had raised in arms against Rome first all the west and then all the east, and whose schemes had been frustrated solely perhaps by infamous aristocratic policy in the one case, and by stupid court policy in the other. Antiochus had been obliged to bind himself in the treaty of peace to deliver up Hannibal; but the

Death of
Hannibal

latter had escaped, first to Crete, then to Bithynia,* and now lived at the court of Prusias king of Bithynia, employed in aiding the latter in his wars with Eumenes, and victorious as ever by sea and by land. It is affirmed that he was desirous of stirring up Prusias also to make war on Rome; a folly, which, as it is told, sounds very far from credible. It is more certain that, while the Roman senate deemed it beneath its dignity to have the old man hunted out in his last asylum (for the tradition which inculcates the senate appears to deserve no credit), Flaminius, whose restless vanity sought after new opportunities for great achievements, undertook, of his own accord, to deliver Rome from Hannibal as he had delivered the Greeks from their chains, and, if not to wield (which was not diplomatic), at any rate to whet and to point, the dagger against the greatest man of his time. Prusias, the most pitiful among the pitiful princes of Asia, was delighted to grant the little favour which the Roman envoy in ambiguous terms requested; and, when Hannibal saw his house beset by assassins, he took poison. He had long been prepared to do so, adds a Roman, for he knew the Romans and the faith of kings. The year of his death is uncertain; probably he died in the latter half of the year 183. 571, at the age of seventy-six. When he was born, Rome was contending with doubtful success for the possession of Sicily; he had lived long enough to see the west wholly subdued, and to fight his own last battle with the Romans against the vessels of his native city which had itself become Roman; and he was constrained at last to remain a mere spectator while Rome overpowered the East as the tempest overpowers the ship that has no one at the helm, and to feel that he alone was the pilot that could have weathered the storm. There was left to him no further hope to be disappointed, when he died; but he had honestly, through fifty years of struggle, kept the oath he had sworn when a boy.

Death of
Scipio.

About the same time, probably in the same year, died also the man whom the Romans were wont to call his conqueror, Publius Scipio. On him fortune had lavished all the successes which she denied to his antagonist—successes which did belong to him, and successes which did not. He had added

* The story that he went to Armenia, and at the request of king Artaxias built the town of Artaxata on the Araxes (Strabo, xi. p. 528; Plutarch, *Luc.* 31), is certainly a fiction; but it is a striking circumstance, that Hannibal should have become mixed up, almost like Alexander, with Oriental fables.

to the empire Spain, Africa, and Asia ; and Rome, which he had found merely the first community of Italy, was at his death mistress of the civilized world. He himself had so many titles of victory, that some of them were made over to his brother and his cousin.* And yet he too spent his last years in bitter vexation, and died when little more than fifty years of age in voluntary banishment, leaving orders to his relatives not to bury his remains in the city for which he had lived and in which his ancestors reposed. It is not exactly known, what drove him from the city. The charges of corruption and embezzlement, which were directed against him and still more against his brother Lucius, were beyond doubt empty calumnies, which do not satisfactorily account for such irritation of feeling ; although it was characteristic of the man, that instead of simply vindicating himself by means of his account-books, he tore them in pieces in presence of the people and of his accusers, and summoned the Romans to accompany him to the temple of Jupiter and to celebrate the anniversary of his victory at Zama. The people left the accuser on the spot, and followed Scipio to the Capitol ; but this was the last glorious day of that illustrious man. His proud spirit, his belief that he was different from, and better than, other men, his very decided family-policy, which in the person of his brother Lucius brought forward a clumsy man of straw as a hero, gave offence to many, and not without reason. While genuine pride protects the heart, arrogance lays it open to every blow and every sarcasm, and corrodes even an originally noble-minded spirit. It is throughout, moreover, the distinguishing characteristic of such natures as that of Scipio—strange mixtures of genuine gold and glittering tinsel—that they need the good fortune and the brilliance of youth in order to exercise their charm, and, when this charm begins to fade, it is the charmer himself that is most painfully conscious of the change.

* Africanus, Asiagenus, Hispallus.

CHAPTER X.

THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR.

Dissatisfac-
tion of
Philip with
Rome.

PHILIP OF MACEDON was greatly annoyed by the treatment which he met with from the Romans after the peace with Antiochus; and the subsequent course of events was not fitted to appease his wrath. His neighbours in Greece and Thrace, mostly communities that had once trembled at the Macedonian name not less than now they trembled at the Roman, diligently sought, as was natural, to retaliate on the fallen great power for all the injuries which since the times of Philip the Second they had received at the hands of Macedon. The empty arrogance and venal anti-Macedonian patriotism of the Hellenes of this period found vent at the diets of the different confederacies, and in ceaseless complaints addressed to the Roman senate. Philip had been allowed by the Romans to retain what he had taken from the Ætolians; but in Thessaly the confederacy of the Magnetes alone had formally joined the Ætolians, while those towns which Philip had wrested from the Ætolians in two of the other Thessalian confederacies—the Thessalian in its narrower sense, and the Perrhæbian—were reclaimed by the latter on the ground that Philip had only liberated these towns, and not conquered them. The Athamanes conceived that they might request their freedom; and Eumenes demanded the maritime cities which Antiochus had possessed in Thrace proper, especially Ænus and Maronea, although in the peace with Antiochus the Thracian Chersonese alone had been expressly promised to him. All these complaints, and numerous minor ones from all Philip's neighbours as to his supporting king Prusias against Eumenes, as to competition in trade, as to the violation of contracts and the seizing of cattle, were poured forth at Rome. The king of Macedonia had to submit

to be accused by the sovereign rabble before the Roman senate, and to accept justice or injustice as the senate chose ; he was compelled to witness judgment constantly going against him : he had to submit to withdraw his garrisons from the Thracian coast and from the Thessalian and Perrhæbian towns, and courteously to receive the Roman commissioners, who came to see whether everything required had been properly done. The Romans were not so indignant against Philip as they had been against Carthage ; in fact, they were even in many respects favourably disposed to the Macedonian ruler ; there was not in his case so reckless a violation of forms as in that of Libya ; but the situation of Macedonia was at bottom substantially the same as that of Carthage. Philip, however, was by no means the man to submit to this infliction with Phœnician patience. Passionate as he was, he had after his defeat been more indignant with his faithless ally than with his honourable antagonist ; and, long accustomed to pursue a policy not Macedonian but personal, he had regarded the war with Antiochus simply as an excellent opportunity of instantaneously revenging himself on the ally who had disgracefully deserted and betrayed him. This object he had attained ; but the Romans, who saw very clearly that the Macedonian was influenced not by friendship for Rome, but by enmity to Antiochus, and who were by no means in the habit of regulating their policy by such feelings of liking and disliking, had carefully abstained from bestowing any material advantages on Philip, and had preferred to confer their favours on the Attalids. From their first elevation the Attalids had been at vehement feud with Macedon, and were politically and personally the objects of Philip's bitterest hatred ; of all the eastern powers they had contributed most to maim Macedonia and Syria, and to extend the protectorate of Rome in the East ; and in the last war, when Philip had voluntarily and loyally embraced the side of Rome, they had been obliged to take part with Rome for the sake of their very existence. The Romans had made use of these Attalids for the purpose of reconstructing in all essential points the kingdom of Lysimachus—the destruction of which had been the most important achievement of the Macedonian rulers after Alexander—and of placing alongside of Macedonia a state, which was its equal in point of power and was at the same time a client of Rome. In the special circumstances a wise sovereign,

devoted to the interests of his people, would perhaps have resolved not to resume the unequal struggle with Rome; but Philip, in whose character the sense of honour was the most powerful of all noble, and the thirst for revenge the most potent of all ignoble, motives, was deaf to the voice of timidity or of resignation, and nourished in the depths of his heart a determination once more to try the hazard of the game. When he received the report of fresh invectives, such as were wont to be launched against Macedon at the Thessalian diets, he replied with the line of Theocritus, that his last sun had not yet set.*

The latter
years of
Philip.

183.

Philip displayed in the preparation and the concealment of his designs a calmness, earnestness, and perseverance which, had he shown them in better times, would perhaps have given a different turn to the destinies of the world. In particular the submissiveness towards Rome, by which he purchased the time indispensable for his objects, formed a severe trial for the fierce and haughty man; nevertheless he courageously endured it, although his subjects, and the innocent occasions of the quarrel, such as the unfortunate Maronea, paid severely for the suppression of his resentment. It seemed as if war could not but break out in 571; but by Philip's instructions his younger son, Demetrius, effected a reconciliation between his father and Rome, where he had lived some years as a hostage and was a great favourite. The senate, and particularly Flamininus who managed Greek affairs, sought to form a Roman party in Macedonia that would be able to paralyze the exertions of Philip, which of course were not unknown to the Romans; and had selected as its head, and perhaps as the future king of Macedonia, the younger prince who was passionately attached to Rome. They explained to him, with marked emphasis, that the senate forgave the father on the son's account; the natural effect of which was, that dissensions arose in the royal household itself, and that the king's elder son, Perseus, who, although the offspring of a marriage of disparagement, was destined by his father for the succession, sought to ruin his brother as his future rival. It does not appear that Demetrius was a party to the Roman intrigues; it was only when he was falsely suspected that he was forced to become guilty, and even then he intended, apparently, no-

* "Ἦδη γὰρ φράσδει πᾶνθ' ἄλιον ἔμμι δεδύκειν.

thing more than flight to Rome. But Perseus took care that his father should be duly informed of this design; an intercepted letter from Flamininus to Demetrius did the rest, and induced the father to give orders that his son should be put to death. Philip learned, when it was too late, the intrigues which Perseus had concocted; and death overtook him, as he was meditating the punishment of the fratricide and his exclusion from the throne. He died in 575 at Demetrias, in his fifty-ninth year. He left behind him a shattered kingdom and a distracted household, and with a broken heart confessed that all his toils and all his crimes had been in vain.

179.

His son Perseus then entered on the government, without encountering opposition either in Macedonia or in the Roman senate. He was a man of stately carriage, expert in all gymnastic exercises, reared in the camp and accustomed to command, imperious like his father and unscrupulous in the choice of his means. Wine and women, which too often led Philip to forget the duties of government, had no charm for Perseus; he was as steady and persevering, as his father had been thoughtless and impulsive. Philip, a king while still a boy, and attended by success during the first twenty years of his reign, had been spoiled and ruined by destiny; Perseus ascended the throne in his thirty-first year, and, as he had while yet a boy borne a part in the unhappy war with Rome and had grown up under the pressure of humiliation and under the idea that a revival of the state was at hand, so he inherited along with the paternal kingdom his father's troubles, resentments, and hopes. In fact he entered with the utmost determination on the continuance of his father's work, and prepared more zealously than ever for war against Rome; he was stimulated, moreover, by the reflection, that he was by no means indebted to the goodwill of the Romans for his wearing the diadem of Macedon. The proud Macedonian nation looked with pride upon the prince whom they had been accustomed to see marching and fighting at the head of their youth; his countrymen, and many Hellenes of every variety of lineage, conceived that in him they had found the proper general for the impending war of liberation. But he was not what he seemed. He wanted Philip's genius, and Philip's elasticity—those truly royal qualities, which success obscured and tarnished, but which under the purifying power of adversity recovered their lustre. Philip was self-indulgent, and allowed things to take their course; but,

King Perseus.

when there was occasion, he found within himself the vigour necessary for speedy and earnest action. Perseus devised comprehensive and subtle plans, and prosecuted them with unwearied perseverance ; but, when the moment arrived for action and his plans and preparations confronted him in stern reality, he was frightened at his own work. He manifested the peculiarity of narrow minds—the means became to him the end ; he heaped up treasures on treasures for war with the Romans, and, when the Romans were in the land, he was unable to relax his grasp of his golden pieces. It was a characteristic circumstance, that after defeat the father first hastened to destroy the papers in his cabinet that might compromise him, whereas the son took his treasure-chests and embarked. In ordinary times he might have made an average king, as good as or better than many others ; but he was not adapted for the conduct of an enterprise, which was from the first a hopeless one unless some extraordinary man should become the soul of the movement.

Resources
of Macedo-
nia.

The power of Macedonia was far from inconsiderable. The devotion of the land to the house of the Antigonids was unimpaired ; in this respect the national feeling was not paralyzed by the dissensions of political parties. A monarchical constitution has the great advantage, that every change of sovereign supersedes old resentments and quarrels and introduces a new era of different men and fresh hopes. The king had judiciously availed himself of this, and had begun his reign with a general amnesty, with the recall of fugitive bankrupts, and with the remission of arrears of taxes. The hateful harshness of the father thus not only yielded benefit, but conciliated affection, to the son. Twenty-six years of peace had partly of themselves filled up the blanks in the Macedonian population, partly given opportunity to the government to take serious steps towards rectifying this, which was really the weak point of the land. Philip urged the Macedonians to marry and raise up children ; he occupied the coast towns, whose inhabitants he carried into the interior, with Thracian colonists of reliable valour and fidelity. He formed a barrier on the north to check once for all the desolating incursions of the Dardani, by converting the space intervening between the Macedonian frontier and the barbarian territory into a desert, and by founding new towns in the northern provinces. In short he took step by step the same course in Macedonia, as

Augustus afterwards took when he laid afresh the foundations of the Roman empire. The army was numerous—30,000 men without reckoning contingents and hired troops—and the younger men were well exercised in the constant border warfare with the Thracian barbarians. It is strange that Philip did not try, like Hannibal, to organize his army after the Roman fashion; but it appears less strange, when we recollect the value which the Macedonians set upon their phalanx, often conquered, but still believed to be invincible. Through the new sources of revenue which Philip had created in mines, customs, and tenths, and through the flourishing state of agriculture and commerce, he had succeeded in replenishing his treasury, granaries, and arsenals. When the war began, there was in the Macedonian treasury money enough to pay the existing army and 10,000 hired troops for ten years, and there were in the public magazines stores of grain for as long a period (18,000,000 *medimni* or 27,000,000 bushels), and arms for an army of three times the strength of the existing one. In fact, Macedonia had become a very different state from what it was when surprised by the outbreak of the second war with Rome. The power of the kingdom was in all respects at least doubled: with a power in every point of view far inferior Hannibal had been able to shake Rome to its foundations.

Its external relations were not in so favourable a position. The nature of the case required that Macedonia should now take up the plans of Hannibal and Antiochus, and should try to place herself at the head of a coalition of all oppressed states against the supremacy of Rome; and certainly threads of intrigue ramified in all directions from the court of Pydna. But their success was slight. It was indeed asserted, that the allegiance of the Italians was wavering; but neither friend nor foe could fail to see that an immediate resumption of the Samnite wars was not at all probable. The nocturnal conferences likewise between Macedonian deputies and the Carthaginian senate, which Massinissa denounced at Rome, could occasion no alarm to serious and sagacious men, even if they were not, as is very possible, an utter fiction. The Macedonian court sought to attach the kings of Syria and Bithynia to its interests by intermarriages; but nothing further came of it, except that the immortal simplicity of the diplomacy which seeks to gain political ends by matrimonial means, once more exposed itself to

Attempted
coalition
against
Rome

derision. Eumenes, whom it would have been ridiculous to attempt to gain, the agents of Perseus would have gladly put out of the way: he was to have been murdered at Delphi on his way homeward from Rome, where he had been active against Macedonia; but the dastardly project miscarried.

Bastarnæ.

181.

Genthius.

Cotys.

Of greater moment were the efforts made to stir up the northern barbarians and the Hellenes to rebellion against Rome. Philip had conceived the project of crushing the old enemies of Macedonia, the Dardani in what is now Servia, by means of another still more barbarous horde of Germanic descent brought from the left bank of the Danube, the Bastarnæ, and of then marching in person with these and with the whole avalanche of peoples thus set in motion by the land route to Italy and invading Lombardy, the Alpine passes leading to which he had already sent spies to reconnoitre—a grand project, worthy of Hannibal, and doubtless immediately suggested by Hannibal's passage of the Alps. It is more than probable that this gave occasion to the founding of the Roman fortress of Aquileia (P. 196), which was formed towards the end of the reign of Philip (578), and did not harmonize with the system followed elsewhere by the Romans in the establishment of fortresses in Italy. The plan, however, was thwarted by the desperate resistance of the Dardani and of the adjoining tribes concerned; the Bastarnæ were obliged to retreat, and the whole horde were drowned in returning home by the giving way of the ice on the Danube. The king then sought at least to extend his clientship among the chieftains of the Illyrian land, the modern Dalmatia and northern Albania. One of those who faithfully adhered to Rome, Arthetaurus, perished, not without the cognizance of Perseus, by the hand of an assassin. The most considerable of the whole, Genthius the son and heir of Pleuratus, was, like his father, nominally in alliance with Rome; but the ambassadors of Issa, a Greek town on one of the Dalmatian islands, informed the senate, that Perseus had a secret understanding with the young, weak, and drunken prince, and that Genthius' envoys served as spies for Perseus in Rome.

In the regions on the east of Macedonia towards the lower Danube the most powerful of the Thracian chieftains, the brave and sagacious Cotys, prince of the Odrysians and ruler of all eastern Thrace from the Macedonian frontier on the Hebrus (Maritza) down to the fringe of coast covered

with Greek towns, was in the closest alliance with Perseus. Of the other minor chiefs who in that quarter took part with Rome, one, Abrupolis prince of the Sagæi, was, in consequence of a predatory expedition directed against Amphipolis on the Strymon, defeated by Perseus and driven out of the country. From these regions Philip had drawn numerous colonists, and mercenaries were to be had there at any time and in any number.

Among the unhappy nation of the Hellenes Philip and Perseus had, long before declaring war against Rome, carried on a double system of proselytizing, attempting to gain over to the side of Macedon on the one hand the national, and on the other—if we may be permitted the expression—the communistic, party. As a matter of course, the whole national party among the Asiatic as well as the European Greeks was now favourable at heart to Macedon; not on account of isolated unrighteous acts on the part of the Roman deliverers, but because the restoration of Hellenic nationality by a foreign power involved a contradiction in terms, and now, when it was too late, every one perceived that the most detestable form of Macedonian rule was less fraught with evil for Greece than a free constitution originating in the noblest intentions of honourable foreigners. That the most able and upright men throughout Greece should be opposed to Rome, was to be expected; the venal aristocracy alone was favourable to Rome, and here and there an isolated man of worth, who, unlike the great majority, was under no delusion as to the circumstances and the future of the nation. This was most painfully experienced by Eumenes of Pergamus, who was the main supporter of that extraneous liberty among the Greeks. In vain he treated the cities subject to him with every sort of consideration; in vain he sued for the favour of the communities and diets by fair-sounding words and still better-sounding gold; he learned with pain that his presents were declined, and that all the statues that had formerly been erected to him were broken in pieces and the honorary tablets were melted down, in accordance with a decree of the diet, simultaneously throughout the Peloponnesus (584). The name of Perseus, again, was on every one's lips; even the states that formerly were most decidedly anti-Macedonian, such as the Achæans, deliberated as to the abolition of the laws directed against Macedon; Byzantium,

Greek national party.

although situated within the kingdom of Pergamus, sought and obtained protection and a garrison against the Thracians not from Eumenes, but from Perseus, and in like manner Lampsacus on the Hellespont joined the Macedonian: the powerful and prudent Rhodians escorted the Syrian bride of king Perseus from Antioch with their whole magnificent war-fleet (for Syrian war-vessels were not allowed to appear in the *Ægean*), and returned home highly honoured and furnished with rich presents, more especially with wood for ship-building; commissioners from the Asiatic cities, and consequently subjects of Eumenes, held secret conferences with Macedonian deputies at Samothrace. The sending of the Rhodian war-fleet had at least the aspect of a demonstration; and such, certainly, was the object of king Perseus, when he exhibited himself and all his army before the eyes of the Hellenes under pretext of performing a religious ceremony at Delphi. That the king should appeal to the support of this national partisanship in the impending war, was natural and reasonable. But it was wrong in him to take advantage of the fearful economic disorders of Greece for the purpose of attaching to Macedonia all those who desired a revolution in matters of property and of debt. It is difficult to form any adequate idea of the unparalleled extent to which the commonwealths as well as individuals in European Greece (excepting the Peloponnesus, which was in a somewhat better position in this respect) were involved in debt. Instances occurred of one city attacking and pillaging another merely to get money—the Athenians, for example, thus attacked Oropus—and among the *Ætolians*, *Perrhæbians*, and *Thessalians* formal battles took place between those that had property and those that had none. Under such circumstances the worst outrages were perpetrated as a matter of course; among the *Ætolians* for instance a general amnesty was proclaimed and a new treaty of peace was made solely for the purpose of entrapping and putting to death a number of emigrants. The Romans attempted to mediate; but their envoys returned without success, and announced that both parties were equally bad and that their animosities were not to be restrained. In this case there was, in fact, no other remedy than that of the officer and the executioner; sentimental Hellenism began to be as repulsive, as from the first it had been ridiculous. Yet king Perseus sought to gain the sup-

port of this party, if it deserve to be called such—of people who had nothing, and least of all an honourable name, to lose—and not only issued edicts in favour of Macedonian bankrupts, but also caused placards to be put up at Larisa, Delphi, and Delos, which summoned all Greeks that were exiled on account of political or other offences or on account of their debts to come to Macedonia and to expect full restitution of their former honours and estates. As may easily be supposed, they came; the social revolution smouldering throughout northern Greece now broke out into open flame, and the national-social party there sent to Perseus for help. If Hellenic nationality was to be saved by such means, the question might well be asked, with all respect for Sophocles and Phidias, whether the object was worth the cost.

The senate saw that it had delayed too long already, and that it was time to put an end to such proceedings. The expulsion of the Thracian chieftain Abrupolis who was in alliance with the Romans, and the alliances of Macedonia with the Byzantines, Ætolians, and some of the Boeotian cities, were equally violations of the peace of 557, and sufficed for the official war-manifesto: the real ground of war was, that Macedonia was seeking to convert her formal sovereignty into a real one, and to supplant Rome in the protectorate of the Hellenes. Even in 581 the Roman envoys at the Achæan diet stated pretty plainly, that an alliance with Perseus was equivalent to casting off the alliance of Rome. In 582 king Eumenes came in person to Rome with a long list of grievances and laid open to the senate the whole situation of affairs: upon which the senate unexpectedly in a secret sitting resolved on an immediate declaration of war, and furnished the ports of Epirus with garrisons. For form's sake an embassy was sent to Macedonia, but its message was of such a nature that Perseus, perceiving that he could not recede, replied that he was ready to conclude with Rome a new alliance on really equal terms, but that he looked upon the treaty of 557 as cancelled; and he bade the envoys leave the kingdom within three days. Thus war was practically declared. This was in the autumn of 582. Perseus, had he wished, might have occupied all Greece and brought the Macedonian party everywhere to the helm, and he might perhaps have crushed the Roman division of 5000 men stationed under Gnæus

Rupture
with Per-
seus.

197.

173.

172.

197.

172.

Sicinius at Apollonia and opposed the landing of the Romans. But the king, who already began to tremble at the serious aspect of affairs, engaged in discussions with the consular Quintus Marcius Philippus, with whom he stood in relations of hospitality, as to the frivolousness of the Roman declaration of war, and allowed himself to be induced in this way to postpone the attack and once more to make an effort for peace with Rome: to which the senate, as might have been expected, only replied by the dismissal of all Macedonians from Italy and the embarkation of the legions. Senators of the older school no doubt censured the "new wisdom" of their colleague, and his un-Roman artifice; but the object was gained and the winter passed away without any movement on the part of Perseus. The Roman diplomatists made all the more zealous use of the interval to deprive Perseus of any support in Greece. They were sure of the Achæans. Even the patriotic party among them—who had neither agreed with those social movements, nor had manifested aught more than a longing after a prudent neutrality—had no idea of throwing themselves into the arms of Perseus; and, besides, the opposition party there had now been brought by Roman influence into power, and attached itself absolutely to Rome. The Ætolian league had asked aid from Perseus in its internal troubles; but the new *strategus*, Lyciscus, chosen under the eyes of the Roman ambassadors, was more of a Roman partisan than the Romans themselves. Among the Thessalians also the Roman party retained the ascendancy. Even the Bœotians, old partisans as they were of Macedon, and sunk in the utmost financial disorder, had not in their collective capacity declared openly for Philip; nevertheless at least two of their cities, Haliartus and Coronea, had of their own accord entered into engagements with Perseus. When on the complaint of the Roman envoy the government of the Bœotian confederacy communicated to him the position of things, he declared that it would best appear which cities adhered to Rome and which did not, if they would severally pronounce their decision in his presence; and thereupon the Bœotian confederacy fell at once to pieces. It is not true that the great structure of Epaminondas was destroyed by the Romans; it actually collapsed before they touched it, and thus indeed became the prelude to the dissolution of the other still more firmly consolidated leagues of Greek

cities.* With the forces of the Bœotian towns friendly to Rome the Roman envoy Publius Lentulus laid siege to Haliartus, even before the Roman fleet appeared in the Ægean.

Chalcis was occupied with Achæan, and the province of Orestis with Epirot, forces: the fortresses of the Dassa-
retæ and Illyrians on the west frontier of Macedonia were

Prepara-
tions for
war.

occupied by the troops of Gnæus Sicinius; and, as soon as the navigation was resumed, Larisa received a garrison of 2000 men. Perseus during all this remained inactive and had not a foot's breadth of land beyond his own territory, when in the spring, or according to the official calendar in June, of 583, the Roman legions landed on the west coast. It is doubtful whether Perseus would have found allies of any mark, even had he shown as much energy as he displayed remissness; but, as circumstances stood, he remained of course completely isolated, and his prolonged attempts at proselytism led, for the time at least, to no result. Carthage, Genthius of Illyria, Rhodes and the free cities of Asia Minor, and even Byzantium hitherto so very friendly with Perseus, offered to the Romans vessels of war; which they, however, declined. Eumenes put his land army and his ships on a war footing. Ariarathes king of Cappadocia sent hostages, unsolicited, to Rome. The brother-in-law of Perseus, Prusias II. king of Bithynia, remained neutral. No one stirred in all Greece. Antiochus IV. king of Syria, designated in courtly style "the God, the brilliant bringer of victory," to distinguish him from his father the "Great," bestirred himself, but only to wrest the Syrian coast during this war from the entirely impotent Egypt.

171.

But, though Perseus stood almost alone, he was no contemptible antagonist. His army numbered 43,000 men; of these 21,000 were phalangites, and 4,000 Macedonian and Thracian cavalry; the rest were chiefly mercenaries. The whole force of the Romans in Greece amounted to between 30,000 and 40,000 Italian troops, besides more than 10,000 men belonging to Numidian, Ligurian, Greek, Cretan, and especially Pergamene contingents. To these was added the fleet, which numbered only 40 decked vessels, as there was no fleet of the enemy to oppose it—Perseus, who had been pro-

Beginning
of the war.

* The legal dissolution of the Bœotian confederacy, however, took place not at this time, but after the destruction of Corinth (Pausan. vii. 14, 4; xvi. 6).

hibited from building ships of war by the treaty with Rome, was just erecting docks at Thessalonica—but it had on board 10,000 troops, as it was destined chiefly to co-operate in sieges. The fleet was commanded by Gaius Lucretius, the land army by the consul, Publius Licinius Crassus.

The Romans
invade
Thessaly.

The consul left a strong division in Illyria to harass Macedonia from the west, while with the main force he started, as usual, from Apollonia for Thessaly. Perseus did not think of disturbing their arduous march, but contented himself with advancing into Perrhæbia and occupying the nearest fortresses. He awaited the enemy at Ossa, and not far from Larissa the first conflict took place between the cavalry and light troops on both sides. The Romans were decidedly beaten. Cotys with the Thracian horse had defeated and broken the Italian, and Perseus with his Macedonian horse the Greek, cavalry; the Romans had 2000 foot and 200 horsemen killed, and 600 horsemen made prisoners, and might deem themselves fortunate in being allowed to cross the Peneius without hindrance. Perseus employed the victory to ask peace on the same terms which Philip had obtained: he was ready even to pay the same sum. The Romans refused his request: they never concluded peace after a defeat, and in this case the conclusion of peace would certainly have been followed by the loss of Greece.

Their lax
and unsuccessful
management of the
war.

The wretched Roman commander, however, knew not how or where to attack; the army marched to and fro in Thessaly, without accomplishing anything of importance. Perseus might have assumed the offensive; he saw that the Romans were badly led and dilatory; the news had passed like wild-fire through Greece, that the Greek army had been brilliantly victorious in the first engagement; a second victory might lead to a general rising of the patriot party, and, by commencing a guerilla warfare, might produce incalculable results. But Perseus, while a good soldier, was not a general like his father; he had made his preparations for a defensive war, and, when things took a different turn, he felt himself as it were paralyzed. He made an important success, which the Romans obtained in a second cavalry combat near Phalanna, a pretext for reverting, as is the habit of narrow and obstinate men, to his first plan, and evacuating Thessaly. This was of course equivalent to renouncing all idea of a Hellenic insurrection: what might have been attained by a different course was shown by the

fact that, notwithstanding what had occurred, the Epirota changed sides. After this nothing serious was accomplished on either side. Perseus subdued king Genthius, chastised the Dardani, and, by means of Cotys, expelled from Thrace the Thracians friendly to Rome and the Pergamene troops. On the other hand the Roman army of the west took some Illyrian towns, and the consul busied himself in clearing Thessaly of the Macedonian garrisons and making sure of the turbulent Ætolians and Acarnanians by occupying Ambracia. But the heroic courage of the Romans was most severely felt by the two unhappy Boeotian towns which took part with Perseus; Haliartus was captured by the Roman admiral, Gaius Lucretius, and the inhabitants were sold into slavery; Coronea was treated in the same manner by the consul Crassus in spite of its capitulation. Never had a Roman army exhibited such wretched discipline as the force under these commanders. They had so disorganized the army that, even in the next campaign of 584, the new consul Aulus Hostilius could not think of undertaking anything serious. especially as the new admiral Lucius Hortensius showed himself to be as incapable and unprincipled as his predecessor. His fleet visited the towns on the Thracian coast without result. The western army under Appius Claudius, whose head-quarters were at Lychnidus in the territory of the Dassaretæ, sustained one defeat after another: after an expedition to Macedonia had been utterly unsuccessful, the king in turn towards the beginning of winter assumed the aggressive with the troops which were no longer needed on the south frontier in consequence of the deep snow blocking up all the passes, took from Appius numerous places and a multitude of prisoners, and entered into connections with king Genthius; he was able in fact to attempt an invasion of Ætolia, while Appius allowed himself to be once more defeated in Epirus by the garrison of a fortress which he had vainly besieged. The Roman main army made two attempts to penetrate into Macedon: first, over the Cambunian mountains, and then through the Thessalian passes; but they were negligently planned, and both were repulsed by Perseus.

170.

The consul employed himself chiefly in the reorganization of the army—a work which was above all things needful, but which required a sterner man and an officer of greater mark. Discharges and furloughs might be bought, and therefore the

Abuses in the army.

divisions were never up to their full numbers ; the men were put into quarters in summer, and, as the officers plundered on a great, the common soldiers plundered on a small, scale. Friendly peoples were subjected to the most shameful suspicions : for instance, the blame of the disgraceful defeat at Larisa was imputed to the pretended treachery of the Ætolian cavalry, and, what was hitherto unprecedented, its officers were sent to be criminally tried at Rome ; and the Molossians in Epirus were forced by false suspicions into actual revolt. The allied states had war-contributions imposed upon them as if they had been conquered, and if they appealed to the Roman senate, their citizens were executed or sold into slavery : this was done, for instance, at Abdera, and similar outrages were committed at Chalcis. The senate interfered in earnest : it enjoined the liberation of the unfortunate Coroneans and Abderites, and forbade the Roman magistrates to ask contributions from the allies without leave of the senate. Gaius Lucretius was unanimously condemned by the burgesses. But such steps could not alter the fact, that the military result of these two campaigns had been null, while the political result had been a foul stain on the Romans, whose extraordinary successes in the East were based in no small degree on their reputation for moral purity and soundness as compared with the scandals of Hellenic administration. Had Philip commanded instead of Perseus, the war would probably have begun with the destruction of the Roman army and the defection of most of the Hellenes ; but Rome was fortunate enough to be constantly outstripped in her blunders by her antagonists. Perseus was content with entrenching himself in Macedonia—which towards the south and west forms a true mountain fortress—as it were in a beleaguered town.

Marcius enters [169. Macedonia through the pass of Tempe.

The third commander-in-chief also, whom Rome sent to Macedonia in 585, Quintus Marcius Philippus, already mentioned as having had a hospitable connection with the king, was not at all equal to his far from easy task. He was ambitious and enterprising, but a bad officer. His hazardous scheme of crossing Olympus by the pass of Lapathus westward of Tempe, leaving behind one division to face the garrison of the pass, and making his way with his main force through impracticable defiles to Heracleum, was not justified by the fact of its success. Not only might a handful of resolute men have blocked up the route, in which case no retreat

could be thought of; but even after the passage, when he stood with the Macedonian main force in front and the strongly fortified mountain-fortresses of Tempe and Lapathus behind him, wedged into a narrow plain on the seashore and without supplies or the possibility of foraging for them, his position was no less desperate than when, in his first consulate, he had allowed himself to be similarly surrounded in the Ligurian defiles which thenceforth bore his name. But as accident saved him then, so the incapacity of Perseus saved him now. As if he could not comprehend the idea of defending himself against the Romans otherwise than by the blockading of the passes, he strangely gave himself over as lost as soon as he saw the Romans on the Macedonian side of them, fled in all haste to Pydna, and ordered his ships to be burnt and his treasures to be sunk. But even this voluntary retreat of the Macedonian army did not rescue the consul from his painful position. He advanced, indeed, without hindrance, but he was obliged, after four days' march, to turn back for want of provisions; and, when the king came to his senses and returned in all haste to resume the position which he had abandoned, the Roman army would have been in great danger, had not the impregnable Tempe surrendered at the right moment and handed over its rich stores to the enemy. The communication with the south was by this means secured to the Roman army; but Perseus had strongly barricaded himself in his former well-chosen position on the bank of the little river Elpius, and there checked the further advance of the Romans. So the Roman army remained, during the rest of the summer and the winter, hemmed in in the furthest corner of Thessaly; and, while the crossing of the passes was certainly a success and the first substantial one in the war, it was due not to the ability of the Roman, but to the blundering of the Macedonian, general. The Roman fleet in vain attempted the capture of Demetrias, and performed no exploit whatever. The light ships of Perseus boldly cruised between the Cyclades, protected the corn-vessels destined for Macedonia, and attacked the transports of the enemy. With the western army matters were still worse: Appius Claudius could do nothing with his reduced division, and the contingent which he asked from Achaia was prevented from coming to him by the jealousy of the consul. Moreover, Gentius had allowed himself to be bribed by Perseus with the promise of a great

The armies
on the
Elpius.

sum of money to break with Rome, and to imprison the Roman envoys; whereupon the frugal king deemed it superfluous to pay the money which he had promised, since Genthius was now certainly compelled, independently of it, to substitute an attitude of decided hostility towards Rome for the ambiguous position which he had hitherto maintained. Accordingly the Romans had a further petty war by the side of the great one, which had already lasted three years. In fact had Perseus been able to part with his money, he might easily have aroused enemies still more dangerous to the Romans. A Celtic host under Clondicus—20,000 men, half horse half foot—offered to take service with him in Macedonia itself; but they could not agree as to the pay. In Hellas too there was such a ferment, that a guerilla warfare might easily have been kindled with a little dexterity and a full exchequer; but, as Perseus had no desire to give and the Greeks did nothing gratuitously, the land remained quiet.

Paullus.

168.

At length the Romans resolved to send the proper man to Greece. This was Lucius Æmilius Paullus, son of the consul of the same name that fell at Cannæ; a man of ancient lineage but of humble means, and therefore not so successful in the comitia as on the battle-field, where he had remarkably distinguished himself in Spain and still more so in Liguria. The people elected him for the second time consul in the year 586 on account of his merits—a course which was at that time rare and exceptional. He was in all respects the fitting man: an excellent general of the old school, strict as respected both himself and his troops, and, notwithstanding his sixty years, still hale and vigorous; an incorruptible magistrate—"one of the few Romans of that age to whom one could not offer money," as a contemporary says of him—and a man of Hellenic culture, who, when commander-in-chief, embraced the opportunity of travelling through Greece to inspect its works of art.

Perseus is
driven back
to Pydna.

Battle of
Pydna.
168.

As soon as the new general arrived in the camp at Hera-cleum, he gave orders for the ill-guarded pass at Pythium to be surprised by Publius Nasica, while skirmishes between the outposts occupied the attention of the Macedonians in the channel of the river Elpius; the enemy was thus turned, and was obliged to retreat to Pydna. There, on the Roman 4th of September, 586, or on the 22nd of June of the Julian calendar—an eclipse of the moon, which a scientific Roman officer announced beforehand to the army that it might not

be regarded as a bad omen, affords in this case the means of determining the date—the outposts accidentally fell into conflict as they were watering their horses after midday; and both sides determined at once to give the battle, which it was originally intended to postpone till the following day. Passing through the ranks in person, without helmet or shield, the grey-headed Roman general arranged his men. Scarce were they in position, when the formidable phalanx assailed them; the general himself, who had witnessed many a hard fight, afterwards acknowledged that he had trembled. The Roman vanguard dispersed; a Pælignian cohort was overthrown and almost annihilated; the legions themselves hurriedly retreated till they reached a hill close upon the Roman camp. Here the fortune of the day changed. The uneven ground and the hurried pursuit had disordered the ranks of the phalanx; the Romans in single cohorts entered at every gap, and attacked it on the flanks and in rear; the Macedonian cavalry which alone could have rendered aid looked calmly on, and soon fled in a body, the king among the foremost; and thus the fate of Macedonia was decided in less than an hour. The 8000 select phalangites allowed themselves to be cut down to a man; as if the phalanx, which fought its last great battle at Pydna, had wished itself to perish there. The overthrow was fearful; 20,000 Macedonians lay on the field of battle, 11,000 were prisoners. The war was at an end, on the fifteenth day after Paullus had assumed the command; all Macedonia submitted in two days. The king fled with his gold—he still had more than 6000 talents (£1,464,000) in his chest—to Samothrace, accompanied by a few faithful attendants. But he himself put to death one of these, Evander of Crete, who was to be called to account as instigator of the attempted assassination of Eumenes; and then his pages and remaining comrades also deserted him. For a moment he hoped that the right of asylum would protect him; but he soon perceived that he was clinging to a straw. An attempt to take flight to Cotys failed. So he wrote to the consul; but the letter was not received, because he designated himself in it as king. He recognized his fate, and surrendered to the Romans at discretion with his children and his treasures, pusillanimous and weeping so as to disgust even his conquerors. With a grave satisfaction, and with thoughts turning rather on the mutability of fortune than on his own present success, the consul re-

Perseus
taken
prisoner.

ceived the most illustrious captive whom Roman general had ever brought home. Perseus died a few years after, as a state prisoner, at Alba on the Fucine lake;* his son in after years earned a living in the same Italian country town as a clerk.

Thus perished the empire of Alexander the Great, which had subdued and Hellenized the East, 144 years after his death.

Defeat and
capture of
Genthius.

That the tragedy, moreover, might not be without its accompaniment of farce, at the same time the war against Genthius, king of Illyria, was also begun and ended by the prætor Lucius Anicius within thirty days. The piratical fleet was taken, the capital Scodra was captured, and the two kings, the heir of Alexander the Great and the heir of Pleuratus, entered Rome side by side as prisoners.

Macedonia
broken up.

The senate had resolved that the peril, which the unseasonable gentleness of Flaminius had brought on Rome, should not recur. Macedonia was abolished. At a conference at Amphipolis on the Strymon the Roman commission ordained, that that compact, thoroughly monarchical, and united state should be broken up into four republican federative leagues moulded on the system of the Greek confederacies, viz., that of Amphipolis in the eastern provinces, that of Thessalonica with the Chalcidian peninsula, that of Pella on the frontiers of Thessaly, and that of Pelagonia in the interior. Intermarriages between persons belonging to different confederacies were to be invalid, and no one might be a freeholder in more than one of them. All who had held office under the king, as well as their grown-up sons, were obliged to leave the country and proceed to Italy on pain of death; he Romans still dreaded, and with reason, the throbbings of the ancient loyalty. The common law and the former constitution otherwise remained in force; the magistrates were of course nominated by communal election, and the power in the communes as well as in the confederacies was placed in the hands of the nobles. The royal domains and royalties were not granted to the confederacies, and these were specially prohibited from working the gold and silver mines, a chief source of the national wealth; but in 596 they were again permitted to work at least the silver-mines.† The importation of

158.

* The story, that the Romans, in order at once to keep the promise which had guaranteed his life and to take vengeance on him, put him to death by depriving him of sleep, is certainly a fable.

† The statement of Cassiodorus, that the Macedonian mines were reopened

salt, and the exportation of timber for ship-building, were prohibited. The land-tax, hitherto paid to the king, ceased, and the confederacies and communities were left to tax themselves; but these had to pay to Rome half of the former land-tax, according to a rate fixed once for all, amounting in all to 100 talents annually (£24,400).^{*} The whole land was for ever disarmed, and the fortress of Demetrias was razed; on the northern frontier alone a chain of posts was to be retained to guard against the incursions of the barbarians. Of the arms given up, the copper shields were sent to Rome, and the rest were burnt.

The Romans gained their object. The Macedonian land still on two occasions took up arms at the call of princes of the old reigning house; but otherwise from that time to the present day it has remained without a history.

Illyria was treated in a similar way. The kingdom of Illyria Gentius was split up into three small free states. There too broken up. the freeholders paid the half of the former land-tax to their new masters, with the exception of the towns, which had adhered to Rome and in return obtained exemption from the tax—an exception which there was no opportunity to make in the case of Macedonia. The Illyrian piratic fleet was confiscated, and presented to the more reputable Greek communities along that coast. The constant annoyances, which the Illyrians inflicted on their neighbours by means of their corsairs, were in this way put an end to, at least for a lengthened period.

Cotys in Thrace, who was difficult to be reached, and con- Cotys.

in 596, receives its more exact interpretation by means of the coins. No gold 158.
coins of the four Macedonias are extant; either therefore the gold-mines remained closed, or the gold extracted was converted into bars. On the other hand there certainly exist silver coins of Macedonia *prima* (Amphipolis) in which district the silver-mines were situated. For the brief period, during which they must have been struck (596–608), the number of them is remarkably great, and proves either that the mines were very energetically wrought, or that the old royal money was recoined in large quantity.

* The statement that the Macedonian commonwealth was “relieved of seigniorial imposts and taxes” by the Romans (Polyb. xxvii. 4) does not necessarily require us to assume a subsequent remission of these taxes: it is sufficient, for the explanation of Polybius’ words, to assume that the hitherto seigniorial tax now became a public one. The continuance of the constitution granted to the province of Macedonia by Paullus down to at least the Augustan age (Liv. xiv. 32; Justin xxxiii. 2), would, it is true, be compatible also with the remission of the taxes. 158–146.

venient for use against Eumenes, obtained pardon, and received back his captive son.

Thus the affairs of the north were settled, and Macedonia also was at last released from the yoke of monarchy. In fact Greece was more free than ever; there no longer existed anywhere in it a king.

Humiliation
of the
Greeks in
general.

But the Romans did not confine themselves to cutting the nerves and sinews of Macedonia. The senate resolved at once to render all the Hellenic states, friend and foe, for ever incapable of harm, and to reduce all of them alike to the same humble state of dependence. The course pursued may itself admit of justification; but the mode, in which it was carried out in the case of the more powerful of the Greek dependent states, was unworthy of a great power, and showed that the epoch of the Fabii and the Scipios was at an end.

Course pur-
sued with
Pergamus.

The state most affected by this change in the position of parties was the kingdom of the Attalids, which had been created and fostered by Rome to keep Macedonia in check, and which now, after the destruction of Macedonia, was in fact no longer needed. It was not easy to find a tolerable pretext for depriving the prudent and considerate Eumenes of his privileged position, and allowing him to fall into disgrace. All at once, about the time when the Romans were encamped at Heracleum, strange reports were circulated regarding him—that he was in secret intercourse with Perseus; that his fleet had been suddenly, as it were, wafted away; that 500 talents had been offered for his non-participation in the campaign and 1500 for his mediation to procure peace, and that the agreement had only broken down through the avarice of Perseus. As to the Pergamene fleet, the king, after having paid his respects to the consul, went home with it at the same time that the Roman fleet went into winter quarters. The story about corruption was as certainly a fable as any newspaper *canard* of the present day; for that the rich, cunning, and consistent Attalid, who had primarily occasioned the breach between Rome and Macedon by his journey in 582 and had been on that account wellnigh assassinated by the banditti of Perseus, should—at the moment when the real difficulties of the war were overcome and its final issue, if ever seriously doubted at all, was doubtful no longer—have sold to the instigator of his murder his share in the spoil for a few talents, and should have perilled the work of long years for so pitiful a consideration, may be set down not

merely as a fabrication, but as a very silly one. That no proof was found either in the papers of Perseus or elsewhere, is sufficiently certain; for even the Romans did not venture to express those suspicions aloud. But they gained their object. Their intentions were shown in the behaviour of the great men in Rome towards Attalus, the brother of Eumenes, who had commanded the Pergamene auxiliary troops in Greece. Their brave and faithful comrade was received in Rome with open arms and invited to ask not for his brother, but for himself—the senate would be glad to give him a kingdom of his own. Attalus asked nothing but *Ænus* and *Maronea*. The senate thought that this was only a preliminary request, and granted it with great politeness. But when he took his departure without having made any further demands, and the senate came to perceive that the reigning family in Pergamus did not live on such terms with each other as were usual in princely houses, *Ænus* and *Maronea* were declared free cities. The Pergamenes obtained not a single foot of territory out of the spoil of Macedon; if after the victory over Antiochus the Romans had still saved forms as respected Philip, they were now disposed to hurt and to humiliate. About this time the senate appears to have declared Pamphylia, for the possession of which Eumenes and Antiochus had hitherto contended, independent. What was of more importance, the Galatians (who had been substantially in the power of Eumenes, ever since he had expelled the king of Pontus by force of arms from Galatia and had on making peace extorted from him the promise that he would maintain no further communication with the Galatian princes), now, reckoning beyond doubt on the variance that had taken place between Eumenes and the Romans, if not directly instigated by the latter, rose against Eumenes, overran his kingdom, and brought him into great danger. Eumenes besought the mediation of the Romans; the Roman envoy declared his readiness to mediate, but thought it expedient that Attalus, who commanded the Pergamene army, should not accompany him lest the barbarians might be put in ill humour. Singularly enough, he accomplished nothing; in fact, he told on his return that his mediation had only exasperated the barbarians. No long time elapsed before the independence of the Galatians was expressly recognized and guaranteed by the senate. Eumenes determined to proceed to Rome in person, and to plead his

divisions were never up to their full numbers ; the men were put into quarters in summer, and, as the officers plundered on a great, the common soldiers plundered on a small, scale. Friendly peoples were subjected to the most shameful suspicions: for instance, the blame of the disgraceful defeat at Larisa was imputed to the pretended treachery of the Ætolian cavalry, and, what was hitherto unprecedented, its officers were sent to be criminally tried at Rome ; and the Molossians in Epirus were forced by false suspicions into actual revolt. The allied states had war-contributions imposed upon them as if they had been conquered, and if they appealed to the Roman senate, their citizens were executed or sold into slavery: this was done, for instance, at Abdera, and similar outrages were committed at Chalcis. The senate interfered in earnest: it enjoined the liberation of the unfortunate Coroneans and Abderites, and forbade the Roman magistrates to ask contributions from the allies without leave of the senate. Gaius Lucretius was unanimously condemned by the burgesses. But such steps could not alter the fact, that the military result of these two campaigns had been null, while the political result had been a foul stain on the Romans, whose extraordinary successes in the East were based in no small degree on their reputation for moral purity and soundness as compared with the scandals of Hellenic administration. Had Philip commanded instead of Perseus, the war would probably have begun with the destruction of the Roman army and the defection of most of the Hellenes ; but Rome was fortunate enough to be constantly outstripped in her blunders by her antagonists. Perseus was content with entrenching himself in Macedonia—which towards the south and west forms a true mountain fortress—as it were in a beleaguered town.

Marcus enters [169. Macedonia through the pass of Tempe.

The third commander-in-chief also, whom Rome sent to Macedonia in 585, Quintus Marcius Philippus, already mentioned as having had a hospitable connection with the king, was not at all equal to his far from easy task. He was ambitious and enterprising, but a bad officer. His hazardous scheme of crossing Olympus by the pass of Lapathus westward of Tempe, leaving behind one division to face the garrison of the pass, and making his way with his main force through impracticable defiles to Heracleum, was not justified by the fact of its success. Not only might a handful of resolute men have blocked up the route, in which case no retreat

could be thought of; but even after the passage, when he stood with the Macedonian main force in front and the strongly fortified mountain-fortresses of Tempe and Lapathus behind him, wedged into a narrow plain on the seashore and without supplies or the possibility of foraging for them, his position was no less desperate than when, in his first consulate, he had allowed himself to be similarly surrounded in the Ligurian defiles which thenceforth bore his name. But as accident saved him then, so the incapacity of Perseus saved him now. As if he could not comprehend the idea of defending himself against the Romans otherwise than by the blockading of the passes, he strangely gave himself over as lost as soon as he saw the Romans on the Macedonian side of them, fled in all haste to Pydna, and ordered his ships to be burnt and his treasures to be sunk. But even this voluntary retreat of the Macedonian army did not rescue the consul from his painful position. He advanced, indeed, without hindrance, but he was obliged, after four days' march, to turn back for want of provisions; and, when the king came to his senses and returned in all haste to resume the position which he had abandoned, the Roman army would have been in great danger, had not the impregnable Tempe surrendered at the right moment and handed over its rich stores to the enemy. The communication with the south was by this means secured to the Roman army; but Perseus had strongly barricaded himself in his former well-chosen position on the bank of the little river Elpius, and there checked the further advance of the Romans. So the Roman army remained, during the rest of the summer and the winter, hemmed in in the furthest corner of Thessaly; and, while the crossing of the passes was certainly a success and the first substantial one in the war, it was due not to the ability of the Roman, but to the blundering of the Macedonian, general. The Roman fleet in vain attempted the capture of Demetrias, and performed no exploit whatever. The light ships of Perseus boldly cruised between the Cyclades, protected the corn-vessels destined for Macedonia, and attacked the transports of the enemy. With the western army matters were still worse: Appius Claudius could do nothing with his reduced division, and the contingent which he asked from Achaia was prevented from coming to him by the jealousy of the consul. Moreover, Genthius had allowed himself to be bribed by Perseus with the promise of a great

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Paullus.

168.

At length the Romans resolved to send the proper man to Greece. This was Lucius Æmilius Paullus, son of the consul of the same name that fell at Cannæ; a man of ancient lineage but of humble means, and therefore not so successful in the comitia as on the battle-field, where he had remarkably distinguished himself in Spain and still more so in Liguria. The people elected him for the second time consul in the year 586 on account of his merits—a course which was at that time rare and exceptional. He was in all respects the fitting man: an excellent general of the old school, strict as respected both himself and his troops, and, notwithstanding his sixty years, still hale and vigorous; an incorruptible magistrate—"one of the few Romans of that age to whom one could not offer money," as a contemporary says of him—and a man of Hellenic culture, who, when commander-in-chief, embraced the opportunity of travelling through Greece to inspect its works of art.

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Battle of
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As soon as the new general arrived in the camp at Hera-cleum, he gave orders for the ill-guarded pass at Pythium to be surprised by Publius Nasica, while skirmishes between the outposts occupied the attention of the Macedonians in the channel of the river Elpius; the enemy was thus turned, and was obliged to retreat to Pydna. There, on the Roman 4th of September, 586, or on the 22nd of June of the Julian calendar—an eclipse of the moon, which a scientific Roman officer announced beforehand to the army that it might not

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be regarded as a bad omen, affords in this case the means of determining the date—the outposts accidentally fell into conflict as they were watering their horses after midday; and both sides determined at once to give the battle, which it was originally intended to postpone till the following day. Passing through the ranks in person, without helmet or shield, the grey-headed Roman general arranged his men. Scarce were they in position, when the formidable phalanx assailed them; the general himself, who had witnessed many a hard fight, afterwards acknowledged that he had trembled. The Roman vanguard dispersed; a Pælignian cohort was overthrown and almost annihilated; the legions themselves hurriedly retreated till they reached a hill close upon the Roman camp. Here the fortune of the day changed. The uneven ground and the hurried pursuit had disordered the ranks of the phalanx; the Romans in single cohorts entered at every gap, and attacked it on the flanks and in rear; the Macedonian cavalry which alone could have rendered aid looked calmly on, and soon fled in a body, the king among the foremost; and thus the fate of Macedonia was decided in less than an hour. The 8000 select phalangites allowed themselves to be cut down to a man; as if the phalanx, which fought its last great battle at Pydna, had wished itself to perish there. The overthrow was fearful; 20,000 Macedonians lay on the field of battle, 11,000 were prisoners. The war was at an end, on the fifteenth day after Paullus had assumed the command; all Macedonia submitted in two days. The king fled with his gold—he still had more than 6000 talents (£1,464,000) in his chest—to Samothrace, accompanied by a few faithful attendants. But he himself put to death one of these, Evander of Crete, who was to be called to account as instigator of the attempted assassination of Eumenes; and then his pages and remaining comrades also deserted him. For a moment he hoped that the right of asylum would protect him; but he soon perceived that he was clinging to a straw. An attempt to take flight to Cotys failed. So he wrote to the consul; but the letter was not received, because he designated himself in it as king. He recognized his fate, and surrendered to the Romans at discretion with his children and his treasures, pusillanimous and weeping so as to disgust even his conquerors. With a grave satisfaction, and with thoughts turning rather on the mutability of fortune than on his own present success, the consul re-

Perseus
taken
prisoner.

ceived the most illustrious captive whom Roman general had ever brought home. Perseus died a few years after, as a state prisoner, at Alba on the Fucine lake;* his son in after years earned a living in the same Italian country town as a clerk.

Thus perished the empire of Alexander the Great, which had subdued and Hellenized the East, 144 years after his death.

Defeat and
capture of
Genthius.

That the tragedy, moreover, might not be without its accompaniment of farce, at the same time the war against Genthius, king of Illyria, was also begun and ended by the prætor Lucius Anicius within thirty days. The piratical fleet was taken, the capital Scodra was captured, and the two kings, the heir of Alexander the Great and the heir of Pleuratus, entered Rome side by side as prisoners.

Macedonia
broken up.

The senate had resolved that the peril, which the unseasonable gentleness of Flaminius had brought on Rome, should not recur. Macedonia was abolished. At a conference at Amphipolis on the Strymon the Roman commission ordained, that that compact, thoroughly monarchical, and united state should be broken up into four republican federative leagues moulded on the system of the Greek confederacies, viz., that of Amphipolis in the eastern provinces, that of Thessalonica with the Chalcidian peninsula, that of Pella on the frontiers of Thessaly, and that of Pelagonia in the interior. Intermarriages between persons belonging to different confederacies were to be invalid, and no one might be a freeholder in more than one of them. All who had held office under the king, as well as their grown-up sons, were obliged to leave the country and proceed to Italy on pain of death; he Romans still dreaded, and with reason, the throbbings of the ancient loyalty. The common law and the former constitution otherwise remained in force; the magistrates were of course nominated by communal election, and the power in the communes as well as in the confederacies was placed in the hands of the nobles. The royal domains and royalties were not granted to the confederacies, and these were specially prohibited from working the gold and silver mines, a chief source of the national wealth; but in 596 they were again permitted to work at least the silver-mines.† The importation of

158.

* The story, that the Romans, in order at once to keep the promise which had guaranteed his life and to take vengeance on him, put him to death by depriving him of sleep, is certainly a fable.

† The statement of Cassiodorus, that the Macedonian mines were reopened

salt, and the exportation of timber for ship-building, were prohibited. The land-tax, hitherto paid to the king, ceased, and the confederacies and communities were left to tax themselves; but these had to pay to Rome half of the former land-tax, according to a rate fixed once for all, amounting in all to 100 talents annually (£24,400).^{*} The whole land was for ever disarmed, and the fortress of Demetrias was razed; on the northern frontier alone a chain of posts was to be retained to guard against the incursions of the barbarians. Of the arms given up, the copper shields were sent to Rome, and the rest were burnt.

The Romans gained their object. The Macedonian land still on two occasions took up arms at the call of princes of the old reigning house; but otherwise from that time to the present day it has remained without a history.

Illyria was treated in a similar way. The kingdom of Illyria Genthius was split up into three small free states. There too broken up. the freeholders paid the half of the former land-tax to their new masters, with the exception of the towns, which had adhered to Rome and in return obtained exemption from the tax—an exception which there was no opportunity to make in the case of Macedonia. The Illyrian piratic fleet was confiscated, and presented to the more reputable Greek communities along that coast. The constant annoyances, which the Illyrians inflicted on their neighbours by means of their corsairs, were in this way put an end to, at least for a lengthened period.

Cotys in Thrace, who was difficult to be reached, and con- Cotya.

in 596, receives its more exact interpretation by means of the coins. No gold 158.
coins of the four Macedonias are extant; either therefore the gold-mines remained closed, or the gold extracted was converted into bars. On the other hand there certainly exist silver coins of Macedonia *prima* (Amphipolis) in which district the silver-mines were situated. For the brief period, during which they must have been struck (596–608), the number of them is remarkably great, and proves either that the mines were very energetically wrought, 158–146.
or that the old royal money was recoined in large quantity.

^{*} The statement that the Macedonian commonwealth was “relieved of seignorial imposts and taxes” by the Romans (Polyb. xxxvii. 4) does not necessarily require us to assume a subsequent remission of these taxes: it is sufficient, for the explanation of Polybius’ words, to assume that the hitherto seignorial tax now became a public one. The continuance of the constitution granted to the province of Macedonia by Paullus down to at least the Augustan age (Liv. xlv. 32; Justin xxxiii. 2), would, it is true, be compatible also with the remission of the taxes.

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on the
Elpius.

divisions were never up to their full numbers ; the men were put into quarters in summer, and, as the officers plundered on a great, the common soldiers plundered on a small, scale. Friendly peoples were subjected to the most shameful suspicions : for instance, the blame of the disgraceful defeat at Larisa was imputed to the pretended treachery of the Ætolian cavalry, and, what was hitherto unprecedented, its officers were sent to be criminally tried at Rome ; and the Molossians in Epirus were forced by false suspicions into actual revolt. The allied states had war-contributions imposed upon them as if they had been conquered, and if they appealed to the Roman senate, their citizens were executed or sold into slavery : this was done, for instance, at Abdera, and similar outrages were committed at Chalcis. The senate interfered in earnest : it enjoined the liberation of the unfortunate Coroneans and Abderites, and forbade the Roman magistrates to ask contributions from the allies without leave of the senate. Gaius Lucretius was unanimously condemned by the burgesses. But such steps could not alter the fact, that the military result of these two campaigns had been null, while the political result had been a foul stain on the Romans, whose extraordinary successes in the East were based in no small degree on their reputation for moral purity and soundness as compared with the scandals of Hellenic administration. Had Philip commanded instead of Perseus, the war would probably have begun with the destruction of the Roman army and the defection of most of the Hellenes ; but Rome was fortunate enough to be constantly outstripped in her blunders by her antagonists. Perseus was content with entrenching himself in Macedonia—which towards the south and west forms a true mountain fortress—as it were in a beleaguered town.

Marcus enters [169. Macedonia through the pass of Tempe.

The third commander-in-chief also, whom Rome sent to Macedonia in 585, Quintus Marcius Philippus, already mentioned as having had a hospitable connection with the king, was not at all equal to his far from easy task. He was ambitious and enterprising, but a bad officer. His hazardous scheme of crossing Olympus by the pass of Lapathus westward of Tempe, leaving behind one division to face the garrison of the pass, and making his way with his main force through impracticable defiles to Heracleum, was not justified by the fact of its success. Not only might a handful of resolute men have blocked up the route, in which case no retreat

could be thought of; but even after the passage, when he stood with the Macedonian main force in front and the strongly fortified mountain-fortresses of Tempe and Lapatthus behind him, wedged into a narrow plain on the seashore and without supplies or the possibility of foraging for them, his position was no less desperate than when, in his first consulate, he had allowed himself to be similarly surrounded in the Ligurian defiles which thenceforth bore his name. But as accident saved him then, so the incapacity of Perseus saved him now. As if he could not comprehend the idea of defending himself against the Romans otherwise than by the blockading of the passes, he strangely gave himself over as lost as soon as he saw the Romans on the Macedonian side of them, fled in all haste to Pydna, and ordered his ships to be burnt and his treasures to be sunk. But even this voluntary retreat of the Macedonian army did not rescue the consul from his painful position. He advanced, indeed, without hindrance, but he was obliged, after four days' march, to turn back for want of provisions; and, when the king came to his senses and returned in all haste to resume the position which he had abandoned, the Roman army would have been in great danger, had not the impregnable Tempe surrendered at the right moment and handed over its rich stores to the enemy. The communication with the south was by this means secured to the Roman army; but Perseus had strongly barricaded himself in his former well-chosen position on the bank of the little river Elpius, and there checked the further advance of the Romans. So the Roman army remained, during the rest of the summer and the winter, hemmed in in the furthest corner of Thessaly; and, while the crossing of the passes was certainly a success and the first substantial one in the war, it was due not to the ability of the Roman, but to the blundering of the Macedonian, general. The Roman fleet in vain attempted the capture of Demetrias, and performed no exploit whatever. The light ships of Perseus boldly cruised between the Cyclades, protected the corn-vessels destined for Macedonia, and attacked the transports of the enemy. With the western army matters were still worse: Appius Claudius could do nothing with his reduced division, and the contingent which he asked from Achaia was prevented from coming to him by the jealousy of the consul. Moreover, Gentius had allowed himself to be bribed by Perseus with the promise of a great

The armies
on the
Elpius.

sum of money to break with Rome, and to imprison the Roman envoys; whereupon the frugal king deemed it superfluous to pay the money which he had promised, since Genthius was now certainly compelled, independently of it, to substitute an attitude of decided hostility towards Rome for the ambiguous position which he had hitherto maintained. Accordingly the Romans had a further petty war by the side of the great one, which had already lasted three years. In fact had Perseus been able to part with his money, he might easily have aroused enemies still more dangerous to the Romans. A Celtic host under Clondicus—20,000 men, half horse half foot—offered to take service with him in Macedonia itself; but they could not agree as to the pay. In Hellas too there was such a ferment, that a guerilla warfare might easily have been kindled with a little dexterity and a full exchequer; but, as Perseus had no desire to give and the Greeks did nothing gratuitously, the land remained quiet.

Paullus.

168.

At length the Romans resolved to send the proper man to Greece. This was Lucius Æmilius Paullus, son of the consul of the same name that fell at Cannæ; a man of ancient lineage but of humble means, and therefore not so successful in the cunitia as on the battle-field, where he had remarkably distinguished himself in Spain and still more so in Liguria. The people elected him for the second time consul in the year 586 on account of his merits—a course which was at that time rare and exceptional. He was in all respects the fitting man: an excellent general of the old school, strict as respected both himself and his troops, and, notwithstanding his sixty years, still hale and vigorous; an incorruptible magistrate—"one of the few Romans of that age to whom one could not offer money," as a contemporary says of him—and a man of Hellenic culture, who, when commander-in-chief, embraced the opportunity of travelling through Greece to inspect its works of art.

Perseus is
driven back
to Pydna.

Battle of
Pydna.
168.

As soon as the new general arrived in the camp at Hera-cleum, he gave orders for the ill-guarded pass at Pythium to be surprised by Publius Nasica, while skirmishes between the outposts occupied the attention of the Macedonians in the channel of the river Elpius; the enemy was thus turned, and was obliged to retreat to Pydna. There, on the Roman 4th of September, 586, or on the 22nd of June of the Julian calendar—an eclipse of the moon, which a scientific Roman officer announced beforehand to the army that it might not

be regarded as a bad omen, affords in this case the means of determining the date—the outposts accidentally fell into conflict as they were watering their horses after midday; and both sides determined at once to give the battle, which it was originally intended to postpone till the following day. Passing through the ranks in person, without helmet or shield, the grey-headed Roman general arranged his men. Scarce were they in position, when the formidable phalanx assailed them; the general himself, who had witnessed many a hard fight, afterwards acknowledged that he had trembled. The Roman vanguard dispersed; a Pælignian cohort was overthrown and almost annihilated; the legions themselves hurriedly retreated till they reached a hill close upon the Roman camp. Here the fortune of the day changed. The uneven ground and the hurried pursuit had disordered the ranks of the phalanx; the Romans in single cohorts entered at every gap, and attacked it on the flanks and in rear; the Macedonian cavalry which alone could have rendered aid looked calmly on, and soon fled in a body, the king among the foremost; and thus the fate of Macedonia was decided in less than an hour. The 8000 select phalangites allowed themselves to be cut down to a man; as if the phalanx, which fought its last great battle at Pydna, had wished itself to perish there. The overthrow was fearful; 20,000 Macedonians lay on the field of battle, 11,000 were prisoners. The war was at an end, on the fifteenth day after Paullus had assumed the command; all Macedonia submitted in two days. The king fled with his gold—he still had more than 6000 talents (£1,464,000) in his chest—to Samothrace, accompanied by a few faithful attendants. But he himself put to death one of these, Evander of Crete, who was to be called to account as instigator of the attempted assassination of Eumenes; and then his pages and remaining comrades also deserted him. For a moment he hoped that the right of asylum would protect him; but he soon perceived that he was clinging to a straw. An attempt to take flight to Cotys failed. So he wrote to the consul; but the letter was not received, because he designated himself in it as king. He recognized his fate, and surrendered to the Romans at discretion with his children and his treasures, pusillanimous and weeping so as to disgust even his conquerors. With a grave satisfaction, and with thoughts turning rather on the mutability of fortune than on his own present success, the consul re-

Perseus
taken
prisoner.

ceived the most illustrious captive whom Roman general had ever brought home. Perseus died a few years after, as a state prisoner, at Alba on the Fucine lake;* his son in after years earned a living in the same Italian country town as a clerk.

Thus perished the empire of Alexander the Great, which had subdued and Hellenized the East, 144 years after his death.

Defeat and
capture of
Genthius.

That the tragedy, moreover, might not be without its accompaniment of farce, at the same time the war against Genthius, king of Illyria, was also begun and ended by the prætor Lucius Anicius within thirty days. The piratical fleet was taken, the capital Scodra was captured, and the two kings, the heir of Alexander the Great and the heir of Pleuratus, entered Rome side by side as prisoners.

Macedonia
broken up.

The senate had resolved that the peril, which the unseasonable gentleness of Flaminius had brought on Rome, should not recur. Macedonia was abolished. At a conference at Amphipolis on the Strymon the Roman commission ordained, that that compact, thoroughly monarchical, and united state should be broken up into four republican federative leagues moulded on the system of the Greek confederacies, viz., that of Amphipolis in the eastern provinces, that of Thessalonica with the Chalcidian peninsula, that of Pella on the frontiers of Thessaly, and that of Pelagonia in the interior. Intermarriages between persons belonging to different confederacies were to be invalid, and no one might be a freeholder in more than one of them. All who had held office under the king, as well as their grown-up sons, were obliged to leave the country and proceed to Italy on pain of death; he Romans still dreaded, and with reason, the throbbings of the ancient loyalty. The common law and the former constitution otherwise remained in force; the magistrates were of course nominated by communal election, and the power in the communes as well as in the confederacies was placed in the hands of the nobles. The royal domains and royalties were not granted to the confederacies, and these were specially prohibited from working the gold and silver mines, a chief source of the national wealth; but in 596 they were again permitted to work at least the silver-mines.† The importation of

158.

* The story, that the Romans, in order at once to keep the promise which had guaranteed his life and to take vengeance on him, put him to death by depriving him of sleep, is certainly a fable.

† The statement of Cassiodorus, that the Macedonian mines were reopened

salt, and the exportation of timber for ship-building, were prohibited. The land-tax, hitherto paid to the king, ceased, and the confederacies and communities were left to tax themselves; but these had to pay to Rome half of the former land-tax, according to a rate fixed once for all, amounting in all to 100 talents annually (£24,400).^{*} The whole land was for ever disarmed, and the fortress of Demetrias was razed; on the northern frontier alone a chain of posts was to be retained to guard against the incursions of the barbarians. Of the arms given up, the copper shields were sent to Rome, and the rest were burnt.

The Romans gained their object. The Macedonian land still on two occasions took up arms at the call of princes of the old reigning house; but otherwise from that time to the present day it has remained without a history.

Illyria was treated in a similar way. The kingdom of Illyria Gentius was split up into three small free states. There too broken up. the freeholders paid the half of the former land-tax to their new masters, with the exception of the towns, which had adhered to Rome and in return obtained exemption from the tax—an exception which there was no opportunity to make in the case of Macedonia. The Illyrian piratic fleet was confiscated, and presented to the more reputable Greek communities along that coast. The constant annoyances, which the Illyrians inflicted on their neighbours by means of their corsairs, were in this way put an end to, at least for a lengthened period.

Cotys in Thrace, who was difficult to be reached, and con- Cotys.

in 596, receives its more exact interpretation by means of the coins. No gold 158.
coins of the four Macedonias are extant; either therefore the gold-mines remained closed, or the gold extracted was converted into bars. On the other hand there certainly exist silver coins of Macedonia *prima* (Amphipolis) in which district the silver-mines were situated. For the brief period, during which they must have been struck (596–608), the number of them is remarkably great, and proves either that the mines were very energetically wrought, 158–146.
or that the old royal money was recoined in large quantity.

* The statement that the Macedonian commonwealth was “relieved of seignorial imposts and taxes” by the Romans (Polyb. xxvii. 4) does not necessarily require us to assume a subsequent remission of these taxes: it is sufficient, for the explanation of Polybius’ words, to assume that the hitherto seignorial tax now became a public one. The continuance of the constitution granted to the province of Macedonia by Paullus down to at least the Augustan age (Liv. xlv. 32; Justin xxxiii. 2), would, it is true, be compatible also with the remission of the taxes.

171. was a bitter commentary on the new institution, that in serious wars (as in 583) it was found necessary to suspend the democratic mode of electing officers, and to recommit to the general the appointment of his staff.

Restrictions
on the elec-
tion of con-
suls and
censors.

- In the case of civil officers, the first and chief object was to limit re-election to the supreme magistracies. This was certainly necessary, if the presidency of annual kings was not to be an empty name; and even in the preceding period re-election to the consulship was not permitted till after the lapse of ten years, while in the case of the censorship it was altogether forbidden (i. 321). No further law was passed in the period before us; but an increased stringency in its application is obvious from the fact that, while the law as to the ten years' interval was suspended in 537 during the continuance of the war in Italy, there was no further dispensation afterwards, and indeed towards the close of this period re-election seldom occurred at all. Moreover, towards the end of this epoch (574) a decree of the people was issued, binding the candidates for public magistracies to apply for them in a fixed order of succession, and to observe certain intervals between the offices and certain limits of age. Custom, indeed, had long prescribed both of these; but it was a sensibly felt restriction of the freedom of election, when the consuetudinary qualification was raised into a legal requirement, and the liberty of disregarding such requirements in extraordinary cases was withdrawn from the electors. In general, admission to the senate was thrown open to persons belonging to the ruling families without distinction as to ability, while not only were the poorer and humbler ranks of the population utterly precluded from access to the offices of government, but all Roman burgesses not belonging to the hereditary aristocracy were practically excluded not indeed exactly from the senate, but from the two highest magistracies, the consulship and the censorship. After the case of Manius Curius (i. 315), no instance can be pointed out of a consul who did not belong to the social aristocracy, and probably no instance of the kind occurred at all. But the number of the *gentes*, which appear for the first time in the lists of consuls and censors in the half-century from the beginning of the war with Hannibal to the close of that with Perseus, is extremely limited; and by far the most of these, such as the Flamini, Terentii, Porcii, Acilii, and Lælii, may be referred to elections carried by the opposi-
- 217.
- 180.

tion, or are traceable to special aristocratic connections. The election of Gaius Lælius in 564, for instance, was evidently due to the Scipios. The exclusion of the poorer classes from the government was, no doubt, required by the altered circumstances of the case. Now that Rome had ceased to be a purely Italian state and had adopted Hellenic culture, it was no longer possible to take a small farmer from the plough and to set him at the head of the community. But it was neither necessary nor beneficial that the elections should, almost without exception, be confined to the narrow circle of the curule houses, and that a "new man" should only be able to make his way into that circle by a sort of usurpation.* No doubt a certain hereditary cha-

190.

* The stability of the Roman aristocracy may be clearly traced, more especially in the case of the patrician *gentes*, by means of the consular and ædilian Fasti. As is well known, the consulate was held by one patrician and one plebeian in each year from 388-581 (with the exception of the years 399, 400, 401, 403, 405, 409, 411, in which both consuls were patricians). Moreover, the colleges of curule ædiles were composed exclusively of patricians in the odd years of the Varronian reckoning, at least down to the close of the sixth century, and they are known for sixteen years, viz., 541, 545, 547, 549, 551, 553, 555, 557, 561, 565, 567, 575, 585, 589, 591, 593. These patrician consuls and ædiles are, as respects their *gentes*, distributed as follows:—

	Consuls. 388-500.		Consuls. 501-581.		Curule Ædiles of these 16 patrician colleges.
Cornelii	15	15	14
Valerii	10	8	4
Claudii	4	8	2
Æmilii	9	6	2
Fabii	6	6	1
Manlii	4	6	1
Postumii	2	6	2
Servilii	3	4	2
Quinctii	2	3	1
Furii	2	3	—
Sulpicii	6	2	2
Veturii	—	2	—
Papirii	3	1	—
Nautii	2	—	—
Julii	1	—	1
Foslii	1	—	—
	70		70		32

Thus the fifteen or sixteen houses of the high nobility, that were powerful in the state at the time of the Licinian laws, maintained their ground without material change in their relative numbers—which no doubt were partly kept up by adoption—for the next two centuries, or, in fact, down to the end of the

racter was inherent not merely in the institution of the senate, in so far as it rested from the first on a representation of the *gentes* (i. 71), but in the nature of the aristocracy generally, in so far as statesmanly wisdom and statesmanly experience are bequeathed from the able father to the able son, and the inspiring spirit of an illustrious ancestry fans every noble spark within the human breast into a speedier and more brilliant flame. In this sense the Roman aristocracy had been at all times hereditary; in fact, it had displayed its hereditary character with great naïveté in the old custom of the senator taking his sons with him to the senate, and of the public magistrate decorating his sons, as it were by anticipation, with the insignia of the highest public honours—the purple border of the consular, and the golden amulet case of the triumphator. But, while in the earlier period the hereditary character of the outward dignity had been to a certain extent borne out by the heritage of intrinsic worth, and the senatorial aristocracy had originally guided the state not by virtue of hereditary right, but by virtue of the highest of all rights of representation—the right of the superior, as contrasted with the mere ordinary, man—it sank in this epoch (and with specially great rapidity after the end of the Hannibalic war) from its original high position as the aggregate of those in the community who were most experienced in counsel and action, into an order of lords, filling up its ranks by hereditary succession, and exercising collegiate misrule.

Usurpation
of power by
certain fa-
milies.

Indeed, matters had already at this period reached such a height, that out of the evil of oligarchy there emerged the still worse evil of usurpation of power by particular families. We have already spoken (P. 283) of the offensive family-policy of the conqueror of Zama, and of his unhappily successful efforts to cover with his own laurels the incapacity and pitifulness of his brother; and the nepotism of the Flaminini was, if possible, still more shameless and offensive than that of the Scipios. Absolute freedom of election in fact augmented the power of such coteries far more than that of the electoral body. The election of Marcus Valerius

republic. To the circle of the plebeian nobility new *gentes* were from time to time added; but in the plebeian Fasti also the old houses, such as the Licinii, Fulvii, Atilii, Domitii, Marcii, Junii, predominate very decidedly throughout three centuries.

Corvus to the consulship at twenty-three had doubtless been for the benefit of the state; but now, when Scipio obtained the ædileship at twenty-three and the consulate at thirty, and Flaminius, while not yet thirty years of age, rose from the quæstorship to the consulship, such proceedings involved serious danger to the republic. Things had already reached such a pass, that the only effective barrier against family rule and its consequences had to be sought in a government strictly oligarchical; and this was the reason, why even the party otherwise opposed to the oligarchy agreed to the restriction imposed on absolute freedom of election.

The government bore the stamp of this gradual change in the spirit of the governing class. It is true that the administration of external affairs was still pervaded at this epoch by the consistency and energy, which had established the dominion of the Roman state over Italy. During the severe disciplinary period of the Sicilian war the Roman aristocracy had gradually raised itself to the height of its new position; and, if it unconstitutionally usurped for the senate powers which in law fell to be shared between the magistrates and the *comitia* alone, it vindicated the step by its certainly far from brilliant, but sure and steady, pilotage of the vessel of the state during the Hannibalic storm and the complications thence arising, and showed to the world that the Roman senate was alone able, and in many respects alone deserved, to rule the wide circle of the Italo-Hellenic states. But, admitting the noble attitude of the senate, which ruled Rome, in opposition to the external foe—an attitude crowned with the noblest results,—we may not overlook the fact, that in the less conspicuous, but far more important and far more difficult, administration of the internal affairs of the state both the treatment of existing institutions and the new arrangements betray an almost opposite spirit, or to speak more correctly, already indicate the ascendancy of opposite principles in this field.

In relation, first of all, to the individual burgess, the government was no longer what it had been. The term “magistrate” meant a man who was more than other men; and, if he was the servant of the community, he was, for that very reason, the master of every burgess. But the tightness of the rein was now visibly relaxed. Where coteries and canvassing flourish as they did in the Rome of that age,

Government of the nobility.

Internal administration.

Decline in the administration.

252. men are chary of forfeiting the good services of their fellows or the favour of the multitude by stern words and straightforward action. If, now and then, there appeared magistrates who displayed the gravity and the sternness of the older time, they were ordinarily, like Cotta (502) and Cato, new men who had not sprung from the bosom of the ruling class. It was even deemed something singular, when Paulus, who had been named commander-in-chief against Perseus, instead of tendering his thanks in the usual manner to the burgesses, declared to them that he presumed they had chosen him as general because they accounted him the most capable of command, and requested them accordingly not to help him to command, but to be silent and obey.

As to military discipline and justice.

The supremacy and hegemony of Rome in the territories of the Mediterranean rested in no small degree on the strictness of her military discipline and administration of justice. Undoubtedly she was still, on the whole, at that time infinitely superior in these respects to the Hellenic, Phœnician, and Oriental states, which were without exception thoroughly disorganized; nevertheless grave abuses were already occurring in Rome. We have previously (P. 296 *et seq.*) pointed out how the wretched character of the commanders-in-chief—and that not merely in the case of demagogues chosen perhaps by the opposition, like Gaius Flaminius and Gaius Varro, but of men who were good aristocrats—had already in the third Macedonian war imperilled the interests of the state. And the mode in which justice was occasionally administered is shown by the scene in the camp of the consul 192. Lucius Quinctius Flaminius at Placentia (562). To compensate a favourite youth for the gladiatorial games of the capital, which through his attendance on the consul he had missed the opportunity of seeing, that haughty lord had ordered a noble Boian who had taken refuge in the Roman camp to be summoned, and had killed him at a banquet with his own hand. Still worse than the occurrence itself, to which many parallels might be adduced, was the fact that the perpetrator was not brought to trial; and not only so, but when the censor Cato on account of it erased his name from the roll of the senate, his fellow-senators invited the expelled to resume his senatorial stall in the theatre. He was, no doubt, a brother of the liberator of the Greeks, and one of the most powerful coterie-leaders in the senate.

The financial system of the Roman community also retro-

graded rather than advanced during this epoch. The amount of their revenues, indeed, was visibly on the increase. The indirect taxes—there were no direct taxes in Rome—increased in consequence of the enlargement of the Roman territory, which rendered it necessary, for example, to institute new customs-offices along the Campanian and Bruttian coasts at Puteoli, Castra (Squillace), and elsewhere, in 555 and 575. The same reason led to the new salt-tariff of 550, fixing the scale of prices at which salt was to be sold in the different districts of Italy, as it was no longer possible to furnish salt at one and the same price to the Roman burgesses now scattered throughout the land; but, as the Roman government probably supplied the burgesses with salt at cost price, if not below it, this financial measure yielded no gain to the state. Still more considerable was the increase in the produce of the domains. The land-tax indeed, which should of right have been paid to the treasury from the Italian domain-lands granted for occupation, was in the great majority of cases neither asked for nor given. On the other hand the *scriptura* was retained; and not only so, but the domains recently acquired in the second Punic war, particularly the greater portion of the territory of Capua and that of Leontini (P. 149, 190), instead of being given up to occupation, were parcelled out and let to petty temporary lessees, and the attempts at occupation made in these cases were opposed with more than usual energy by the government; by which steps the state acquired an important and secure source of income. The mines of the state also, particularly the important Spanish mines, were turned to profit on lease. Lastly, the revenue was augmented by the tribute of the transmarine subjects. From extraordinary sources very considerable sums accrued during this epoch to the state treasury, particularly the produce of the spoil in the war with Antiochus, 200 millions of sesterces (£2,055,000), and that of the war with Perseus, 210 millions of sesterces (£2,156,000)—the latter, the largest sum which ever came at one time into the Roman exchequer.

But this increase of revenue was for the most part counterbalanced by the increasing expenditure. The provinces, Sicily perhaps excepted, probably cost nearly as much as they yielded; the expenditure on highways and other structures rose in proportion to the extension of territory; the repayment also of the advances (*tributa*) received from the freeholder burgesses during times of severe war formed a burden

As to the management of the finances.

199.

179. 204.

for many a year on the Roman treasury. To these fell to be added very considerable losses occasioned to the revenue by the mismanagement, negligence, or connivance of the supreme magistrates. Of the conduct of the magistrates in the provinces, of their habit of living luxuriously at the expense of the public purse, of their embezzlement more especially of the spoil, of the incipient system of bribery and extortion, we shall speak in the sequel. How the state fared generally as regarded the farming of its revenues and the contracts for supplies and buildings, may be inferred from the circumstance, that the senate resolved in 587 to desist from the working of the Macedonian mines that had fallen to Rome, because the lessees of the minerals would either plunder the subjects or cheat the exchequer—a truly naïve confession of impotence, in which the controlling board pronounced its own censure. Not only was the land-tax of the occupied domain-land allowed tacitly to fall into abeyance, as has been already mentioned, but private buildings in the capital and elsewhere were suffered to encroach on the public property, and the water from the public aqueducts was diverted to private purposes: great dissatisfaction was created on one occasion when the censor took serious steps against such trespassers, and compelled them either to desist from this exclusive use of the public property, or to pay the price fixed by law for the ground or water. The conscience of the Romans, otherwise in economic matters so scrupulous, showed, so far as the state was concerned, a remarkable laxity. “He who steals from a burgess,” said Cato, “ends his days in chains and fetters; but he who steals from the community ends them in gold and purple.” If, notwithstanding the fact that the public property of the Roman community was fearlessly and with impunity plundered by officials and speculators, Polybius still lays stress on the rarity of embezzlement in Rome, while Greece could hardly produce a single official who had not touched the public money, and on the honesty with which a Roman commissioner or magistrate would upon his simple word of honour administer enormous sums, while in the case of the paltriest sum in Greece ten letters were sealed and twenty witnesses were required and yet everybody cheated, this merely implies that social and financial demoralization had advanced much further in Greece than in Rome, and, in particular, that direct and palpable peculation was not as yet so flourishing in the one case as in the other. The general

financial result is most clearly exhibited to us by the state of the public buildings, and by the amount of cash in the exchequer. We find in times of peace a fifth, in times of war a tenth, of the revenues expended on public buildings; which, in the circumstances, does not seem to have been a very large outlay. With these sums, as well as with fines which were not directly payable into the exchequer, much was probably done for the repair of the highways in and near the capital, for the formation of the chief Italian roads,* and for the construction of public buildings. Perhaps the most important of the building operations in the capital, known to belong to this period, was the great repair and extension of the network of sewers throughout the city, contracted for probably in 570, for which 24,000,000 sesterces (£244,000) were set apart at once, and to which it may be presumed that the portions of the *cloacæ* still extant, at least in the main, belong. To all appearance however, even apart from the severe pressure of war, this period was inferior to the last section of the preceding epoch in respect of public buildings; between 482 and 607 no new aqueduct was constructed at Rome. The treasure of the state, no doubt, increased; the last reserve in 545, when they found themselves under the necessity of laying hands on it, amounted only to 4000 pounds of gold (£164,000; P. 174) whereas a short time after the close of this period (597) close on £860,000 in precious metals were stored in the exchequer. But, when we take into account the enormous extraordinary revenues which in the generation after the close of the Hannibalic war came into the Roman treasury, the latter sum surprises us rather by its smallness than by its magnitude. So far as with the extremely meagre statements before us it may be allowable to speak of results, the finances of the Roman state exhibit an excess of income over expenditure, but are far from presenting a brilliant sum total.

The change in the spirit of the government was most distinctly apparent in the treatment of the Italian and extra-Italian subjects of the Roman community. Formerly there were distinguished in Italy four classes: the ordinary, and

* The expenses of these were, however, thrown mainly in all probability on the adjoining inhabitants. The old system of making requisitions of task-work was not abolished: it must not unfrequently have happened, that the slaves of the landholders were called away to be employed in the construction of roads. (Cato, *de R. R.* 2.)

Passive
burgesses.

the Latin, allied communities, the Roman burgesses *sine suffragio*, and the burgesses with the full franchise. The third of these four classes disappeared during the course of this period, for the communities of passive burgesses either—as was the case with Capua more especially—lost their Roman citizenship in consequence of the Hannibalic war, or one after another acquired the full franchise; so that at the close of this period there were no passive burgesses of Rome, except isolated individuals who were for special reasons excluded from the right of voting.

Deditici.

On the other hand there emerged a new class, in a position of peculiar inferiority, deprived of municipal freedom and of the right to carry arms and to some extent treated almost like public slaves (*peregrini dediticii*); to which, in particular, the members of the former Campanian, southern Picentine, and Bruttian communities that had been in alliance with Hannibal (P. 190) belonged. To these were added the Celtic tribes tolerated on the south side of the Alps, whose position in relation to the Italian confederacy is but imperfectly known, but is sufficiently characterized as inferior by the clause embodied in their treaties of alliance with Rome, that no member of these communities should ever be allowed to acquire Roman citizenship (P. 195).

Allies.

The position of the non-Latin allies had, as we have mentioned before (P. 191), undergone a change greatly to their disadvantage in consequence of the Hannibalic war. Only a few communities in this category, such as Neapolis, Nola, and Heraclea, had during all the vicissitudes of that war remained steadfastly on the Roman side, and therefore retained their former rights as allies unaltered; by far the greater portion were obliged, in consequence of having changed sides, to submit to an injurious revision of the existing treaties. The reduced position of the non-Latin allies is attested by the emigration that set in from these towards the Latin communities: when in 577 the Samnites and Pælignians applied to the senate for a reduction of their contingents, their request was based on the ground that during recent years 4000 Samnite and Pælignian families had migrated to the Latin colony of Fregellæ.

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Latins.

That the Latins,—which term now denoted the few cities in old Latium that were not included in the Roman burgess-union such as Tibur and Præneste, and the Latin colonies dispersed throughout all Italy—were still at this

time in a better position, is implied in their very name ; but they too suffered, in proportion, not much less injuriously. The burdens imposed on them were unjustly increased, and the pressure of military service was more and more transferred from the burgesses to the Latin and other Italian allies. For instance, in 536, nearly twice as many of the allies were called out as of the burgesses : after the end of the Hannibalic war all the burgesses received their discharge, but not all the allies ; the latter were chiefly employed for garrison duty and for the odious service in Spain. In the triumphal largess of 577 the allies received not as formerly an equal share with the burgesses, but only the half, so that amidst the unrestrained rejoicing of that soldiers' carnival the divisions thus treated as inferior followed the chariot of victory in sullen silence : in the assignations of land in northern Italy the burgesses received ten *jugera* of arable land each, the non-burgesses three *jugera* each. That liberty of migration was no longer granted to the Latin communities founded after 486, has been already observed (i. 433). It was retained in law by the older Latin cities ; but the crowding of their burgesses *en masse* to Rome, and the complaints of their magistrates as to the increasing depopulation of the cities and the impossibility under such circumstances of furnishing the due contingent, led the Roman government not to allow the exercise of this right of migration by these Latins, unless the emigrant left behind children of his own in his native city ; and, in conformity with this principle, police-ejections from the capital were carried out to a great extent (567, 577). The measure might be unavoidable, but it was none the less felt as a material restriction of the right of free migration accorded by treaty to the allied cities. Moreover, the towns founded by Rome in the interior of Italy began towards the close of this period to receive instead of Latin rights the full franchise, which previously was only given to the maritime colonies ; and the enlargement of the Latin body by the accession of new communities, which hitherto had gone on so regularly, thus came to an end. Aquileia, the founding of which began in 571, was the latest of the Italian colonies of Rome that received Latin rights ; the full franchise was given to the colonies, sent forth nearly at the same time, of Potentia, Pisaurum, Parma, Mutina, and Luna (570-577). The reason for this evidently lay in the decline of the Latin as com-

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177.

268.

187, 177

183.

184-177

pared with the Roman franchise. The colonists conducted to the new settlements were always, and now more than ever, chosen in preponderating number from the Roman burgesses; and even among the poorer portion of these there was no longer to be found any one willing, even for the acquisition of considerable material advantages, to exchange his rights as a burgess for the privileges of a Latin.

Roman
franchise
more diffi-
cult of ac-
quisition.
350.

Lastly, in the case of non-burgesses—communities as well as individuals—admission to the Roman franchise was almost completely foreclosed. The earlier course of incorporating the subject communities in that of Rome had been dropped about 400, that the Roman burgess-body might not by an undue extension be too much decentralized; and therefore communities of half-burgesses were instituted (i. 437). Now the centralization of the community was abandoned, partly through the admission of the half-burgess communities to the full franchise, partly through the accession of numerous more remote burgess-colonies to its ranks; but the older system of incorporation was not resumed. It cannot be shown, that after the complete subjugation of Italy even a single Italian community exchanged its position as an ally for the Roman franchise; probably none after that date in reality acquired it. But even the transition of individual Italians to the Roman franchise was at this epoch rendered considerably more difficult, especially by the limitation of the liberty of migration which was in law associated with the passive franchise; and it was confined almost wholly to the case of magistrates of the Latin communities (i. 433) and of non-burgesses admitted, by special favour towards themselves individually, on the founding of burgess-colonies.*

It cannot be denied that these changes *de facto* and *de jure* in the relations of the Italian subjects exhibit at least an intimate connection and consistency. The situation of

* Thus, as is well known, Ennius of Rudia received burgess-rights from one of the triumvirs, Q. Fulvius Nobilior, on occasion of the founding of the burgess-colonies of Potentia and Pisaurum (Cic. *Brut.* xi. 79); whereupon, according to the well-known custom, he adopted the *prænomen* of the latter. The non-burgesses who were sent to take part in the foundation of a burgess-colony, did not, at least in this epoch, through that circumstance acquire *de jure* Roman citizenship, although they frequently laid claim to it (Liv. xxxiv. 42); but the magistrates charged with the founding of a colony were empowered, by a clause in the decree of the people relative to each case, to confer burgess-rights on a certain number of persons (Cic. *pro Balb.* xvi. 48.)

the subject classes was throughout deteriorated in proportion to the gradations previously subsisting, and, while the government had formerly endeavoured to soften the shades of distinction and to arrange means of transition from one to another, now the intermediate links were everywhere set aside and the connecting bridges were broken down. As within the Roman burgess-body the ruling class separated itself from the people, uniformly evaded public burdens, and uniformly appropriated honours and advantages, so the burgesses in their turn asserted their distinction from the Italian confederacy, and excluded it more and more from the joint enjoyment of power while transferring to it a double or triple share in the public burdens. As the nobility, in relation to the plebeians, returned to the close exclusiveness of the declining patriciate, so did the burgesses in relation to the non-burgesses; the plebeiate, which had become great through the liberality of its principles, now wrapped itself up in the rigid maxims of patricianism. The abolition of the passive burgesses cannot in itself be censured, and, so far as concerned the motive which led to it, the step belonged in all probability to another category to be mentioned afterwards; but through its abolition an intermediate connecting link was lost. Far more momentous, however, was the disappearance of the distinction between the Latin and the other Italian communities. The privileged position of the Latin nation in Italy was the foundation of the Roman power; that foundation gave way, when the Latin towns began to feel that they were no longer privileged partakers in the dominion of the powerful cognate community but substantially subjects of Rome like the rest, and when all the Italians began to find their position equally intolerable. It is true, that there were still distinctions. The Bruttians and their companions in misery were treated exactly like slaves and conducted themselves accordingly, running away, for instance, from the fleet in which they served as galley-slaves, whenever they could, and gladly taking service against Rome; and the Celtic, and above all the transmarine, subjects formed a class still more oppressed than the Italians were—a class intentionally abandoned by the government to contempt and maltreatment at the hands of the Italians. But such distinctions, while implying a gradation of classes among the subjects, could afford no reasonable compensation for the earlier contrast between the cognate, and the alien, Italian subjects. A profound dissatisfaction pre-

ailed through the whole Italian confederacy, and fear alone prevented it from finding expression. The proposal made in the senate after the battle at Cannæ, to give the Roman franchise and a seat in the senate to two men from each Latin community, was made at an unseasonable time, and was rightly rejected; but it shows the apprehension with which men in the ruling community even then viewed the relations between Latium and Rome. Had a second Hannibal now carried the war into Italy, it may be doubted whether he would have again been thwarted by the steadfast resistance of the Latin name to a foreign domination.

The provinces.

But by far the most important institution which this epoch introduced into the Roman commonwealth, and that at the same time which involved the most decided and fatal deviation from the course hitherto pursued, was the new provincial magistracies. The earlier state-law of Rome knew nothing of tributary subjects: the conquered communities were either sold into slavery, or merged in the Roman commonwealth, or admitted to an alliance which secured to them at least communal independence and freedom from taxation. But the Carthaginian possessions in Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, as well as the kingdom of Hiero, had paid tithe and tribute to their former masters: if Rome was desirous of retaining these possessions at all, it was in the judgment of the short-sighted the most judicious, and undoubtedly the most convenient, course to manage the new territories entirely in accordance with the rules heretofore observed. Accordingly the Romans simply retained the Carthagino-Hieronic provincial constitution, and organized in accordance with it those provinces, such as Hither Spain, which they wrested from the barbarians. It was the shirt of Nessus, which they inherited from the enemy. Beyond doubt at first the Roman government intended, in imposing taxes on their subjects, not properly to enrich themselves, but only to cover the cost of administration and defence; but they deviated from this course, when they made Macedonia and Illyria tributary without undertaking the government or the guardianship of the frontier there. The fact, however, that they still maintained moderation in the imposition of burdens was of little consequence as compared with the conversion of their sovereignty into a profitable privilege at all; the fall was the same, whether a single apple was taken or the tree was plundered.

Punishment followed in the steps of wrong. The new pro-

vincial system necessitated the appointment of governors, whose position was absolutely incompatible not only with the welfare of the provinces, but with the Roman constitution. As the Roman community in the provinces took the place of the former rulers of the land, so the governor appeared there in the position of a king; the Sicilian prætor, for example, resided in Hiero's palace at Syracuse. Now it is true, that the governor was nevertheless bound in law to administer his office with republican honour and frugality. Cato, when governor of Sardinia, appeared in the towns subject to him on foot and attended by a single servant who carried his coat and sacrificial ladle; and, when he returned from his Spanish governorship, he sold his war horse beforehand, because he did not hold himself entitled to charge the state with the expenses of its transport. There is no question that the Roman governors—although certainly but few of them pushed their conscientiousness, like Cato, so far as to border on the stingy and the ridiculous—made in many cases a powerful impression on their subjects, more especially on the frivolous and unstable Greeks, by their ancestral piety, by the reverential quietness prevailing at their assemblies, by their comparatively upright administration of office and of justice, by their proper severity more particularly towards the worst oppressors of the provincials—the Roman revenue-farmers and bankers—and in general by the gravity and dignity of their deportment. The provincials found their government comparatively tolerable. They had not been pampered by their former Carthaginian governors and Syracusan masters, and they were soon to find occasion for recalling with gratitude the present rods as compared with the coming scorpions: it is easy to understand how, in later times, the sixth century of the city appeared as the golden era of provincial rule. But it was not practicable for any length of time to be at once republican and king. Playing the part of governors demoralized the Roman ruling class with fearful rapidity. Haughtiness and arrogance towards the provincials were so natural in the circumstances, as scarcely to form matter of reproach against individual magistrates. But already it was a rare thing—and the rarer, because the government adhered rigidly to the old principle of not paying public officials—that a governor returned with quite clean hands from his province; it was already remarked upon as something singular, that Paullus, the conqueror of Pydna,

193. did not take money. The bad custom of delivering to the governor "honorary wine" and other "voluntary" gifts seems as old as the provincial constitution itself, and may well have been a legacy from the Carthaginians; even Cato, in his administration of Sardinia in 556, had to content himself with regulating and moderating such dues. The right of the magistrates, and of those travelling on the business of the state generally, to free quarters and free conveyance was already employed as a pretext for exactions. The more important right of the magistrate to obtain from his province supplies of grain—partly for the maintenance of himself and his retinue (*in cellam*), partly for the provisioning of the army in case of war or on other special occasions—on requisition at a fair value was already so scandalously abused, that on the complaint of the Spaniards the senate, in 583, found it necessary to withdraw from the governors the right of fixing the price of the supplies for either purpose (P. 212). Requisitions had begun to be made on the subjects even for the popular festivals in Rome; the unmeasured vexatious demands made on the Italian as well as extra-Italian communities by the ædile, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, for a festival which he had to provide, induced the senate officially to interfere (572). The liberties which Roman magistrates at the close of this period allowed themselves to take not only with the unhappy subjects, but even with the dependent free-states and kingdoms, are illustrated by the raids of Gaius Volso in Asia Minor (P. 272), and especially by the scandalous proceedings in Greece during the war with Perseus (P. 297).

Control
over the
governors.

The government had no right to be surprised at such things, for it provided no serious check on the excesses of this capricious military administration. Judicial control, it is true, was not entirely wanting. Although, according to the universal but more than questionable rule of allowing no complaint to be brought against a commander-in-chief during his term of office (i. 258), the Roman governor could ordinarily be called to account only after the mischief had been done, yet he was amenable either to a criminal or to a civil prosecution. In order to the institution of the former, some Roman magistrate who possessed criminal jurisdiction had to undertake the case and bring it before the bar of the people; the civil action was remitted by the senator who administered the corresponding prætorship to a jury appointed, ac-

according to the constitution of the tribunal in those times, from the ranks of the senate. In both cases, therefore, the control lay in the hands of the ruling class, and, although the latter was still sufficiently upright and honourable not absolutely to set aside well-founded complaints, and the senate even in several instances, at the call of those aggrieved, condescended itself to order the institution of a civil process, yet the complaints of poor men and foreigners against powerful members of the ruling aristocracy—submitted to judges and jurymen far remote from the scene and, if not involved in the like guilt, at least belonging to the same order as the accused—could from the first only reckon on success in the event of the wrong being clear and crying; and to complain in vain was almost certain destruction. The aggrieved no doubt found a certain support in the hereditary relations of clientship, which the subject cities and provinces were wont to enter into with their conquerors and other Romans who had been brought into contact with them. The Spanish governors felt that no one could with impunity maltreat the clients of Cato; and the circumstance that the representatives of the three nations conquered by Paullus—the Spaniards, Ligurians, and Macedonians—would not forego the privilege of carrying his bier to the funeral pile, was the noblest dirge in honour of that noble man. But not only did this special protection give the Greeks opportunity to display in Rome all their talent for abasing themselves in presence of their masters, and to demoralize even those masters by their ready servility (the decrees of the Syracusans in honour of Marcellus, after he had destroyed and plundered their city and they had complained of his conduct to the senate in vain, form one of the most scandalous pages in the far from honourable annals of Syracuse); but, in connection with the dangers of a family policy, this patronage on the part of great houses had also its politically perilous side. In this way the result was that the Roman magistrates in some degree feared the gods and the senate, and for the most part were moderate in their plundering; but they did plunder, and that with impunity provided they observed such moderation. The mischievous rule became established, that in the case of minor exactions and moderate violence the Roman magistrate acted in some measure within his sphere and was in law exempt from punishment, so that those who were aggrieved had to keep silence; and from

this rule succeeding ages did not fail to draw the fatal consequences.

Supervision
of the
senate over
the pro-
vinces and
their
governors.

Nevertheless, even though the tribunals had been as strict as they were lax, the liability to a judicial reckoning could only check the worst evils. The true security for a good administration lay in a strict and uniform supervision by the supreme administrative authority: and this the senate utterly failed to provide. It was in this respect that the laxity and helplessness of the collegiate government became earliest apparent. By right the governors ought to have been subjected to an oversight far more strict and more special than had sufficed for the Italian municipal administration; and now, when the empire embraced great transmarine dominions, the arrangements, through which the government preserved to itself the supervision of the whole, ought to have undergone a corresponding expansion. In both respects the case was reversed. The governors ruled virtually as sovereign; and the most important of the institutions serving for the latter purpose, the census of the empire, was extended to Sicily alone, not to any of the provinces subsequently acquired. This emancipation of the supreme administrative officials from the central authority was more than hazardous. The Roman governor placed at the head of the armies of the state, and in possession of considerable financial resources; subject to but a lax judicial control, and practically independent of the supreme administration; and impelled by a sort of necessity to separate the interests of himself and of the people whom he governed from those of the Roman community and to treat them as conflicting, far more resembled a Persian satrap than one of the commissioners of the Roman senate at the time of the Samnite wars. The man, moreover, who had just conducted a legalized military tyranny abroad, could with difficulty find his way back to the common civic level, which distinguished between those who commanded and those who obeyed, but not between masters and slaves. Even the governing class felt, that their two fundamental principles—equality within the aristocracy, and the subordination of the power of the magistrates to the senatorial college—began in this instance to give way in their hands. The aversion of the government to the acquisition of new provinces and to the whole provincial system; the institution of the provincial quæstorships, which were intended to take at least the financial power out of the hands of the governors;

and the abolition of the arrangement—in itself so proper—for lengthening the tenure of such offices (P. 212), very clearly evince the anxiety felt by the more far-seeing of the Roman statesmen as to the fruits of the seed thus sown. But diagnosis is not cure. The internal government of the nobility continued to follow the direction once given to it; and the decay of the administration and of the financial system—the precursor of future revolutions and usurpations—steadily pursued its course, if not unnoticed, yet unchecked.

If the new nobility was less strictly defined than the old aristocracy of the *gentes*, and if, while the one encroached on the rest of the burgesses as respected the joint enjoyment of political rights *de jure*, the other only did so *de facto*, the second form of inferiority was for these very reasons worse to bear and worse to throw off than the first. Attempts were, as a matter of course, made to throw it off. The opposition rested on the support of the *comitia*, as the nobility did on the senate: in order to understand the opposition, we must describe the spirit of the burgesses during this period and their position in the commonwealth.

Whatever could be demanded of an assembly of burgesses like the Roman, which was not the motive power, but the firm foundation, of the whole machinery—a sure perception of the common good, a sagacious deference towards the right leader, a steadfast spirit in prosperous and evil days, and, above all, the capacity of sacrificing the individual for the general welfare and the comfort of the present for the advantage of the future—all these qualities the Roman community exhibited in so high a degree that, when we look to its conduct as a whole, all censure is lost in reverent admiration. Even now good sense and discretion still thoroughly predominated. The whole conduct of the burgesses with reference to the ruling class as well as to the opposition shows very clearly that the same mighty patriotism before which even Hannibal's genius had to quit the field pervaded the proceedings of the Roman *comitia*. No doubt they often erred; but their errors originated not in the mischievous impulses of a rabble, but in the narrow views characteristic of burgesses and farmers. The machinery however, by means of which the burgesses took part in the course of public affairs, became certainly more and more unwieldy, and the circumstances in which they were placed through their own great deeds far outgrew their power to deal

The opposition.

Character of the Roman burgess body.

with them. We have already stated, that in the course of this epoch most of the former communities of passive burgesses, as well as a considerable number of newly established colonies, received the full Roman franchise. At the close of this period the Roman burgess-body, in a tolerably compact mass, occupied Latium in its widest sense, Sabina, and a part of Campania, so that it reached on the west coast northward to Cære and southward to Cumæ; within this district there were only a few cities not included in it, such as Tibur, Præneste, Signia, and Norba. To this fell to be added the maritime colonies on the coasts of Italy which uniformly possessed the full Roman franchise, the Picerian and trans-Apennine colonies of recent foundation to which the franchise had to be conceded (P. 333), and a very considerable number of Roman burgesses, who, without forming separate communities in a strict sense, were dispersed throughout Italy in market-villages and hamlets (*fora et conciliabula*). To some extent the unwieldiness of a community so constituted was remedied, as regarded purposes of justice* and of administration, by the deputy judges we have previously mentioned (i. 435); and already perhaps the maritime (i. 449) and the new Picenian and trans-Apennine colonies exhibited at least the first lineaments of the system under which afterwards smaller urban communities were organized within the great city-commonwealth of Rome. But in all political questions the general assembly in the Roman Forum was alone entitled to act. It is obvious at a glance, that this assembly was no longer, in its composition or in its collective action, what it had been when all the persons entitled to vote could exercise their privilege as citizens by leaving their farms in the morning and returning home the same evening. Moreover, the government—whether from want of judgment, from negligence, or from any evil design, we cannot tell—no longer enrolled the communities admitted to the franchise after 513 in newly insti-

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* In Cato's treatise on husbandry, which, as is well known, primarily bore reference to an estate in the district of Venafrum, the judicial discussion of such processes as might arise is referred to Rome only as respects one definite case; namely, that in which the landlord leases the winter pasture to the owner of a flock of sheep, and thus has to deal with a lessee who, as a rule, is not domiciled in the district (c. 149). It may be inferred from this, that in ordinary cases, where the contract was with a person domiciled in the district, such processes as might arise were even in Cato's time decided not at Rome, but before the local judges.

tuted tribes, but entered them in the old ; so that gradually each tribe came to be composed of different townships scattered over the whole Roman territory. Tribes such as these, containing on an average 8000 (the urban naturally more, the rural fewer) persons entitled to vote, without local connection or inward unity, no longer admitted of being definitely led or of being satisfactorily addressed beforehand ; disadvantages, which must have been the more felt, that in the Roman assemblies there was no liberty of debate. Moreover, while the burgesses had quite sufficient capacity to discern their municipal interests, it was foolish and utterly ridiculous to leave the decision of the highest and most difficult questions which the power that ruled the world had occasion to solve to a well-disposed but fortuitous concourse of Italian farmers, and to allow the nomination of generals and the conclusion of treaties of state to be finally judged of by people who understood neither the grounds nor the consequences of their decrees. In all matters higher than mere municipal affairs the Roman popular assemblies accordingly played a childish and even silly part. As a rule, the people stood and assented to all proposals ; and, when in exceptional instances they of their own impulse refused their sanction, as on occasion of the declaration of war against Macedonia in 554 (P. 233), the policy of the market-place certainly made a pitiful opposition—and with a pitiful issue—to the policy of the state.

200.

At length the rabble of clients assumed a position, formally, of equality and often even, practically, of superiority, alongside of the class of independent burgesses. The institutions in which it originated were of great antiquity. From time immemorial the noble Roman exercised a sort of government over his freedmen and dependents, and was consulted by them in all their more important affairs ; a client, for instance, was careful not to give his children in marriage without having obtained the consent of his patron, and very often the latter directly arranged the match. But, when the aristocracy became converted into a special ruling class concentrating in its hands not only power but wealth, the clients became parasites and beggars ; and these new partisans of the rich undermined outwardly and inwardly the burgess class. The aristocracy not only tolerated this sort of clientship, but worked it financially and politically for their own advantage. Thus, for instance, the old penny collections,

Rise of a
city rabble.

which hitherto had taken place chiefly for religious purposes or in connection with the burial of men of merit, were now employed by lords of high standing—for the first time by
 186. Lucius Scipio, in 568, on pretext of a popular festival which he had in contemplation—for the purpose of levying on extraordinary occasions a contribution from the public. Presents were specially placed under legal restriction (in
 204. 550), because the senators began under that name to take regular tribute from their clients. But the retinue of clients was above all serviceable to the ruling class as a means of commanding the comitia; and the issue of the elections shows clearly, how powerfully the dependent rabble already at this epoch counteracted the influence of the independent middle class.

The very rapid increase of the rabble in the capital particularly, which these facts serve to indicate, is also demonstrable otherwise. The increasing number and importance of the freedmen are shown by the very serious discussions that arose in the previous century (i. 317), and were continued during the present, as to their right to vote in the public assemblies, and by the remarkable resolution, adopted by the senate during the Hannibalic war, to admit honourable freedwomen to a participation in the public collections, and to grant to the legitimate children of manumitted fathers the insignia hitherto belonging only to the children of the free-born (P. 316). The majority of the Hellenes and Orientals who settled in Rome were probably little better than the freedmen, for a national servility clung as indelibly to the former as the servility of their legal position clung to the latter.

Systematic
corruption
of the
multitude.

But not only did these natural causes operate to produce a metropolitan rabble: neither the nobility nor the demagogues, moreover, can be acquitted from the reproach of having systematically nursed its growth, and of having undermined, so far as in them lay, the old public spirit by flattery of the people and things still worse. The electors as a body were still too respectable to admit of direct electoral corruption showing itself on a great scale; but the favour of those entitled to vote was indirectly courted by methods far from commendable. The old obligation of the magistrates, particularly of the ædiles, to see that corn could be procured at a moderate price and to superintend the games, began to degenerate into the state of things which at length gave

rise to the horrible cry of the city populace under the empire, "Bread for nothing and games for ever!" Large supplies of grain, either placed by the provincial governors at the disposal of the Roman market officials, or delivered at Rome free of cost by the provinces themselves for the purpose of ingratiating themselves with particular Roman magistrates, enabled the ædiles, from the middle of the sixth century onward, to furnish grain to the population of the capital below cost price. "It was no wonder," Cato considered, "that the burgesses no longer listened to good advice—the belly had no ears."

Distribu-
tions of
grain.

Popular amusements increased to an alarming extent. For five hundred years the community had been content with one festival in the year, and with one circus. The first Roman demagogue by profession, Gaius Flaminius, added a second festival and a second circus (534);* and by these institutions—the tendency of which is sufficiently indicated by the very name of the new festival, "the plebeian games"—he probably purchased permission to give battle at the Trasimene lake. When the path was once opened, the evil made rapid progress. The festival in honour of Ceres, the goddess who protected the plebeian order (i. 284), must have been but little, if at all, later than the plebeian games. On the suggestion of the Sibylline and Marcian prophecies, moreover, a fourth festival was added in 542 in honour of Apollo, and a fifth in 550 in honour of the "Great Mother" recently transplanted from Phrygia to Rome. These were the severe years of the Hannibalic war—on the first celebration of the Apollinarian games the burgesses were summoned from the circus itself to arms; the superstitious fear peculiar to Italy was feverishly excited, and persons were not wanting who took advantage of the opportunity to circulate Sibylline and prophetic oracles and to recommend themselves to the people through the medium of their contents; we can scarcely blame the government, which was obliged to call for so enormous sacrifices from the burgesses, for yielding in such matters. But what was once conceded

Festivals.

220.

212.

204.

* The building of the circus is attested. Respecting the origin of the plebeian games there is no ancient tradition (for what is said by the Pseudo-Asconius, p. 143, *Orell.* is none such); but seeing that they were celebrated in the Flaminian circus (Val. Max. i. 7, 4), and first certainly occur in 538 four years after it was built (Liv. xxiii. 30), what we have stated above is sufficiently proved.

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173.

had to be continued; indeed, even in more peaceful times (581) there was added another festival, although of minor importance—the games in honour of Flora. The cost of these new festal amusements was defrayed by the magistrates, intrusted with the exhibition of the respective festivals, from their own means; the curule ædiles had, over and above the old national festival, those of the Mother of the gods; and of Flora; the plebeian ædiles had the plebeian festival and that of Ceres, and the urban prætor the Apollinarian games. Those who sanctioned the new festivals perhaps excused themselves in their own eyes by the reflection, that they were not at any rate a burden on the public purse; but it would have been in reality far less injurious to burden the public budget with a number of useless expenses, than to allow the furnishing of an amusement for the people to become practically a qualification for holding the highest office in the state. The future candidates for the consulship soon entered into a mutual rivalry in their expenditure on these games, which incredibly increased their cost; and of course it was no injury to the interests of the consul expectant, if he gave, over and above this as it were legal contribution, a “voluntary gift” (*munus*)—particularly, a gladiatorial show—at his own expense for the public benefit. The splendour of the games became gradually the standard by which the electoral body measured the fitness of the candidates for the consulship. The nobility had, in truth, to pay dear for their honours—a gladiatorial show on a respectable scale cost 720,000 sesterces (£7200)—but they paid willingly, since by this means they absolutely precluded men who were not wealthy from a political career.

Squandering
of the
spoil.

Corruption, however, was not restricted to the Forum; it was transferred even to the camp. The old burgess militia had reckoned themselves fortunate when they brought home a compensation for their labour in war, and, in the event of success, a trifling gift as a memorial of victory. The new generals, with Scipio Africanus at their head, lavishly scattered amongst their troops the money of Rome as well as the proceeds of the spoil: it was on this point, that Cato quarrelled with Scipio during the last campaigns against Hannibal in Africa. The veterans of the second Macedonian and the Asiatic war already returned home, in general, wealthy men: even the better class began to commend a general, who did not appropriate the gifts of the provincials and the

gains of war entirely to himself and his immediate followers, and from whose camp not a few men returned with gold, and many with silver, in their pockets: men began to forget that the moveable spoil was the property of the state. When Lucius Paullus again dealt with it in the old mode, his own soldiers, especially the volunteers who had been allured in numbers by the prospect of rich plunder, were on the eve of refusing to decree to the victor of Pydna the honour of a triumph—an honour which they threw away on every one who had subjugated three Ligurian villages.

How much the military discipline and the martial spirit of the burgesses suffered from this conversion of war into a traffic in plunder, may be traced in the campaigns against Perseus; and the spread of cowardice was manifested in a way almost scandalous during the insignificant Istrian war (in 576). On occasion of a trifling skirmish magnified by rumour to gigantic dimensions, the land army and the naval force of the Romans, and even the Italians at home, took to flight, and Cato found it necessary to address a special reproof to his countrymen for their cowardice. In this too the noble youth took precedence. Already during the Hannibalic war (545) the censors found occasion to visit with severe penalties the indolence of those who were bound to serve in the equestrian ranks. Towards the close of this period (574?) a decree of the people prescribed evidence of ten years' service as a qualification for holding any public magistracy, with a view to compel the sons of the nobility to enter the army.

Decay of
warlike
spirit.

178.

209.

180.

But perhaps nothing so clearly evinces the decline of genuine pride and genuine honour in high and low alike as that hunting after insignia and titles, which appeared under different forms of expression, but with substantial identity of character, among all ranks and classes. So urgent was the demand for the honour of a triumph that there was difficulty in upholding the old rule, which accorded a triumph only to the ordinary supreme magistrate who augmented the power of the state in open battle, and thus, it is true, not unfrequently excluded from that honour the very authors of the most important successes. There was a necessity for acquiescence while those generals, who had in vain solicited, or had no prospect of attaining, a triumph from the senate or the burgesses, marched in triumph on their own account at least to the Alban mount (first in 523). No combat

Title-
hunting.

- with a Ligurian or Corsican horde was too insignificant to be made a pretext for demanding a triumph. In order to put an end to peaceful triumphators, such as were the consuls of 573, the granting of a triumph was made to depend on the producing proof of a pitched battle which had cost the lives of at least 5000 of the enemy; but this proof was frequently evaded by false bulletins, and already in noble houses many an enemy's armour might be seen to glitter, which had by no means come thither from the field of battle. While formerly the commander-in-chief of the one year had been proud in that which followed to enter the staff of his successor, the fact that the consular Cato took service as a military tribune under Tiberius Sempronius Longus (560) and Manius Glabrio (563; P. 263), was now regarded as a demonstration against the new-fashioned arrogance. Formerly the thanks of the community once for all had sufficed for service rendered to the state; now every meritorious act seemed to demand a permanent distinction. Already Gaius Duilius, the victor of Mylæ (494), had gained an exceptional permission that, when he walked in the evening through the streets of the capital, he should be preceded by a torch-bearer and a piper. Statues and monuments, very often erected at the expense of the person whom they purported to honour, became so common, that it was ironically pronounced a distinction to have none. But such merely personal honours did not long suffice. A custom came into vogue, by which the victor and his descendants derived a permanent surname from the victories they had won—a custom mainly established by the victor of Zama who got himself designated as the hero of Africa, his brother as the hero of Asia, and his cousin as the hero of Spain.* The example set by the higher was followed by the humbler classes. When the ruling order did not disdain to settle the funeral arrangements for different ranks and to decree to the man who had been censor a purple winding-sheet, it could not complain of the freedmen for desiring that their sons at any rate might be decorated with the much envied purple border. The robe, the ring, and the amulet-case distinguished not only the bur-

* P. 283. The first certain instance of such a surname is that of Manius Valerius Maximus, consul in 491, who, as conqueror of Messana, assumed the name Messalla (P. 36): that the consul of 419 was, in a similar manner called Calenus, is an error. The surname of Maximus in the Valerian gens (i. 280) is not precisely analogous with the same surname in the Fabian (i. 317).

gess and the burgess's wife from the foreigner and the slave, but also the person who was free born from one who had been a slave, the son of free born, from the son of manumitted, parents, the son of the knight and the senator from the common burgess, the descendant of a curule house from the common senator (P. 316)—and this in a community where all that was great and good was the work of civil equality!

The dissension in the community was reflected in the ranks of the opposition. Resting on the support of the farmers, the patriots raised a loud cry for reform; resting on the support of the mob in the capital, demagogism began its work. Although the two tendencies do not admit of being wholly separated but in various respects go hand in hand, it will be necessary to consider them apart.

The party of reform emerges, as it were, personified in Marcus Porcius Cato (520-605). Cato, the last statesman of note belonging to that earlier system which restricted its ideas to Italy and was averse to schemes of universal empire, was for that reason accounted in after times the model of a genuine Roman of the antique stamp; he may with greater justice be regarded as the representative of the opposition of the Roman middle class to the new Hellenicocosmopolite nobility. Brought up at the plough, he was induced to enter on a political career by a neighbouring proprietor, one of the few nobles who kept aloof from the tendencies of the age, Lucius Valerius Flaccus. That upright patrician deemed the rough Sabine farmer the proper man to stem the current of the times; and he was not deceived in his estimate. Beneath the ægis of Flaccus, and after the good old fashion serving his fellow-citizens and the commonwealth in counsel and action, Cato fought his way up to the consulate and a triumph, and even to the censorship. Having in his seventeenth year entered the burgess-army, he had passed through the whole Hannibalic war from the battle on the Trasimene lake to that of Zama; had served under Marcellus and Fabius, under Nero and Scipio; and at Tarentum and Sena, in Africa, Sardinia, Spain, and Macedonia, had shown equal ability as a soldier, a staff-officer, and a general. He was the same in the Forum, as in the battle-field. His prompt and intrepid address, his rough but pungent rustic wit, his knowledge of Roman law and Roman affairs, his incredible activity and his iron frame, first brought him into notice in the neighbouring towns; and, when at length he made his

The party
of reform.
Cato.
234-149.

appearance on the greater arena of the Forum and the senate-house in the capital, constituted him the most influential pleader and political orator of his time. He took up the keynote first struck by Manius Curius, his ideal among Roman statesmen (i. 815): throughout his long life he made it his task honestly, to the best of his judgment, to assail on all hands the prevailing declension; and even in his eighty-fifth year he battled in the Forum with the new spirit of the times. He was anything but comely—he had green eyes, his enemies alleged, and red hair—and he was not a great man, still less a far-seeing statesman. Thoroughly narrow in his political and moral views, and having the ideal of the good old times ever before his eyes and on his lips, he cherished an obstinate contempt for everything new. Deeming himself entitled by virtue of his own austere life to manifest an unrelenting severity and harshness towards everything and everybody; upright and honourable, but without a glimpse of any duty beyond the sphere of police discipline and of mercantile integrity; an enemy to all villany and vulgarity as well as to all genius and refinement, and above all things a foe to those who were his foes; he never made an attempt to stop evils at their source, but waged war throughout life against mere symptoms, and especially against persons. The ruling lords, no doubt, looked down with a lofty disdain on the ignoble barker, and believed, not without reason, that they were far superior; but fashionable corruption in and out of the senate secretly trembled in the presence of the old censor of morals with his proud republican bearing, of the scar-covered veteran of the Hannibalic war, and of the highly influential senator who was the protector of the Roman farmers. He publicly laid before his noble colleagues, one after another, his list of their sins,—certainly without being remarkably particular as to the proofs, and certainly also with a peculiar relish in the case of those who had personally crossed or provoked him. With equal fearlessness, he reproved and publicly scolded the burgesses for every new injustice and every fresh disorder. His angry attacks provoked numerous enemies, and he lived in declared and irreconcilable hostility with the most powerful aristocratic coterie of the time, particularly the Scipios and Flamini. He was publicly accused twenty-four times; but the farmers—and it is a significant indication, how powerful still in the Roman middle class was the spirit which had enabled them to sur-

vive the day of Cannæ—never allowed the unsparing champion of reform to lack the support of their votes. Indeed, when in 570 Cato and his like-minded patrician colleague, Lucius Flaccus, solicited the censorship, and announced beforehand that it was their intention when in that office to undertake a thorough purification of all ranks and classes, the two men so greatly dreaded were elected by the burgesses notwithstanding all the exertions of the nobility; and the latter were obliged to submit, while the great purgation actually took place and erased among others the brother of Africanus from the roll of the equites, and the brother of the deliverer of the Greeks from the roll of the senate.

184.

This warfare directed against individuals, and the various attempts to repress the spirit of the age by means of justice and of police, however deserving of respect might be the sentiments in which they originated, could only at most stem the current of corruption for a short time; and, while it is remarkable that Cato was enabled in spite of that current or rather by means of it to play his political part, it is equally significant that he was as little successful in getting rid of the leaders of the opposite party as they were in getting rid of him. The processes of count and reckoning instituted by him and by those who shared his views before the burgesses uniformly remained, at least in the cases that were of political importance, quite as ineffectual as the counter-accusations directed against him. Nor was much more effect produced by the police-laws, which were issued at this period in unusual numbers, especially with a view to the restriction of luxury and the introduction of a frugal and orderly housekeeping, and some of which have still to be noticed in our view of the national economics.

Police reform.

Far more practical and more useful were the attempts made to counteract the spread of decay by indirect means; among which, beyond doubt, the assignations of new farms out of the domain land occupy the first place. These assignations were made in great numbers and of considerable compass in the period between the first and second war with Carthage, and again from the close of the latter till towards the end of this epoch. The most important of them were the distribution of the Picenian possessions by Gaius Flaminius in 522 (P. 83); the foundation of eight new maritime colonies in 560 (P. 191); and above all the comprehensive colonization of the district between the Apennines and the Po by the

Assignations of land.

232.

194.

218.
189-177. establishment of the Latin colonies of Placentia, Cremona (P. 83), Bononia (P. 198), and Aquileia (P. 196), and of the burgess-colonies, Potentia, Pisaurum, Mutina, Parma, and Luna (P. 198) in the years 586 and 565-577. By far the greater part of these valuable foundations may be ascribed to the reforming party. Cato and those who shared his opinions demanded such steps, pointing, on the one hand, to the devastation of Italy by the Hannibalic war and the alarming decrease of the farms and of the free Italian population generally, and, on the other, to the widely extended possessions of the nobles—occupied along with, and similarly to, property of their own—in Cisalpine Gaul, in Samnium, and in the Apulian and Bruttian districts; and although the rulers of Rome did not probably comply with his demands to the extent to which they might and should have complied with them, yet they did not remain deaf to the warning voice of so judicious a man.

Reforms
in the
military
service.

Of a kindred character was the proposal, which Cato made in the senate, to remedy the decline of the burgess cavalry by the institution of four hundred new equestrian stalls (P. 320). The exchequer cannot have wanted means for the purpose; but the proposal appears to have been defeated by the exclusive spirit of the nobility and their endeavours to expel from the burgess cavalry those who were troopers merely and not knights. On the other hand, the serious emergencies of the war, which soon induced the Roman government to make an attempt—fortunately unsuccessful—to recruit their armies after the Oriental fashion from the slave-market (P. 137, 167), compelled them to modify the qualifications hitherto required for service in the burgess army, viz., a minimum census of 11,000 asses (£115), and free birth. Apart from the fact that they took up for service in the fleet the persons of free birth rated between 4000 asses (£41) and 1500 asses (£12 10s.) and all the freedmen, the minimum census for the legionary was reduced to 4000 asses (£41); and, in case of need, both those who were bound to serve in the fleet and the free-born rated between 1500 asses (£12 10s.) and 375 asses (£3 18s.) were enrolled in the burgess infantry. These innovations, which belong probably to the end of the preceding or beginning of the present epoch, doubtless did not originate in party efforts any more than did the Servian military reform; but they gave a material impulse to

the democratic party, in so far as those who bore civic burdens necessarily claimed and eventually obtained equalization of civic rights. The poor and the freedmen began to be of some importance in the commonwealth from the time when they served it; and chiefly from this cause arose one of the most important constitutional changes of this epoch—the remodelling of the *comitia centuriata*, which most probably took place in the same year in which the war concerning Sicily terminated (513).

According to the order of voting hitherto followed in the centuriate assembly the equites, that is, the old gentile and the new plebeian nobility, had voted first, and then the first class, that is, those of the highest rating; and these two divisions, when they concurred, had decided every vote. The suffrage of those assessed under the four following classes had been of doubtful weight; that of those whose rating remained below the standard of the lowest class had been virtually illusory; and the freedmen had with few exceptions been totally destitute of the suffrage. According to the new arrangement, on the other hand, each of the five classes probably obtained an equal number of votes; the right of precedence in voting was withdrawn from the equites, who however retained their separate divisions, and was transferred to a voting-division chosen from the first class by lot; and, lastly, the freedmen were placed on an equal footing with the free-born. This reform is described as the termination of the conflicts between patricians and plebeians, and with reason, in so far as it cancelled the last privilege of political value that was left in the hands of the gentile nobility, the right of precedence in voting. Nor must we estimate this as a matter of altogether trifling importance, for even now the patrician order were still powerful enough to fill the second consulship and the second censorship, which stood open in law alike to patricians and plebeians, solely with men of their own body, the former up to the close of this period (till 582), the latter even for a generation longer (till 623); and in fact, at the most perilous moment which the Roman republic ever experienced—in the crisis after the battle of Cannæ—they cancelled the quite duly and legally conducted election of the officer who was in all respects the ablest, the plebeian Marcellus, to the consulship vacated by the death of the patrician Paullus, solely on account of his plebeian origin. At the same time this reform was the first important constitu-

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Remodelling
of the
*comitia cen-
turiata*.

172.

131.

- tional change which the new democratic opposition wrung from the nobility, inasmuch as, on the one hand, it took away their right of precedence in voting, and, on the other hand, it equalized the suffrages of the rich and the poor, of the free-born and the freedmen, who were assessable, so that, instead of a half, only about a fifth of the whole number of votes remained in the hands of those of the highest rating. But one of the most important, perhaps practically the most important, of these innovations—the equalizing of the freedmen with the free-born—was set aside again twenty years later (534) by one of the most notable men of the reform party itself, the censor Gaius Flaminius, and the freedmen were removed from the centuries—a measure which the censor Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, the father of the two authors of the Roman revolution, fifty years afterwards (585) renewed and enforced against the freedmen who were always intruding afresh. The abiding fruit therefore of the reform of the centuries, apart from the enactment directed against the prerogative of the equestrian order, was the political abolition of distinctions in point of wealth among the burgesses whose valuation exceeded the lowest rating. Substantially in this way all freeholder burgesses of free birth had long enjoyed equality of suffrage in the *comitia tributa*, while the votes of the non-freeholders and freedmen had been rendered almost practically worthless by their being crowded into four of the thirty-five tribes. The general result accordingly was the remodelling of the *comitia centuriata* according to the principle already recognized in the *comitia tributa*; a change which recommended itself by the circumstance, that elections, proposals of laws, criminal charges, and generally all affairs requiring the co-operation of the burgesses, came to be uniformly brought before the *comitia tributa*, and the more unwieldy centuries were seldom convoked except when it was constitutionally necessary to do so for electing the censors, consuls, and prætors, or for decreeing an aggressive war. It thus appears that this reform did not introduce a new principle into the constitution, but only brought into general application the principle that had long regulated the working of the practically more frequent and more important form of the burgess-assemblies. Its democratic, but by no means demagogic, tendency is clearly apparent in the circumstance that the proper supports of every really revolutionary party, viz., the proletariat and the freedmen, still continued as before to
- 220.
- 169.

hold an inferior position in the centuries as well as in the tribes. For that reason the practical significance of this alteration in the voting arrangements of the popular assemblies must not be estimated too highly. The new law of election completed, in theory, civil equality, but did not prevent, and probably did not even materially impede, the contemporary formation of a new politically privileged order. It is certainly not owing to the mere imperfection of tradition, defective as it undoubtedly is, that we are nowhere able to point to a practical influence exercised by this much-discussed reform on the course of political affairs. An intimate connection, we may add, subsisted between this reform which equalized the suffrages of the burgesses entitled to vote at all, and the already-mentioned abolition of the Roman burgess-communities *sine suffragio* which were gradually merged in the community of full burgesses. The levelling spirit of the party of progress suggested the abolition of distinctions within the burgess-body, while the chasm between burgesses and non-burgesses was at the same time deepened and widened.

Reviewing what the reform party of this age aimed at and obtained, we find that it undoubtedly exerted itself with patriotism and energy to check, and to a certain extent succeeded in checking, the spread of decay (more especially the falling off of the farmer class and the relaxation of the old strict and frugal habits) and the preponderating political influence of the new nobility. But we fail to discover any higher political aim. The discontent of the multitude, and the moral indignation of the better classes found perhaps in this opposition their appropriate and powerful expression; but we do not find either a clear insight into the sources of the evil, or any definite and comprehensive plan of remedying it. A certain want of purpose pervaded all these efforts otherwise so deserving of respect, and the purely defensive attitude of the defenders foreboded little good in the issue. Whether the disease could be remedied at all by human skill, remains fairly open to question; but the Roman reformers of this period seem to have been good citizens rather than good statesmen, and to have conducted the great struggle between the old civism and the new cosmopolitanism on their part in a somewhat inadequate and narrow spirit.

But, as this period witnessed the rise of a rabble by the side of the burgesses, so it witnessed also the emergence of

Results of
the efforts
at reform.

ism.

a demagogism that flattered the mob alongside of the respectable and useful party of opposition. Cato was already acquainted with men, who made a trade of demagogism; who had a morbid propensity for speechifying, as others had for drinking or for sleeping; who hired listeners, if they could find no willing audience otherwise; and whom people heard as they heard the market crier, without attending to their words or, when needing help, intrusting themselves to their care. In his caustic fashion the old man describes these fops formed after the model of the Greek talkers of the agora, dealing in jests and witticisms, singing and dancing, ready for anything; such an one was, in his opinion, good for nothing but to exhibit himself as harlequin in a procession and to bandy talk with the public—he would sell his talk or his silence for a bit of bread. In truth these demagogues were the worst enemies of reform. While the reformers insisted above all things and in every direction on moral amendment, demagogism preferred to insist on the limitation of the powers of government and the extension of those of the burgesses.

Abolition of
the dicta-
torship.

217.

216.

202.

Under the former head the most important innovation was the practical abolition of the dictatorship. The crisis occasioned by Quintus Fabius and his popular opponents in 537 (P. 126) gave the death-blow to this all-along unpopular institution. Although the government once afterwards, in 538, under the immediate impression produced by the battle of Cannæ, nominated a dictator invested with active command, it could not again venture to do so in more peaceful times. On several occasions subsequently (the last in 552), sometimes after a previous indication by the burgesses of the person to be nominated, a dictator was appointed for urban business; but the office, without being formally abolished, fell practically into desuetude. Through its abeyance the Roman constitutional system, so artificially constructed, lost a corrective which was very desirable with reference to its peculiar feature of collegiate magistrates (i. 263), and the ruling class, which was vested with the sole power of creating a dictatorship or in other words of suspending the consuls, and ordinarily designated the person who was to be nominated as dictator, lost one of its most important instruments. Its place was but very imperfectly supplied by the power—which the senate thenceforward claimed—of conferring in extraordinary emergencies, parti-

cularly on the sudden outbreak of revolt or war, a quasi-dictatorial power on the supreme magistrates for the time being, by instructing them "to take measures for the safety of the commonwealth at their discretion," and thus creating a state of things similar to the modern martial law.

Along with this change the formal powers of the people in the nomination of magistrates as well as in questions of government, administration, and finance, received a hazardous extension. The priesthoods—particularly those politically most important, the colleges of men of lore—according to ancient custom filled up the vacancies in their ranks, and nominated also their own presidents, where these corporations had presidents at all; and in fact, for such institutions destined to transmit the knowledge of divine things from generation to generation, the only form of election in keeping with their spirit was co-optation. It was therefore a circumstance not of great political importance, but indicative of the incipient disorganization of the republican arrangements, that at this time (before 542), while election into the colleges themselves was left on its former footing, the designation of the presidents—the curiones and pontifices—from the ranks of those corporations was transferred from the colleges to the community. In this case, however, with a pious regard for forms that is genuinely Roman, in order to avoid any error, only the minority of the tribes, and therefore not the "people," completed the act of election.

Election of
priests by
the com-
munity.

212.

Of greater importance was the growing interference of the burgesses in questions as to persons and things belonging to the sphere of military administration and external policy. Under this head we class the transference of the nomination of the ordinary staff-officers from the general to the burgesses, which has been already mentioned (P. 323); the election of the leaders of the opposition as commanders in chief against Hannibal (P. 120, 128); the unconstitutional and irrational decree of the people in 537, which divided the supreme command between the unpopular generalissimo and his popular lieutenant who opposed him in the camp as well as at home (P. 127); the tribunician complaint laid before the burgesses, charging an officer like Marcellus with an injudicious and dishonest management of the war (545), which even compelled him to come from the camp and to prove his military capacity before the public of the capital; the still more scandalous attempts to deprive the victor of Pydna of his triumph by a decree of the

Interference
of the com-
munity in
war and ad-
ministra-
tion.

217.

219.

- burgesses (P. 347); the investiture—suggested, it is true, by the senate—of a private man with extraordinary consular authority (544; P. 152); the dangerous threat of Scipio that, if the senate should refuse him the chief command in Africa, he would seek the sanction of the burgesses (549; P. 181); the attempt of a man half crazy with ambition to extort from the burgesses, against the will of the government, a declaration of war in every respect unwarranted against the Rhodians (587; P. 307); and the new constitutional axiom, that every state treaty acquired validity only through the ratification of the people.

Interference
of the com-
munity with
the finances.

- This joint action of the burgesses in governing and in commanding was fraught in a high degree with peril. But still more dangerous was their interference with the finances of the state; not only because any attack on the oldest and most important right of the government—the exclusive administration of the public property—struck at the root of the power of the senate, but because the placing of the most important business of this nature—the distribution of the public domains—in the hands of the public assemblies necessarily dug the grave of the republic. To allow the public assembly to decree the transference of public property without limit to its own pocket was not only wrong, but was the beginning of the end; it demoralized the best-disposed citizens, and gave to the proposer a power incompatible with a free commonwealth. Salutory as was the distribution of the public land, and doubly blameable as was the senate accordingly for omitting to cut off the most dangerous of all weapons of agitation by voluntarily distributing the occupied lands, yet Gaius Flaminius, when he came to the burgesses in 522 with the proposal to distribute the domains of Picenum, undoubtedly injured the commonwealth more by the means than he benefited it by the end. Cassius had probably two hundred and fifty years earlier proposed the same thing (i. 288); but the two measures, closely as they coincided in the letter, were yet wholly different, inasmuch as Cassius submitted a matter affecting the community to that community while still in its vigour and conducting its own government, whereas Flaminius submitted a public question to the popular assembly of a great state.

Nullity of
the comitia.

Not the governing party only, but the party of reform also, very properly regarded the military, executive, and financial government as the legitimate domain of the senate,

and carefully abstained from making full use of, to say nothing of augmenting, the formal power vested in popular assemblies that were inwardly doomed to inevitable dissolution. Never even in the most limited monarchy was a part so completely null assigned to the monarch as was allotted to the sovereign Roman people: this was no doubt in more than one respect to be regretted, but it was, owing to the existing state of the comitial machinery, even in the view of the friends of reform a matter of necessity. For that reason Cato and those who shared his views never submitted to the burgesses a question, which interfered with the government strictly so called; and never, directly or indirectly, by decree of the people extorted from the senate the political or financial measures which they wished, such as the declaration of war against Carthage or assignments of land. The government of the senate might be bad; the popular assemblies could not govern at all. Not that an evil-disposed majority predominated in them; on the contrary the counsel of a man of standing, the loud call of honour, and the louder call of necessity were still, as a rule, listened to in the comitia, and averted the most injurious and disgraceful results. The burgesses, before whom Marcellus pleaded his cause, ignominiously dismissed his accuser, and elected the accused as consul for the following year; they suffered themselves also to be persuaded of the necessity of the war against Philip, terminated the war against Perseus by the election of Paullus, and accorded to the latter his well-deserved triumph. But in order to such elections and such decrees there was needed some special stimulus; in general the mass having no will of its own followed the first impulse, and folly or accident dictated the decision.

In the state, as in every organism, an organ which no longer discharges its functions is injurious; and the nullity of the sovereign assembly of the people involved no small danger. Any minority in the senate might constitutionally appeal against the majority to the comitia. To every individual, who possessed the easy art of addressing untutored ears or of merely throwing away money, a path was opened up for his acquiring a position or procuring a decree in his favour, to which the magistrates and the ruling class were formally bound to do homage. Hence sprung those-citizen-generals, accustomed to sketch plans of battle on the tables of taverns and to look down on the

Disorgani-
zation of
government.

regular service with compassion by virtue of their inborn genius for strategy; hence those staff-officers, who owed their command to the canvassing system of the capital and, whenever matters looked serious, had at once to get leave of absence *en masse*; and hence the battles of the Trasimene lake and of Cannæ, and the disgraceful management of the war with Perseus. At every step the government was thwarted and led astray by decrees of the burgesses which it could not anticipate, and, as was to be expected, most of all in the very cases where it was most in the right.

But the weakening of the ruling order and the weakening of the community itself were among the lesser dangers that sprung from this demagogism. Still more directly the factious violence of individual ambition pushed itself forward under the ægis of the constitutional rights of the burgesses. That which formally issued forth as the will of the supreme authority in the state was in reality very often the mere personal pleasure of the mover; and what was to be the fate of a commonwealth in which war and peace, the nomination and deposition of the general and his officers, the public chest and the public property, were dependent on the caprice of the multitude and of its accidental leaders? The thunder-storm had not yet burst; but the clouds were gathering in denser masses, and occasional peals of thunder were already rolling through the sultry air. It was a circumstance, moreover, fraught with double danger, that the tendencies which were apparently most opposite met together at their extremes, both as regarded ends and as regarded means. Family policy and demagogism carried on a similar and equally dangerous rivalry in patronizing and worshipping the rabble. Gaius Flaminius was regarded by the statesmen of the following generation as the initiator of that course, from which the reforms of the Gracchi, and—let us add—the democratico-monarchical revolution that followed, proceeded. But Publius Scipio also, although setting the fashion to the nobility in arrogance, title-hunting, and client-making, sought support for his personal and almost dynastic policy of opposition to the senate in the multitude, which he not only charmed by the dazzling effect of his personal qualities, but bribed by his largesses of grain; in the legions, whose favour he courted by all means whether right or wrong; and above all in the body of clients, high and low, that personally adhered to him. Only the dreamy mysticism, on which the charm as well as the weakness of that

remarkable man so largely depended, never suffered him to awake at all or allowed him to awake but imperfectly out of the belief that he was nothing, and that he desired to be nothing, but the first citizen of Rome.

To assert the possibility of a reform would be as rash as to deny it: this much is certain, that a thorough amendment of the state in all its departments was urgently required, and that in no quarter was any serious attempt made to accomplish it. Various alterations in details, no doubt, were made on the part of the senate as well as on the part of the popular opposition. The majorities on both sides were still well disposed, and still frequently, notwithstanding the chasm that separated the parties, united in a common endeavour to effect the removal of the worst evils. But, while they did not stop the evil at its source, it was to little purpose that the better disposed listened with anxiety to the dull murmur of the swelling flood and worked at dikes and dams. Contenting themselves with palliatives, and failing to apply even these—especially such as were the most important, the improvement of justice, for instance, and the distribution of the domains—in proper season and due measure, they helped to prepare evil days for their posterity. By neglecting to break up the field at the proper time, they propagated weeds even without any desire to do so. To later generations, who survived the storms of revolution, the period after the wars of Hannibal appeared the golden age of Rome, and Cato seemed the model of the Roman statesman. It was in reality the calm before the storm and the epoch of political mediocrities, an age like that of the Walpole government in England; and no Chatham was found in Rome to infuse fresh energy into the stagnant life of the nation. Wherever we cast our eyes, chinks and rents are yawning in the old building; we see workmen busy sometimes in filling them up, sometimes in enlarging them; but we nowhere perceive any trace of preparations for thoroughly rebuilding or renewing it, and the question is no longer whether, but simply when, the structure will fall. During no epoch did the Roman constitution remain formally so stable as in the period from the Sicilian to the third Macedonian war and for a generation beyond it; but the stability of the constitution was here, as everywhere, not a sign of the health of the state, but a token of incipient sickness and the harbinger of revolution.

CHAPTER XII.

THE MANAGEMENT OF LAND AND OF CAPITAL.

Roman
economics.

It is in the sixth century of the city that we first find materials for a history of the times exhibiting in some measure the mutual connection of events; and it is in that century also that the economic condition of Rome emerges into view more clearly and distinctly. It was at this epoch that the wholesale system, as regards both the cultivation of land and the management of capital, became first established under the form, and on the scale, which afterwards prevailed; although we cannot exactly discriminate how much of that system is traceable to earlier precedent, how much to an imitation of the methods of husbandry and of speculation among peoples that were earlier civilized, especially the Phœnicians, and how much to the growth of capital and the growth of intelligence in the nation. A summary outline of these economic relations will conduce to a more accurate understanding of the internal history of Rome.

Roman husbandry* applied itself either to the farming of estates, to the occupation of pasture lands, or to the tillage

* In order to gain a true idea of ancient Italy, it is necessary for us to bear in mind the great changes which have been produced there by modern cultivation. Of the *cereal*ia, rye was not cultivated in antiquity; and the Romans of the Empire were astonished to find that oats, with which they were well acquainted as a weed, was used by the Germans for making porridge. Rice was first cultivated in Italy at the end of the fifteenth, and maize at the beginning of the sixteenth, century. Potatoes and tomatoes were brought from America; artichokes seem to be nothing but a cultivated variety of the cardoon, which was known to the Romans, although the latter appear to have been unacquainted with the peculiar character superinduced on it by cultivation. The almond, again, or "Greek nut," the peach, or "Persian nut," and also the "soft nut" (*nux mollusca*), although originally foreign to Italy, are met with there at least 150 years before Christ. The date-palm, introduced into Italy from Greece as

of petty holdings. A very distinct view of the first of these is presented to us in the description given by Cato.

The Roman estates were, considered as larger holdings, uniformly of limited extent. That described by Cato had an area of 240 *jugera*; a very common measure was the so-called *centuria* of 200 *jugera*. Where the laborious culture of the vine was contemplated, the unit of husbandry was made still less; Cato assumes in that case an area of 100 *jugera*. Any one who wished to invest more capital in farming did not enlarge his estate, but acquired several estates; accordingly the quantity of 500 *jugera* (i. 304), fixed as the maximum which it was allowable to occupy, has been conceived to represent the contents of two or three estates.

Farming of
estates.
Their size.

Heritable leases were not recognized in law, and leases for life occurred as a substitute only in the case of communal land. Leases for shorter periods, granted either for a fixed sum of money or on condition that the lessee should bear all the costs of tillage and should receive in return a share, ordinarily one half, of the produce,* were not unknown, but they were exceptional and a makeshift; so that

Manage-
ment of the
estate.

into Greece from the East, and forming a living attestation of the primitive commercial-religious intercourse between the West and the East, was already cultivated in Italy 300 years before Christ (Liv. x. 47; Pallad. v. 5, 2. 12, 1), not for its fruit (Plin. *H. N.* xiii. 4, 26), but, just as in the present day, as a curiosity, and for the sake of the leaves which were used at public festivals. The cherry, or fruit of *Cerasus* on the Black Sea, was later in being introduced, and only began to be planted in Italy in Cicero's time, although the wild cherry is indigenous there; still later, perhaps, came the apricot, or "Armenian plum." The citron-tree was not cultivated in Italy till the later ages of the Empire; the orange was only introduced by the Moors in the twelfth or thirteenth, and the aloe (*Agave Americana*) from America only in the sixteenth, century. Cotton was first cultivated in Europe by the Arabs. The buffalo also and the silkworm belong only to modern, not to ancient Italy.

It is obvious that the products which Italy originally had not are for the most part those very products which seem to us truly "Italian;" and if modern Germany, as compared with the Germany visited by Cæsar, may be called a southern land, Italy has since in no less degree acquired a more "southern" aspect.

* According to Cato, *de R. R.* 137 (comp. 16), in the case of a lease with division of the produce the gross produce of the estate, after deduction of the fodder necessary for the oxen that drew the plough, was divided between lessor and lessee (*colonus partiarius*) in the proportions agreed upon between them. That the shares were ordinarily equal may be conjectured from the analogy of the French *bail à cheptel* and the similar Italian system of half-and-half leases, as well as from the absence of all trace of any other scheme of partition. It is erroneous to refer to the case of the *politor*, who got the fifth of the grain or, if the division took place before thrashing, from the sixth

no distinct class of tenant-farmers grew up in Italy.* Ordinarily therefore the proprietor himself superintended the management of his estates; he did not, however, manage them strictly in person, but only appeared from time to time on the property in order to settle the plan of operations, to look after its execution, and to audit the accounts of his servants. He was thus enabled on the one hand to work a number of estates at the same time, and on the other hand to devote himself, as circumstances might require, to public affairs.

Objects of
husbandry.

The grain cultivated consisted chiefly of spelt and wheat, with some barley and millet; turnips, radishes, garlic, poppies, were also grown, and—particularly as fodder for the cattle—lupines, beans, pease, vetches, and other leguminous plants. The seed was sown ordinarily in autumn, only in exceptional cases in spring. Much activity was displayed in irrigation and draining; and drainage by means of covered ditches was early in use. Meadows also for supplying hay were not wanting, and even in Cato's time they were frequently irrigated artificially. Of equal, if not of greater, economic importance than grain and vegetables were the olive and the vine, of which the former was planted among the crops, the latter in vineyards appropriated to itself.† Figs, apples, pears, and other fruit trees were cultivated; and likewise elms, poplars, and other leafy trees and

to the ninth sheaf (Cato, 136, comp. 5); he was not a lessee sharing the produce, but a labourer assumed in the harvest season, who received his daily wages according to that contract of partnership (P. 368).

* There existed no appropriate form for such a lease even in law; for that the contract of *locatio* first applied to the letting of houses, and was only transferred to the leasing of land, is shown very clearly by the rule—applicable to the letting of a house, but not to the leasing of land—that the payment of the tenant must necessarily consist in money; in consequence of which the produce-lease among the Romans comes under the category of contingencies occurring in practical life but not falling within the theory of jurisprudence. The lease first assumed real importance when the Roman capitalists began to acquire transmarine possessions on a great scale; then indeed they knew how to value it, when a temporary lease was continued through several generations (Colum. i. 7, 3).

† That the space between the vines was occupied not by grain, but only at the most by such fodder plants as easily grew in the shade, is evident from Cato (33, comp. 137), and accordingly Columella (iii. 3) calculates on no other accessory gain in the case of a vineyard except the produce of the young shoots sold. On the other hand, the orchard (*arbustum*) was sown like any corn field (Colum. ii. 9, 6). It was only where the vine was trained on living trees that corn was cultivated in the intervals between them.

shrubs, partly for the felling of the wood, partly for the sake of the leaves which were useful as litter and as fodder for cattle. The rearing of cattle, on the other hand, held a far less important place in the economy of the Italians than it holds in modern times, for vegetables formed the general fare, and animal food made its appearance at table only exceptionally; where it did appear, it consisted almost solely of the flesh of swine or lambs. Although the ancients did not fail to perceive the economic connection between agriculture and the rearing of cattle, and in particular the importance of producing manure, the modern combination of the growth of corn with the rearing of cattle was a thing foreign to antiquity. The larger cattle were kept only so far as was requisite for the tillage of the fields, and they were fed not on pasture set apart for the purpose, but, wholly during summer and mostly in winter also, in the stall. Sheep, again, were driven out on the stubble pasture; Cato allows 100 head to 240 *jugera*. Frequently, however, the proprietor preferred to let his winter pasture to a large sheep-owner, or to hand over his flock of sheep to a lessee who was to share the produce, stipulating for the delivery of a certain number of lambs and of a certain quantity of cheese and milk. Swine—Cato assigns to a large estate ten sties—poultry, and pigeons were kept in the farmyard, and fed as there was need; and, where opportunity offered, a small hare-preserve and a fish-pond were constructed—the first modest steps towards that nursing and rearing of game and fish which was afterwards prosecuted to so enormous an extent.

The labours of the field were performed by means of oxen which were employed for ploughing, and of asses, which were used specially for the carriage of manure and for driving the mill; perhaps a horse also was kept, apparently for the use of the master. These animals were not reared on the estate, but were purchased; the oxen and horses at any rate were generally castrated. Cato assigns to an estate of 100 *jugera* one, to one of 240 *jugera* three, yoke of oxen; a later writer on agriculture, Saserna, assigns two yoke to the 200 *jugera*. Three asses were, according to Cato's estimate, required for the smaller, and four for the larger, estate.

The human labour on the farm was regularly performed by slaves. At the head of the body of slaves on the estate

Means of
husbandry.
Cattle.

Rural
slaves.

(*familia rustica*) stood the steward (*vilicus*, from *villa*), who received and expended, bought and sold, went to obtain the instructions of the landlord, and in his absence issued orders and administered punishment. Under him were placed the stewardess (*vilica*), who took charge of the house, kitchen and larder, poultry-yard and dovecot; a number of ploughmen (*bubulci*) and common serfs, an ass-driver, a swineherd, and, where a flock of sheep was kept, a shepherd. The number, of course, varied according to the method of husbandry pursued. An arable estate of 200 *jugera* without orchards was estimated to require two ploughmen and six serfs; a similar estate with orchards two ploughmen and nine serfs; an estate of 240 *jugera* with olive plantations and sheep, three ploughmen, five serfs, and three herdsmen. A vineyard naturally required a larger expenditure of labour: an estate of 100 *jugera* with vine-plantations was supplied with one ploughman, eleven ordinary slaves, and two herdsmen. The steward of course occupied a freer position than the other slaves: the treatise of Mago advised that he should be allowed to marry, to rear children, and to have funds of his own, and Cato advises that he should be married to the stewardess; he alone had some prospect, in the event of good behaviour, of obtaining liberty from his master. In other respects all formed a common household. The slaves were, like the larger cattle, not bred on the estate, but purchased at an age capable of labour in the slave-market; and, when through age or infirmity they had become incapable of working, they were again sent with other refuse to the market.* The farm-buildings (*villa rustica*) supplied at once stabling for the cattle, storehouses for the produce, and a dwelling for the steward and the slaves; while a separate country house (*villa urbana*) for the master was frequently erected on the estate. Every slave, even the steward

* Mago, or his translator (in Varro, *R. R.*, i. 17, 3), advises that slaves should not be bred, but should be purchased not under 22 years of age; and Cato must have had a similar course in view, as the personal staff of his model farm clearly shows, although he does not exactly say so. Cato (2) expressly counsels the sale of old and diseased slaves. The slave-breeding described by Columella (i. 8), under which female slaves who had three sons were exempted from labour, and the mothers of four sons were even manumitted, was perhaps an independent speculation rather than a part of the regular management of the farm—similar to the trade pursued by Cato himself of purchasing slaves to be trained and sold again (Plutarch, *Cat. Maj.* 21). The characteristic taxation mentioned in this same passage probably has reference to the body of servants properly so called (*familia urbana*).

himself, had all the necessaries of life delivered to him on the master's behalf at certain times and according to fixed rates; and upon these he had to subsist. He received in this way clothes and shoes, which were purchased in the market, and which the recipients had merely to keep in repair; a quantity of wheat monthly, which each had to grind for himself; as also salt, olives or salted fish to form a relish to their food, wine, and oil. The quantity was regulated by the labour; on which account the steward, who had easier work than the common slaves, got scantier measure than these. The stewardess attended to all the baking and cooking; and all partook of the same fare. It was not the ordinary practice to place chains on the slaves; but when any one had incurred punishment or was thought likely to attempt escape, he was set to work in chains and was shut up during the night in the slaves' prison.*

Ordinarily these slaves belonging to the estate were sufficient; in case of need neighbours, as a matter of course, helped each other with their slaves for day's wages. Other-
Other labourers.
 wise labourers from without were not usually employed, except in peculiarly unhealthy districts, where it was found advantageous to limit the amount of slaves and to employ hired persons in their room, and for the ingathering of the harvest, for which the regular supply of labour on the farm did not suffice. At the corn and hay harvests they

* In this restricted sense the chaining of slaves, and even of the sons of the family (Dionys. ii. 26), was very old; and accordingly chained field-labourers are mentioned by Cato as exceptions, to whom, as they could not themselves grind, bread had to be supplied instead of grain (56). Even in the times of the Empire the chaining of slaves uniformly presents itself as a punishment inflicted definitively by the master, provisionally by the steward (Colum. i. 8; Gai. i. 13; Ulp. i. 11). If, notwithstanding, the tillage of the fields by means of chained slaves appeared in subsequent times as a distinct system, and the labourers' prison (*ergastulum*)—an underground cellar with window-apertures numerous, but narrow and not to be reached from the ground by the hand (Colum. i. 6)—became a necessary part of the farm-buildings, this state of matters was occasioned by the fact that the position of the rural serfs was harder than that of other slaves and therefore those slaves were chiefly placed in it who had, or seemed to have, committed some offence. That cruel masters, moreover, applied the chains without any occasion to do so, we do not mean to deny, and it is clearly indicated by the circumstance that the law-books do not decree the penalties applicable to slave transgressors against those in chains, but prescribe the punishment of the half-chained. It was precisely the same with branding; it was meant to be, strictly, a punishment, but the whole flock was probably marked (Diodor. xxxv. 5; Bernays, Phocylides, p. 31).

took in hired reapers, who often instead of wages received from the sixth to the ninth sheaf of the produce reaped, or, if they also thrashed, the fifth of the grain: Umbrian labourers, for instance, went annually in great numbers to the vale of Rieti, to help to gather in the harvest there. The grape and olive harvest was ordinarily let to a contractor, who by means of his men—hired free labourers, or slaves of his own or of others—conducted the gleaning and pressing under the inspection of persons appointed by the landlord for the purpose, and delivered the produce to the master;* very frequently the landlord sold the harvest on the tree or branch, and left the purchaser to look after the ingathering.

Spirit of
the system.

The whole system was pervaded by the utterly unscrupulous spirit characteristic of the power of capital. Slaves and cattle were placed on the same level; a good watchdog, it is said in a Roman writer on agriculture, must not be on too friendly terms with his "fellow-slaves." The slave and the ox were fed properly so long as they could work, because it would not have been good economy to let them starve; and they were sold like a worn-out ploughshare when they became unable to work, because in like manner it would not have been good economy to maintain them longer. In earlier times religious considerations had exercised an alleviating influence, and had released the slave and the plough-ox from labour on the days enjoined for festivals and for rest.† Nothing is more characteristic of the spirit of Cato and those who shared his sentiments than the way in which they inculcated the observance of the holiday in the letter,

* Cato does not expressly say this as to the vintage, but Varro does so (i. 17), and it is implied in the nature of the case. It would have been economically an error to fix the number of the slaves on a property by the standard of the labours of harvest; and least of all, had such been the case, would the grapes have been sold on the tree, which yet was frequently done (Cato, 147).

† Columella (ii. 12, 9) reckons to the year on an average 45 rainy days and holidays; with which accords the statement of Tertullian (*De Idolol.* 14), that the number of the heathen festival days did not come up to the fifty days of the Christian festal season from Easter to Whitsunday. To these fell to be added the time of rest in the middle of winter after the completion of the autumnal sowing, which Columella estimates at thirty days. Within this time, doubtless, the moveable "festival of seed-sowing" (*feria sementicia*; comp. i. 197, and Ovid. *Fust.* i. 661) uniformly occurred. This month of rest must not be confounded with the holidays for holding courts in the season: the harvest (Plin. *Ep.* viii. 21, 2, *et al.*) and vintage.

and evaded it in reality, by advising that, while the plough should certainly be allowed to rest on these days, the slaves should even then be incessantly occupied with other labours not expressly prohibited. On principle no freedom of movement whatever was allowed to them—a slave, so runs one of Cato's maxims, must either work or sleep—and no attempt was ever made to attach the slaves to the estate or to their master by any bond of human sympathy. The letter of the law, in all its naked hideousness, regulated the relation, and the Romans indulged no illusions as to the consequences. "So many slaves, so many foes," said a Roman proverb. It was an economic maxim, that dissensions among the slaves ought rather to be fostered than suppressed. In the same spirit Plato and Aristotle, and no less strongly the oracle of the landlords, the Carthaginian Mago, caution masters against bringing together slaves of the same nationality, lest they should originate combinations and perhaps conspiracies of their fellow-countrymen. The landlord, as we have already said, governed his slaves exactly in the same way as the Roman community governed its subjects in the "country estates of the Roman people," the provinces; and the world learned by experience, that the ruling state had modelled its new system of government on that of the slaveholder. If, moreover, we have risen to that little-to-be envied elevation of thought which values no feature of an economy save the capital invested in it, we cannot deny to the management of the Roman estates the praise of consistency, energy, punctuality, frugality, and solidity. The sound practical husbandman is reflected in Cato's description of the steward, as he ought to be. He is the first on the farm to rise and the last to go to bed; he is strict in dealing with himself as well as with those under him, and knows more especially how to keep the stewardess in order, but is also careful of his labourers and his cattle, and in particular of the ox that draws the plough; he puts his hand frequently to work and to every kind of it, but never works himself weary like a slave; he is always at home, never borrows nor lends, gives no entertainments, troubles himself about no other worship than that of the gods of the hearth and the field, and like a true slave leaves all dealings with the gods as well as with men to his master; lastly and above all, he modestly meets that master and faithfully and simply, without carelessness and without excess of

thought, lives according to the instructions which that master has given. He is a bad husbandman, it is elsewhere said, who buys what he can raise on his own land ; a bad father of a household, who takes in hand during the day what can be done by candle-light, unless the weather be bad ; a still worse, who does on a working-day what might be done on a holiday ; but worst of all is he, who in good weather allows work to go on within doors instead of in the open air. The characteristic enthusiasm too of high farming is not wanting ; and the golden rules are laid down, that the soil was given to the husbandman not to be scoured and swept but to be sown and reaped, and that the farmer therefore ought first to plant vines and olives and only thereafter, and that not too early in life, to build himself a villa. A certain boorishness marks the system, and, instead of the rational investigation of causes and effects, the well-known rules of rustic experience are uniformly brought forward ; yet there is an evident endeavour to appropriate the experience of others and the products of foreign lands : in Cato's list of the sorts of fruit trees, for instance, Greek, African, and Spanish species appear.

Husbandry
of the petty
farmers.

The husbandry of the petty farmer differed from that of the landholder only or chiefly in its being on a smaller scale. The owner himself and his children in this case laboured along with the slaves or in their room. The quantity of cattle was reduced, and, where an estate no longer covered the expenses of the plough and of the yoke that drew it, the hoe formed its substitute. The culture of the olive and the vine was less prominent, or was entirely wanting.

In the vicinity of Rome and of other large seats of consumption there existed also carefully irrigated gardens for flowers and vegetables, somewhat similar to those which one now sees around Naples ; and these yielded a very abundant return.

Pastoral
husbandry.

Pastoral husbandry was practised on a far greater scale than agriculture. An estate in pasture land (*saltus*) had of necessity in every case an area considerably greater than an arable estate—the least allowance was 800 *jugera*—and it might with advantage to the business be indefinitely extended. Italy is so situated in respect of climate that the summer pasture in the mountains and the winter pasture in the plains supplement each other : already at that period, just as at the present day, and for the most part probably

along the same paths, the flocks and herds were driven in spring from Apulia to Samnium, and in autumn back again from Samnium to Apulia. The winter pasturage, however, as has been already observed, did not consist entirely of ground kept for the purpose, but was partly the grazing of the stubbles. Horses, oxen, asses, and mules were reared, chiefly to supply the animals required by landowners, carriers, soldiers, and so forth; herds of swine and of goats also were not neglected. But the almost universal habit of wearing woollen stuffs gave a far greater independence and far higher development to the breeding of sheep. The management was in the hands of slaves, and was on the whole similar to the management of the arable estate, the cattle-master (*magister pecoris*) coming in room of the steward. Throughout the summer the shepherd-slaves lived for the most part not under a roof, but, often miles remote from human habitations, under sheds and sheepfolds; it was necessary therefore that the strongest men should be selected for this employment, that they should be provided with horses and arms, and that they should be allowed far greater freedom of movement than was granted to the slaves on arable estates.

In order to form some estimate of the economic results of this system of husbandry, we must consider the state of prices, and particularly the prices of grain at this period. On an average these were alarmingly low; and that in great measure through the fault of the Roman government, which in this important question was led into the most fearful blunders not so much by its short-sightedness, as by an unpardonable disposition to favour the proletariat of the capital at the expense of the farmers of Italy. The main question here was that of the competition between transmarine and Italian corn. The grain, which was delivered by the provincials to the Roman government sometimes gratuitously, sometimes for a moderate compensation, was in part applied by the government to the maintenance of the Roman official staff and of the Roman armies on the spot, partly given up to the lessees of the *decumæ* on condition of their either paying a sum of money for it or of their undertaking to deliver certain quantities of grain at Rome or wherever else it should be required. From the time of the second Macedonian war the Roman armies were uniformly supported by transmarine corn, and, though this tended to the

Results.
Competition
of transma-
rine corn.

benefit of the Roman exchequer, it cut off the Italian farmer from an important field of consumption for his produce. This however was the least part of the mischief. The government had long, as was reasonable, kept a watchful eye on the price of grain, and, when there was a threatening of dearth, had interfered by well-timed purchases abroad; and now, when the corn-deliveries of its subjects brought into its hands every year large quantities of grain—larger probably than were needed in times of peace—and when, moreover, opportunities were presented to it of acquiring foreign grain in almost unlimited quantity at moderate prices, there was a natural temptation to glut the markets of the capital with such grain, and to dispose of it at rates which either in themselves or as compared with the Italian rates were ruinously low. Already in the

203-200. years 551-554, and in the first instance apparently at the suggestion of Scipio, 6 *modii* (1½ bush.) of Spanish and African wheat were sold on public account to the citizens of Rome at 24 and even at 12 asses (1s. or 6d.).

196. years afterwards (558), more than 240,000 bushels of Sicilian grain were distributed at the latter illusory price in the capital. In vain Cato inveighed against this shortsighted policy: the rise of demagogism had a part in it, and these extraordinary, but probably very frequent, distributions of grain under the market price by the government or individual magistrates became the germs of the subsequent corn-laws. But, even where the transmarine corn did not reach the consumers in this extraordinary mode, it injuriously affected Italian agriculture. Not only were the masses of grain which the state sold off to the lessees of the tenths beyond doubt acquired under ordinary circumstances by these so cheaply that, when re-sold, it could be disposed of under the price of production; but it is probable that in the provinces, particularly in Sicily—in consequence partly of the favourable nature of the soil, partly of the extent to which wholesale farming and slave-holding were pursued on the Carthaginian system (P. 9)—the price of production was in general considerably lower than in Italy, while the transport of Sicilian and Sardinian corn to Latium was at least as cheap as, if not cheaper than, its transport thither from Etruria, Campania, or even northern Italy. In the natural course of things therefore transmarine corn could not but flow to the peninsula, and lower the price of

the grain produced there. Under the unnatural disturbance of relations occasioned by the lamentable system of slave-labour, it would perhaps have been justifiable to impose a duty on transmarine corn for the protection of the Italian farmer; but the very opposite course seems to have been pursued, and, with a view to favour the import of transmarine corn to Italy, a prohibitive system seems to have been applied in the provinces—for, though the Rhodians were allowed to export a quantity of corn from Sicily by way of special favour, the exportation of grain from the provinces must probably, as a rule, have been free only as regarded Italy, and the transmarine corn must thus have been monopolized for the benefit of the mother-country.

The effects of this system are clearly evident. A year of extraordinary fertility like 504—when the people of the capital paid for 6 Roman *modii* ($1\frac{1}{2}$ bush.) of spelt not more than $\frac{1}{4}$ of a *denarius* (about 5*d.*), and at the same price there were sold 180 Roman pounds (a pound = 11 oz.) of dried figs, 60 pounds of oil, 72 pounds of meat, and 6 *congi* (= $4\frac{1}{2}$ gallons) of wine—is scarcely, by reason of its very singularity, to be taken into account; but other facts speak more distinctly. Even in Cato's time Sicily was called the granary of Rome. In productive years Sicilian and Sardinian corn was disposed of in the Italian ports for the freight. In the richest corn districts of the peninsula—the modern Romagna and Lombardy—during the time of Polybius victuals and lodgings in an inn cost on an average half an as ($\frac{1}{4}$ *d.*) per day; a bushel and a half of wheat was there worth half a *denarius* (4*d.*). The latter average price, about the twelfth part of the normal price elsewhere,*

Prices of
Italian corn.
250.

* The medium price of grain in the capital may be assumed at least for the seventh and eighth centuries of Rome at one *denarius* for the Roman *modius*, or 2*s.* 8*d.* per bushel of wheat, for which there is now paid (according to the average of the prices in the provinces of Brandenburg and Pomerania from 1816 to 1841) about 3*s.* 5*d.* Whether this not very considerable difference between the Roman and the modern prices depends on a rise in the value of corn or on a fall in the value of silver, can hardly be decided.

It is very doubtful, perhaps, whether in the Rome of this and of later times the prices of corn really fluctuated more than is the case in modern times. If we compare prices like those quoted above, of 4*d.* and 5*d.* for the bushel and a half, with those of the worst times of war-dearth and famine—such as in the second Punic war when the same quantity rose to 9*s.* 7*d.* (1 *medimnus* = 15 *drachmæ*; Polyb. ix. 44), in the civil war to 19*s.* 2*d.* (1 *modius* = 5 *denarii*; Cic. *Verr.* iii. 92, 214), in the great dearth

shows undeniably that the producers of grain in Italy were wholly destitute of a market for their produce, and in consequence corn and corn-land there were almost valueless.

Revolution
in Roman
agriculture.

In a great industrial state, whose agriculture cannot feed its population, such a result might perhaps be regarded as useful or at any rate as not absolutely injurious; but a country like Italy, where manufactures were inconsiderable and agriculture was altogether the mainstay of the state, was in this way systematically ruined, and the welfare of the nation as a whole was sacrificed in the most shameful fashion to the interests of the essentially unproductive population of the capital, to which in fact bread could never become too cheap. Nothing perhaps evinces so clearly as this, how wretched was the constitution and how incapable was the administration of this so-called golden age of the republic. Any representative system, however meagre, would have led at least to serious complaints and to a perception of the seat of the evil; but in those collective assemblages of the citizens anything was listened to sooner than the warning voice of a foreboding patriot. Any government that deserved the name would of itself have interfered; but the mass of the Roman senate probably with well-meaning credulity regarded the low prices of grain as a real blessing for the people, and the Scipios and Flaminiuses had, forsooth, more important things to do—to emancipate the Greeks, and to exercise the functions of republican kings. So the ship drove on unhindered towards the breakers.

Decay of
the farmers.

When the small holdings ceased to yield any substantial clear return, the farmers were irretrievably ruined, and the more so that they gradually, although more slowly than the other classes, lost the moral tone and frugal habits of the earlier ages of the republic. It was merely a question of time, how rapidly the hides of the Italian farmers would come, by purchase or by resignation, to be merged in the larger properties. The landlord was better able to maintain himself than the farmer. The former produced at a cheaper rate than the latter, when, instead of letting his land according

under Augustus, even to 21s. 3d. (5 *modii* = 27½ *denarii*; Euseb. *Chron. p. Chr. 7, Scal.*)—the difference is indeed immense; but such extreme cases are but little instructive, and might in either direction be found recurring under the like conditions at the present day.

to the older system to petty temporary lessees, he caused it according to the newer system to be cultivated by his slaves. Accordingly, where this course had not been adopted at an earlier period (i. 457), the competition of Sicilian slave-corn compelled the Italian landlord to adopt it, and to have the work performed by slaves without wife or child instead of families of free labourers. The landlord, moreover, could hold his ground better against competitors by means of improvements or changes in cultivation, and he could content himself with a smaller return from the soil than the farmer, who wanted capital and intelligence and who merely had what was requisite for his subsistence. Hence the Roman landholder comparatively neglected the culture of grain—which in many cases seems to have been restricted to the raising of the quantity required for the staff of labourers*—and gave increased attention to the producing of oil and wine as well as to the breeding of cattle. These, under the favourable climate of Italy, had no need to fear foreign competition; Italian wine, Italian oil, Italian wool not only commanded the home markets, but were soon sent abroad; the valley of the Po, which could find no consumption for its corn, provided the half of Italy with swine and bacon. With this the statements, that have reached us as to the economic results of Roman husbandry, very well accord. There is some ground for assuming that capital invested in land was reckoned to yield a good return at 6 per cent.; this appears to accord with the average rate of interest at this period, which was about twice as much. The rearing of cattle yielded on the whole better results than arable husbandry: in the latter the vineyard gave the best return, next came the vegetable garden and the olive orchard, while meadows and corn-fields yielded least.† It is of course presumed that

Culture of
oil and
wine, and
rearing of
cattle.

* Accordingly Cato calls the two estates, which he describes, summarily "olive-plantation" (*olivetum*) and "vineyard" (*vinca*), although not wine and oil merely, but grain also and other products were cultivated there. If indeed the 800 *culei*, for which the possessors of a vineyard are directed to provide themselves with casks (11), formed the maximum of a year's vintage, the whole of the 100 *jugera* must have been planted with vines, because a produce of 8 *culei* per *jugum* was almost unprecedented (Colum. iii. 3); but Varro (i. 22) understood, and evidently with reason, the estimate to apply to the case of the possessor of a vineyard who found it necessary to make the new vintage before he had sold the old.

† That the Roman landlord made on an average 6 per cent. on his capital, we infer from Colum. iii. 3, 9. We have a precise estimate of the expense and

each species of husbandry was prosecuted under the conditions that suited it, and on the soil which was adapted to its nature. These circumstances were already in themselves sufficient to supersede the husbandry of the petty farmer on

produce only in the case of the vineyard, for which Columella gives the following calculation of the cost per *jugerum* :—

Price of the ground	1000	sesterces.
Price of the slaves who work it (proportion to <i>jugerum</i>)	1143	„
Vines and stakes	2000	„
Loss of interest during the first two years	497	„

Total 4640 sesterces = £48.

He calculates the produce as, at any rate, 60 *amphoræ*, worth at least 900 sesterces (9l. 4s.), which would thus represent a return of 17 per cent. But this is somewhat illusory, as, apart from bad harvests, the cost of gathering in the produce (P. 368) and the expenses of the maintenance of the vines, stakes, and slaves are omitted from the estimate.

The gross produce of meadow, pasture, and forest is estimated by the same agricultural writer as, at most, 100 sesterces per *jugerum*, and that of corn land as less rather than more: in fact, the average return of 25 *modii* of wheat per *jugerum* gives, according to the average price in the capital of 1 *denarius* per *modius*, not more than 100 sesterces for the gross proceeds, and at the seat of production the price must have been still lower. Varro (iii. 2) reckons as a good ordinary gross return for a larger estate 150 sesterces per *jugerum*. Estimates of the corresponding expense have not reached us: as a matter of course, the management in this instance cost much less than in that of a vineyard.

All these statements, moreover, date from a century or more after Cato's death. From him we have only the general statement that the breeding of cattle yielded a better return than agriculture (*ap. Cicero, De Off.* ii. 25, 89; *Colum.* vi. *præf.* 4, *comp.* ii. 16, 2; *Plin. H. N.* xviii. 5, 30; *Plutarch, Cato*, 21); which of course is not meant to imply that it was everywhere advisable to convert arable land into pasture, but is to be understood relatively as signifying that the capital invested in the rearing of flocks and herds on mountain pastures and other suitable grounds yielded, as compared with capital invested in cultivating suitable corn land, a higher interest. Perhaps the circumstance has been also taken into account in the calculation, that the want of energy and intelligence in the landlord operates far less injuriously in the case of pasture land than in the highly developed culture of the vine and olive. On an arable estate, according to Cato, the returns of the soil stood as follows in a descending series :—1, vineyard; 2, vegetable garden; 3, osier copse, which yielded a large return in consequence of the culture of the vine; 4, olive plantation; 5, meadow yielding hay; 6, corn fields; 7, copse; 8, wood for felling; 9, oak forest for forage to the cattle;—all of which nine elements enter into the scheme of husbandry for Cato's model estates.

The higher net return of the culture of the vine as compared with that of corn is attested also by the fact, that under the award pronounced in the arbitration between the city of Genoa and the villages tributary to it in 637 the city received a sixth of wine, and a twentieth of grain, as quitrent.

all hands by the system of farming on a great scale, and it was difficult by means of legislation to counteract them. But an injurious effect was produced by the Claudian law to be mentioned afterwards (shortly before 536), which excluded the senatorial houses from mercantile speculation, and thereby artificially compelled them to invest their enormous capitals mainly in land or, in other words, to replace the old homesteads of the farmers by estates under the management of land-stewards and by pastures for cattle. Moreover special circumstances tended to favour the growth of pastoral husbandry as contrasted with agriculture, although the former was far more injurious to the state. First of all, this form of extracting profit from the soil—the only one which in reality demanded and rewarded operations on a great scale—alone corresponded to the vast capital and to the enterprising spirit of the capitalists of this age. An estate under cultivation, while not demanding the presence of the master constantly, required his frequent appearance on the spot, while the circumstances did not well admit of his enlarging such an estate or of his multiplying his possessions except within narrow limits; whereas an estate under pasture admitted of unlimited enlargement, and claimed little of the owner's attention. For this reason men already began to convert good arable land into pasture even at an economic loss—a practice which was prohibited by legislation (we know not when, perhaps about this period) but hardly with success. The growth of pastoral husbandry was favoured also by the occupation of the domain land. As the portions so occupied were ordinarily large, the system gave rise almost exclusively to great estates; and not only so, but the occupiers of these possessions, which might be resumed by the state at pleasure and were in law always insecure, were afraid to lay out any considerable expense in their cultivation—by planting vines, for instance, or olives. The consequence was, that these lands were mainly turned to account as pasture.

We are prevented from giving a similar comprehensive view of the moneyed economy of Rome, partly by the want of special treatises descending from Roman antiquity on the subject, partly by its very nature which was far more complex and varied than that of the Roman husbandry. So far as can be ascertained, its principles were, still less perhaps than those of husbandry, the peculiar property of the Romans;

thought, lives according to the instructions which that master has given. He is a bad husbandman, it is elsewhere said, who buys what he can raise on his own land; a bad father of a household, who takes in hand during the day what can be done by candle-light, unless the weather be bad; a still worse, who does on a working-day what might be done on a holiday; but worst of all is he, who in good weather allows work to go on within doors instead of in the open air. The characteristic enthusiasm too of high farming is not wanting; and the golden rules are laid down, that the soil was given to the husbandman not to be scoured and swept but to be sown and reaped, and that the farmer therefore ought first to plant vines and olives and only thereafter, and that not too early in life, to build himself a villa. A certain boorishness marks the system, and, instead of the rational investigation of causes and effects, the well-known rules of rustic experience are uniformly brought forward; yet there is an evident endeavour to appropriate the experience of others and the products of foreign lands: in Cato's list of the sorts of fruit trees, for instance, Greek, African, and Spanish species appear.

Husbandry
of the petty
farmers.

The husbandry of the petty farmer differed from that of the landholder only or chiefly in its being on a smaller scale. The owner himself and his children in this case laboured along with the slaves or in their room. The quantity of cattle was reduced, and, where an estate no longer covered the expenses of the plough and of the yoke that drew it, the hoe formed its substitute. The culture of the olive and the vine was less prominent, or was entirely wanting.

In the vicinity of Rome and of other large seats of consumption there existed also carefully irrigated gardens for flowers and vegetables, somewhat similar to those which one now sees around Naples; and these yielded a very abundant return.

Pastoral
husbandry.

Pastoral husbandry was practised on a far greater scale than agriculture. An estate in pasture land (*saltus*) had of necessity in every case an area considerably greater than an arable estate—the least allowance was 800 *jugera*—and it might with advantage to the business be indefinitely extended. Italy is so situated in respect of climate that the summer pasture in the mountains and the winter pasture in the plains supplement each other: already at that period, just as at the present day, and for the most part probably

along the same paths, the flocks and herds were driven in spring from Apulia to Samnium, and in autumn back again from Samnium to Apulia. The winter pasturage, however, as has been already observed, did not consist entirely of ground kept for the purpose, but was partly the grazing of the stubbles. Horses, oxen, asses, and mules were reared, chiefly to supply the animals required by landowners, carriers, soldiers, and so forth; herds of swine and of goats also were not neglected. But the almost universal habit of wearing woollen stuffs gave a far greater independence and far higher development to the breeding of sheep. The management was in the hands of slaves, and was on the whole similar to the management of the arable estate, the cattle-master (*magister pecoris*) coming in room of the steward. Throughout the summer the shepherd-slaves lived for the most part not under a roof, but, often miles remote from human habitations, under sheds and sheepfolds; it was necessary therefore that the strongest men should be selected for this employment, that they should be provided with horses and arms, and that they should be allowed far greater freedom of movement than was granted to the slaves on arable estates.

In order to form some estimate of the economic results of this system of husbandry, we must consider the state of prices, and particularly the prices of grain at this period. On an average these were alarmingly low; and that in great measure through the fault of the Roman government, which in this important question was led into the most fearful blunders not so much by its short-sightedness, as by an unpardonable disposition to favour the proletariat of the capital at the expense of the farmers of Italy. The main question here was that of the competition between transmarine and Italian corn. The grain, which was delivered by the provincials to the Roman government sometimes gratuitously, sometimes for a moderate compensation, was in part applied by the government to the maintenance of the Roman official staff and of the Roman armies on the spot, partly given up to the lessees of the *decumæ* on condition of their either paying a sum of money for it or of their undertaking to deliver certain quantities of grain at Rome or wherever else it should be required. From the time of the second Macedonian war the Roman armies were uniformly supported by transmarine corn, and, though this tended to the

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tween persons of integrity by means of an oath demanded by the one party and given by the other—a mode of settlement which was reckoned valid even in law; and a traditional rule enjoined the jury, in the absence of evidence, to give their verdict in favour of the man of unstained character when opposed to one who was disreputable, and only in the event of both parties being of equal repute to give it in favour of the defendant.* The conventional respectability of the Romans was especially apparent in the more and more strict enforcement of the rule, that no respectable man should allow himself to be paid for the performance of personal services. Accordingly magistrates, officers, jurymen, guardians, and generally all respectable men intrusted with public functions, received no recompense for the services which they rendered except, at most, a compensation for their bare outlay; and not only so, but the services which intimate acquaintances (*amici*) rendered to each other—such as giving security, representation in law-suits, custody (*depositum*), lending of objects not intended to be let on hire (*commodatum*), the managing and attending to business in general (*procuratio*)—were treated according to the same principle, so that it was improper to receive any compensation for them and an action was not allowable even where a compensation had been promised. How entirely the man was merged in the merchant, appears most distinctly perhaps in the substitution of a money-payment and an action at law for duelling—even for the political duel—in the Roman life of this period. The usual form of settling questions of personal honour was this; a wager was laid between the offender and the party offended as to the truth or falsehood of the offensive assertion, and under the shape of an action for the stake the question of fact was submitted with all the forms of law to a jury; the acceptance of such a wager when offered by the offended or offending party was, just like the acceptance of a challenge to a duel at the present day, left open in law, but in point of honour it could seldom be refused.

* The chief passage as to this point is the fragment of Cato in Gellius, xiv. 2. In the case of the *obligatio litteris* also, i. e., a claim based solely on the entry of a debt in the account-book of the creditor, this legal recognition of the personal credibility of the party, even where his testimony in his own cause is concerned, affords the key of explanation; and hence it happened, that in later times, when this mercantile honour had vanished from Roman life, the *obligatio litteris*, while not exactly abolished, fell of itself into desuetude.

One of the most important consequences of this mercantile spirit, which displayed itself with an intensity hardly conceivable by those not engaged in business, was the extraordinary impulse given to the formation of associations. In Rome this was especially fostered by the system already often mentioned as adopted by the government in the transaction of its business—the system of middlemen: for from the extent of the transactions it was natural, and it was probably often required by the state for the sake of greater security, that capitalists should undertake such leases and contracts not individually, but in partnership. All great transactions were organized on the model of these state-contracts. Indications are even found of the occurrence among the Romans of that feature so characteristic of the system of association—a coalition of rival companies in order jointly to establish monopolist prices.* In transmarine transactions more especially and such as were otherwise attended with considerable risk, the system of partnership was so extensively adopted, that it practically took the place of insurance, which was unknown to antiquity. Nothing was more common than the nautical loan, as it was called—the modern “bottomry”—by which the risk and gain of transmarine traffic were proportionally distributed among the owners of the vessel and cargo and all the capitalists who had advanced money for the voyage. It was, however, a general rule of Roman economy that one should rather take small shares in many speculations than speculate independently; Cato advised the capitalist not to fit out a single ship with his money, but to enter into concert with forty-nine other capitalists so as to send out fifty ships and take an interest to the extent of a fiftieth share in each. The greater complication thus introduced into business was overcome by the Roman merchant through

* In the remarkable model contract given by Cato (141) for the letting of the olive-harvest, there is the following paragraph:—

“None [of the persons desirous to contract on the occasion of letting] shall withdraw, for the sake of causing the gathering and pressing of the olives to be let at a dearer rate; except when [the joint bidder] immediately names [the other bidder] as his partner. If this rule shall appear to have been infringed, all the partners [of the company with which the contract has been concluded] shall, if desired by the landlord or the overseer appointed by him, take an oath [that they have not conspired in this way to prevent competition]. If they do not take the oath, the stipulated price is not to be paid.” It is tacitly assumed that the contract is taken by a company, not by an individual capitalist.

his punctual laboriousness and his system of management by slaves and freedmen, which, regarded from the point of view of the pure capitalist, was far preferable to our counting-house system. Thus these mercantile companies, with their hundred ramifications, largely influenced the economy of every Roman of note. There was, according to the testimony of Polybius, hardly a man of means in Rome who had not been concerned as an avowed or silent partner in leasing the public revenues; and much more must each have invested on an average a considerable portion of his capital in mercantile associations generally.

All this, moreover, laid the foundation for that endurance of Roman wealth, which was perhaps still more remarkable than its magnitude. The phenomenon unique perhaps of its kind, to which we have already called attention (P. 325), viz., that the social *status* of the great houses remained almost the same for several centuries, finds its explanation in the somewhat narrow but solid principles on which they managed their mercantile property.

Moneyed
aristocracy.

In consequence of the one-sided prominence assigned to capital in the Roman economy, the evils inseparable from a pure capitalist system could not fail to appear.

Civil equality, which had already received a fatal wound through the rise of the ruling order of lords, suffered an equally severe blow in consequence of the line of social demarcation becoming more and more distinctly drawn between the rich and the poor. Nothing more effectually promoted this separation in a downward direction, than the already-mentioned rule—apparently a matter of indifference, but in reality involving the deepest arrogance and insolence on the part of the capitalists—that it was disgraceful to take money for work; a wall of partition was thus raised not merely between the common day-labourer or artisan and the respectable landlord or manufacturer, but also between the soldier or subaltern and the military tribune, and between the clerk or messenger and the magistrate. In an upward direction a similar barrier was raised by the Claudian law instigated by Gaius Flaminius (shortly before

218.

536), which prohibited senators and senators' sons from possessing seagoing vessels except for the transport of the produce of their estates, and probably also from participating in public contracts—forbidding them generally from carrying on whatever the Romans included under the head of

“speculation” (*quæstus*).* It is true that this enactment was not called for by the senators; it was on the contrary a work of the democratic opposition, which perhaps desired in the first instance merely to prevent the evil of members of the governing class personally entering into dealings with the government. It may be, moreover, that the capitalists in this instance, as so often afterwards, made common cause with the democratic party, and seized the opportunity of diminishing competition by the exclusion of the senators. The former object was, of course, only imperfectly attained, for the system of partnership opened up to the senators ample facilities for continuing to speculate in secret; but this decree of the people drew a legal line of demarcation between those nobles who did not speculate at all, or at any rate not openly, and those who did, and it placed alongside of the aristocracy which was primarily political an aristocracy which was purely moneyed—the equestrian order, as it was afterwards called, whose rivalries with the senatorial order fill the history of the following century.

A further consequence of the one-sided power of capital was the disproportionate prominence of those branches of business which were the most sterile and the least productive to the national economy as a whole. Industrial art, which ought to have held the highest place, in fact occupied the lowest. Commerce flourished; but it was universally non-reciprocal. Even on the northern frontier the Romans do not seem to have been able to give merchandise in exchange for the slaves, who were brought in numbers from the Celtic and probably even from the Germanic territories to Ariminum and the other markets of northern Italy; at least in 528 the export of silver money to the Celtic territory was prohibited by the Roman government. In the intercourse with Greece, Syria, Egypt, Cyrene, and Carthage, the balance of trade was necessarily unfavourable to Italy. Rome began to become the capital of the Mediterranean states, and Italy to become the suburbs of Rome; the Romans had no wish to be anything more, and

Sterility
of the
capitalist
system.

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* Livy (xxi., 63 comp. Cic. *Verr.* v. 18, 45) mentions only the enactment as to the sea-going vessels; but Asconius (in *Or. de Toga Cand.* p. 94. Orell.) and Dio (lv. 10, 5) state that the senator was also forbidden by law to undertake state-contracts (*redemptiones*); and, as according to Livy “all speculation was considered indecorous in a senator,” the Claudian law probably went further than he states.

in their opulent indifference were satisfied with a non-reciprocal commerce, such as every city which is nothing more than a capital necessarily carries on—they possessed, forsooth, money enough to pay for everything which they needed, and for everything which they did not need. On the other hand the most unproductive of all sorts of business, the traffic in money and the farming of the revenue, formed the true mainstay and stronghold of the Roman economy. And, lastly, whatever elements that economy had contained for the production of a prosperous middle class and of a lower one provided with sufficient subsistence were extinguished by the unhappy system of employing slaves, or, at the best, contributed to the multiplication of the troublesome order of freedmen.

The capitalists and public opinion.

But above all the deep-rooted immorality, which is inherent in an economy of pure capital, ate into the heart of society and of the commonwealth, and substituted an absolute selfishness for humanity and patriotism. The better portion of the nation were very clearly aware of the seeds of corruption which lurked in that pursuit of gain; and the instinctive hatred of the great multitude, as well as the displeasure of the well-disposed statesman, was especially directed against the trade of the professional money-lender, which for long had been subjected to penal laws and still continued under the letter of the law amenable to punishment. In a comedy of this period the money-lender is told that the class to which he belongs is on a parallel with the *lenones*—

*Eodem hercle vos pono et paro ; parissumi estis ibus.
Hi saltem in occultis locis prostant : vos in foro ipso :
Vos fenore, hi male suadendo et lustris lacerant homines.
Rogitationes plurimas propter vos populus scivit,
Quas vos rogatas rumpitis : aliquam reperitis rimam.
Quasi aquam ferventem frigidam esse, ita vos putatis leges.*

Cato the leader of the reform party expresses himself still more emphatically than the comedian. “Lending money at interest,” he says in the preface to his treatise on agriculture, “has various advantages, but it is not honourable. Our forefathers accordingly ordained, and inscribed it among their laws, that the thief should be bound to pay two-fold, but the man who takes interest four-fold, compensation; whence we may infer how much worse a citizen they deemed the usurer than the thief.” There is no great dif-

ference, he elsewhere considers, between a money-lender and a murderer; and we must allow, that his acts did not fall short of his words—when governor of Sardinia, by his rigorous administration of the law he drove the Roman bankers to their wits' end. The great majority of the ruling senatorial order regarded the system of the speculators with dislike, and not only conducted themselves in the provinces on the whole with more integrity and honour than these moneyed men, but frequently acted as a check on them. Only, the frequent changes of the supreme magistrates and the inevitable inequality in their mode of handling the laws necessarily rendered the effort to check such proceedings in a great measure ineffectual.

The Romans perceived moreover—as it was not difficult to perceive—that it was of far more consequence to give a different direction to the whole national economy than to exercise a police control over speculation; it was such views mainly that men like Cato enforced by precept and example on the Roman agriculturist. “When our forefathers,” continues Cato in the preface just quoted, “pronounced the eulogy of a worthy man, they praised him as a worthy farmer and a worthy landlord; he who was thus commended was thought to have received the highest praise. The merchant I deem energetic and diligent in the pursuit of gain; but his calling is too much exposed to perils and mischances. On the other hand farmers furnish the bravest men and the ablest soldiers; no calling is so honourable, safe, and inoffensive as theirs, and those who occupy themselves with it are least liable to evil thoughts.” He was wont to say of himself, that his property was derived solely from two sources—agriculture and frugality; and, though this was neither very logically expressed nor strictly conformable to the truth,* yet Cato was not unjustly regarded by his contemporaries and by posterity as the model of a Roman landlord. Unhappily it is a truth as remarkable as it is painful, that this husbandry, commended so much and cer-

Reaction
of the
capitalist
system on
agriculture.

* Cato, like every other Roman, invested a part of his means in the breeding of cattle, and in commercial and other undertakings. But it was not his habit directly to violate the laws; he neither speculated in state-leases—which as a senator he was not allowed to do—nor practised usury. It is an injustice to charge him with a practice in the latter respect at variance with his theory; the *fenus nauticum*, in which he certainly engaged, was not a branch of usury prohibited by the law; it really formed an essential part of the business of chartering and freighting vessels.

tainly with so entire good faith as a remedy, was itself pervaded by the poison of the capitalist system. In the case of pastoral husbandry this was obvious; for that reason it was most in favour with the public and least in favour with the party desirous of moral reform. But how stood the case with agriculture itself? The warfare, which from the third to the fifth century *v. c.* capital had waged against labour, by withdrawing under the form of interest on debt the revenues of the soil from the working farmers and bringing them into the hands of the idly consuming freeholder, had been settled chiefly by the extension of the Roman economy and the transference of the capital which existed in Latium to the field of mercantile activity opened up throughout the range of the Mediterranean. Now even the extended field of business was no longer able to contain the increased mass of capital; and an insane legislation laboured simultaneously to compel the investment of senatorial capital by artificial means in Italian estates, and systematically to depreciate the arable land of Italy by interference with the prices of grain. Thus there began a second campaign of capital against free labour or—what was substantially the same thing in antiquity—against the small farmer system; and, if the first had been bad, it yet seemed mild and humane as compared with the second. The capitalists no longer lent to the farmer at interest—a course which in itself was not now practicable because the petty landholder no longer produced any surplus of consequence, and was moreover not sufficiently simple and radical—but they bought up the farms and converted them, at the best, into estates managed by stewards and wrought by slaves. This also was called agriculture; it was in reality the application of the capitalist system to the produce of the soil. The description of the husbandmen, which Cato gives, is excellent and quite just; but how does it correspond to the system itself which he portrays and recommends? If a Roman senator, as must not unfrequently have been the case, possessed four such estates as that described by Cato, the same space, which in the olden time when small holdings prevailed had supported from 100 to 150 farmers' families, was now occupied by one family of free persons and about 50, for the most part unmarried, slaves. If this was the remedy by which the decaying national economy was to be restored to vigour,

it bore, unhappily, an aspect of extreme resemblance to the disease.

The general result of this system is only too clearly ^{Develop-} obvious in the changed proportions of the population. It is ^{ment of} true that the condition of the various districts of Italy was ^{Italy.} very unequal, and some were even prosperous. The farms, instituted in great numbers in the region between the Apennines and the Po at the time of its colonization, did not so speedily disappear. Polybius, who visited that quarter not long after the close of the present period, commends its numerous, handsome, and vigorous population: with a just legislation as to corn it would perhaps have been possible to make the basin of the Po, and not Sicily, the granary of the capital. In like manner Picenum and the so-called *ager Gallicus* acquired a numerous body of farmers through the distributions of domain-land consequent on the Flaminian law of 522—a body, however, which was sadly reduced in the Hannibalic war. In Etruria, and perhaps also in Umbria, the internal condition of the subject communities was unfavourable to the flourishing of a class of free farmers. Matters were better in Latium—which could not be entirely deprived of the advantages of the market of the capital, and which had on the whole been spared by the Hannibalic war—as well as in the secluded mountain-valleys of the Marsians and Sabellians. On the other hand the Hannibalic war had fearfully devastated southern Italy and had ruined, in addition to a number of smaller places, its two largest cities, Capua and Tarentum, both once able to send into the field armies of 30,000 men. Samnium had recovered from the severe wars of the fifth century: according to the census of 529 it was in a position to furnish as many men capable of arms as all the Latin towns, and it was probably at that time, next to the *ager Romanus*, the most flourishing region of the peninsula. But the Hannibalic war had desolated the land afresh, and the assignments of land in that quarter to the soldiers of Scipio's army, although considerable, probably did not cover the loss. Campania and Apulia, both hitherto well-peopled regions, were still worse treated in the same war by friend and foe. In Apulia, no doubt, assignments of land were made afterwards, but the colonies instituted there were not successful. The beautiful plain of Campania remained better peopled; but the territory of Capua and of the other communities

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broken up in the Hannibalic war became public property, and the occupants of it were uniformly not proprietors, but petty temporary lessees. Lastly, in the wide Lucanian and Bruttian territories the population, which was already very thin before the Hannibalic war, was visited by the whole severity of the war itself and of the penal executions that followed in its train; nor was much done on the part of Rome to revive the agriculture there—with the exception perhaps of Valentia (Vibo, now Monteleone), none of the colonies established there attained any real prosperity.

Falling off
in the
population.

With every allowance for the inequality in the political and economic circumstances of the different districts and for the comparatively flourishing condition of several of them, the retrogression is yet on the whole unmistakeable, and it is confirmed by the most indisputable testimonies as to the general condition of Italy. Cato and Polybius agree in stating, that Italy was at the end of the sixth century far weaker in population than at the end of the fifth, and was no longer able to furnish armies so large as in the first Punic war. The increasing difficulty of the levy, the necessity of lowering the qualification for service in the legions, and the complaints of the allies as to the magnitude of the contingents to be furnished by them, confirm these statements; and, in the case of the Roman burgesses, the numbers tell the same tale. In 502, shortly after the expedition of Regulus to Africa, they amounted to 298,000 men capable of arms; thirty years later, shortly before the commencement of the Hannibalic war (534), they had fallen off to 270,000, or by a tenth, and again twenty years after that, shortly before the end of the same war (550), to 214,000, or by a fourth; and a generation afterwards—during which no extraordinary losses occurred, but the institution of the great burgess-colonies in the plain of northern Italy in particular occasioned a perceptible and exceptional increase—the numbers of the burgesses had hardly again reached the point at which they stood at the commencement of this period. If we had similar statements regarding the Italian population generally, they would beyond all doubt exhibit a deficit relatively still more considerable. The decline of the national vigour less admits of proof; but it is stated by the writers on agriculture, that flesh and milk disappeared more and more from the diet of the common people. At the same time the slave population

increased, as the free population declined. In Apulia, Lucania, and the Bruttian land, pastoral husbandry must already in Cato's time have preponderated over agriculture; the half-savage slave-herdsmen had in reality the command of the country. Apulia was rendered so insecure by them, that a strong force had to be stationed there; in 569 a slave-conspiracy planned on the largest scale, and interwoven with the proceedings of the Bacchanalia, was discovered there, and nearly 7000 men were judicially condemned. In Etruria also Roman troops were obliged to take the field against a band of slaves (558), and even in Latium there were instances in which towns like Setia and Præneste were in danger of being surprised by a band of runaway serfs (556). The nation was visibly diminishing, and the community of free citizens was resolving itself into a body composed of masters and slaves; and, although it was in the first instance the two long wars with Carthage which decimated and ruined both the burgesses and the allies, the Roman capitalists beyond doubt contributed quite as much as Hamilcar and Hannibal to the decline in the vigour and the numbers of the Italian people. No one can say whether the government could have rendered help; but it was an alarming and discreditable fact, that the circles of the Roman aristocracy, well-meaning and energetic as for the most part they were, never once showed any insight into the real gravity of the situation or any foreboding of the full magnitude of the danger. When a Roman lady belonging to the high nobility, the sister of one of the numerous citizen-admirals who in the first Punic war had ruined the fleets of the state, one day got among a crowd in the Roman Forum, she said aloud in the hearing of those around, that it was high time to place her brother once more at the head of the fleet and to lighten the pressure in the market-place by bleeding the citizens afresh (508). Those who thus thought and spoke were, no doubt, a small minority; nevertheless this outrageous speech was simply a forcible expression of the criminal indifference with which the whole noble and rich world looked down on the common citizens and farmers. They did not exactly desire their destruction, but they allowed it to run its course; and so desolation advanced with gigantic steps over the flourishing land of Italy, where countless numbers of free men had lately rejoiced in moderate and merited prosperity.

CHAPTER XIII.

FAITH AND MANNERS.

Roman austerity and Roman pride.

LIFE, in the case of the Roman, was spent under conditions of austere restraint, and, the nobler he was, the less he was a free man. All-powerful custom restricted him to a narrow range of thought and action; and to have led a serious and strict or, to use the characteristic Latin expressions, a grave and severe life, was his glory. Neither more nor less was expected of a Roman than that he should keep his household in good order and unflinchingly bear his part of counsel and action in public affairs. But, while the individual had neither the wish nor the power to be aught else than a member of the community, the glory and the might of that community were felt by every individual citizen as a personal possession to be transmitted along with his name and his homestead to his posterity; and thus, as one generation after another was laid in the tomb and each in succession added its fresh contribution to the stock of ancient honours, the sense of collective dignity in the noble families of Rome swelled into that mighty pride of Roman citizenship, to which the earth has never perhaps witnessed a parallel, and the traces of which, as singular as they are grand, seem to us whenever we meet them to belong as it were to another world. It was one of the characteristic peculiarities of this powerful pride of citizenship, that, while not suppressed, it was yet compelled by the rigid simplicity and equality that prevailed among the citizens to remain locked up within the breast during life, and was only allowed to find expression after death; but it was displayed in the funeral of the man of distinction so conspicuously and intensely, that this

ceremonial is better fitted than any other phenomenon of Roman life to give to us who live in other times a glimpse of that wonderful spirit of the Romans.

It was a singular procession, at which the citizens were invited to be present by the summons of the public crier: A Roman funeral.

"Yonder warrior is dead; whoever can, let him come to escort Lucius Æmilius; he is borne forth from his house." It was opened by bands of wailing women, musicians, and dancers; one of the latter was dressed out and furnished with a mask in imitation of the deceased, and by gesture probably and action recalled once more to the multitude the appearance of the well-known man. Then followed the most magnificent and peculiar part of the solemnity—the procession of ancestors—before which all the rest of the pageant so faded in comparison, that noblemen of the true Roman type enjoined their heirs to restrict the funeral pomp to that procession alone. We have already mentioned that the images of those ancestors who had filled the curule ædileship or any higher ordinary magistracy, wrought in wax and painted,—modelled as far as possible after life, but not wanting even for the earlier ages up to and beyond the time of the kings—were wont to be placed in wooden niches along the walls of the family hall, and were regarded as the chief ornament of the house. When a death occurred in the family, suitable persons, chiefly actors, were dressed up with these masks and the corresponding official costume to take part in the funeral ceremony, so that the ancestors—each in the principal dress worn by him in his lifetime, the triumphator in his gold-embroidered, the censor in his purple, and the consul in his purple-bordered, robe, with their lictors and the other insignia of office—all in chariots gave the final escort to the dead. On the bier overspread with massive purple and gold-embroidered coverlets and fine linen cloths lay the deceased himself, likewise in the full costume of the highest office which he had filled, and surrounded by the armour of the enemies whom he had slain and by the chaplets which in jest or earnest he had won. Behind the bier came the mourners, all dressed in black and without ornament, the sons of the deceased with their heads veiled, the daughters without veil, the relatives and clansmen, the friends, the clients and freedmen. Thus the procession passed on to the Forum. There the corpse was placed in an erect position; the ancestors descended from their

chariots and seated themselves in the curule chairs; and the son or nearest gentile kinsman of the deceased ascended the rostra, in order to announce to the assembled multitude in simple recital the names and deeds of each of the men sitting in a circle around him and, last of all, those of him who had recently died.

This may be called a barbarous custom, and a nation of artistic feelings would certainly not have tolerated the continuance of this odd resurrection of the dead down to an epoch of fully developed civilization; but even Greeks who were very dispassionate and but little disposed to reverence, such as Polybius, acknowledged the imposing effect produced by the naïve pomp of this funeral ceremony. It was a conception essentially in keeping with the grave solemnity, the uniform movement, and the proud dignity of Roman life, that departed generations should continue to walk, as it were, corporeally among the living, and that, when a burgess weary of labours and of honours was gathered to his fathers, these fathers themselves should appear in the Forum to receive him among their number.

The new
Hellenism.

But the Romans had now reached a crisis of transition. Now that the power of Rome was no longer confined to Italy but had spread far and wide to the west and to the east, the days of the old home life of Italy were over, and a Hellenizing civilization came in its room. It is true that Italy had been subject to the influence of Greece, ever since it had a history at all. We have formerly shown how the youthful Greece and the youthful Italy—both of them with some measure of simplicity and originality—gave and received intellectual impulses; and how at a later period Rome endeavoured after a more external manner to appropriate to practical use the language and inventions of the Greeks. But the Hellenism of the Romans of the present period was, in its causes as well as its consequences, something essentially new. The Romans began to feel the lack of a richer intellectual life, and to be startled as it were at their own utter want of mental culture; and, if even nations of artistic gifts, such as the English and Germans, have not disdained in the pauses of their own productiveness to avail themselves of the paltry French culture for filling up the gap, it need excite no surprise that the Italian nation now flung itself with eager zeal on the glorious treasures as well as on the vile refuse of the intellectual development of

Hellas. But it was an impulse still more profound and deep-rooted, which carried the Romans irresistibly into the Hellenic vortex. Hellenic civilization still assumed that name, but it was Hellenic no longer; it was, in fact, humanistic and cosmopolitan. It had solved the problem of moulding a mass of different nations into one whole completely in the field of intellect, and to a certain degree in that of politics; and, now when the same task on a wider scale devolved on Rome, she entered on the possession of Hellenism along with the rest of the inheritance of Alexander the Great. Hellenism therefore was no longer a mere stimulus, or subordinate influence; it penetrated the Italian nation to the very core. Of course, the vigorous home life of Italy strove against the foreign element. It was only after a most vehement struggle that the Italian farmer abandoned the field to the cosmopolite of the capital; and, as in Germany the French coat called forth the national Germanic frock, so the reaction against Hellenism aroused in Rome a tendency, which opposed the influence of Greece on principle in a style to which earlier centuries were altogether unaccustomed, and in doing so fell not unfrequently into downright follies and absurdities.

No department of human action or thought remained unaffected by this struggle between the new fashion and the old. Even political relations were largely influenced by it. The whimsical project of emancipating the Hellenes, the well-deserved failure of which has already been described, the kindred, likewise Hellenic, idea of combining republics in a common opposition to kings, and the desire of propagating Hellenic polity at the expense of eastern despotism—which were the two principles that regulated, for instance, the treatment of Macedonia—were fixed ideas of the new school, just as dread of the Carthaginians was the fixed idea of the old; and, if Cato pushed the latter to a ridiculous excess, Philhellenism now and then indulged in extravagances at least as foolish. For example, the conqueror of king Antiochus not only had a statue of himself in Greek costume erected on the Capitol, but also, instead of calling himself in good Latin *Asiaticus*, assumed the meaningless indeed and anomalous, but yet magnificent and almost Greek, surname of *Asiagenus*.* A more important conse-

* That *Asiagenus* was the original title of the hero of Magnesia and of his descendants, is established by coins and inscriptions; the fact that the Capito-

quence of this attitude of the ruling nation towards Hellenism was, that the process of Latinizing gained ground everywhere in Italy except where it encountered the Hellenes. The cities of the Greeks in Italy, so far as the war had not destroyed them, remained Greek. Apulia, about which, it is true, the Romans gave themselves little concern, appears about this very epoch to have been thoroughly pervaded by Hellenism, and the local civilization there seems to have attained the level of the decaying Hellenic culture by its side. Tradition is silent on the matter; but the numerous coins of cities, uniformly furnished with Greek inscriptions, and the manufacture of painted vases after the Greek style, which was carried on only in that part of Italy with more ambition and gaudiness than taste, show that Apulia had completely adopted Greek habits and Greek art.

But the real struggle between Hellenism and its national antagonists during the present period was carried on in the field of faith, of manners, and of art and literature; and we must not omit to attempt some delineation of this great strife of principles, however difficult it may be to present a summary view of the myriad forms and aspects which the conflict assumed.

The national religion and unbelief.

The extent to which the old simple faith still retained a living hold on the Italian mind, is shown very clearly by the admiration or astonishment which this problem of Italian piety excited among the contemporary Greeks. On occasion of a conflict with the Ætolians it was reported of the Roman commander-in-chief that during the battle he was wholly engaged in praying and sacrificing like a priest; whereas Polybius with his somewhat stale moralizing calls the attention of his countrymen to the political usefulness of this piety, and admonishes them that a state cannot consist of wise men alone, and that such ceremonies are very convenient for the sake of the multitude.

Religious economy.

But if Italy still possessed—what had long been a mere antiquarian curiosity in Hellas—a national religion, it was already visibly beginning to be ossified into theology. The

line Fasti call him *Asiaticus* is one of several traces indicating that these have undergone a non-contemporaneous revision. The former surname can only be a corruption of *Ἀσιαγενής*—the form which later authors substituted for it—which signifies not a conqueror of Asia, but an Asiatic by birth.

torpor creeping over faith is nowhere perhaps so distinctly apparent as in the alterations in the economy of divine service and of the priesthood. The public service of the gods became not only more tedious, but above all more and more costly. In 558 there was added to the three old colleges of augurs, pontifices, and keepers of oracles, a fourth consisting of three "banquet-masters" (*tres viri epulones*), solely for the important purpose of superintending the banquets of the gods. The priests as well as the gods had a just title to their feasts; new institutions, however, were not needed with that view, as every college applied itself with zeal and devotion to its convivial affairs. The clerical banquets were accompanied by the claim of clerical immunities. The priests even in times of grave embarrassment claimed the right of exemption from public burdens, and only after very troublesome controversy submitted to make payment of the taxes in arrear (558). To the individual, as well as to the community, piety became a more and more costly article. The custom of instituting endowments, and generally of undertaking permanent pecuniary obligations, for religious objects prevailed among the Romans in a manner similar to its prevalence in Roman Catholic countries at the present day. These endowments—particularly after they came to be regarded by the supreme spiritual and at the same time the supreme juristic authority in the state, the pontifices, as a real burden devolving *de jure* on every heir or other person acquiring the estate—began to form an extremely oppressive charge on property; "inheritance without sacrificial obligation" was a proverbial saying among the Romans somewhat similar to our "rose without a thorn." The dedication of a tenth of their substance became so common, that twice every month a public entertainment was given from the proceeds in the Forum Boarium at Rome. With the Oriental worship of the Mother of the Gods there was imported to Rome among other pious nuisances the practice, annually recurring on certain fixed days, of demanding penny-collections from house to house (*stipem cogere*). Lastly, the subordinate class of priests and soothsayers, as was reasonable, rendered no service without being paid for it; and beyond doubt the Roman dramatist sketched from life when, in the curtain-conversation between husband and wife, he represents the account for pious services as ranking with the

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accounts for the cook, the nurse, and other customary presents.—

*Da mihi, vir, ——— quod dem Quinquatribus
Præcantrici, conjectrici, hariolæ atque haruspicæ ;
Tum piatricem clementer non potest quin munerem.
Flagitium est, si nil mittetur, quo supercilio spicit.*

The Romans did not create a God of Gold, as they had formerly created one of Silver (i. 451) ; nevertheless he reigned in reality alike over the highest and lowest spheres of religious life. The old pride of the Latin national religion—the moderation of its economic demands—was irrevocably gone.

Theology. At the same time its ancient simplicity also departed. Theology, the spurious offspring of reason and faith, was already occupied in introducing its own tedious prolixity and solemn inanity into the old homely national faith, and thereby expelling the true spirit of that faith. The catalogue of the duties and privileges of the priest of Jupiter, for instance, might well have a place in the Talmud. They pushed the natural rule—that no religious service can be acceptable to the gods unless it be performed without flaw—to such an extent in practice, that a single sacrifice had to be repeated thirty times in succession on account of mistakes again and again committed, and that the games, which also formed a part of divine service, were regarded as undone if the presiding magistrate had committed any slip in word or deed or if the music even had paused at a wrong time, and so had to be begun afresh, frequently for several, even as many as seven, times in succession.

Irreligious spirit. This exaggeration of conscientiousness was already a symptom of its incipient torpor ; and the reaction against it—indifference and unbelief—appeared without delay.

249. Even in the first Punic war (505) an instance occurred in which the consul himself made an open jest of consulting the auspices before battle—a consul, it is true, belonging to the eccentric Claudian *gens*, which alike in good and evil was ahead of its age. Towards the end of this epoch complaints were loudly made, that the lore of the augurs was neglected, and that, to use Cato's language, a number of ancient auguries and auspices were falling into oblivion through the indolence of the college. An augur like Lucius Paullus, who regarded the priesthood as a science and not as a mere title, was already a rare exception ; and could not but be so,

when the government more and more openly and unhesitatingly employed the auspices for the accomplishment of its political designs, or, in other words, treated the national religion in accordance with the view of Polybius as a superstition useful for imposing on the public at large. Where the way was thus paved, the Hellenistic irreligious spirit found free course. In connection with the incipient taste for art the sacred images of the gods began even in Cato's time to be employed, like other furniture, to embellish the chambers of the rich. More dangerous wounds were inflicted on religion by the rising literature. It could not indeed venture on open attacks, and such direct additions as were made by its means to religious ideas—*e. g.* the *Pater Cælus* formed by Ennius from the Roman Saturnus in imitation of the Greek Uranos—were, while Hellenistic, of no great importance. But the diffusion of the doctrines of Epicharmus and Euhemerus in Rome was fraught with momentous consequences. The poetical philosophy, which the later Pythagoreans had extracted from the writings of the old Sicilian comedian Epicharmus of Megara (about 280), or rather had, at least for the most part, circulated under cover of his name, regarded the Greek gods as natural substances, Zeus as the atmosphere, the soul as a particle of sun-dust, and so forth. This philosophy of nature, like the Stoic doctrine in later times, had in its most general outlines a certain affinity with the Roman religion, and was, in so far, calculated to undermine the national religion by resolving it into allegory. A historical analysis of religion was given in the "Sacred Memoirs" of Euhemerus of Messene (about 450), which, under the form of an account of the travels of the author among the marvels of foreign lands, subjected to a thorough and searching investigation the accounts current as to the so-called gods, and resulted in the conclusion that there neither were nor are gods at all. To indicate the character of the book, it may suffice to mention the one fact, that the story of Kronos devouring his children is explained as arising out of the existence of cannibalism in the earliest times and its abolition by King Zeus. Notwithstanding, or even by virtue of, its insipidity and destructive tendency, the production had an undeserved success in Greece, and helped, in concert with the current philosophies there, to bury the dead religion. It is a remarkable indication of the expressed and conscious antagonism between religion and the new

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philosophy, that Ennius already translated into Latin those notoriously destructive writings of Epicharmus and Euhemerus. The translator probably justified himself at the bar of Roman police by pleading, that the attacks were directed only against the Greek, and not against the Latin, gods; but the evasion was tolerably transparent. Cato was, from his point of view, quite right in assailing these tendencies indiscriminately, wherever they met him, with his own peculiar bitterness, and in calling even Socrates a corrupter of morals and offender against religion.

Home and
foreign
supersti-
tion.

Thus the old national religion was visibly on the decline; and, as the great trees of the primeval forest were uprooted, the soil became covered with a rank growth of thorns and briars and with weeds that had never been seen before. Native superstitions and foreign impostures of the most various hues mingled, competed, and conflicted with each other. No Italian stock remained exempt from this transmuting of old faith into new superstition. As the lore of entrails and of lightning was cultivated among the Etruscans, so the free art of observing birds and conjuring serpents flourished luxuriantly among the Sabellians and in particular the Marsians. Even among the Latin nation, and in fact in Rome itself, we meet with similar phenomena, although they are, comparatively speaking, less conspicuous. Such for instance were the lots of Præneste, and the remarkable discovery at 181. Rome in 573 of the tomb and posthumous writings of king Numa. These were alleged to prescribe religious rites altogether strange and unheard of; but the credulous were, to their regret, not permitted to learn more than this coupled with the fact that the books looked very new; for the senate laid hands on the treasure and ordered the rolls to be summarily thrown into the fire. The home manufacture was quite sufficient to meet such demands of folly as might reasonably be expected; but the Romans were far from being content with it. The Hellenism of that epoch, already denationalized and pervaded by Oriental mysticism, introduced not only unbelief but also superstition in its most offensive and dangerous forms to Italy; and these vagaries moreover, had a special charm, precisely because they were foreign.

Worship of
Cybele.

Chaldaean astrologers and casters of nativities were already in the sixth century spread throughout Italy; but a still more important event—one making in fact an epoch in

history—was the reception of the Phrygian Mother of the Gods among the publicly recognized divinities of the Roman state, to which the government had been obliged to give their consent during the last weary years of the Hannibalic war (550). A special embassy was sent for the purpose to Pessinus, a city in the territory of the Celts of Asia Minor; and the rough field-stone, which the priests of the place liberally presented to the foreigners as the real Mother Cybele, was received by the community with unparalleled pomp. Indeed, by way of perpetually commemorating the joyful event, clubs in which the members entertained each other in rotation were instituted among the higher classes, and seem to have materially stimulated the rising tendency to the formation of cliques. With the permission thus granted for the *cultus* of Cybele, the worship of the Orientals gained a footing officially in Rome; and, though the government strictly insisted that the emasculate priests of the new gods should remain Celts (*Galli*) as they were called, and that no Roman burgess should devote himself to this pious eunuchism, yet the barbaric pomp of the “Great Mother”—her priests clad in Oriental costume with the chief eunuch at their head, marching in procession through the streets to the foreign music of fifes and kettledrums, and begging from house to house—and the whole character of the system, half sensuous, half monastic, must have exercised a most material influence over the sentiments and views of the people.

204.

The effect was only too rapidly and fearfully apparent. A few years later (568) rites of the most abominable character came to the knowledge of the Roman authorities: a secret nocturnal festival in honour of the god Bacchus had been first introduced into Etruria by a Greek priest, and, spreading like a cancer, had rapidly reached Rome and propagated itself over all Italy, everywhere corrupting families and giving rise to the most heinous crimes, unparalleled unchastity, falsifying of testaments, and murdering by poison. More than 7000 men were sentenced to punishment, most of them to death, on this account, and rigorous enactments were issued as to the future; yet they did not succeed in repressing the system. and six years later (574) the magistrate to whom the matter fell complained that 8000 men more had been condemned and still there appeared no end of the evil.

Worship of
Bacchus.
186.

180.

Repressive
measures.

Of course all rational men were agreed in the condemnation of these spurious forms of religion—as absurd as they were injurious to the commonwealth: the pious adherents of the olden faith as well as the partisans of Hellenic enlightenment concurred in their ridicule of, and indignation at, this superstition. Cato made it an instruction to his steward, “that he was not to present any offering, or to allow any offering to be presented on his behalf, without the knowledge and orders of his master, except at the domestic hearth and on the wayside-altar at the Compitalia, and that he should consult no *haruspex*, *hariolus*, or *Chaldeus*.” The well-known question as to how a priest could contrive to suppress laughter when he met his colleague, originated with Cato, and was primarily applied to the Etruscan *haruspex*. Much in the same spirit Ennius censures in true Euripidean style the mendicant soothsayers and their adherents:

*Sed superstitiosi vates impudentesque arioli,
Aut inertes aut insani aut quibus egestas imperat,
Qui sibi semitam non sapiunt, alteri monstrant viam,
Quibus divitias pollicentur, ab eis drachumam ipsi petunt*

242.

But in such times reason from the first plays a losing game against unreason. The government, no doubt, interfered; the pious impostors were punished and expelled by the police; every foreign worship not specially sanctioned was forbidden; even the consulting of the comparatively innocent lot-oracle of Præneste was officially prohibited in 512; and, as we have already said, those who took part in the mysteries were rigorously prosecuted. But, when once men's heads are thoroughly turned, no command of the higher authorities avails to set them right again. How much the government was obliged to concede, or at any rate did concede, is obvious from what has been stated. The Roman custom, in virtue of which the state consulted Etruscan sages in certain emergencies and the government accordingly took steps to secure the traditional transmission of Etruscan lore in the noble families of Etruria, as well as the permission of the secret worship of Demeter which was not immoral and was restricted to women, may probably be ranked with the earlier innocent and comparatively indifferent adoption of foreign rites. But the admission of the worship of the *Magna Dea* was a bad sign of the weakness which

the government felt in presence of the new superstition, perhaps even of the extent to which it was itself pervaded by it; and it showed in like manner either an unpardonable negligence or something still worse, that the authorities only took steps against such proceedings as the Bacchanalia at so late a stage and even then on an accidental information.

The picture, which has been handed down to us of the life of Cato the Elder, enables us in substance to perceive how, according to the ideas of the respectable Roman citizens of that period, the private life of the Roman should be spent. Active as Cato was as a statesman, administrator, author, and mercantile speculator, family life always formed with him the central object of existence; it was better, he thought, to be a good husband than a great senator. His domestic discipline was strict. The servants were not allowed to leave the house without orders, nor to talk of what occurred in the household to strangers. The more severe punishments were not inflicted capriciously, but sentence was pronounced and executed after a quasi-judicial procedure: the strictness with which offences were punished may be inferred from the fact, that one of his slaves who had concluded a purchase without orders from his master hanged himself on the matter coming to Cato's ears. For slight offences, such as mistakes committed in waiting at table, the consular was wont after dinner to administer to the culprit the proper number of lashes with a thong wielded by his own hand. He kept his wife and children in order no less strictly, but by other means; for he declared it sinful to lay hands on a wife or grown-up children in the same way as on slaves. In the choice of a wife he disapproved marrying for money, and recommended men to look to good descent; but he himself married in old age the daughter of one of his poor clients. Moreover he adopted views in regard to continence on the part of the husband similar to those which everywhere prevail in slave countries: a wife was throughout regarded by him as simply a necessary evil. His writings abound in invectives against the chattering, finery-loving, ungovernable fair sex; it was the opinion of the old lord that "all women are plaguy and proud," and that, "were men quit of women, their life would probably be less godless." On the other hand the rearing of his children born in wedlock was a matter which touched his heart and

Austerity
of manners.

his honour, and the wife in his eyes existed strictly and solely for the children's sake. She nursed them ordinarily herself, or, if she allowed her children to be suckled by female slaves, she also allowed their children in return to draw nourishment from her own breast; one of the few traits, which indicate an endeavour to mitigate the institution of slavery by ties of human sympathy—the common impulses of maternity and the bond of foster-brotherhood. The old general was present in person, whenever it was possible, at the washing and swaddling of his children. He watched with reverential care over their childlike innocence; he assures us that he was as careful lest he should utter an unbecoming word in presence of his children as if he had been in presence of the Vestal Virgins, and that he never before the eyes of his daughters embraced their mother, except when she had become alarmed during a thunder-storm. The education of his son was perhaps the noblest portion of his varied and variously honourable activity. True to his maxim, that a ruddy-cheeked boy was worth more than a pale one, the old soldier in person initiated his son into all bodily exercises, and taught him to wrestle, to ride, to swim, to box, and to endure heat and cold. But he felt very justly, that the time had gone by when it sufficed for a Roman to be a good farmer and soldier; and he felt also that it could not but have an injurious influence on the mind of his boy, if he should subsequently learn that the teacher, who had rebuked and punished him and had won his reverence, was a mere slave. Therefore he in person taught the boy what a Roman was wont to learn, to read and write and know the law of the land; and even in his later years he worked his way so far into the general culture of the Hellenes, that he was able to deliver to his son in his native tongue whatever in that culture he deemed to be of use to a Roman. All his writings were primarily intended for his son, and he wrote his historical work for that son's use with large distinct letters in his own hand. He lived in a homely and frugal style. His strict parsimony tolerated no expenditure on luxuries. He allowed no slave to cost him more than 1500 *denarii* (£62) and no dress more than 100 *denarii* (£4 3s.); no carpet was to be seen in his house, and for a long time there was no whitewash on the walls of the rooms. Ordinarily he partook of the same fare with his servants, and did not suffer his outlay in cash for the meal

to exceed 30 asses (1s. 1½d.); in time of war even wine was uniformly banished from his table, and he drank water or, according to circumstances, water mixed with vinegar. On the other hand, he was no enemy to hospitality; he was fond of associating both with his club in town and with the neighbouring landlords in the country; he sat long at table, and, as his varied experience and his shrewd and ready wit made him a pleasant companion, he disdained neither the dice nor the wine-flask: among other receipts in his book on husbandry he even gives a tried recipe for the case of a too hearty meal and too deep potations. His life up to extreme old age was one of ceaseless activity. Every moment was apportioned and occupied; and every evening he was in the habit of turning over in his mind what he had heard, said, or done during the day. Thus he found time for his own affairs as well as for those of his friends and of the state, and time also for conversation and pleasure; everything was done quickly and without many words, and his genuine spirit of activity hated nothing so much as bustle or a great ado about trifles.

So lived the man, who was regarded by his contemporaries and by posterity as the true model of a Roman citizen, and who appeared as it were the living embodiment of the—certainly somewhat coarse-grained—energy and honesty of Rome as opposed to Greek indolence and Greek immorality; as a later Roman poet says :*

Foreign manners are nought else than myriad vagaries ;
Better than the Roman burgess no one bears him in the world ;
One Cato is to me worth more than a hundred Socrateses.

Such judgments will not be absolutely adopted by history; but every one who carefully considers the revolution, which the degenerate Hellenism of this age accomplished in the modes of life and thought among the Romans, will be inclined to deepen rather than to modify that condemnation of the foreign manners.

The ties of family life became relaxed with fearful rapidity. The evil of grisettes and boy-favourites spread like a pestilence, and, as matters stood, it was not possible to take any material steps in the way of legislation against it. The high tax, which Cato the Censor (570) laid on this

New manners.

184.

* [I have not been able to find, nor has Dr. Mommsen furnished me with, the original of these lines.—TR.]

- most abominable species of slaves kept for luxury, would not be of much moment, and besides fell practically into disuse a year or two afterwards along with the property-tax generally. Celibacy—as to which grave complaints were already made in 520—and divorces naturally increased in proportion. Horrible crimes were perpetrated in the bosom of the noblest families; for instance, the consul Gaius Calpurnius Piso was poisoned by his wife and his stepson in order to occasion a supplementary election to the consulship and so to procure the supreme magistracy for the latter—a plot which was successful (574). Moreover, the emancipation of women began. According to old custom the married woman was subject in law to the marital power which was parallel with the paternal, and the unmarried woman to the guardianship of her nearest male *agnati* which fell little short of the paternal power; the wife had no property of her own, the virgin and widow had at any rate no right of management. But now women began to aspire to independence in respect of property, and, getting quit of their agnate guardianship through evasions suggested by advocates—particularly through mock marriages—they took the management of their property into their own hands, or, in the event of being married, sought by means not much better to withdraw themselves from the marital power, which under the strict letter of the law was necessary. The mass of capital which was collected in the hands of women appeared to the statesmen of the time so dangerous, that they resorted to the extravagant expedient of prohibiting by law the testamentary nomination of women as heirs (585), and even sought by a highly arbitrary practice to deprive women for the most part of those collateral inheritances which fell to them without testament. In like manner the family jurisdiction over women, which was connected with that marital and tutorial power, became practically more and more antiquated. Even in public matters women already began to have a will of their own and occasionally, as Cato thought, “to rule the rulers of the world;” their influence could be traced in the comitia, and already statues were erected in the provinces to Roman ladies.
- Luxury.** Luxury prevailed more and more in dress, ornaments, and furniture, in the buildings and on the tables. Especially after the expedition to Asia Minor, which took place in 190, Asiatico-Hellenic luxury, such as prevailed at Ephesus

and Alexandria, transferred its empty refinement and its petty trifling destructive alike of money, time, and pleasure, to Rome. Here too women took the lead : in spite of Cato's zealous invective they managed to procure the abolition, after the peace with Carthage (559), of the decree of the people passed soon after the battle of Cannæ (539), which forbade them to use gold ornaments, variegated dresses, or chariots ; no course was left to their zealous antagonist but to place a high tax on those articles (570). A multitude of new and for the most part frivolous articles—silver plate elegantly figured, table-couches with bronze mounting, Attalic dresses as they were called and carpets of rich gold brocade—now found their way to Rome. Above all, this new luxury appeared in the appliances of the table. Hitherto without exception the Romans had only partaken of hot dishes once a day ; now hot dishes were not unfrequently produced at the second meal (*prandium*), and for the principal meal the two courses formerly in use no longer sufficed. Hitherto the women of the household had themselves attended to the baking of bread and cooking ; and it was only on occasion of entertainments that a professional cook was specially hired, who in that case superintended alike the cooking and the baking. Now, on the other hand, a scientific cookery began to prevail. In the better houses a special cook was kept. A division of labour became necessary, and the trade of baking bread and cakes branched off from that of cooking—the first bakers' shops in Rome appeared about 583. Poems on the art of good eating, with long lists of the most palatable fishes and other marine products, found their readers : and the theory was reduced to practice. Foreign delicacies—anchovies from Pontus, wine from Greece—began to be esteemed in Rome, and Cato's receipt for giving to the ordinary wine of the country the flavour of Coan by means of brine would hardly inflict any considerable injury on the Roman wine-merchants. The old decorous singing and reciting of the guests and their boys were supplanted by Asiatic *sambucistriæ*. Hitherto the Romans had perhaps drunk pretty deeply at supper, but drinking-banquets in the strict sense were unknown ; now formal revels came into vogue, on which occasions the wine was little or not at all diluted and was drunk out of large cups, and the drinking of healths, in which each was bound to follow his neighbour in regular succession, formed

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the leading feature—"drinking after the Greek style" (*Græco more bibere*) or "playing the Greek" (*pergræcari, congræcare*) as the Romans called it. In consequence of this debauchery dice-playing, which had long been in use among the Romans, reached such a height that it was necessary for legislation to interfere. The aversion to labour and the habit of idle lounging were visibly on the increase.* Cato proposed to have the market paved with pointed stones, in order to put a stop to the habit of idling; the Romans laughed at the jest, and went on to enjoy the pleasure of loitering and staring around them.

Increase of
amuse-
ments.

We have already noticed the alarming increase of the popular amusements during this epoch. At the beginning of it, apart from some unimportant foot and chariot races which should rather be ranked among the religious ceremonies, only a single general festival was held in the month of September, lasting for four days and having a definitely fixed maximum of cost (i. 473). At its close this popular festival had a duration of at least six days; and besides this there were celebrated at

* A sort of *parabasis* in the *Curculio* of Plautus describes what went on in the leading thoroughfares of the capital, with little humour perhaps, but with life-like distinctness:

*Commonstrabo, quo in quemque hominem facile inveniatis loco,
Ne nimio opere sumat operam, si quem conventum velit,
Vel vitiosum vel sine vitio, vel probum vel improbum.
Qui perjurum convenire vult hominem, mitto in comitium;
Qui mendacem et gloriosum, apud Cloacinæ sacrum.
[Ditis damnosos maritos sub Basilica quærito.
Ibidem erunt scorta exoleta, quique stipulari solent.]
Symbolarum collatores apud forum piscarium.
In foro infimo boni homines atque dites ambulant.
In medio propter Canalem, ibi ostentatores meri.
Confidentes garrulique et malevoli supra Lacum,
Qui alteri de nihilo audacter dicunt contumeliam.
Et qui ipsi sat habent quod ipsis vere possit dicier.
Sub Veteribus, ibi sunt, qui dant quique accipiunt fœnori.
Pons ædem Castoris, ibi sunt, subito quibus credas male.
In Tusco vico, ibi sunt homines, qui ipsi sese venditant.
In Velabro vel pistorem, vel lanium, vel haruspicem,
Vel qui ipsi vorsant, vel, qui aliis subvorsentur, præbeant.
Ditis damnosos maritos apud Leucadium Oppiam.*

184.

The verses in brackets are a subsequent addition, inserted after the building of the first Roman bazaar (570). The business of the baker (*pistor*, literally miller) embraced at this time the sale of delicacies and the providing accommodation for revellers (*Festus*, *Ep. v. alicariæ*, p. 7, *Müll*; *Plautus*, *Capt.* 160; *Poen.* i. 2, 54; *Trin.* 407). The same was the case with the butchers. *Leucadia Oppia* probably kept a house of bad fame.

the beginning of April the festival of the Mother of the Gods or the so-called Megalensia, towards the end of April that of Ceres and that of Flora, in June that of Apollo, in November the Plebeian games—all of them probably occupying already more days than one. To these fell to be added the numerous cases where the games were celebrated afresh, in which pious scruples probably often served as a mere pretext, and the incessant extraordinary festivals. Among these the already-mentioned banquets furnished from the dedicated tenths (P. 399), the feasts of the gods, the triumphal and funeral festivities, were conspicuous; and above all the festal games which were celebrated—for the first time in 505—at the close of one of those longer periods which were marked off in the Etrusco-Roman religion, the *sæcula*, as they were called. At the same time domestic festivals were multiplied. During the second Punic war there were introduced, among the nobles, the already-mentioned banquetings on the anniversary of the entrance of the *Magna Dea* (after 550), and, among the lower orders of people, the similar Saturnalia (after 537), both under the influence of powers henceforth closely allied—the foreign priest and the foreign cook. A very near approach was made to that ideal condition, in which every idler should know where he might kill the time every day; and this in a commonwealth, where formerly activity had been with all and sundry the aim of existence, and idle enjoyment had been proscribed by custom as well as by law! The bad and demoralizing elements in these festal observances, moreover, daily acquired greater ascendancy. It is true that still as formerly the chariot races formed the brilliant finale of the national festivals; and a poet of this period describes very vividly the straining expectancy with which the eyes of the multitude were fastened on the consul, when he was on the point of giving the signal for the chariots to start. But the former amusements no longer sufficed; there was a craving for new and more varied spectacles. Greek athletes now made their appearance (for the first time in 568) alongside of the native wrestlers and boxers. Of the dramatic exhibitions we shall speak hereafter: the introduction of the Greek comedy and tragedy to Rome was a gain perhaps of doubtful value; but they formed at any rate the best acquisition made on this occasion. The Romans had probably long indulged in the sport of coursing hares and

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204.
217.
188.

186. hunting foxes in presence of the public ; now these innocent hunts were converted into formal baitings of wild beasts, and the wild beasts of Africa—lions and panthers—were (first so far as can be proved in 568) transported at great cost to Rome, in order that by killing or being killed they might serve to glut the eyes of the gazers of the capital. The still more revolting gladiatorial games, such as prevailed in Campania and Etruria, now gained admission to Rome ; human blood was first shed for sport in the Roman Forum in 490. Of course these demoralizing amusements encountered severe censure : the consul of 486, Publius Sophus, sent a divorce to his wife, because she had attended funeral games ; the government managed to procure a decree of the people prohibiting the importation of foreign animals to Rome, and strictly insisted that no gladiators should appear at the public festivals. But here too it wanted either the proper power or proper energy : it succeeded, apparently, in checking the practice of baiting animals, but the appearance of sets of gladiators at private festivals, particularly at funeral celebrations, was not suppressed. Still less could the public be prevented from preferring the gladiator to the rope-dancer, the rope-dancer to the comedian, the comedian to the tragedian ; or the stage be prevented from revelling by choice amidst the pollution of Hellenic life. Whatever elements of culture were contained in the scenic and musical entertainments were from the first thrown aside ; it was by no means the object of the givers of the Roman festivals to elevate—though it should be but temporarily—the whole body of spectators through the power of poetry to the level of feeling of the best, as the Greek stage did in the period of its prime, or to prepare an artistic treat for a select circle, as our theatres endeavour to do. The character of the managers and spectators in Rome is illustrated by a scene at the triumphal games in 587, where the first Greek flute-players, on their melodies failing to please, were instructed by the director to box with one another instead of playing, upon which the delight knew no bounds.
264. 268. 167.

Nor was the evil confined to the corruption of Roman manners by Hellenic contagion ; conversely the scholars began to demoralize their instructors. Gladiatorial games, which were unknown in Greece, were first introduced by 175-164. king Antiochus Epiphanes (575-590), a professed imitator

of the Romans, at the Syrian court, and, although they excited at first greater horror than pleasure in the Greek public, which was more humane and had more of a taste for art than the Romans, they yet held their ground and gradually came more and more into vogue.

As a matter of course, this revolution in life and manners brought an economic revolution in its train. Residence in the capital became more and more coveted as well as more costly. Rents rose to an unexampled height. Extravagant prices were paid for the new articles of luxury; a barrel of anchovies from the Black Sea cost 1600 sesterces (£14)—more than the price of a rural slave; a beautiful boy cost 24,000 sesterces (£246)—more than many a farmer's homestead. Money therefore, and nothing but money, became the watchword with high and low. In Greece it had long been the case that nobody did anything without being paid for it, as the Greeks themselves with discreditable naïveté allowed: after the second Macedonian war the Romans began in this respect also to imitate the Greeks. Respectability had to provide itself with legal buttresses; administrators, for instance, had to be prohibited by decree of the people from taking money for their services; the juriconsults alone formed a noble exception, and needed no decree of the people to compel their adherence to the honourable custom of giving their good advice gratuitously. Men did not, if possible, steal outright; but all shifts seemed allowable in order to attain rapidly to riches—plundering and begging, cheating on the part of contractors and swindling on the part of speculators, usurious trading in money and in grain, even the turning of purely moral relations such as friendship and marriage to economic account. Marriage especially became on both sides an object of mercantile speculation; marriages for money were common, and it appeared necessary to refuse legal validity to the presents which the spouses made to each other. That, under such a state of things, plans for setting fire on all sides to the capital came to the knowledge of the authorities, need excite no surprise. When man no longer finds enjoyment in work, and works merely in order to attain as quickly as possible to enjoyment, it is a mere accident that he does not become a criminal. Destiny lavished all the glories of power and riches with liberal hand on the Romans; but, in truth, the Pandora's box was a gift of doubtful value.

CHAPTER XIV.

LITERATURE AND ART.

THE influences which stimulated the growth of Roman literature were of a character altogether peculiar and hardly paralleled in any other nation. To estimate them correctly, it is necessary in the first place that we should glance at the national education and national recreations of this period.

Knowledge
of lan-
guages.

Language lies at the root of all mental culture ; and this was especially the case in Rome. In a community where so much importance was attached to speeches and documents, and where the citizen at an age, which is still according to modern ideas regarded as boyhood, was already intrusted with the uncontrolled management of his property and might find himself under the necessity of formally addressing the public assembly, not only was great value set all along on a fluent and polished use of the mother-tongue, but efforts were at an early period directed to acquire a command of it in the years of boyhood. The Greek language also was already generally diffused in Italy in the times of Hannibal. In the higher circles a knowledge of that language, which was the general medium of intercourse for ancient civilization, had long been a far from uncommon accomplishment ; and now, when the change in the position of Rome had so enormously increased the intercourse with foreigners and the foreign traffic, such a knowledge was, if not necessary, yet in all probability of very material importance to the merchant as well as the statesman. By means of the Italian slaves and freedmen, a very large portion of whom were Greek or half-

Greek by birth, the Greek language and Greek knowledge to a certain extent reached even the lower ranks of the population, especially in the capital. The comedies of this period indicate that even the humbler classes of the capital were familiar with a sort of Latin, which could no more be properly understood without a knowledge of Greek than Sterne's English or Wieland's German without a knowledge of French.* Men of senatorial families, however, not only addressed a Greek audience in Greek, but even published their speeches—Tiberius Gracchus (consul in 577 and 591) for instance, so published a speech which he had given at Rhodes—and in the time of Hannibal wrote their chronicles in Greek, as we shall have occasion to mention more particularly in the sequel. Individuals went still further. The Greeks honoured Flamininus by complimentary demonstrations in the Roman language (P. 247), and he returned the compliment; the "great general of the Æneïades" dedicated his votive gifts to the Greek gods after the Grecian fashion in Greek distichs.† Cato reproached another senator with the fact, that he had the effrontery to deliver Greek recitations with the due modulation at Greek revels.

Under the influence of such circumstances Roman educa-

* A distinct set of Greek expressions, such as *stratioticus*, *machæra*, *nauclerus*, *trapezita*, *danista*, *drapeta*, *cenopolium*, *bolus*, *malacus*, *morus*, *graphicus*, *logus*, *apologus*, *techna*, *schema*, forms quite a special feature in the language of Plautus. Translations are seldom attached, and that only in the case of words not included in the circle of ideas to which those which we have cited belong; for instance, in the *Truculentus*—in a verse, however, that is perhaps a later addition (i. 1, 60)—we find the explanation: *φρόνησις est sapientia*. Fragments of Greek also are common, as in the *Casina* (iii. 6, 9):

Πράγματ' αἰ παρὲχ' εἰς—*Dabo μέγα κακὸν, ut opinor.*

Greek puns likewise occur, as in the *Bacchides* (240)

opus est chryso Chrysalo.

Ennius in the same way takes for granted that the etymological meaning of Alexandros and Andromache is known to the spectators (Varro, *de L.L.* vii. 82). Most characteristic of all are the half-Greek formations, such as *feritribas*, *plagipatida*, *pugilice*, or in the *Miles Gloriosus* (213):

Euge! euscheme hercle astitit sic dulice et comœdice!

† One of these epigrams composed in the name of Flamininus runs thus:

Ζηνὸς ἰὼ κραίπναισι γεγαυότες ἱπποσύναισι
Κούροι, ἰὼ Σπαρτας Τυνδαρίδαι βασιλεῖς,
Ἀλεξάνδ' αὖ Τίτος ὑμῖν ὑπέρτατον ἔπασε δῶρον
Ἑλλήνων τεύξας παῖσιν ἐλευθερίαν.

tion developed itself. It is a mistaken opinion, that antiquity was materially inferior to our own times in the general diffusion of elementary attainments. Even among the lower classes and slaves there was considerable knowledge of reading, writing, and counting: in the case of a slave-steward, for instance, Cato, following the example of Mago, takes for granted an ability to read and write. Elementary instruction, as well as instruction in Greek, must have been long ere this period imparted to a very considerable extent in Rome. But the epoch now before us initiated an education, the aim of which was to communicate not merely an outward expertness, but a real mental culture. Hitherto a knowledge of Greek had conferred on its possessor as little superiority in civil or social life, as a knowledge of French perhaps confers at the present day in a hamlet of German Switzerland; and the earliest writers of Greek chronicles probably held a position among the senators similar to that of the farmer in the fens of Holstein who has been a student and in the evening, when he comes home from the plough, takes down his Virgil from the shelf. He, who assumed airs of greater importance by reason of his Greek, was reckoned a bad patriot and a fool; and certainly even in Cato's time one who spoke Greek ill or not at all might still become a leading man and be made senator and consul. But a change was already taking place. The internal decomposition of Italian nationality had already, particularly in the aristocracy, advanced so far as to render the substitution of a broader human culture for that nationality inevitable: and the craving after a more advanced civilization was already powerfully stirring men's minds. The study of the Greek language as it were spontaneously met this craving. The classical literature of Greece, the Iliad and still more the Odyssey, had all along formed the basis of instruction; the overflowing treasures of Hellenic art and science were already by this means spread before the eyes of the Italians. Without any outward revolution, strictly speaking, in the character of instruction the natural result was, that the empirical study of the language became converted into a higher study of the literature; that the general culture connected with such literary studies was communicated in increased measure to the scholars; and that these availed themselves of the knowledge thus acquired to dive into that Greek literature which most power-

fully influenced the spirit of the age—the tragedies of Euripides and the comedies of Menander.

In a similar way greater importance came to be attached to the study of Latin. The higher society of Rome began to feel the need, if not of exchanging their mother-tongue for Greek, at least of refining it and adapting it to the changed state of culture; and for this purpose too they found themselves in every respect dependent on the Greeks. The economic arrangements of the Romans placed the work of elementary instruction in the mother-tongue—like every other work held in little estimation, and performed for hire—chiefly in the hands of slaves, freedmen, or foreigners, or in other words chiefly in the hands of Greeks or half-Greeks;* a course attended with the less difficulty, because the Latin alphabet was almost identical with the Greek and the two languages possessed a close and striking affinity. But this was the least influential circumstance; the importance of the study of Greek in a formal point of view exercised a far deeper influence over the study of Latin. Any one, who knows how singularly difficult it is to find suitable matter and suitable forms for the higher intellectual culture of youth, and how much more difficult it is to set aside the matter and forms once found, will understand how it was that the Romans knew no mode of supplying the want of a more advanced Latin instruction except that of simply transferring the solution of this problem, which the study of the Greek language and literature furnished, to the study of Latin. In the present day a process entirely analogous goes on under our own eyes in the transference of the methods of instruction from the dead to the living languages.

But unfortunately the chief requisite for such a transference was wanting. The Romans could, no doubt, learn to read and write Latin by means of the Twelve Tables; but a Latin culture presupposed a literature, and no such literature existed in Rome.

To this element of influence there was added another. We have already described the multiplication of the amusements of the Roman people. The stage had long played an important part in these recreations; the chariot-races formed strictly the principal amusement in all of them, but these

The stage under Greek influence.

* Such, *e. g.*, was Chilo, the slave of Cato the Elder, who earned money on his master's behalf as a teacher of children (Plutarch, *Cato Maj.* 20).

races uniformly took place only on one, viz. the concluding, day, while the first days were substantially devoted to stage-entertainments. But for long these stage-representations consisted chiefly of dances and jugglers' feats; the improvised chants, which were produced on these occasions, had neither dialogue nor plot (i. 473). It was only now that the Romans looked around them for a real drama. The Roman popular festivals were throughout under the influence of the Greeks, whose talent for amusing and for killing time naturally rendered them the purveyors of pleasure to the Romans. Now no national amusement was a greater favourite in Greece, and none was more varied, than the theatre; it could not but speedily attract the attention of those who provided the Roman festivals and their staff of assistants. The earlier Roman stage-chant contained within it a dramatic germ, capable perhaps of development; but to develop the drama from that germ required on the part of the poet and the public a genial power of imparting and receiving, such as was not to be found among the Romans at all, and least of all at this period; and, had it been possible to find it, the impatience of those intrusted with the amusement of the multitude would hardly have allowed to the noble fruit peace and leisure to ripen. In this case too there was an outward want, which the nation was unable to satisfy; the Romans desired a theatre, but the pieces were wanting.

Rise of a .
 Roman literature.

On these elements Roman literature was based; and its defective character was from the first and necessarily the result of such an origin. All real art has its root in individual freedom and a cheerful enjoyment of life, and the germs of such an art were not wanting in Italy; but, when Roman life substituted for freedom and joyousness the sense of corporate obligation and the consciousness of duty, art was arrested, and, instead of growing, of necessity pined away. The culminating point of Roman development was the period which had no literature. It was not till Roman nationality began to give way and Hellenicocosmopolite tendencies began to prevail, that literature made its appearance at Rome in their train. Accordingly from the beginning, and by stringent internal necessity, it took its stand on Greek ground and in broad antagonism to the distinctively Roman national spirit. Roman poetry in particular had its immediate origin not in the inward im-

pulse of the poet, but in the outward demands of the school, which needed Latin manuals, and of the stage, which needed Latin dramas. Now both institutions—the school and the stage—were thoroughly anti-Roman and revolutionary. The gaping and staring idleness of the theatre was utterly offensive to the sober earnestness and the spirit of activity that animated the Romans of the olden type; and—inasmuch as it was the deepest and noblest conception lying at the root of the Roman commonwealth, that within the circle of Roman citizens there should be neither master nor slave, neither *millionaire* nor beggar, but that above all a like faith and a like culture should signalize all Romans—the school and the necessarily exclusive school-culture were far more dangerous still, and were in fact utterly destructive of the sense of equality. The school and the theatre became the most effective levers in the hands of the new spirit of the age, and all the more so that they used the Latin tongue. Men might perhaps speak and write Greek, and yet not cease to be Romans; but in this case they were in the habit of speaking in the Roman language, while the whole inward being and life were Greek. It is not one of the most pleasing, but it is one of the most remarkable and in a historical point of view most instructive, facts in this brilliant era of Roman conservatism, that during its course Hellenism struck root in the whole field of intellect not immediately political, and that the schoolmaster and the *maître de plaisir* of the great public in close alliance created a Roman literature.

In the earliest Roman authors the later development Livius An- appears, as it were, in embryo. The Greek Andronikos *Andronicus*. (born before 482, and lived till after 547), afterwards as a 272. 207. Roman citizen called Lucius* Livius Andronicus, came to Rome at an early age in 482 among the other captives taken 272. at Tarentum (i. 423) and passed into the possession of the conqueror of Sena (P. 177), Marcus Livius Salinator (consul 535, 547). He was employed as a slave, partly in acting 219. 207. and copying texts, partly in giving instruction in the Latin and Greek languages, which he taught to the children of his master and to other boys of wealthy parents in and out of the house. He distinguished himself so much in this way that his master gave him freedom, and even the authorities, who not unfrequently availed themselves of his services—

* The later rule, by which the freedman necessarily bore the *prænomen* of his patron, was not yet applied in republican Rome.

272. commissioning him, for instance, to prepare a thanksgiving-chant after the fortunate turn taken by the Hannibalic war in 547—out of regard for him conceded to the guild of poets and actors a place for their common worship in the temple of Minerva on the Aventine. His authorship arose out of his double occupation. As schoolmaster he translated the Odyssey into Latin, in order that the Latin text might form the basis of his Latin, as the Greek text was the basis of his Greek, instruction; and this earliest of Roman school-books maintained its place in education for centuries. As an actor, he not only like every other wrote the texts themselves for his own use, but he also published them as books, that is, he read them in public and diffused them by copies. What was still more important, he substituted the Greek drama for the
240. old essentially lyrical stage poetry. It was in 514, a year after the close of the first Punic war, that the first play was exhibited on the Roman stage. The creation of an epos, a tragedy, and a comedy in the Roman language, and that by a man who was more Roman than Greek, was historically a remarkable event; but we cannot speak of his labours as having any artistic value. They make no sort of claim to originality; viewed as translations, they are characterized by a barbarism which is all the more conspicuous, that his poetry does not naïvely display its own native simplicity, but pedantically labours to imitate the high artistic culture of the neighbouring people. The wide deviations from the original are due not to the freedom, but to the rudeness of the imitation; the treatment is sometimes insipid, sometimes turgid, the language harsh and quaint.* We have no diffi-

* One of the tragedies of Livius presented the line—

Quem ego nefrendem alui lacteam immulgéns opem.

The verses of Homer (*Odyssey*, xii. 16):

οὐδ' ἄρα Κίρκην
ἐξ Ἀΐδεω ἐλθόντες ἐλήθομεν, ἀλλὰ μάλ' ὅκα
ἦλθ' ἐντυραμένη· ἅμα δ' ἀμφίπολοι φέρον αὐτῇ
σίτον καὶ κρέα πολλὰ καὶ αἶθρα οἶνον ἐρυθρόν.

are thus interpreted:

*Töpper citi ad aëdis—venimus Circe
Simul diuina coram (?)—portant ad nautis,
Milia alia in isdem—inseruntur.*

The most remarkable feature is not so much the barbarism as the thoughtlessness of the translator, who, instead of sending Circe to Ulysses, sends Ulysses to Circe. Another still more ridiculous mistake is the translation of αἰδοίσιον

culty in believing the statement of the old critics of art, that, apart from the compulsory perusal in school, none of the poems of Livius were taken up a second time. Yet these labours were in various respects models for succeeding times. They formed the commencement of the Roman translation-literature, and naturalized the Greek metres in Latium. The reason why these were adopted only in the dramas, while the *Odyssey* of Livius was written in the national Saturnian measure, evidently was that the iambs and trochees of tragedy and comedy far more easily admitted of imitation in Latin than the epic dactyls.

But this preliminary stage of literary development was soon passed. The epics and dramas of Livius were regarded by posterity, and undoubtedly with perfect justice, as resembling the rigid statues of Dædalus destitute of emotion or expression—curiosities rather than works of art. But in the following generation, now that the foundations were once laid, there arose a lyric, epic, and dramatic art; and it is of great importance, even in a historical point of view, to trace this poetical growth.

Both as respects extent of production and influence over Drama. the public, the drama stood at the head of the poetry thus developed in Rome. In antiquity there was no permanent Theatre. theatre with fixed charges for admission; in Greece as in Rome dramas made their appearance only as an element in the annually recurring or extraordinary amusements of the citizens. Among the measures, by which the government counteracted or imagined that they counteracted that extension of the popular festivals which they justly regarded with anxiety, they refused to permit the erection of a stone building for a theatre.* Instead of this there was erected for each festival a scaffolding of boards with a stage for the actors (*proscænium*, *pulpitum*) and a decorated background (*scaena*); and in a semicircle in front of it was staked off a

Ævna (Odyss. xv. 373) by *lusi* (Festus, *Ep. v. affatim*, p. 11, *M.*). Such traits are not in a historical point of view matters of indifference; we recognize in them the level of intellectual culture which marked these earliest Roman verse-making schoolmasters, and we at the same time perceive that, although Andronicus was born in Tarentum, Greek cannot have been properly his mother-tongue.

* Such a building was, no doubt, constructed for the Apollinarian games in the Flaminian circus in 575 (Liv. xl. 51; Becker, *Top.* p. 605); but it was probably soon afterwards pulled down again (Tertull, *de Spect.* 10).

space for the spectators (*cavea*), which was merely sloped without steps or seats, so that if the spectators had not brought chairs along with them, they squatted, reclined, or stood.* The women were probably separated at an early period, and were restricted to the uppermost and worst places; otherwise the places were not in law distinguished till 560, after which, as already mentioned (P. 321), the lowermost and best positions were reserved for the senators.

194. Audience. The audience was anything but distinguished. The better classes, it is true, did not keep aloof from the general recreations of the people; the fathers of the city seem even to have been bound for decorum's sake to appear on these occasions. But the very nature of a civic festival implied that, while slaves and probably foreigners also were excluded, admittance free of charge was given to every citizen with his wife and children;† and accordingly the body of spectators cannot have differed much from what one sees in the present day at public fireworks and gratuitous exhibitions. Naturally, therefore, the proceedings were not of the most orderly character; children cried, women talked and screamed, now and then a wench prepared to make her way to the stage; the attendants had on these festivals anything but a holiday, and found frequent occasion at one time to confiscate a mantle and at another to ply the rod.

The introduction of the Greek drama increased the demands on the dramatic staff, and there seems to have been no redundancy in the supply of capable actors: on one occasion a piece of Nævius had for want of actors to be performed by amateurs. But this produced no change in the position of the artist; the poet or, as he was at this time called, the "writer," the actor, and the composer not only belonged still, as formerly, to the despised class of labourers for

155. * In 599 there were still no seats in the theatre (Ritschl. *Parerg.* i. p. xviii. xi. 214; comp. Ribbeck, *Trag.* p. 285); but, as not only the authors of the Plautine prologues, but Plautus himself on various occasions, make allusions to a sitting audience (*Mil. Glor.* 82, 83; *Auhul.* iv. 9, 6; *Trucul. ap. fin.*; *Epid. ap. fin.*), most of the spectators must have brought stools with them, or have seated themselves on the ground.

† Women and children appear to have been at all times admitted to the Roman theatre (Val. Max. vi. 3, 12; Plutarch. *Quæst. Rom.* 14; Cicero, *de Har. Resp.* xii. 24; Vitruv. v. 3, 1; Suetonius, *Aug.* 44, &c.); but slaves were *de jure* excluded (Cicero, *de Har. Resp.* xii. 26; Ritschl. *Parerg.* i. p. xix. 223), and the same must probably have been the case with foreigners, excepting of course the guests of the community, who took their places among or by the side of the senators (Varro, v. 155; Justin. xliii. 5, 10; Sueton. *Aug.* 44).

hire (P..384), but were still, as formerly, placed in the most marked way under the ban of public opinion, and subjected to police maltreatment (i. 474). Of course all reputable persons kept aloof from such an occupation. The manager of the company (*dominus gregis* or *factionis*, also *choragus*), who was ordinarily also the chief actor, was generally a freedman, and its members were ordinarily his slaves; the composers, whose names have reached us, were all of them non-free. The remuneration was not merely small—a *honorarium* of 8000 sesterces (£82) given to a dramatist is described shortly after the close of this period as unusually high—but was, moreover, only paid by the magistrates providing the festival, if the piece was not a failure. With the payment the matter ended; dramatic competitions and honorary prizes, such as took place in Attica, were not yet heard of in Rome—the Romans at this time appear to have simply applauded or hissed as we now do, and to have brought forward only a single piece for exhibition each day.* Under such circumstances, when art worked for days' wages and the artist instead of receiving due honour was subjected to disgrace, the new national theatre of the Romans could exhibit no original or at all artistic development; and, while the noble rivalry of the noblest Athenians had called into life the Attic drama, the Roman drama taken as a whole could produce nothing save a spoiled copy of its predecessor, in which the only wonder is that it has been able to display so much grace and wit in the details.

In the dramatic world comedy greatly preponderated over tragedy: the spectators knit their brows, when instead of

* It is not necessary to infer from the prologues of Plautus (*Cas.* 17; *Amph.* 65) that there was a distribution of prizes (*Ritschl. Parerg.* i. 229); even the passage *Trin.* 706, may very well belong to the Greek original, not to the translator; and the total silence of the *didascaliz* and prologues, as well as of all tradition, on the point of prize adjudications and prizes is decisive.

That only one piece was produced each day we infer from the fact, that the spectators come from home at the beginning of the piece (*Pœn.* 10), and return home after its close (*Epid. Pseud. Rud. Stich. Truc. ap. fin.*). They went, as these passages show, to the theatre after the second breakfast, and were at home again for the midday meal; the performance thus lasted, according to our reckoning, from about noon till half-past two o'clock, and a piece of Plautus, with music in the intervals between the acts, would probably occupy nearly that length of time (comp. *Horat. Ep.* ii. 1, 189). The passage in which Tacitus (*Ann.* xiv. 20) makes the spectators spend "whole days" in the theatre refers to the state of matters at a later period.

the expected comedy a tragedy began. Thus it happened that, while this period exhibits poets who devoted themselves specially to comedy, such as Plautus and Cæcilius, it presents none who cultivated tragedy alone; and among the dramas of this epoch known to us by name there occur three comedies for one tragedy. Of course the Roman comic poets, or rather translators, laid hands in the first instance on the pieces which had possession of the Hellenic stage at the time; and thus they found themselves exclusively* confined to the range of the newer Attic comedy, and chiefly to its best-known poets, Philemon of Soli in Cilicia (394?–492) and Menander of Athens (412–462). This comedy came to be of so great importance as regards the development not only of Roman literature, but even of the nation at large, that history has reason to pause and consider it.

360–262.)
342–292.)

Character
of the
newer
Attic
comedy.

The pieces are of tiresome monotony. Almost without exception the plot turns on helping a young man, at the expense either of his father or of some *leno*, to obtain possession of a sweetheart of undoubted charms and of very doubtful morals. The path to success in love regularly lies through some sort of pecuniary fraud; and the crafty servant, who provides the needful sum and performs the requisite swindling while the lover is mourning over his amatory and pecuniary distresses, is the real mainspring of the piece. There is no want of befitting reflections on the joys and sorrows of love, of tearful parting-scenes, of lovers who in the anguish of their hearts threaten to do themselves mischief; love or rather amativeness was, as the old critics of art say, the very life-breath of the Menandrian poetry. Marriage forms, at least with Menander, the inevitable finale; on which occasion, for the greater edification and satisfaction of the spectators, the virtue of the heroine usually comes forth almost if not wholly untarnished, and the heroine herself proves to be the lost daughter of some rich

* The scanty use made of what is called the Middle Attic comedy does not require notice in a historical point of view, since it was nothing but the Menandrian comedy in a less developed form. There is no trace of any employment of the older comedy. The Roman tragi-comedy—after the type of the *Amphitruo* of Plautus—was no doubt styled by the Roman literary historians *fabula Rhinthonica*; but the newer Attic comedians also composed such parodies, and it is difficult to see why the Romans should have resorted for their translations to Rhinthon and the older writers rather than to those who were nearer to their own times.

man and so in every respect an eligible match. Along with these love-pieces we find others of a pathetic kind. Among the comedies of Plautus, for instance, the *Rudens* turns on a shipwreck and the right of asylum; while the *Trinummus* and the *Captivi* contain no amatory intrigue, but depict the noble devotedness of the friend to his friend and of the slave to his master. Persons and situations are found recurring down to the very details like patterns on a carpet; we never get rid of the asides of unseen listeners, of knocking at the house-doors, and of slaves scouring the streets on some errand or other. The standing masks, of which there was a certain fixed number—*e. g.* eight masks for old men, and seven for servants—from which alone in ordinary cases at least the poet had to make his choice, further favoured a stock-model treatment. It was necessary perhaps for such a comedy to reject the lyrical element in the older comedy—the chorus—and to confine itself from the first to conversation or at most recitation: at any rate it was devoid not of the political element only, but of all true passion and of all poetical elevation. The pieces judiciously made no pretension to any grand or really poetical effect; their charm resided primarily in furnishing occupation for the intellect not only through their subject-matter—in which respect the newer comedy was distinguished from the old as much by the greater intrinsic emptiness as by the greater outward complication of the plot—but more especially through their execution in detail—in which the point and polish of the dialogue, in particular, formed the triumph of the poet and the delight of the audience. Complications and confusions of one person with another which very readily allowed scope for extravagant, often licentious, practical jokes (as in the *Casina*, which winds up with the retiring of the two bridegrooms and of the soldier dressed up as bride in genuine Falstaffian style), jests, drolleries, and riddles, which in fact for want of real conversation furnished the staple materials of entertainment at the Attic table of the period, fill up a large portion of these comedies. The authors of them wrote not like Eupolis and Aristophanes for a great nation, but rather for a cultivated society which, like other clever circles pining away in inactive ingenuity, spent its time in guessing riddles and playing at charades. They give us, therefore, no picture of their times; of the great historical and intellectual movements of the age no

trace appears in these comedies, and we need to recall, in order to realize, the fact that Philemon and Menander were really contemporaries of Alexander and Aristotle. But they give us a picture, equally elegant and faithful, of that refined Attic society beyond the circles of which comedy never travels. Even in the disfigured Latin copy, through which we chiefly know it, the grace of the original is not wholly obliterated; and more especially in the pieces which are imitated from Menander, the most talented of these poets, the life which the poet beheld and shared is delicately reflected not so much in its aberrations and distortions as in its amiable every-day course. The friendly domestic relations between father and daughter, husband and wife, master and servant, with their love-affairs and other little interesting incidents, are portrayed with so broad a truthfulness, that they do not miss their effect even now: the servants' feast, for instance, with which the *Stichus* concludes is, in the circumscribed character of its relations and the harmony of the two lovers and the one sweetheart, of unsurpassed gracefulness in its kind. The elegant grisettes, who make their appearance perfumed and adorned, with their hair fashionably dressed and in variegated, gold-embroidered, sweeping robes, or even perform their toilette on the stage, are very effective. In their train come the procuresses, sometimes of the most vulgar sort, such as one who appears in the *Curculio*, sometimes duennas like Goethe's old Barbara, such as Scapha in the *Mostellaria*; and there is no lack of brothers and comrades ready with their help. There is great abundance and variety of parts representing the old: there appear in turn the austere and avaricious, the fond and tender-hearted, and the indulgent accommodating, papas, the amorous old man, the easy old bachelor, the jealous aged matron with her old maid-servant who takes part with her mistress against her master; whereas young men's parts appear less prominently, and neither the first lover, nor the virtuous model son who here and there occurs, lays claim to much importance. The servant-world—the crafty valet, the stern house-steward, the old vigilant tutor, the rural slave redolent of garlic, the impertinent page—forms a transition to the very numerous professional characters. A standing figure among these is the jester (*parasitus*) who, in return for permission to feast at the tables of the rich, has to entertain the guests with drolleries and charades, or, according to cir-

cumstances, to submit to have the potsherds flung at his head. This was at that time a formal trade in Athens; and it is certainly no mere poetical fiction, which represents such a parasite as expressly preparing himself for his work by means of his books of witticisms and anecdotes. Favourite characters, moreover, are those of the cook, who understands not only how to bully in an unrivalled style, but also how to pilfer like a professional thief; the shameless *leno*, complacently confessing to the practice of every vice, of whom Ballio in the *Pseudolus* is a model specimen; the military braggadocio, in whom we trace a very distinct embodiment of the free-lance habits that prevailed under Alexander's successors; the professional sharper or sycophant, the stingy money-changer, the solemnly silly physician, the priest, mariner, fisherman, and the like. To these fall to be added, lastly, the parts delineative of character in the strict sense, such as the superstitious man of Menander and the miser in the *Aulularia* of Plautus. The national-Hellenic poetry has preserved, even in this its last creation, its indestructible plastic vigour; but the delineation of character is in this case copied from without rather than reproduced from inward experience, and the more so, the more the task approaches to the really poetical. It is a significant circumstance that, in the parts illustrative of character to which we have just referred, the psychological truth is for the most part represented by its logical embodiment; the miser there collects the parings of his nails and laments the tears which he sheds as a waste of water. But the blame of this want of depth in the portraying of character, and generally of the whole poetical and moral hollowness of this newer comedy, lay less with the comic writers than with the nation as a whole. Everything distinctively Greek was expiring: fatherland, national faith, domestic life, all nobleness of action and sentiment were gone; poetry, history, and philosophy were inwardly exhausted; and nothing remained to the Athenian save the school, the fish-market, and the brothel. It is no matter of wonder and hardly a matter of blame, that poetry, which is destined to shed a glory over human existence, could make nothing more out of such a life than the Menandrian comedy presents to us. It is at the same time very remarkable that the poetry of this period, wherever it was able to turn away in some degree from the corrupt Attic life without falling into schoolboy

imitation, immediately gathers strength and freshness from the ideal. In the only remnant of the mock-heroic comedy of this period—the *Amphitruo* of Plautus—there breathes throughout a purer and more poetical air than in all the other remains of the contemporary stage. The good-natured gods treated with gentle irony, the noble forms from the heroic world, and the ludicrously cowardly slaves present the most wonderful mutual contrasts; and, after the comical course of the plot, the birth of the son of the gods amidst thunder and lightning forms an almost grand concluding effect. But this task of turning the myths into irony was innocent and poetical, as compared with that of the ordinary comedy depicting the Attic life of the period. No special accusation may be brought from a historico-moral point of view against poets in general, nor ought it to be made matter of individual reproach to the particular poet that he occupies the level of his epoch; comedy was not the cause but the effect of the corruption that prevailed in the national life. But it is necessary, more especially with a view to estimate correctly the influence of these comedies on the life of the Roman people, to point out the abyss which yawned beneath all that polish and elegance. The coarsenesses and obscenities, which Menander indeed in some measure avoided, but of which there is no lack in the other poets, are the least part of the evil. Features far worse are, the dreadful aspect of life as a desert, in which the only oases are lovemaking and intoxication; the fearfully prosaic monotony, in which anything resembling enthusiasm is to be found only among the sharpers whose heads have been turned by their own swindling, and who prosecute the trade of cheating with some sort of zeal; and above all that immoral morality, with which the pieces of Menander in particular are garnished. Vice is chastised, virtue is rewarded, and any peccadilloes are covered by conversion at or after marriage. There are pieces, such as the *Trinummus* of Plautus and several of Terence, in which all the characters down to the slaves possess some admixture of virtue; all swarm with honest men who suffer themselves to be deceived, with maidenly virtue wherever possible, with lovers equally favoured and making love in company; moral commonplaces and well-turned ethical maxims abound. A finale of reconciliation such as that of the *Bacchides*, where the swindling sons and the swindled fathers by way of a

good conclusion all go to carouse together in the brothel, presents a corruption of morals thoroughly worthy of Kotzebue.

Such were the foundations, and such the elements which shaped the growth, of Roman comedy. Originality was in its case excluded not merely by want of æsthetic freedom, but still more directly, it is probable, by virtue of its liability to police control. Among the considerable number of Latin comedies of the sixth century which are known to us, there is not one that did not announce itself as an imitation of a definite Greek model; the title was only complete when the names of the Greek piece and of its author were also given, and if, as occasionally happened, the "novelty" of a piece was disputed, the point in dispute was merely whether it had been previously translated. Comedy laid the scene of its plot abroad not only frequently, but regularly and under the pressure of necessity; and the special name of that form of art (*fabula palliata*) was derived from the fact, that the scene was laid out of Rome, usually in Athens, and that the *dramatis personæ* were Greeks or at any rate not Romans. The foreign costume is strictly carried out even in detail, especially in those things in which the uncultivated Roman was distinctly sensible of the contrast. Thus the names of Rome and the Romans are avoided, and, where they are referred to, they are called in good Greek "foreigners" (*barbari*); in like manner among the appellations of moneys and coins that so frequently occur there does not once appear a Roman coin. We form a strange idea of men of so great and so versatile talent as Nævius and Plautus, if we refer such caprices to their free choice: this strange and clumsy outlandish aspect of the Roman comedy was undoubtedly occasioned by causes very different from æsthetic considerations. The transference of such a state of social matters as is uniformly delineated in the new Attic comedy to the Rome of the Hannibalic period would have been a direct outrage on its civil order and morality. But, as the dramatic spectacles at this period were regularly given by the ædiles and prætors who were entirely dependent on the senate, and even extraordinary festivals, funeral games for instance, could not take place without permission of the government; and as the Roman police, moreover, was not in the habit of standing on ceremony in any case, and least of all in dealing with comedies; the reason is self-evident why this comedy, even after it was admitted

Roman
comedy.

Its Hellenism a necessary result of the law.

as one of the Roman national amusements, still was not allowed to bring forward a Roman on the stage, and remained as it were relegated to foreign lands.

Political
neutrality.

The compilers were still more decidedly prohibited from naming any living person either in terms of praise or censure, as well as from any captious allusion to the circumstances of the times. In the whole range of the Plautine and post-Plautine comedy, there is not, so far as we know, matter for a single action of damages. In like manner—if we leave out of view some wholly harmless jests—we meet hardly any trace of invectives levelled at communities (invectives which, owing to the lively municipal spirit of the Italians, would have been specially dangerous), except the significant scoff at the unfortunate Capuans and Atellans (P. 191) and, what is remarkable, various sarcasms on the arrogance and the bad Latin of the Prænestines.* In general no references to the events or circumstances of the present occur in the pieces of Plautus. The only exceptions are, good wishes for the progress of the war† or for peaceful times; general sallies directed against usurious dealings in grain or money, against extravagance, against bribery by candidates, against the frequency of triumphs, against those who made a trade of collecting forfeited fines, against farmers of the revenue distraining for payment, against the dear prices of the oil-dealers; and once—in the *Curculio*—a more lengthened diatribe as to the doings in the Roman market, resembling the *parabases* of the older Attic comedy, and but little likely to cause offence (P. 410). But even in the

* *Bacch.* 24; *Trin.* 609; *Truc.* iii. 2. 23. Nævius also, who in fact was generally less scrupulous, ridicules the Prænestines and Lanuvini (*Com.* 21, *Ribb.*). There are indications more than once of a certain variance between the Prænestines and Romans (*Liv.* xxiii. 20, xlii. 1); and the executions in the time of Pyrrhus (i. 407) as well as the catastrophe in that of Sulla, were certainly connected with this variance.—Innocent jokes, such as *Capt.* 160, 881, of course passed uncensored.—The compliment paid to Massilia in *Cus.* v. 4, 1, deserves notice.

† Thus the prologue of the *Cistellaria* concludes with the following words, which may have a place here as the only contemporary mention of the Hannibalic war in the literature that has come down to us:—

*Hæc res sic gesta est. Bene valet, et vincite
Virtute vera, quod fecistis antidi hac;
Servate vestros socios, veteres et novos;
Augete auxilia vestris justis legibus;
Perdite perduelles: parite laudem et lauream;
Ut vobis victi Pœni pœnas sufferant.*

midst of such patriotic endeavours, which from a police point of view were entirely in order, the poet interrupts himself;

*Sed summe ego stultus, qui rem curo publicam
Ubi sunt magistratus, quos curare oporteat?*

and, taken as a whole, we can hardly imagine a comedy politically tamer than the comedy of Rome in the sixth century.* The oldest Roman comic writer of note, Gnæus Nævius, alone forms a remarkable exception. Although he did not write exactly original Roman comedies, the few fragments of his, which we possess, are full of references to circumstances and persons in Rome. Among other liberties he not only ridiculed one Theodotus a painter by name, but even directed against the victor of Zama the following verses, of which Aristophanes need not have been ashamed:

*Etiam qui res magnas manu sæpe gessit gloriose,
Cujus facta viva nunc vigent, qui apud gentes solus præstat,
Eum suus pater cum pallio uno ab amica abduxit.*

As he himself says,

Libera lingua loquemur ludis Liberalibus,

he probably often wrote offensively and put dangerous questions, such as:

Cedo qui vestram rem publicam tantam amisistis tam cito?

which he answered by an enumeration of political sins, such as:

Proveniebant oratores novi, stulti adulescentuli.

But the Roman police was not disposed like the Attic to hold stage-invectives and political diatribes as privileged, or even to tolerate them at all. Nævius was put in prison for these and similar sallies, and was obliged to remain there, till he had publicly made amends and recantation in other comedies. These quarrels, apparently, drove him from his native land; but his successors took warning from his ex-

* For this reason we can hardly be too cautious in assuming allusions on the part of Plautus to the events of the times. Recent investigation has set aside many instances of mistaken acuteness of this sort; but might not the reference to the Bacchanalia, which is found in *Cas. v. 4, 11* (Ritschl. *Parerg. i. 192*), have been expected to incur censure? We may perhaps reverse the case and infer from the notices of the festival of Bacchus in the *Casina* and some other pieces (*Amph. 703*; *Aul. iii. 1, 3*; *Bacch. 53, 371*; *Mil. Glor. 1016*; and especially *Men. 836*), that these were written at a time when it was not yet dangerous to speak of the Bacchanalia.

ample—one of them indicates very plainly, that he has no desire whatever to incur an involuntary gagging like his colleague Nævius. Thus the result was accomplished—not much less unique of its kind than the conquest of Hannibal—that, during an epoch of the most feverish national excitement, there arose a national stage utterly destitute of political tinge.

Character
of the
editing
of Roman
comedy.

Persons and
situations.

But the restrictions thus stringently and laboriously imposed by custom and police on Roman poetry stifled its very breath. Not without reason might Nævius declare the position of the poet under the sceptre of the Lagidæ and Seleucidæ enviable as compared with his position in free Rome.* The degree of success in individual instances was of course determined by the quality of the original which was followed, and by the talent of the individual editor; but amidst all their individual variety the whole range of translations must have agreed in certain leading features, inasmuch as all the comedies were adapted to similar conditions of exhibition and a similar audience. The treatment of the whole as well as of the details was uniformly in the highest degree free; and it was necessary that it should be so. While the original pieces were performed in presence of that society which they copied, and in this very fact lay their principal charm, the Roman audience of this period was so different from the Attic, that it was not even able properly to understand that foreign world. The Roman comprehended neither the grace and courtesy, nor the sentimentalism and the whitened emptiness of the domestic life of the Hellenes. The slave-world was utterly different; the Roman slave was a piece of household furniture, the Attic slave was a servant. Where marriages of slaves occur or a master carries on a kindly conversation with his slave, the Roman translators ask their audience not to take offence at such things which are usual in Athens;† and, when at a later

* The remarkable passage in the *Tarentilla* can have no other meaning:—

*Quas ego in theatro hic meis probavi plausibus,
Ea non audere quemquam regem rumpere:
Quanto libertatem hanc hic superat servitus!*

† The ideas of the modern Hellas on the point of slavery are illustrated by the passage in Euripides (*Ion*, 854; comp. *Helena*, 728):—

*Ἐν γάρ τι τοῖς δούλοισιν αἰσχύνην φέρει,
Τούνομα· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα τῶν ἐλευθέρων.
Οὐδεὶς κακίων δούλος, ὅστις ἐσθλὸς ᾖ.*

period comedies began to be written in Roman costume, the part of the crafty servant had to be rejected, because the Roman public did not tolerate slaves of this sort overlooking and controlling their masters. The professional figures and those illustrative of character, which were sketched more broadly and farcically, bore the process of transference better than the polished figures of every-day life; but even of those delineations the Roman editor had to lay aside several—and these probably the very finest and most original, such as the *Thais*, the match-maker, the moon-conjurer, and the mendicant priest of Menander—and to keep chiefly to those foreign professions, with which the Greek luxury of the table, already very generally diffused in Rome, had made his audience familiar. The delineation of the professional cook and the parasite in the comedy of Plautus with so striking a vividness and relish finds its explanation in the fact, that Greek cooks at that time daily offered their services in the Roman market, and that Cato found it necessary to give orders even to his steward not to keep a parasite. In like manner the translator could make no use of a very large portion of the elegant Attic conversation in his originals. The Roman citizen or farmer stood in much the same relation to the refined revelry and debauchery of Athens, as the German of a provincial town to the mysteries of the Palais Royal. A science of cookery, in the strict sense, never entered into his thoughts; the dinner-parties no doubt continued to be very numerous in the Roman imitation, but everywhere the plain Roman roast pork predominated over the variety of baked meats and the refined sauces and dishes of fish. Of the riddles and drinking songs, of the Greek rhetoric and philosophy, which played so great a part in the originals, we meet only a stray trace now and then in the Roman adaptation.

The havoc, which the Roman editors were compelled in deference to their audience to make in the originals, drove them inevitably into methods of cancelling and amalgamating incompatible with artistic construction. It was usual not only to throw out whole parts occurring in the original, but also to insert others taken from other comedies of the same or of another poet; a treatment indeed which, owing to the outwardly logical construction of the originals and the recurrence of standing figures and incidents, was not quite so bad as it might seem. Moreover the poets, at least in

Construction of the plot.

200. the earlier period, allowed themselves the most singular liberties in the construction of the plot. The plot of the *Stichus* (performed in 554) otherwise so excellent turns upon the circumstance, that two sisters, whom their father urges to abandon their absent husbands, play the part of Penelopes, till the husbands return home with rich mercantile gains and with a beautiful damsel as a present for their father-in-law. In the *Casina*, which was received with altogether peculiar favour by the public, the bride, from whom the piece is named and around whom the plot revolves, does not make her appearance at all, and the *dénouement* is quite naïvely described by the epilogue as "about to be enacted within." Very often the plot as it thickens suddenly breaks off, the connecting thread is allowed to drop, and other similar signs of an unfinished art appear. The reason of this lay probably far less in the unskilfulness of the Roman editors, than in the indifference of the Roman public to æsthetic laws. Taste, however, gradually formed itself. In the later pieces Plautus has evidently bestowed more care on their construction, and the *Captivi* for instance, the *Pseudolus*, and the *Bacchides* are executed in a masterly manner after their kind. His successor Cæcilius, none of whose pieces are extant, is said to have pre-eminently distinguished himself by the more artistic treatment of the subject.

Roman barbarism.

In the treatment of details the endeavour of the poet to bring matters as far as possible home to his Roman hearers, and the rule of police which required that the pieces should retain a foreign character, produced the most singular contrasts. The Roman gods, the ritual, military, and legal terms of the Romans, present a strange appearance amid the Greek world; Roman *ædiles* and *tresviri* are grotesquely mingled with *agoranomi* and *demarchi*; pieces whose scene is laid in Ætolia or Epidamnus send the spectator without scruple to the Velabrum and the Capitol. Such a patchwork of Roman local tints distributed over the Greek ground is barbarous enough; but interpolations of this nature, which are often in their naïve way very ludicrous, are far more tolerable than that thorough alteration of the pieces into a ruder shape, which the editors deemed necessary to suit the far from Attic culture of their audience. It is true that several even of the new Attic poets probably needed no accession to their coarseness; pieces like the *Asinaria* of Plautus

cannot owe their unsurpassed dullness and vulgarity solely to the translator. Nevertheless coarse incidents so prevail in the Roman comedy, that the translators must either have interpolated them or at least have made a very one-sided selection. In the endless abundance of cudgelling and in the lash ever suspended over the back of the slaves we recognize very clearly the household-government inculcated by Cato, just as we recognize the Catonian opposition to women in the never-ending abuse of wives. Among the jokes of their own invention, with which the Roman editors deemed it proper to season the elegant Attic dialogue, several are almost incredibly unmeaning and barbarous.*

So far as concerns metrical treatment on the other hand, the flexible and sounding verse on the whole does all honour to the composers. The fact that the iambic trimeters, which predominated in the originals and were alone suitable to their moderate conversational tone, were very frequently replaced in the Latin edition by iambic or trochaic tetrameters, is to be attributed not so much to any want of skill on the part of the editors who knew well how to handle the trimeter, as to the uncultivated taste of the Roman public which was pleased with the sonorous magnificence of the long verse even where it was not appropriate.

* For instance, in the otherwise very graceful examination which in the *Stichus* of Plautus the father and his daughters institute into the qualities of a good wife, the irrelevant question—whether it is better to marry a virgin or a widow—is inserted, merely in order that it may be answered by a no less irrelevant and, in the mouth of the interlocutrix, altogether absurd commonplace against women. But that is a trifle compared with the following specimen. In Menander's *Plocium* a husband bewails his troubles to his friend:—

Ἔχω δ' ἐπικληρον Λάμμαν· οὐκ εἰρηκὰ σοι
 Τοῦτ' ; εἴτ' ἄρ' οὐχί ; κυρίαν τῆς οἰκίας
 Καὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν καὶ πάντων αὐτ' ἐκείνης
 Ἔχομεν, Ἀπολλον, ὥς χαλεπῶν χαλεπώτατον.
 Ἀπασι δ' ἀργαλέα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἐμοὶ μόνῳ,
 Τίφ, πολὺ μᾶλλον θυγατρὶ.—πραγμ' ἄμαχον λέγεις·
 Εἰδὼ οἶδα.

In the Latin edition of Cæcilius, this conversation, so elegant in its simplicity, is converted into the following uncouth dialogue:—

Sed tua moroseans uxor quæso est?—Quam rogas?—
Qui tandem?—Tædet mentionis, quæ mihi
Ubi domum adveni adsedi, extemplo savium
Dat jejuna anima.—Nil peccat de savio:
Ut devomas volt, quod foris potaveris.

Scenic arrangements.

Lastly, the arrangements for the exhibition of the pieces bore the like stamp of indifference to æsthetic requirements on the part of the managers and the public. The stage of the ancients—which on account of the extent of the theatre and from the performances taking place by day made no pretension to acting properly so called, employed men to represent female characters, and absolutely required an artificial strengthening of the voice of the actor—was entirely dependent, in a scenic as well as acoustic point of view, on the use of facial and resonant masks. These were well-known in Rome; in amateur performances the players appeared without exception masked. But the actors who were to perform the Greek comedies were not supplied with the masks—beyond doubt much more artificial—that were necessary for them; a circumstance which, in connection with the defective acoustic arrangements of the stage,* not only compelled the actor to exert his voice unduly, but drove Livius to the highly inartistic but inevitable expedient of having the portions which were to be sung performed by a singer not belonging to the staff of actors, and accompanied by the mere dumb show of the actor within whose part they fell. As little were the givers of the Roman festivals disposed to put themselves to any material expense for decorations and machinery. The Attic stage regularly presented a street with houses in the background, and had no shifting decorations; but, besides various other apparatus, it possessed more especially a contrivance for pushing forward on the chief stage a smaller one representing the interior of a house. The Roman theatre, however, was not provided with this; and we can hardly therefore throw the blame on the poet, if everything, even childbirth, was represented on the street.

Æsthetic result.

Such was the nature of the Roman comedy of the sixth century. The process by which the Greek dramas were transferred to Rome furnishes us with a picture, historically invaluable, of the diversity in the culture of the two nations; but in an æsthetic and a moral point of view the original did not stand high, and the imitation stood still lower. The world of beggarly rabble, to whatever extent the Roman editors might take possession of it under the benefit of the

* Even when the Romans built stone theatres, these had not the sounding-apparatus by which the Greek architects supported the efforts of the actors (Vitruv. v. 5, 8).

inventory, presented in Rome a forlorn and strange aspect, shorn as it were of its delicate characteristics: comedy no longer rested on the basis of reality, but persons and incidents seemed capriciously or carelessly mingled as in a game of cards; in the original a picture from life, it became in the reproduction a caricature. Under a management which could announce a Greek *agon* with flute-playing, choirs of dancers, tragedians, and athletes, and eventually convert it into a boxing-match (P. 412); and in presence of a public which, as later poets complain, ran away *en masse* from the play, if there were pugilists, or rope-dancers, or even gladiators to be seen; poets such as the Roman composers were—workers for hire and of inferior social position—were obliged even perhaps against their own better judgment and their own better taste to accommodate themselves more or less to the prevailing frivolity and rudeness. It was quite possible, nevertheless, that there might arise among them individuals of lively and vigorous talents, who were able at least to repress the foreign and factitious element in poetry, and, when they had found their fitting sphere, to produce pleasing and even important creations.

At the head of these stood Gnaeus Nævius, the first Nævius. Roman who deserves to be called a poet, and, so far as the accounts preserved regarding him and the few fragments of his works allow us to form an opinion, to all appearance one of the most remarkable and most important names in the whole range of Roman literature. He was a younger contemporary of Andronicus (his poetical activity began considerably before, and probably did not end till after, the Hannibalic war) and felt in a general sense his influence; he was, as is usually the case in artificial literatures, a worker in all the forms of art produced by his predecessor, in epos, tragedy, and comedy, and closely adhered to him in the matter of metres. Nevertheless, an immense chasm separates the poets and their poems. Nævius was neither freedman, schoolmaster, nor actor, but a citizen of unstained character although not of noble descent, belonging probably to one of the Latin communities of Campania, and a soldier in the first Punic war.* In thorough contrast to

* The personal notices of Nævius are sadly confused. Seeing that he fought in the first Punic war, he cannot have been born later than 495. Dramas, probably the first, were exhibited by him in 519 (Gell. xii. 21, 45). That he died

the language of Livius, that of Nævius is easy and clear, free from stiffness and affectation, and seems even in tragedy to avoid pathos as it were on purpose; his verses, in spite of the not unfrequent *hiatus* and several other licences afterwards disallowed, have a smooth and graceful flow.* While the quasi-poetry of Livius proceeded, somewhat like that of Gottsched in Germany, from purely external impulses and moved wholly in the leading-strings of the Greeks, his successor emancipated Roman poetry, and with the true divining-rod of the poet struck those springs out of which alone in Italy a native poetry could well up—national history and comedy. Epic poetry no longer merely furnished the schoolmaster with a lesson-book, but appealed on its own merits to the hearing and reading public. Composing for the stage had been hitherto, like the preparation of the stage costume, a subsidiary employment of the actor or a mechanical service performed for him; with Nævius the relation was inverted, and the actor now became the servant of the composer. His poetical activity is marked throughout by a national stamp. This stamp is most distinctly

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204. in 550, as is usually stated, was doubted by Varro (*ap. Cic. Brut. xv. 60*), and certainly with reason; if it were so, he must have made his escape during the Hannibalic war to the soil of the enemy. The sarcastic verses on Scipio (P. 431) cannot have been written before the battle of Zama. We may place
 204. 194. his life between 490 and 560, so that he was contemporary of the two Scipios
 211. who fell in 543 (*Cic. de Rep. iv. 10*), ten years younger than Andronicus, and perhaps ten years older than Plautus. His Campanian origin is indicated by Gellius, and his Latin nationality, if proof of it were needed, by himself in his epitaph. The hypothesis that he was not a Roman citizen, but possibly a citizen of Cales or of some other Latin town in Campania, renders the fact that the Roman police treated him so unscrupulously the more easy of explanation. At any rate he was not an actor, for he served in the army.

* Compare, *e.g.* with the verse of Livius the fragment from Nævius' tragedy of *Lycurgus* :—

*Vos qui regalis corporis custodias
 Agitatis, ite actutum in frondiferos locos,
 Ingenio arbusta ubi nata sunt, non obsita;*

or the famous words, which in the *Hector Proficiscens* Hector addresses to Priam :—

Lætus sum, laudari me abs te, pater, a laudato viro;

and the charming verse from the *Tarentilla* :—

Alii adnutat, alii admictat; alium amat, alium tenet.

impressed on his grave national drama and on his national epos, of which we shall have to speak hereafter; but it also appears in his comedies, which of all his poetic performances seem to have been the best adapted to his talents and the most successful. It was probably, as we have already said, external considerations alone that induced the poet to adhere in comedy so much as he did to the Greek originals; and this did not prevent him from far outstripping his successors and probably even the insipid originals in the freshness of his mirth, and in the fulness of his living interest in the present; indeed in a certain sense he reverted to the paths of the Aristophanic comedy. He felt full well, and in his epitaph expressed, what he had been to his nation:

*Mortales immortales flere si foret fas,
Flerent Divæ Camenæ Nævium postam;
Itaque, postquam est Orcino traditus thesauro,
Obliti sunt Romæ loquier Latina lingua.*

Such proud language on the part of the man and the poet well befitted one, who had witnessed and had personally taken part in the struggles with Hamilcar and with Hannibal, and who had discovered for the thoughts and feelings of that age—so full of deep excitement and so elevated by mighty joy—a poetical expression which, if not exactly the highest, was sound, adroit, and national. We have already mentioned the troubles into which his licence brought him with the authorities, and how, driven in all probability by these troubles from Rome, he ended his life in Utica. In his instance likewise the individual life was sacrificed for the common weal, and the beautiful for the useful.

His younger contemporary, Titus Maccius Plautus (500? –570), appears to have been far inferior to him both in outward position and in the conception of his poetical calling. A native of the little town of Sassina, which was originally Umbrian but was perhaps by this time Latinized, he earned his livelihood in Rome at first as an actor, and then—after he had lost in mercantile speculations what he had gained by his acting—as a theatrical composer reproducing Greek comedies, without employing himself in any other department of literature and probably without making any pretension to authorship properly so called. There seems to have been at that time a considerable number of persons who made a trade of thus editing comedies in Rome; but

Plautus.
254–184.

their names, especially as they did not perhaps in general publish their works,* were virtually forgotten, and the pieces belonging to this stock of plays, which were preserved, passed in after times under the name of the most popular of them, Plautus. The *litteratores* of the following century reckoned up as many as 130 such "Plautine pieces;" but of these a large portion at any rate were merely revised by Plautus or had no connection with him at all; the best of them are still extant. To form a proper judgment, however, regarding the poetical character of the editor is very difficult, if not impossible, since the originals have not been preserved. That the editors reproduced good and bad pieces without selection; that they were subject and subordinate both to the police and to the public; that they were as indifferent to æsthetical requirements as their audience, and to please the latter, lowered the originals to a farcical and vulgar tone—are objections, which apply rather to the whole manufacture of translations than to the individual remodeller. On the other hand we may regard as characteristic of Plautus, the masterly handling of the language and of the varied rhythms, a rare skill in adjusting and working the situation for dramatic effect, the almost always clever and often excellent dialogue, and, above all, a broad and fresh humour, which produces an irresistible comic effect with its happy jokes, its rich vocabulary of nicknames, its whimsical coinage of words, its pungent, often mimic, descriptions and situations—excellences, in which we seem to recognize the former actor. Undoubtedly the editor even in these respects rather retained what was successful in the original than furnished contributions of his own. Those portions of the pieces which can with certainty be traced to the translator are, to say the least, mediocre; but they enable us to understand why Plautus came to be and continued the true popular poet of Rome and the true mainstay of the Roman stage, and why even after the passing away of the Roman world the theatre has repeatedly reverted to his plays.

Still less are we able to form a special opinion as to the

* This hypothesis appears necessary, because otherwise the ancients could not have hesitated in the way they did as to the genuineness or spuriousness of the pieces of Plautus: in the case of no author, properly so-called, of Roman antiquity, do we find anything like a similar uncertainty as to his literary property. In this respect, as in so many other external points there exists a most remarkable analogy between Plautus and Shakespeare.

third and last (for though Ennius wrote comedies, he did *Cæcilius*. so altogether unsuccessfully) comedian of note in this epoch, *Stælius Cæcilius*. He resembled Plautus in his position in life and his profession. Born in Cisalpine Gaul in the district of Mediolanum, he was brought among the Insubrian prisoners of war (P. 82, 195) to Rome, and earned a livelihood, first as a slave, afterwards as a freedman, by remodelling Greek comedies for the theatre down to his probably early death (586). His language was not pure, as was to be expected from his origin; on the other hand, he directed his efforts, as we have already said (P. 434), to a more artistical construction of the plot. His pieces experienced but a dull reception from his contemporaries, and the public of later times laid aside *Cæcilius* for Plautus and Terence. The critics of the true literary age of Rome—the Varronian and Augustan epochs—assigned to *Cæcilius* the first place among the Roman editors of Greek comedies; but this verdict appears due to the fact, that the mediocrity of the connoisseur gladly prefers a kindred spirit of mediocrity to any special features of excellence in the poet. These art-critics probably took *Cæcilius* under their wing, simply because he was more regular than Plautus and more vigorous than Terence; notwithstanding which he may very well have been far inferior to both. 168.

If therefore the literary historian, while fully acknow- Moral re-
 ledging the very respectable talents of the Roman come- sult.
 dians, cannot recognize in their mere stock of translations a product either artistically important or artistically pure, the judgment of history respecting its moral aspects must necessarily be far more severe. The Greek comedy which formed its basis was morally of little consequence, inasmuch as it was simply on the same level of corruption with its audience; but the Roman drama was, at an epoch when men were wavering between the old austerity and the new corruption, the great school at once of Hellenism and of vice. This Attico-Roman comedy, with its prostitution of body and soul usurping the name of love—equally immoral in shamelessness and in sentimentality, with its offensive and unnatural magnanimity, with its uniform glorification of a life of debauchery, with its mixture of rustic coarseness and foreign refinement, was one continuous lesson of Romano-Hellenic demoralization, and was felt as such. A proof of this is preserved in the epilogue of the *Captivi* of Plautus:—

*Spectatores, ad pudicos mores facta hæc fabula est :
 Neque in hac subagitationes sunt neque ulla amatio,
 Nec pueri suppositio neque argenti circumductio ;
 Neque ubi amans adulescens scortum liberet clam suum patrem.
 Hujusmodi paucas poetæ reperiunt comedias,
 Ubi boni meliores fiant. Nunc vos, si vobis placet,
 Et si placuimus neque odio fuimus, signum hoc mittite.
 Qui pudicitiae esse vultis præmium, plausum date !*

We see here the opinion entertained regarding the Greek comedy by the party of moral reform ; and it may be added, that even in the rare instances of moral comedies the morality was of a character only adapted to ridicule innocence more surely. Who can doubt that these dramas gave a practical impulse to corruption ? When Alexander the Great derived no pleasure from a comedy of this sort which its author read before him, the poet excused himself by saying that the fault lay not with him, but with the king ; that, in order to relish such a piece, a man must be in the habit of holding revels and of giving and receiving blows in an intrigue. The man knew his trade : if, therefore, the Roman citizens gradually acquired a taste for these Greek comedies, we see at what a price it was bought. The Roman government was to blame not for doing so little in behalf of this poetry, but on the contrary for tolerating it at all. Vice indeed is powerful even without a pulpit ; but that is no excuse for the erection of a pulpit to proclaim it. To debar the Hellenic comedy from immediate contact with the persons and institutions of Rome, was a subterfuge rather than a serious means of defence. In fact, comedy would probably have been much less injurious morally, had they allowed it to have free course, so that the calling of the poet might have been ennobled and a Roman poetry in some measure independent might have been developed ; for poetry is a moral power, and, if it inflicts deep wounds, it is largely able also to heal them. As it was, in this field also the government erred both in omission and commission ; the political neutrality and moral hypocrisy of its stage-police contributed their part to the fearfully rapid breaking up of the Roman nation.

National
comedy.

But while a national comedy was repressed by the government in Rome, it appears to have come into vogue contemporaneously in the Latin country towns. For there probably, about the close of this period, flourished Titinius,

the earliest known composer of original Latin comedies *Titinius*. (*fabulæ togatæ*).^{*} This comedy was also based on the new Attic intrigue-piece; it was not translation, however, but imitation; the scene of the piece lay in Italy, and the actors appeared in the Italian dress (i. 440), the *toga*. Here the Latin life and habits were brought out with peculiar freshness. The pieces were laid mostly in southern Latium, *e. g.* in Setia, Ferentinum, or Velitræ, and delineated the citizen life of such intermediate towns; the very titles, such as *Psaltria* or *Ferentinatis*, *Tibicina*, *Jurisperita*, *Fullones*, indicate this, and many particular incidents, such as that of the townsman who has his shoes made after the model of the sandals of the Alban kings, tend to confirm it. The female characters preponderate in a remarkable manner over the male.[†] With genuine Latin pride the poet recalls the great times of the Pyrrhic war, and looks down on his new Latin neighbours,—

Qui Obse et Volse fabulantur; nam Latine nesciunt.

The few fragments of the comedies of this poet serve vividly to recall to us the statement of Cicero, that before the Social War the general culture in the Latin towns was higher than in Rome itself; the poet himself mentions the liking of the Ferentinates for Greek habits. It was only natural, that genuine culture and pure Latin nationality should be far better represented in the audience of these country towns than in that which flocked to the Roman popular festivals. This national comedy, moreover, was probably marked by somewhat of that antagonism between the country and the capital, which appeared contemporaneously in Cato and afterwards in Varro. As in the German comedy, which proceeded from the French in much the same way as the

^{*} Respecting Titinius there is an utter want of literary information; except that, to judge from a fragment of Varro, he seems to have been older than Terence (558–595, Ritschl. *Parerg.* i. 194)—for in all probability no more can be inferred from that passage—and though, of the two groups there compared, the second (Trabea, Atilius, Cæcilius) is on the whole older than the first (Titinius, Terentius, Atta) it does not exactly follow that the oldest of the junior group is to be deemed younger than the youngest of the elder. 196–159.

[†] Of the fifteen comedies of Titinius, with which we are acquainted, six are named after male characters (*Baratus?* *Cæcus*, *Fullones*, *Hortensius*, *Quintus*, *Varus*), and nine after female (*Gemina*, *Jurisperita*, *Prilia?* *Privigna*, *Psaltria* or *Ferentinatis*, *Setina*, *Tibicina*, *Veliterna*, *Uubrana?*), two of which, the *Jurisperita* and the *Tibicina*, are evidently parodies of men's occupations. The feminine world preponderates also in the fragments.

Roman comedy from the Attic, the French *Lisette* was very soon superseded by the *Frauenzimmerchen* Franziska, so this Latin national comedy sprang up, if not with equal poetical power, at any rate with the same tendency and perhaps with similar success, by the side of the Hellenizing comedy of the capital.

Tragedies. Greek tragedy as well as Greek comedy came during the course of this epoch to Rome. It was a more valuable, and in some respects also an easier, acquisition than comedy. The Greek and particularly the Homeric epos, which was the basis of tragedy, was not unfamiliar to the Romans, and was already interwoven with their own national legends; and the susceptible foreigner found himself far more at home in the ideal world of the heroic myths than in the fish-market of Athens. Nevertheless tragedy also promoted, only with less abruptness and less vulgarity, the anti-national and Hellenizing spirit; and in this point of view it was a circumstance of the most decisive importance, that the Greek tragic stage of this period was chiefly under the sway of Euripides (274–348). This is not the place for a thorough delineation of that remarkable man and of his still more remarkable influence on his contemporaries and posterity; but the intellectual movements of the later Greek and the Græco-Roman epoch were to so great an extent affected by him, that it is indispensable to sketch at least the leading outlines of his character. Euripides was one of those poets who raise poetry to a higher level, but in doing so manifest far more the true sense of what ought to be than the power of poetically realizing it. The profound saying which morally as well as poetically sums up all tragic art—that action is passion—holds true no doubt as to ancient tragedy; it exhibits man in action, but it makes no real attempt to individualize him. The unsurpassed grandeur with which the struggle between man and destiny fulfils its course in Æschylus depends substantially on the circumstance, that each of the contending powers is only conceived broadly and generally; the essential humanity in Prometheus and Agamemnon is but slightly tinged by poetical individualizing. Sophocles seizes human nature in its broader types, the king, the old man, the sister; but not one of his figures displays the microcosm of man in all his aspects—the features of individual character. A high stage was thereby reached, but not the highest; the delineation

Euripides,
480–406.

of man in his entirety and the entwining of the individual, in themselves finished, figures into a higher poetical whole form a greater achievement, and therefore, as compared with Shakespeare, Æschylus and Sophocles represent imperfect stages of development. But, when Euripides undertook to present man as he is, the advance was logical and in a certain sense historical rather than poetical. He was able to destroy the ancient tragedy, but not to create the modern. Everywhere he halted half way. Masks, through which the expression of the life of the soul is, as it were, translated from the particular into the general, were as necessary for the typical tragedy of antiquity as incompatible with the tragedy of character; but Euripides retained them. With remarkably delicate tact the older tragedy never presented the dramatic element, to which it was unable to allow free scope, unmixed, but constantly fettered it in some measure by the choice of epic subjects from the superhuman world of gods and heroes and by the lyrical choruses. One feels that Euripides was impatient under these fetters: in his subjects he descended at least to semi-historic times, and his choral chants were of so subordinate importance, that they were frequently omitted from the performances in after times and with hardly any injury perhaps to the piece; but yet he has neither placed his figures wholly on the basis of reality, nor entirely thrown aside the chorus. Throughout and on all sides he is the full exponent of an age, in which, on the one hand, the grandest historical and philosophical movements were going forward, but in which, on the other hand, the primitive fountain of all poetry—a pure and homely national life—had become turbid. While the reverential piety of the older tragedians sheds over their pieces as it were a reflected radiance of heaven; while the limitation of the narrow horizon of the older Hellenes exercises its satisfying power over the hearer; the world of Euripides appears in the pale glimmer of speculation as much denuded of the gods as it is pervaded by the element of reflection, and gloomy passions shoot like lightnings athwart the gray clouds. The old deeply-rooted faith in destiny has disappeared; fate governs as an outwardly despotic power, and the slaves gnashing their teeth wear its fetters. The unbelief, which is the despair of faith, speaks in this poet with superhuman power. Of necessity therefore the poet never attained a plastic conception

overpowering him, nor ever reached a truly poetic effect on the whole; for which reason he was in some measure careless as to the construction of his tragedies, and indeed not unfrequently altogether spoiled them in this respect by providing no central interest either of plot or person. The slovenly fashion of constructing the plot in the prologue, and of unravelling it by a *Deus ex machinâ* or some other platitude, was in reality introduced by Euripides. All the effect in his case lies in the details; and certainly with great art every effort has in this respect been made to conceal the irreparable want of poetic completeness. Euripides is a master in what are called effects; these have ordinarily a sensuous sentimental colouring, and often moreover stimulate the sensuous impression by a special high seasoning, such as the mixing up subjects turning on love with murder or incest. The delineations of Polyxena willing to die and of Phædra pining away under the grief of secret love, above all the splendid picture of the mystic ecstasies of the Bacchæ, are of the greatest beauty in their kind; but they are neither artistically nor morally pure, and the reproach of Aristophanes, that the poet was unable to paint a Penelope, was thoroughly well founded. Of a kindred character is the introduction of common compassion into the tragedy of Euripides. While his stunted heroes or heroines, such as Menelaus in the *Helena*, Andromache, Electra as a poor peasant, the sick and ruined merchant Telephus, are repulsive or ridiculous and ordinarily both, the pieces, on the other hand, which confine themselves more to the atmosphere of common reality and exchange the character of tragedy for that of the affecting family picture or that almost of sentimental comedy, such as the *Iphigenia in Aulis*, the *Ion*, the *Alceste*, produce perhaps the most pleasing effect of all his numerous works. With equal frequency, but with less success, the poet attempts to bring into play an intellectual interest. Hence springs the complicated plot, which is calculated not like the older tragedy to move the feelings, but rather to keep curiosity on the rack; hence the dialectically pointed dialogue, to us non-Athenians often absolutely intolerable; hence the apophthegms, which are scattered throughout the pieces of Euripides like flowers in a pleasure-garden; hence above all the psychology of Euripides, which by no means rests on direct human experience, but on logical reflection. His *Medea* is certainly in so far painted

from life, that she is before departure properly provided with money for her voyage; but of the struggle in the soul between maternal love and jealousy the unbiassed reader will not find much in Euripides. But, above all, poetic effect is replaced in the tragedies of Euripides by a moral or political design. Without strictly or directly entering on the questions of the day, and having in view throughout social rather than political questions, Euripides in the legitimate issues of his principles coincided with the contemporary political and philosophical radicalism, and was the first and chief apostle of that new cosmopolitan humanity which broke up the old Attic national life. This was the ground at once of that opposition which the profane and un-Attic poet encountered among his contemporaries, and of that marvellous enthusiasm, with which the younger generation and foreigners devoted themselves to the poet of emotion and of love, of apophthegm and of tendency, of philosophy and of humanity. Greek tragedy in the hands of Euripides stepped beyond its proper sphere and consequently broke down; but the success of the cosmopolitan poet was only promoted by this, since at the same time the nation also stepped beyond its sphere and broke down likewise. The criticism of Aristophanes probably hit the truth exactly both in a moral and in a poetical point of view; but poetry influences the course of history not in proportion to its absolute value, but in proportion as it is able to anticipate the spirit of the age, and in this respect Euripides was unsurpassed. And thus it happened, that Alexander read him diligently; that Aristotle developed the idea of the tragic poet with special reference to him; that the latest poetic and plastic art in Attica as it were originated from him (for the new Attic comedy did nothing but transfer Euripides into a comic form, and the school of painters which we meet with in the designs of the later vases derived their subjects no longer from the old epics, but from the Euripidean tragedy); and lastly that, the more the old Hellas gave place to the new Hellenism, the more the fame and influence of the poet increased, and Greek life abroad, in Egypt as well as in Rome, was directly or indirectly moulded in the main by Euripides.

The Hellenism of Euripides flowed to Rome through Roman very various channels, and probably produced a speedier ^{Roman} tragedy. and deeper effect there by indirect means than through the

medium of direct translations. The tragic drama in Rome was not exactly later in its rise than comedy (P. 420); but the far greater expense of bringing a tragedy on the stage—which was undoubtedly felt as a consideration of moment, at least during the Hannibalic war—as well as the disposition of the public (P. 422) retarded the development of tragedy. In the comedies of Plautus the allusions to tragedies are not very frequent, and most references of this kind may have been taken from the originals. The first and only influential tragedian of this epoch was the younger contemporary of Nævius and Plautus, Quintus Ennius 239-169. (515-585), whose pieces were already travestied by contemporary comic writers, and were exhibited and declaimed by posterity down to the days of the Empire.

The tragic drama of the Romans is far less known to us than the comic: on the whole the same features, which have been noticed in the case of comedy, are presented by tragedy also. The dramatic stock, in like manner, was mainly formed by translations of Greek pieces. The preference was given to subjects derived from the siege of Troy and the legends immediately connected with it, evidently because this cycle of myths alone was rendered familiar to the Roman public by their instruction at school. Incidents of striking horror predominate, such as matricide or infanticide in the *Eumenides*, the *Alcæon*, the *Cresphontes*, the *Melanippe*, the *Medea*, and the immolation of virgins in the *Polyxena*, the *Erechthides*, the *Andromeda*, the *Iphigenia*; we cannot avoid recalling the fact, that the public for which these tragedies were prepared was in the habit of witnessing gladiatorial games. The female characters and ghosts appear to have made the deepest impression. In addition to the rejection of masks, the most remarkable deviations of the Roman edition from the original related to the chorus. The Roman theatre, fitted up perhaps in the first instance for comic plays without chorus, had not the special dancing-stage (*orchestra*) with the altar in the middle, on which the Greek chorus performed its part, or, to speak more correctly, the space thus appropriated among the Greeks served with the Romans as a sort of pit; accordingly the choral dance at least, with its artistic alternations and intermixture of music and declamation, must have been omitted in Rome, and, even if the chorus was retained, it had but little importance. Of course there were various alterations of de-

tail, changes in the metres, curtailments, and mutilations; in the Latin edition of the *Iphigenia* of Euripides, for instance, the chorus of women has been—either after the model of another tragedy, or by the editor's own device—converted into a chorus of soldiers. The Latin tragedies of the sixth century cannot be pronounced good translations in our sense of the word;* yet it is probable that a tragedy of Ennius gave a far less imperfect image of the original of Euripides than a comedy of Plautus gave of the original of Menander.

The historical position and influence of Greek tragedy in Rome were entirely analogous to those of Greek comedy; and while, as the difference in the two kinds of composition necessarily implied, the Hellenistic tendency appeared in tragedy under a purer and more spiritual form, the tragic drama of this period and Ennius, its principal representative, displayed far more decidedly an anti-national and consciously propagandist aim. Ennius, hardly the most important but

* We subjoin, for comparison, the opening lines of the *Medea* in the original of Euripides and in the version of Ennius:—

Εἰς' ὄφελ' Ἀργούσ μὴ διαπτέσθαι σκάφος	
Κόλχων ἐς αἶαν κυανέας Συμπλη- γάδας,	
Μηδ' ἐν νάπαισι Πηλίου πεσεῖν ποτε	<i>Utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus</i>
Τυηθεῖσα πύκη, μηδ' ἐρετμῶσαι χέρας	<i>Cæsa accidisset abiegnæ ad terram trabes, Neve inde navis inchoandæ exordium Cæpisset, quæ nunc nominatur no- mine</i>
Ἀνδρῶν ἀρίστων, οἳ τὸ πάγχρυσον δέρος	<i>Argo, quia Argivi in ea dilecti viri Vecti petebant pellem inauratam arietis</i>
Πελίᾳ μετῆλθον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δέσποιν' ἐμῇ	<i>Colchis, imperio regis Pelix, per dolum.</i>
Μήδεια πύργους γῆς ἐπλευσ' Ἰωλ- κίας	<i>Nam nunquam era errans mea domo efferreret pedem</i>
Ἐρωτι θυμὸν ἐκπλαγεῖσ' Ἰάσονος.	<i>Medea, animo ægra, amore sævo saucia.</i>

The variations of the translation from the original are instructive—not only its tautologies and periphrases, but also the omission or explanation of the less familiar mythological names, *e. g.* the Symplegades, the Iolcian land, the Argo. But the instances in which Ennius has really misunderstood the original are rare.

184. certainly the most influential poet of the sixth century, was not a Latin by birth, but on the contrary by virtue of his origin half a Greek. Of Messapian descent and Hellenic culture, he settled in his thirty-fifth year at Rome, and lived there—at first as a resident alien, but after 570 as a burgess (P. 334)—in straitened circumstances, supported partly by giving instructions in Latin and Greek, partly by the proceeds of his pieces, partly by the donations of those Roman chiefs, who, like Publius Scipio, Titus Flamininus, and Marcus Fulvius Nobilior were inclined to promote the modern Hellenism and to reward the poet, who sang their own and their ancestors' praises and accompanied some of them to the field in the character, as it were, of a poet laureate nominated beforehand to celebrate the great deeds which they were to perform. He has himself elegantly described the client-like qualities requisite for such a calling.* From the first and by virtue of the whole tenor of his life a cosmopolite, he had the skill to appropriate the distinctive features of the nations among which he lived—Greek, Latin, and even Oscan—without devoting himself absolutely to any one of them; and while the Hellenism of the earlier Roman poets was the result rather than the conscious aim of their poetic activity, and accordingly they at least attempted more or less to take their stand on national ground, Ennius on the contrary

* Beyond doubt the ancients were right in recognizing a sketch of the poet's own character in the passage in the seventh book of the Annals, where the consul calls to his side the confidant,

*quocum bene sæpe libenter
Mensam sermonesque suos rerumque suarum
Congeriem partit, magnam cum lassus diei
Partem fuisset de summis rebus regundis
Consilio indu foro lato sanctoque senatu:
Cui res audacter magnas parvasque jocumque
Eloqueretur, cuncta simul malaque et bona dictu
Evomeret, si qui vellet, tutoque locaret.
Quocum multa volup ac gaudia clamque palamque.
Ingenium cui nulla malum sententia suadet
Ut faceret facinus lenis aut malus, doctus fidelis
Suisvis homo facundus suo contentus beatus
Scitus secunda loquens in tempore commodus verbum
Paucum, multa tenens antiqua sepulta, vetustas
Quem fecit mores veteresque novosque tenentem,
Multorum veterum leges divumque hominumque,
Prudenter qui dicta loquive tacereve possit.*

In the line before the last we should probably read *multarum rerum leges divumque hominumque*.

is very distinctly conscious of his revolutionary tendency, and evidently labours with zeal to bring into vogue neo-logical Hellenic ideas among the Italians. His most serviceable instrument was tragedy. The remains of his tragedies show that he was well acquainted with the whole range of the Greek tragic drama and with Æschylus and Sophocles in particular; it is the less therefore the result of accident, that he has moulded the great majority of his pieces, and all those that attained celebrity, after the model of Euripides. In the selection and treatment he was doubtless influenced partly by external considerations. But these alone cannot account for his bringing forward so decidedly the Euripidean element in Euripides; for his neglecting the choruses still more than did his original; for his laying still stronger emphasis on sensuous effect than the Greek; nor for his taking up pieces like the Thyestes and the Telephus so well known from the immortal ridicule of Aristophanes, with their princes' woes and woful princes, and even such a piece as "Menalippa the Female Philosopher," in which the whole plot turns on the absurdity of the national religion, and the tendency to make war on it from the physicist point of view is at once apparent. The sharpest arrows are everywhere—and that partly in passages which can be proved to have been inserted*—directed against faith in the miraculous, and we almost wonder that the censorship of the Roman stage allowed such tirades to pass as the following:—

*Ego deum genus esse semper dixi et dicam cœlitum,
Sed eos non curare opinor, quid agat humanum genus;
Nam si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis, quod nunc abest.*

We have already remarked (P. 402) that Ennius scientifically inculcated the same irreligion in a didactic poem; and it is evident that he was in earnest in this freethinking. With this trait other features are in harmony—his poli-

* Comp. P. 404. Euripides (*Iph. in Aul.* 956) defines the soothsayer as a man,

*Ὅς δλίγ' ἀληθῆ, πολλὰ δὲ ψευδῆ λέγει
Τυχὰν, ὅταν δὲ μὴ τύχῃ, διοίχεται.*

This is turned by the Latin translator into the following diatribe against the casters of horoscopes:—

*Astrologorum signa in cœlo quæsit, observat, Jovis
Cum capra aut nepa aut exoritur lumen aliquod beluæ.
Quod est ante pedes, nemo spectat: cœli scrutantur plagas.*

tical opposition tinged with radicalism, that here and there appears;* his singing the praises of the Greek pleasures of the table (P. 409); above all his setting aside the last national element in Latin poetry, the Saturnian measure, and substituting for it the Greek hexameter. That the "multiform" poet executed all these tasks with equal neatness, that he elaborated hexameters out of a language of by no means dactylic structure, and that without checking the natural flow of his style he moved with confidence and freedom amidst unwonted measures and forms—are so many evidences of his extraordinary plastic talent, which was in fact more Greek than Roman;† where he offends us, the offence is owing much more frequently to Greek alliteration‡ than to Roman ruggedness. He was not a great poet, but a man of graceful and sprightly talent, throughout possessing the vivid sensibilities of a poetic nature, but needing the tragic buskin to feel himself a poet and wholly destitute of

* In the *Telephus* we find him saying—

Palam mutire plebeis piaculum est.

† The following verses, excellent in matter and form, belong to the adaptation of the *Phœnix* of Euripides:

*Sed virum virtute vera vivere animatum addecet,
Fortiterque innoxium (?) vocare adversum adversarios.
Ea libertas est, qui pectus purum et firmum gestitat:
Aliæ res obnoxiosæ nocte in obscura latent.*

In the *Scipio*, which was probably incorporated in the collection of miscellaneous poems, there occurred the graphic lines:

*mundus cœli vastus constitit silentio,
Et Neptunus sævus undis asperis pausam dedit.
Sol equis iter repressit ungulis volantibus;
Constitere annos perennes, arbores cento vacant.*

This last passage affords us a glimpse of the way in which the poet worked up his original poems. It is simply an expansion of the words which occur in the tragedy *Hectoris Lustra* (the original of which was probably by Sophocles) as spoken by a spectator of the combat between Hephæstus and the Scamander:—

Constitit credo Scamander, arbores cento vacant.

and the incident is derived from the *Iliad* (xxi. 381).

‡ Thus in the *Phœnix* we find the line;—

—stultus, qui cupita cupiens cupienter, cupit.

and this is not the most absurd specimen of such recurring assonances. He also indulged in acrostic verses (Cic. *de Div.* ii. 54, 111).

the comic vein. We can understand the pride with which the Hellenizing poet looked down on those rude strains,

———— *quos olim Faunei vatesque caneant.*

and the enthusiasm with which he celebrates his own artistic poetry :

*Enni poeta salve, qui mortalibus
Versus propinas flammeos medullitus.*

The genius of Ennius instinctively assured him that he had spread his sails to a prosperous breeze ; Greek tragedy became, and thenceforth remained, a possession of the Latin nation.

Through less frequented paths, and with a less favourable National wind, a bolder mariner pursued a higher aim. Nævius not National dramas. only like Ennius—although with far less success—adapted Greek tragedies for the Roman stage, but also attempted to create, independently of the Greeks, a grave national drama (*fabula prætextata*). No outward obstacles here stood in the way ; he brought forward subjects both from Roman legend and from the contemporary history of the country on the stage of his native land. Such were his “Nursing of Romulus and Remus” or the “Wolf,” in which Amulius king of Alba appeared, and his “Clastidium,” which celebrated the victory of Marcellus over the Celts in 532 (P. 82). 222. After his example, Ennius in his “Ambracia” described from personal observation the siege of that city by his patron Nobilior in 565 (P. 277). 189. But the number of these national dramas remained small, and that species of composition soon disappeared from the stage ; the scanty legends and the colourless history of Rome were unable permanently to compete with the Hellenic mythology. Respecting the poetic value of the pieces we have no longer the means of judging ; but, if we may take account of the general poetical intention, there were in Roman literature few such strokes of genius as the creation of a Roman national drama. Only the Greek tragedians of that earliest period which still felt its nearness to the gods,—only poets like Phrynichus and Æschylus,—had the courage to bring the great deeds which they had witnessed, and in which they had borne a part, on the stage by the side of those of legendary times ; and here, if anywhere, we are enabled vividly to realize what the Punic wars were and how powerful was their effect, when

we find a poet, who, like Æschylus, had himself fought in the battles which he sang, introducing the kings and consuls of Rome upon that stage on which men had hitherto been accustomed to see none but gods and heroes.

Recitative
poetry.

Recitative poetry also took its rise during this epoch at Rome. Livius naturalized the custom which among the ancients held the place of our modern publication—the public reading of new works by the author—in Rome, at least to the extent of reciting them in his school. As poetry was not in this instance practised with a view to a livelihood, or at any rate not directly so, this branch of it was not regarded by public opinion with such disfavour as writing for the stage: towards the end of this epoch several noble Romans had publicly come forward in this manner as poets.* Recitative poetry however was chiefly cultivated by those poets who occupied themselves with writing for the stage, and the former held a subordinate place as compared with the latter; in fact, a public to which read poetry might address itself can have existed only to a very limited extent at this period in Rome.

Satura.

Lyrical, didactic, and epigrammatic poetry in particular were feebly represented. The religious festival chants—of which the annals of this period certainly have already chosen to commemorate the authors—as well as the monumental inscriptions on temples and tombs, for which the Saturnian remained the regular measure, hardly belong to literature in its proper sense. So far as the minor poetry makes its appearance at all, it is classed ordinarily, and that as early as the time of Nævius, under the name of *satura*. This term was originally applied to the old stage-poem without a plot which after the time of Livius was driven off the stage by the Greek drama; but in its application to recitative poetry it corresponds in some measure to our “miscellaneous poems,” and like the latter denotes not any definite species or style of art, but simply poems not of an epic or dramatic kind treating of any matters (mostly subjective), and written in any form, at the pleasure of the author. In addition to Cato’s “poem on morals” to be noticed afterwards, which was probably written in Saturnian verses

* Besides Cato, we find the names of two “consulars and poets” belonging to this period (Sueton. *Vita Terent.* 4)—Quintus Labeo, consul in 571, and Marcus Popillius, consul in 581. But it remains uncertain whether they published their poems. Even in the case of Cato this may be doubted.

after the precedent of the earlier attempts at a national didactic poetry (i. 475), there came under this category the minor poems of Ennius, which that writer, who was very fertile in this department, published partly in his collection of *saturæ*, partly separately. Among these were brief narrative poems relating to the legendary or contemporary history of his country; editions of the religious romance of Euhemerus (P. 401), of the physical poems circulated in the name of Epicharmus (P. 401), and of the gastronomics of Archestratus of Gela, a poet who treated of the higher cookery; as also a dialogue between Life and Death, fables of Æsop, a collection of moral maxims, parodies and epigrammatic trifles—small matters, but indicative of the versatile powers as well as the neological didactic tendencies of the poet, who evidently allowed himself the freest range in this field, which the censorship did not reach.

The attempts at a metrical treatment of the national Metrical annals lay claim to greater poetical and historical importance. annals. Here too it was Nævius who gave poetic form to so much Nævius. of the legendary as well as of the contemporary history as admitted of connected narrative; and who, more especially, recorded in the half-prosaic Saturnian national metre the story of the first Punic war simply and distinctly, with a straightforward adherence to fact, without disdaining anything as unpoetical, and without at all, especially in the description of historical times, going in pursuit of poetical flights or embellishments—maintaining throughout his narrative the present tense.* What we have already said of

* The following fragments will give some idea of its tone. Of Dido he says :

*Blande et docte percontat—Æneas quo pacto
Troiam urbem liquerit.*

Again of Amulius :

*Manusque susum ad cælum—sustulit suas rex
Amulius ; gratulatur—divis.*

Part of a speech where the indirect construction is remarkable :

*Sin illos deserant for—tissimos virorum
Magnum stuprum populo—fieri per gentis.*

With reference to the landing at Malta in 498 :

*Transit Melitam Romanus—insulam integram omnem
Urit populatur vastat—rem hostium conciannat.*

[Lastly,

the national drama of the same poet, applies substantially to the work of which we are now speaking. The epic poetry of the Greeks, like their tragedy, had wholly reference to the heroic period; it was an altogether new and, at least in design, an enviably grand idea—to light up the present with the brilliance of poetry. Although in point of execution the chronicle of Nævius was probably not much better than the rhyming chronicles of the middle ages, which are in various respects of kindred character, yet the poet was certainly justified in regarding this work of his with an altogether peculiar complacency. It was no small achievement, in an age when there was absolutely no historical literature except official records, to have composed for his countrymen a connected account of the deeds of their own times and of earlier ages, and in addition to have placed before their eyes the noblest incidents of their history in a dramatic form.

Ennius.

Ennius proposed to himself the very same task as Nævius; but the similarity of the subject only brings out into stronger relief the political and poetical contrast between the national and the anti-national poet. Nævius sought out for the new subject a new form; Ennius fitted or forced it into the forms of the Hellenic epos. The hexameter replaced the Saturnian verse; the ornate style of the Homeridæ, striving after plastic vividness of delineation, replaced the homely historic narrative. Wherever the circumstances admit, Homer is directly translated; *e.g.* the burial of those that fell at Heraclea is described after the model of the burial of Patroclus, and under the helmet of Marcus Livius Stolo, the military tribune who fights with the Istrians, lurks none other than the Homeric Ajax; the reader is not even spared the Homeric invocation of the muse. The epic machinery is fully set agoing; after the battle of Cannæ, for instance, Juno in a full council of the gods pardons the Romans, and Jupiter after obtaining the consent of his wife promises them a final victory over the Carthaginians. Nor do the “Annals” fail to betray the neological and

Lastly, as to the peace which terminated the war concerning Sicily:

*Id quoque paciscunt mœnia—sint Lutatium quæ
Reconcilient: captivos—plurimos idem
Sicilienses paciscit—obsides ut reddant.*

Hellenistic tendencies of the author. The very employment of the gods for the mere purpose of decoration bears this stamp. The remarkable vision, with which the poem opens, tells in good Pythagorean style how the soul now inhabiting Quintus Ennius had previously been domiciled in Homer and still earlier in a peacock, and then in good physicist style explains the nature of things and the relation of the body to the mind. Even the choice of the subject serves the same purpose—at any rate the Hellenic literati of all ages have found an especially suitable handle for their Græco-cosmopolite tendencies in this very rehabilitation of Roman history. Ennius lays stress on the circumstance that the Romans were reckoned Greeks:

Contendunt Græcos, Graios memorare solent sos.

The poetical value of the greatly celebrated *Annals* may easily be estimated after the remarks which we have already made regarding the excellences and defects of the poet in general. A poet of lively sympathies, he naturally felt himself elevated by the enthusiastic impulse which the great age of the Punic wars gave to the national sensibilities of Italy, and he not only often succeeds in imitating Homeric simplicity, but also and still more frequently makes his lines strikingly echo the solemnity and decorum of the Roman character. But the construction of his epic was defective; indeed, it must have been very lax and indifferent, when it was possible for the poet to insert a special book by way of supplement to please an otherwise forgotten hero and patron. On the whole the *Annals* were beyond question the work in which Ennius fell furthest short of his aim. The plan of making an *Iliad* pronounces its own condemnation. It was Ennius, who in this poem for the first time introduced into literature that changeling compound of epos and of history, which from that time up to the present day has haunted it like a ghost, unable either to live or to die. But the poem certainly had its success. Ennius claimed to be the Roman Homer with still greater ingenuousness than Klopstock claimed to be the German, and was received as such by his contemporaries and still more so by posterity. The veneration for the father of Roman poetry was transmitted from generation to generation; even the polished Quintilian says, "Let us revere Ennius as we revere an ancient sacred grove, whose mighty oaks of a

thousand years are more venerable than beautiful;" and, if any one is disposed to wonder at this, he may recall analogous phenomena in the successes of the *Æneid*, the *Henriad*, and the *Messiad*. A mighty poetical development of the nation would indeed have set aside that almost comic official parallel between the Homeric *Iliad* and the Ennian *Annals* as easily as we have set aside the parallels of Sappho and Karschin and of Pindar and Willamov; but no such development took place in Rome. Owing to the importance of the subject, the aristocratic interest of the poem, and the great plastic talent of the poet, the *Annals* remained the oldest Roman original poem which appeared to the culture of later generations readable or worth reading; and thus, singularly enough, posterity came to honour this thoroughly anti-national epos of a half-Greek scholar as the true model poem of Rome.

Prose literature.

A prose literature arose in Rome not much later than Roman poetry, but in a very different way. It experienced neither the artificial stimulus, by which the school and the stage prematurely forced the growth of Roman poetry, nor the artificial restraint, to which Roman comedy in particular was subjected by the strict and narrow-minded censorship of the stage. Nor was this form of literary activity placed from the first under the ban of good society by the stigma which attached to the "ballad-singer." Accordingly the prose literature, while far less extensive and less active than the contemporary poetical authorship, had a far more natural growth. While poetry was almost wholly in the hands of men of humble rank and not a single noble Roman appears among the celebrated poets of this age, there is, on the contrary, among the prose writers of this period hardly a name that is not senatorial; and it is from the circles of the highest aristocracy, from men who had been consuls and censors—the Fabii, the Gracchi, the Scipios—that this literature throughout proceeds. The conservative and national tendency, in the nature of the case, accorded better with this prose authorship than with poetry; but here too—and particularly in the most important branch of this literature, historical composition—the Hellenistic tendency had a powerful, in fact a too powerful, influence both on matter and form.

Writing of history.

Down to the period of the Hannibalic war there was no historical composition in Rome; for the entries in the book

of Annals were of the nature of records and not of literature, and never made any attempt to develop the connection of events. It is a significant illustration of the peculiarity of Roman character, that notwithstanding the extension of Roman power far beyond the bounds of Italy, and notwithstanding the constant contact of the noble society of Rome with the Greeks who were so full of literary activity, it was not before the middle of the sixth century that there sprung up any desire to impart a knowledge of the deeds and fortunes of the Roman people, by means of authorship, to the contemporary world and to posterity. When at length this desire was felt, there were neither literary forms ready at hand for the use of Roman history, nor was there a public prepared to read it; and great talent and considerable time were required to create both. In the first instance, accordingly, these difficulties were in some measure evaded by writing the national history either in the mother tongue and in that case in verse, or in prose and in that case in Greek. We have already spoken of the metrical Annals of Nævius (written about 550?) and of Ennius (written about 581); both belong to the earliest historical literature of the Romans, and those of Nævius may be regarded as the oldest of all Roman historical works. At nearly the same period were composed the Greek "Histories" of Quintus Fabius Pictor* (after 553), a man of noble family who took an active part in state affairs during the Hannibalic war, and of Publius Scipio, the son of Scipio Africanus, (who died about 590). In the former case they availed them-

204.

173.

201.

164.

* That this oldest prose work on the history of Rome was composed in Greek, is established beyond a doubt by Dionys. i. 6, and Cicero, *de Div.* i. 21, 43. The Latin Annals quoted under the same name by Quintilian and later grammarians remain involved in mystery, and the difficulty is increased by the circumstance, that there is also quoted under the same name a very complete exposition of the pontifical law in the Latin language. But the latter treatise will not be attributed by any one, who has traced the development of Roman literature in its connection, to an author of the age of the Hannibalic war; and it appears doubtful whether Latin annals originated in that age, although it must remain a moot question whether there has been a confusion of the earlier with a later annalist, Quintus Fabius Maximus Servilianus (consul in 612), or whether there existed an old Latin edition of the Greek Annals of Fabius as well as of those of Acilius and Albinus, or whether there were two annalists of the name of Fabius Pictor.

142.

The historical work, likewise written in Greek, ascribed to Lucius Cincius Alimentus, a contemporary of Fabius, seems a spurious compilation of the Augustan age.

selves of the poetical art which was already to a certain extent developed, and addressed themselves to a public with a taste for poetry, which was not altogether wanting; in the latter case they found the Greek forms ready to their hand, and addressed themselves—as the interest of their subject stretching far beyond the bounds of Latium naturally suggested—primarily to the cultivated foreigner. The former plan was adopted by the plebeian, the latter by the nobler, authors; just as in the time of Frederick the Great an aristocratic literature in the French language subsisted side by side with the native German authorship of pastors and professors, and, while men like Gleim and Ramler wrote war-songs in German, kings and generals wrote military histories in French. Neither the metrical chronicles nor the Greek annals by Roman authors constituted Latin historical composition in the proper sense of the term; this only began with Cato, whose “*Origines*,” not published before the close of this epoch, formed at once the oldest historical work written in Latin and the first important prose work in Roman literature.*

All these works, while not coming up to the Greek conception of history,† were, as contrasted with the more detached notices of the Book of Annals, systematic histories with a connected narrative and a more or less regular structure. They all, so far as we can see, embraced the national history from the building of Rome down to the time of the writer, although in point of title the work of Nævius related only to the first war with Carthage, and that of Cato only to the early history. They were thus naturally divided into the three sections of the legendary period, of earlier, and of contemporary, history.

History of
the origin
of Rome.

In the legendary period the history of the origin of the city was set forth with great minuteness; and in its case the peculiar difficulty had to be surmounted, that there were, as we have already shown (i. 483), two wholly irreconcilable

168.

* Cato's whole literary activity belonged to the period of his old age (Cicero, *Cat.* xi. 38; Nepos, *Cato*, 3); the composition even of the earlier books of the “*Origines*” falls not before, yet probably not long subsequent to, 586 (Plin. *H. N.*, iii. 14, 114).

† It is evidently by way of contrast with Fabius that Polybius (xl. 6, 4) calls attention to the fact, that Albinus, the passionate admirer of everything Greek, endeavoured to write a systematic history (*πραγματικὴ ἱστορίαν*).

versions of it in circulation : the national version, which, in its leading outlines at least, was probably already embodied in the book of Annals, and the Greek version of Timæus, which cannot have remained unknown to these Roman chroniclers. The object of the former was to connect Rome with Alba, that of the latter to connect Rome with Troy ; in the former accordingly the city was built by Romulus son of the Alban king, in the latter by the Trojan prince Æneas. To the present epoch, probably either to Nævius or to Pictor, belongs the amalgamation of the two stories. The Alban prince Romulus remains the founder of Rome, but becomes at the same time the descendant of Æneas' daughter ; Æneas does not found Rome, but is represented as bringing the Roman Penates to Italy and building Lavinium as their shrine, while his son Ascanius founds Alba Longa, the mother-city of Rome and the ancient metropolis of Latium. All this was a sorry and unskilful patchwork. The view that the original Penates of Rome were preserved not, as had hitherto been believed, in their temple in the Roman Forum, but in the shrine at Lavinium, could not but be offensive to the Romans ; and the Greek fiction was a still worse expedient, inasmuch as under it the gods only bestowed on the grandson what they had adjudged to the grandsire. But the amalgamation served its object : without exactly denying the national origin of Rome, it yet deferred to the Hellenizing tendency, and legalized in some degree that desire to claim kindred with Æneas which was already at this epoch greatly in vogue (P. 415) ; and thus it became the stereotyped, and was soon accepted as the official, account of the origin of the mighty community.

With the exception of the story of the origin of the city, the Greek historiographers had given themselves little or no concern as to the Roman commonwealth ; so that the recital of the further course of the national history must have been chiefly derived from native sources. But the scanty information that has been transmitted to us does not enable us to discern distinctly what sort of traditions, in addition to the book of Annals, were at the command of the earliest chroniclers, and what they may possibly have added of their own. The tales inserted from Herodotus* were probably

* For instance the history of the siege of Gabii is compiled from the anecdotes as to Zopyrus and the tyrant Thrasybulus in Herodotus, and one version

still foreign to these earliest annalists, and a direct borrowing of Greek materials for this section cannot be proved. The more remarkable, therefore, is the tendency, which is everywhere, even in the case of Cato the enemy of Hellenism, very distinctly apparent, not only to connect Rome with Hellas, but to represent the Italian and Greek nations as having been originally identical. To this tendency we owe the primitive Italians or aborigines who were immigrants from Greece, and the primitive Greeks or Pelasgians whose wanderings brought them to Italy.

The earlier
history.

The current story presented some sort of connection, though the connecting thread was but weak and loose. throughout the regal period down to the institution of the republic; but at that point the stream of legend dried up, and it was not merely difficult but altogether impossible to form a narrative, in any degree connected and readable, out of the lists of magistrates and the scanty notices appended to them. The poets were the most sensible of the blank. Nævius appears for that reason to have passed at once from the regal period to the war regarding Sicily: Ennius, who in the third of his eighteen books was still occupied with the regal period and in the sixth had already reached the war with Pyrrhus, must have treated the first two centuries of the republic merely in the most general outline. How the annalists who wrote in Greek managed the matter, we do not know. Cato adopted a peculiar course. He felt no pleasure, as he himself says, "in relating what was set forth on the tablet in the house of the Pontifex Maximus, how often wheat had been dear, and when the sun or moon had been eclipsed;" and so he devoted the second and third books of his historical work to accounts of the origin of the other Italian communities and their admission to the Roman confederacy. He thus got rid of the fetters of chronicle, which reports events year by year under the heading of the magistrates for the time being; the statement, that Cato's historical work narrated events "sectionally," must refer to this feature of his method. This attention bestowed on the other Italian communities, which surprises us in a Roman work, receives its explanation in part from the political position of the author, who wholly

of the story of the exposure of Romulus is framed on the model of the story of Cyrus' youth as Herodotus relates it.

leaned on the support of the municipal Italy in his opposition to the proceedings of the capital; while it furnished a sort of substitute for the missing history of Rome from the expulsion of king Tarquinius down to the Pyrrhic war, by presenting in its own way the main result of that history—the union of Italy under the hegemony of Rome.

Contemporary history, again, was treated in a connected and detailed manner. Nævius described the first, and Fabius the second, war with Carthage from their own knowledge; Ennius devoted at least thirteen out of the eighteen books of his *Annals* to the epoch from Pyrrhus down to the Istrian war (P. 196); Cato narrated in the fourth and fifth books of his historical work the wars from the first Punic war down to that with Perseus, and in the two last books, which probably were on a different and more copious plan, he related the events of the last twenty years of his life. For the Pyrrhic war Ennius may have employed Timæus or other Greek authorities; but on the whole the accounts given were based, partly on personal observation or communications of eye-witnesses, partly on each other.

Contemporaneously with historical literature, and in some sense as an appendage to it, arose the literature of speeches and letters. This in like manner was commenced by Cato; for the Romans possessed nothing of an earlier age except some funeral orations, most of which probably were only brought to light at a later period from family archives, such as that which the veteran Quintus Fabius, the opponent of Hannibal, delivered when an old man over a son who had died in his prime. Cato on the other hand committed to writing in his old age such of the numerous orations which he had delivered during his long and active public career as were historically important, as a sort of political memoirs, and published them partly in his historical work, partly, it would seem, as independent supplements thereto. There also existed a collection of his letters.

With non-Roman history the Romans concerned themselves in so far that a certain knowledge of it was deemed indispensable for the cultivated Roman; even old Fabius is said to have been familiar not merely with the Roman, but also with foreign, wars, and it is distinctly testified that Cato diligently read Thucydides and the Greek historians in general. But, if we leave out of view the collection of anecdotes and maxims which Cato compiled for himself as

Contemporary history.

Speeches and letters.

History of other nations.

the fruits of this reading, no trace is discernible of any literary activity in this field.

Uncritical
treatment
of history.

492.

406.

These first essays in historical literature were all of them, as a matter of course, pervaded by an easy uncritical spirit; neither authors nor readers readily took offence at inward or outward inconsistencies. King Tarquinius the Second, although he was already grown up at the time of his father's death and did not begin to reign till thirty-nine years afterwards, is nevertheless still a young man when he ascends the throne. Pythagoras, who came to Italy about a generation before the expulsion of the kings, is nevertheless set down by the Roman historians as a friend of the wise Numa. The state-envoys sent to Syracuse in the year 262 transact business with Dionysius the elder, who ascended the throne eighty-six years afterwards (348). This naïve uncritical spirit is especially apparent in the treatment of Roman chronology. Since according to the Roman reckoning—the outlines of which were probably fixed in the previous epoch—the foundation of Rome took place 240 years before the consecration of the Capitoline temple (i. 480) and 360 years before the burning of the city by the Gauls (i. 476), and the latter event, which was noticed in Greek historical works, fell according to these in the year of the Athenian archon Pyrgion 388 B. C. Ol. 98, 1, the building of Rome accordingly fell on Ol. 8, 1. This was, according to the chronology of Eratosthenes which was already recognized as canonical, the year 436 after the fall of Troy; nevertheless the common story retained as the founder of Rome the grandson of the Trojan Æneas. Cato, who as a good financier checked the calculation, no doubt drew attention in this instance to the incongruity; but he does not appear to have proposed any mode of getting over the difficulty. The list of the Alban kings, which was afterwards inserted with this view, certainly did not proceed from him.

Partiality.

The same uncritical spirit, which prevailed in the early history, prevailed also to a certain extent in the representation of historical times. The accounts certainly without exception bore that strong party colouring, for which the Fabian narrative of the origin of the second war with Carthage is censured by Polybius with the calm severity so peculiar to him. Mistrust, however, is more appropriate in such circumstances than reproach. It would be somewhat

ridiculous to expect from the Roman contemporaries of Hannibal a just judgment of their antagonist; but no intentional misrepresentation of the facts, except such as a simple-minded patriotism of itself involves, has been proved against the fathers of Roman history.

The beginnings of scientific culture, and even of author-
ship relating thereto, also fall within this epoch. The Science.
instruction hitherto given had been substantially confined to reading and writing and a knowledge of the law of the land.* But a closer contact with the Greeks gradually suggested to the Romans the idea of a more general culture; and stimulated the endeavour, if not directly to transplant the Greek culture to Rome, at any rate to modify the Roman culture to some extent after its model.

Above all, the knowledge of the mother-tongue began to
shape itself into Latin grammar; Greek philology trans- Grammar.
ferred its methods to the kindred idiom of Italy. The active study of grammar began nearly at the same time with Roman authorship. About 520 Spurius Carvilius, a teacher
of writing, appears to have regulated the Latin alphabet, and 234.
to have given to the letter *g*, which was not previously included in it (i. 487), the place of the *z* which could be dispensed with—the place which it still holds in the modern alphabets of the west. At the same time perhaps the letter *x* in the Latin alphabet may have been transferred from the fourteenth place, originally assigned to it, to the twenty-first—a change, which can only have been made for the purpose of arranging the Latin alphabet in accordance with the sequence of the Greek numeral signs, and thus demonstrates the combination of the two languages, and the preponderance of Greek, in the elementary instruction of the period. The Roman schoolmasters must have been constantly working at the adjustment of orthography; the Latin Muses too never disowned their scholastic Hippocrene, and at all times applied themselves to orthography side by side with poetry. Ennius especially—resembling Klopstock in this respect also—not only practised an etymological play on similar sounds quite after the Alexandrian style;† but also introduced, in place of the simple signs for the double consonants that

* Plautus (*Mostell.* 126) says of parents, that they teach their children *litteras, jura, leges*; and Plutarch (*Cato Maj.* 20) testifies to the same effect.

† Thus in his Epicharmian poems the name of Jupiter is derived from the circumstance *quod juvat*; that of Ceres from the fact *quod gerit fruges*.

had hitherto been usual, the more accurate Greek double writing. Of Nævius and Plautus, it is true, nothing of the kind is known; the popular poets in Rome must have treated orthography and etymology with the carelessness, which poets usually manifest in such matters.

Rhetoric
and
philosophy.

The Romans of this epoch still remained strangers to rhetoric and philosophy. Public speaking in their case was too decidedly the mainspring of public life to be accessible to the handling of the foreign schoolmaster; the genuine orator Cato poured forth all the vials of his indignant ridicule over the Isocratean folly of ever learning, and yet never being able, to speak. The Greek philosophy, although it acquired a certain influence over the Romans through the medium of didactic and especially of tragic poetry, was nevertheless viewed with an apprehension compounded of boorish ignorance and of instinctive misgiving. Cato bluntly called Socrates a talker and a revolutionist, who was justly put to death as an offender against the faith and the laws of his country; and the opinion, which even Romans addicted to philosophy entertained regarding it, probably finds expression in the words of Ennius:

*Philosophari est mihi necesse, at paucis nam omnino haut placet.
Degustandum ex ea, non in eam ingurgitandum censeo.*

Nevertheless the Poem on Morals and the Instructions in Oratory, which were found among the writings of Cato, may be regarded as the Roman quintessence or, if the expression be preferred, the Roman *caput mortuum* of Greek philosophy and rhetoric. The immediate sources whence Cato drew were, in the case of the poem on morals, probably the Pythagorean writings on morals (coupled of course with due commendation of the simple ancestral manners), and, in the case of the book on oratory, the speeches of Thucydides and more especially those of Demosthenes, all of which Cato zealously studied. Of the spirit of these manuals we may form some idea from the golden oratorical rule, oftener quoted than followed by posterity, "to think of the matter and leave the words to suggest themselves."*

Medicine.

Similar manuals of a general elementary character were composed by Cato on the Art of Healing, the Science of War, Agriculture, and Jurisprudence—all of which studies

* *Rem tene, verba sequentur.*

were likewise more or less under Greek influence. Physics and mathematics were not much studied in Rome; but the applied sciences connected with them received a certain measure of attention. This was most of all true of medicine. In 535 the first Greek physician, the Peloponnesian Arehagathus, settled in Rome and there acquired such repute by his surgical operations, that a residence was assigned to him on the part of the state and he received the freedom of the city; and thereafter his colleagues flocked in crowds to Rome. Cato no doubt not only reviled the foreign medical practitioners with a zeal worthy of a better cause, but attempted, by means of his medical manual compiled from his own experience and probably in part also from the medical literature of the Greeks, to revive the good old fashion under which the father of the family was at the same time the family physician. The physicians and the public gave themselves, as was reasonable, but little concern about his obstinate invectives: at any rate the profession, one of the most lucrative which existed in Rome, continued a monopoly in the hands of the foreigners, and for centuries there were none but Greek physicians in Rome.

219.

Hitherto the measurement of time had been treated in Rome with barbarous indifference, but matters were now at least in some degree improved. With the erection of the

Mathematics.

first sundial in the Roman Forum in 491 the Greek hour (*ὥρα*, *hora*) began to come into use at Rome: it happened, however, that the Romans erected a sundial which had been prepared for Catana situated four degrees further to the south, and were guided by this for a whole century. Towards the end of this epoch we find several of the nobles taking an interest in mathematical studies. Manius Acilius Glabrio (consul in 563) attempted to check the confusion of the calendar by a law, which allowed the pontifical college to insert or omit intercalary months at discretion: if the measure failed in its object and in fact aggravated the evil, the failure was probably owing more to the unscrupulousness than to the want of intelligence of the Roman theologians. Marcus Fulvius Nobilior (consul in 565), a man of Greek culture, endeavoured at least to make the Roman calendar more generally known. Gaius Sulpicius Gallus (consul in 588), who not only predicted the eclipse of the moon in 586 but also calculated the distance of the moon from the earth, and who appears to have come forward even as an

263.

191.

189.

166.

168.

astronomical writer, was accordingly admired by his contemporaries as a prodigy of diligence and acuteness.

Agriculture
and the art
of war.

Agriculture and the art of war were, of course, primarily regulated by the standard of traditional and personal experience, as is very distinctly apparent in that one of the two treatises of Cato on Agriculture which has reached our time. But the results of Græco-Latin, and even of Phœnician, culture were brought to bear on these subordinate fields just as on the higher provinces of intellectual activity, and for that reason the foreign literature relating to them cannot but have attracted some measure of attention.

Jurispru-
dence.

Jurisprudence, on the other hand, was only in a subordinate degree affected by foreign elements. The activity of the jurists of this period was still mainly devoted to the answering of parties consulting them and to the instruction of younger listeners; but this oral instruction contributed to form a traditional groundwork of rules, and literary activity was not wholly wanting. A work of greater importance for jurisprudence than the short sketch of Cato was the treatise promulgated by Sextus Ælius Pætus, surnamed the "subtle" (*catus*), who was the first practical jurist of his time, and, in consequence of his exertions for the public benefit in this respect, rose to the consulship (556) and to the censorship (560). His treatise—the "*Tripartita*" as it was called—was a work on the Twelve Tables, which appended to each sentence of the text an explanation (chiefly, it is probable, of the antiquated and unintelligible expressions) and the corresponding formula of action. While this process of annotation undeniably indicated the influence of Greek grammatical studies, the portion treating of the formulæ of action, on the contrary, was based on the older collection of Appius (i. 485) and on the general system of procedure as developed by national usage and precedent.

198.
194.

Cato's ency-
clopædia.

The state of science generally at this epoch is very distinctly exhibited in the collection of manuals composed by Cato for his son which, as a sort of encyclopædia, were designed to set forth in short maxims what a "proper man" (*vir bonus*) ought to be as orator, physician, husbandman, warrior, and jurist. No distinction was yet drawn between an elementary and a special study of the sciences; but so much of science generally as seemed necessary or useful was required of every true Roman. The work did not include Latin grammar, which consequently cannot as yet have at-

tained that formal development which is implied in a properly scientific instruction in language; and it excluded music and the whole cycle of the mathematical and physical sciences. Throughout it was the directly practical element in science which alone was to be handled, and that with as much brevity and simplicity as possible. The Greek literature was no doubt made use of, but only to furnish some serviceable maxims of experience culled from the mass of chaff and rubbish: it was a favourite saying of Cato, that "Greek literature must be looked into, but not thoroughly studied." Thus arose those household manuals of necessary information, which, while rejecting Greek subtlety and obscurity, banished also Greek acuteness and depth, but through that very peculiarity moulded the position of the Romans towards Greek science for all ages.

Thus poetry and literature came to Rome along with the sovereignty of the world, or, to use the language of a poet of the age of Cicero:

Character
and historical
position
of Roman
literature.

*Panico bello secundo Musa pennato gradu
Intulit se bellicosam Romuli in gentem feram.*

In the districts, also, using the Sabellian and Etruscan dialects there must have been no want of a contemporary intellectual culture. Tragedies in the Etruscan language are mentioned, and vases with Oscan inscriptions show that the makers of them were acquainted with Greek comedy. The question accordingly presents itself, whether, contemporarily with Nævius and Cato, a Hellenizing literature like the Roman may not have been in course of formation on the Arnus and Volturnus. But all information on the point is lost, and history can in such circumstances only indicate the blank.

The Roman literature is the only one, as to which we can still form an opinion; and however problematical its absolute worth may appear to the æsthetic judge, for those who wish to apprehend the history of Rome it remains of unique value as the reflection of the inner mental life of Italy in that sixth century—so full of the din of arms and so pregnant with the destinies of the future—during which the distinctive development of Italian life closed, and the land began to enter on the broader career of ancient civilization. In it too there prevailed that antagonism, which everywhere during this epoch pervaded the life of the nation, and characterized the age of transition. No one of unprejudiced mind, and

Hellenizing
literature.

who is not misled by the venerable rust of two thousand years, can be deceived as to the defectiveness of the Hellenistico-Roman literature. Roman literature by the side of that of Greece resembles a German orangery by the side of a grove of Sicilian orange-trees; both may give us pleasure, but it is impossible even to conceive them as parallel. This holds true of the literature in the mother-tongue of the Latins still more decidedly, if possible, than of the Roman literature in a foreign tongue; to a very great extent the former was not the work of Romans at all, but of foreigners, of half-Greeks, Celts, and ere long even Africans, whose knowledge of Latin was only acquired by study. None of those who in this age appeared as poets before the public, as we have already said, can be shown to have been noble; and not only so, but none can be shown to have been natives of Latium proper. Even the name given to the poet was foreign; Ennius emphatically calls himself a *poeta*.^{*} But not only was this poetry foreign; it was also liable to all those defects, which are found to occur where schoolmasters become authors and the great multitude forms the public. We have shown, how comedy was artistically debased out of regard to the multitude, and in fact sank into vulgar coarseness; we have further shown, that two of the most influential Roman authors were schoolmasters in the first instance and only became poets in the sequel, and that, while the Greek philology which only sprang up after the decline of the national literature experimented only on the dead body, in Latium grammar and literature had their foundations laid simultaneously and went hand in hand, almost as in the case of modern missions to the heathen. In fact, if we view with an unprejudiced eye this Hellenistic literature of the sixth century—that mechanical poetry destitute of all distinct productive power, that uniform imitation of the very shallowest forms of foreign art, that stock of translations, that changeling of an epos—we are tempted to classify it among the purely diseased symptoms of the epoch before us.

^{*} See the lines already quoted at P. 453.

The formation of the name *poeta* from the vulgar Greek *ποιητής* instead of *ποιητής*—as *ἐπὶ ποιῆσαι* was in use among the Attic potters—is characteristic. We may add that *poeta* technically denotes only the author of epic or recitative poems, not a composer for the stage, who at this time was rather styled *scōba* (P. 422; Festus, s. v., p. 333 M.).

But such a judgment, if not unjust, would yet be just only in a very partial sense. We must first of all consider that this artificial literature sprang up in a nation, which not only did not possess any national poetic art, but could never attain any such art. In antiquity, which knew nothing of the modern poetry of individual life, creative poetical activity fell mainly within the mysterious period when a nation was experiencing the fears and pleasures of growth: without prejudice to the greatness of the Greek epic and tragic poets we may assert, that their poetry mainly consisted in reproducing the primitive stories of human gods and divine men. This basis of ancient poetry was totally wanting in Latium: where the world of gods remained shapeless and legend remained barren, the golden apples of poetry could not voluntarily ripen. To this falls to be added a second and more important consideration. The inward mental development and the outward political evolution of Italy had equally reached a point, at which it was no longer possible to retain the Roman nationality based on the exclusion of all higher and individual mental culture, and to repel the encroachments of Hellenism. The propagation of Hellenism in Italy had certainly a revolutionary and a denationalizing tendency, but it was indispensable for the necessary intellectual equalization of the nations; and this primarily constitutes the historical and even the poetical justification of the Romano-Hellenistic literature. Not a single new and genuine work of art issued from its workshop, but it brought Italy within the intellectual horizon of Hellas. Viewed even in its mere outward aspect, Greek poetry presumes in the hearer a certain amount of positive knowledge. That self-contained completeness, which is one of the most essential peculiarities of the dramas of Shakespeare for instance, was foreign to ancient poetry; a person unacquainted with the cycle of Greek legend would fail to see the background, and often even the ordinary meaning, of every rhapsody and every tragedy. If the Roman public of this period was in some degree familiar, as the comedies of Plautus show, with the Homeric poems and the legends of Herakles, and was acquainted with at least the more generally current of the other myths,* this knowledge must

* Even subordinate figures from the legends of Troy and of Herakles make their appearance, *e. g.* Talthymbius (*Stich.* 305), Autolycus (*Bacch.* 275), Parthaon (*Men.* 745). Moreover the most general outlines must have been

have found its way to the public primarily through the stage and the school, and thus have formed at least a first step towards the understanding of the Hellenic poetry. But still deeper was the effect—on which the most ingenious literary critics of antiquity justly laid emphasis—produced by the naturalization of the Greek poetic language and the Greek metres in Latium. If “conquered Greece vanquished her rude conqueror by art,” the victory was primarily accomplished by elaborating from the unpliant Latin idiom a cultivated and elevated poetical language, so that instead of the monotonous and hackneyed Saturnian the senarius flowed and the hexameter rushed, and the mighty tetrameters, the jubilant anapaests, and the artfully intermingled lyrical rhythms fell on the Latin ear in the mother-tongue. Poetical language is the key to the ideal world of poetry, poetic measure the key to poetical feeling; for the man, to whom the eloquent epithet is dumb and the living image is dead, and in whom the times of dactyls and iammbuses awaken no inward echo, Homer and Sophocles have composed in vain. Let it not be said that poetical and rhythmical feeling comes spontaneously. The ideal feelings are no doubt implanted by nature in the human breast, but they need favourable sunshine in order to germinate; and especially in the Latin nation, which was but little susceptible of poetic impulses, they needed external nurture. Nor let it be said, that, by virtue of the widely diffused acquaintance with the Greek language, its literature might have sufficed for the susceptible Roman public. The mysterious charm, which language exercises over man, and which poetical language and rhythm only exercise in a higher degree, attaches not to any tongue learnt accidentally, but only to the mother-tongue. From this point of view we shall form a juster judgment of the Hellenistic literature, and particularly of the poetry, of the Romans of this period. If it was the tendency of that literature to transplant the radicalism of Euripides to Rome, to resolve the gods either into deceased men or into mental conceptions, to place a denationalized Latium by the side of a denationalized Hellas, and to merge all purely and distinctly de-

known in the case of the Theban and the Argonautic legends, and of the stories of Bellerophon (*Bacch.* 810), Pentheus (*Merc.* 467), Procne, and Philomela (*Rud.* 604), Sappho and Phaon (*Mil.* 1247).

veloped national peculiarities into the questionable idea of general civilization, every one is at liberty to approve or disapprove this tendency, but none can doubt its historical necessity. From this point of view the very defectiveness of the Roman poetry, which cannot be denied, may be explained and so may in some degree be justified. It is no doubt pervaded by a disproportion between the trivial and often mutilated contents and the comparatively finished form; but the real significance of this poetry lay precisely in its formal features, especially those of language and metre. It was not seemly, that poetry in Rome was principally in the hands of schoolmasters and foreigners and was chiefly translation or imitation; but, if the primary object of poetry was simply to form a bridge from Latium to Hellas, Livius and Ennius had certainly a vocation to the poetical pontificate in Rome, and a translated literature was the simplest means to the end. It was still less seemly, that Roman poetry preferred to lay its hands on the most prolix and trivial originals; but in this view it was appropriate. No one will desire to place the poetry of Euripides on a level with that of Homer; but, historically viewed, Euripides and Menander were quite as much the oracles of cosmopolitan Hellenism as the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were the oracles of national Hellenism, and in so far the representatives of the new school had good reason for introducing their audience especially to this cycle of literature. The instinctive consciousness also of their limited poetical powers may partly have induced the Roman composers to keep mainly by Euripides and Menander and to leave Sophocles and even Aristophanes untouched; for, while poetry is essentially national and difficult to transplant, intellect and wit, on which the poetry of Euripides as well as of Menander is based, are in their nature cosmopolitan. Moreover the fact always deserves to be honourably acknowledged, that the Roman poets of the sixth century did not attach themselves to the Hellenic literature of the day or what is called Alexandrinism, but sought their models solely in the older classical literature, although not exactly in its richest or purest fields. On the whole, however innumerable may be the false accommodations and sins against the rules of art which we can point out in them, these were just the offences which were by stringent necessity attendant on the far from scrupulous efforts of the missionaries of Hellenism;

and they are, in a historical and even æsthetical point of view, outweighed in some measure by the zeal of faith equally inseparable from propagandism. We may form a different opinion from Ennius as to the value of his new gospel; but, if in the case of faith it does not matter so much what, as how, men believe, we cannot refuse recognition and admiration to the Roman poets of the sixth century. A fresh and strong sense of the power of the Hellenic world-literature, a sacred longing to transplant the marvellous tree to the foreign land, pervaded the whole poetry of the sixth century, and coincided in a peculiar manner with the thoroughly elevated spirit of that great age. The later refined Hellenism looked down on the poetical performances of this period with some degree of contempt; it should rather perhaps have looked up to the poets, who with all their imperfections yet stood in a more intimate relation to Greek poetry, and approached nearer to genuine poetical art, than their more cultivated successors. In the bold emulation, in the sounding rhythms, even in the mighty professional pride of the poets of this age there is, more than in any other epoch of Roman literature, an imposing grandeur; and even those who are under no illusion as to the weak points of this poetry may apply to it the proud language, in which Ennius celebrates its praise:

*Enni poeta, salve, qui mortalibus
Versus propinas flammeos medullitus.*

National
opposition.

As the Hellenico-Roman literature of this period was essentially marked by a dominant tendency, so was also its antithesis, the contemporary national authorship. While the former aimed at neither more nor less than the annihilation of Latin nationality by the creation of a poetry Latin in language but Hellenic in form and spirit, the best and purest part of the Latin nation was driven to reject and place under the ban of outlawry the literature of Hellenism along with Hellenism itself. The Romans in Cato's time stood opposed to Greek literature, very much as in the time of the Cæsars they stood opposed to Christianity; freedmen and foreigners formed the main body of the poetical, as they afterwards formed the main body of the Christian, community; the nobility of the nation and above all the government saw in poetry as in Christianity an absolutely hostile power; Plautus and Ennius were ranked with the

rabble by the Roman aristocracy for reasons nearly the same as those for which the apostles and bishops were put to death by the Roman government. In this field too it was Cato, of course, who took the lead as the vigorous champion of his native country against the foreigners. The Greek literati and physicians were in his view the most dangerous scum of the radically corrupt Greek people,* and the Roman "ballad-singers" are treated by him with ineffable contempt (i. 474). He and those who shared his sentiments have been often and harshly censured on this account, and certainly the expressions of his displeasure are not unfrequently characterized by the bluntness and narrowness peculiar to him; but on a closer consideration we must not only confess him to have been in individual points substantially right, but we must also acknowledge that the national opposition in this field, more than anywhere else, abandoned the manifestly inadequate line of mere negative defence. When his younger contemporary, Aulus Postumius Albinus, who was an object of ridicule to the Hellenes themselves by his offensive Hellenizing, and who even manufactured Greek verses—when this Albinus in the preface to his historical treatise pleaded in excuse for his defective Greek that he was by birth a Roman—was not the question quite in place, whether he had been required by competent authority to meddle with things which he did not understand? Were the trades perhaps of the professional translator of comedies and of the poet celebrating heroes for bread and protection more honourable two thousand years ago, than they are now? Had Cato not reason to make it a reproach against Nobilior, that he took

* "As to these Greeks," he says to his son Marcus, "I shall tell at the proper place, what I came to learn regarding them at Athens; and shall show that it is useful to look into their writings, but not to study them thoroughly. They are an utterly corrupt and ungovernable race—believe me, this is true as an oracle; if that people bring hither its culture, it will ruin everything, and most especially, if it send hither its physicians. They have conspired to despatch all barbarians by their physicking, nevertheless they get themselves paid for it, that people may trust them, and that they may the more easily bring us to ruin. They call us barbarians, too, and indeed revile us by the still more vulgar name of Opicans. I interdict thee, therefore, from all dealings with the practitioners of the healing art."

Cato in his zeal was not aware that the name of Opicans, which had in Latin an objectionable sense, was in Greek quite free from this, and that the Greeks had in the most innocent way come to designate the Italians by that term (i. 140).

Ennius—who, we may add, glorified in his verses the Roman potentates without respect of persons, and overloaded Cato himself with praise,—along with him to Ambracia as the celebrator of his future achievements? Had he not reason to revile the Greeks, with whom he had become acquainted in Rome and Athens, as an incorrigibly wretched pack? This opposition to the culture of the age and the Hellenism of the day was well warranted; but Cato was by no means chargeable with an opposition to culture and to Hellenism in general. On the contrary it is the highest merit of the national party, that they comprehended very clearly the necessity of creating a Latin literature, and of bringing the stimulating influences of Hellenism to bear on it; only their intention was, that Latin literature should not be a mere copy taken from the Greek and intruded on the national feelings of Rome, but should, while quickened by Greek influences, be developed in a manner conformable to Italian nationality. With a gifted instinct, which attests not so much the sagacity of individuals as the general elevation of the epoch, they perceived that in the case of Rome, owing to the total want of earlier poetical productiveness, history furnished the only materials for the development of a distinctive intellectual life. Rome was, what Greece was not, a state; and the mighty consciousness of this truth lay at the root both of the bold attempt which Nævius made to form by means of history a Roman epos and a Roman drama, and of the creation of Latin prose by Cato. It is true that the endeavour to replace the gods and heroes of legend by the kings and consuls of Rome resembles the attempt of the giants to storm heaven by means of mountains piled one above another: without a mythologic world there is no ancient epos and no ancient drama, and poetry knows no substitutes. With greater moderation and good sense Cato left poetry proper, as a thing irremediably lost, to the party opposed to him; although his attempt to create a didactic poetry in national measure after the model of the earlier Roman productions—the Appian poem on morals and the poem on agriculture—remains significant and deserving of respect, if not in point of success, yet in point of intention. Prose afforded him a more favourable field, and accordingly he applied the whole varied power and energy peculiar to him to the creation of a prose literature in his native tongue. This effort was all the more Roman and all the

more deserving of respect, that the public which he primarily addressed was the family circle, and that in such an effort he stood almost alone in his time. Thus arose his "Origines," his remarkable state-speeches, his treatises on special branches of science. They are certainly pervaded by a national spirit, and turn on national subjects; but they are far from anti-Hellenic: in fact they originated essentially under Greek influence, although in a different sense from that in which the writings of the opposite party so originated. The idea and even the title of his chief work were borrowed from the Greek "foundation-histories" (*κτίσεις*). The same is true of his oratorical authorship; he ridiculed Isocrates, but he tried to learn from Thucydides and Demosthenes. His encyclopædia is substantially the result of his study of Greek literature. Of all the undertakings of that active and patriotic man none was more fruitful of results and none more useful to his country than this literary activity, little esteemed in comparison as it probably was by himself. He found numerous and worthy successors in rhetorical and scientific authorship; and though his original historical treatise, which of its kind may be compared with the Greek logography, was followed by no Herodotus or Thucydides, yet he was the means of establishing the principle, that literary occupation in connection with the useful sciences as well as with history was not merely becoming but honourable in a Roman.

Let us glance, in conclusion, at the state of the arts of architecture, sculpture, and painting. So far as concerns the former, the traces of growing luxury were less observable in public than in private buildings. It was not till towards the close of this period, and especially from the time of the censorship of Cato (570), that the Romans began in the case of the former to have respect to public convenience as well to public exigency; to line with stone the basins (*lacus*) supplied from the aqueducts (570); to erect colonnades (575, 580); and above all to transfer to Rome the Attic court and business halls—the *basilicæ* as they were called. The first of these buildings, somewhat corresponding to our modern bazaars,—the Porcian or silversmiths' hall—was erected by Cato in 570 alongside of the senate-house; others were soon associated with it, till gradually along the sides of the Forum the private shops were replaced by these splendid columnar halls. Every-day life, however, was more deeply influenced

Architeo-
ture.

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by the revolution in domestic architecture which must, at latest, be placed in this period. The dwelling-room (*atrium*), court (*cavum ædium*), garden and garden colonnade (*peristylum*), the record-chamber (*tablinum*), chapel, kitchen, and bedrooms were by degrees severally provided for; and, as to the internal fittings, the column began to be applied both in the court and in the dwelling-room for the support of the open roof and also for the garden colonnades: throughout these arrangements it is probable that Greek models were copied or at any rate made use of. Yet the materials used in building remained simple; "our ancestors," says Varro, "dwelt in houses of brick, and laid merely a moderate foundation of hewn stone to keep away damp."

Plastic art
and painting.

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Of Roman plastic art we scarcely encounter any other trace than, perhaps, the embossing in wax of the images of ancestors. Painters and painting are mentioned somewhat more frequently. Manius Valerius caused the victory which he obtained over the Carthaginians and Hiero in 491 off Messana (P. 86) to be depicted on the side wall of the senate-house—the first historical frescoes in Rome, which were followed by many of similar character, and which were in the domain of the arts of design what the national epos and the national drama became not much later in the domain of poetry. We find named as painters, one Theodotus who, as Nævius scoffingly said,

*Sedens in cella circumtectus tegetibus
Lares ludentis peni pinxit bubulo;*

Marcus Pacuvius of Brundisium, who painted in the temple of Hercules in the Forum Boarium—the same who, when more advanced in life, made himself a name as an editor of Greek tragedies; and Marcus Plautius Lyco, a native of Asia Minor, whose beautiful paintings in the temple of Juno at Ardea procured for him the freedom of that city.* But these very facts clearly indicate, not only that the exercise of art in Rome was altogether of subordinate importance and more of a manual occupation than an art, but also that it

* Plautius belongs to this or to the beginning of the following period, for the inscription on his pictures (Plin. *H. N.* xxxv. 10, 115), being hexametrical, cannot well be older than Ennius, and the bestowal of the citizenship of Ardea must have taken place before the Social War through which Ardea lost its independence.

fell, probably still more exclusively than poetry, into the hands of Greeks and half Greeks.

On the other hand there appeared in the circles of the nobility the first traces of the tastes subsequently displayed by the dilettante and the collector. They admired the magnificence of the Corinthian and Athenian temples, and regarded with contempt the old-fashioned terra-cotta figures on the roofs of those of Rome: even a man like Lucius Paullus, who shared the feelings of Cato rather than of Scipio, viewed and judged the Zeus of Phidias with the eye of a connoisseur. The custom of carrying off the treasures of art from the conquered Greek cities was first introduced on a large scale by Marcus Marcellus after the capture of Syracuse (542). The practice met with severe reprobation from men of the old school of training, and the stern veteran Quintus Fabius, for instance, on the capture of Tarentum (545) gave orders that the statues in the temples should not be touched, but that the Tarentines should be allowed to retain their indignant gods. Yet the plundering of temples in this way became of more and more frequent occurrence. Titus Flamininus in particular (560) and Marcus Fulvius Nobilior (567), two leading champions of Roman Hellenism, and Lucius Paullus (587) were the means of filling the public buildings of Rome with the master-pieces of the Greek chisel. In taking such steps the Romans had a dawning consciousness of the truth, that an interest in art as well as an interest in poetry formed an essential part of Hellenic culture or, in other words, of modern civilization; but, while the appropriation of Greek poetry was impossible without some sort of poetical activity, in the case of art the mere beholding and procuring of its productions seemed to suffice, and therefore, while a native literature was formed in an artificial way in Rome, no attempt even was made to develop a native art.

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CORRECTIONS.

- Page 10, line 32, for *connubium* read *conubium*.
 „ 52, „ 2, for *warfar eand* read *warfare and*.
 „ 68, „ 37, for *nations* read *cities*.
 „ 128, „ 38, for *citadel* read *fort*.
 „ 129, „ 5, for *ordres* read *orders*.
 „ 141. To the second marginal heading add the word *Campania*.
 „ 154, line 9, for *Dmye* read *Dyme*.
 „ 190, „ 8, for *Alexandrian* read *Alexandrine*.
 „ 250, „ 21, for *could not be aware* read *could not but be aware*
 „ 273, „ 22, for *smidst* read *amidst*.
 „ 346, „ 8, delete semicolon after *gods*.
 „ 438, „ 25, for *of* read *with*.



